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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Questions 
The last decades were marked by a proliferation of private regulatory projects in the 
transnational regulatory space. Private organizations, including firms and social 
movements, increasingly engaged in transnational rule-making that had been 
traditionally considered the prerogative of states and intergovernmental organizations. 
Private actors engaged in rule-making because they perceived states as either 
unwilling or incapable of developing rules that would effectively facilitate global 
economic integration and protect the natural environment and worker, consumer and 
human rights. Among the systems of private regulation that seek to improve social 
and environmental behavior of firms by using market forces, certification and labeling 
has become the most prominent mode of transnational private governance (Bartley 
2007b; Zeitlin 2011). How certification and labeling emerges, diffuses and influences 
companies and other groups involved and to what extent certification and labeling is 
an effective policy instrument at the time of globalization are the two fundamental 
questions of my thesis. I address these questions using the example of a private 
program of forest certification that aims at promoting environmentally appropriate, 
socially beneficial and economically viable management of the world’s forests – the 
Forest Stewardship Council’s forest certification program. 
Previous research sheds light on the roots of the emerging forms of regulation 
in the transnational economic space, the process of their institutionalization as policy 
instruments and their impact on the organizational structure of transnational 
regulatory fields. We know less what direct and side effects certification and labeling 
have had on the behavior of firms, the structure of markets, national policy dynamics 
and on environmental and social conditions (Schneiberg and Bartley 2008; Vogel 
2008). Even less is known about the effects of private regulation of environmental and 
social behavior of firms in countries beyond advanced industrial countries of Europe 
and North America (for important exceptions see Bartley 2010b; Espach 2009). They 
are characterized by low environmental and social performance and weak state control 
over the behavior of firms. The role of the national political and social context in the 
institutionalization of new forms of regulation at the national level has been largely 
neglected, as well as the ways actors promote and apply new regulatory instruments in 
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difficult situations that are typical for non-advanced industrial countries. In my thesis, 
I explore how nonstate actors – i.e., social movement organizations and firms – 
implement global rules in the challenging social and political context of a country 
commonly called an emerging market economy. I investigate how local social and 
political situations interplay with global private rules and how this interplay shapes 
the functioning and the impact of private rules. 
Following Djelic and Quack (2003a), Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006b) 
and Bartley (2007b), I conceptualize the emergence of new forms of regulation of 
environmental and social behavior of firms, e.g., environmental and social 
certification and labeling, as a process of active institution-building. Institutions are 
defined here as “social regimes”, i.e., sets of formal “rules stipulating expected 
behavior and ‘ruling out’ behavior deemed to be undesirable” (Streeck and Thelen 
2005: 12-13). The sets of rules are enforced by third parties and involve “rule-makers 
and rule-takers, the former setting and modifying … the rules with which the latter are 
expected to comply” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 13). I argue that transnational 
institution-building occurs at two levels – transnational and domestic. At the 
transnational level, transnational coalitions are built, resources are mobilized, the 
transnational rules are formulated, enforcement mechanisms (if any) are specified and 
organizational structures responsible for rule-making and enforcement are constructed 
by rule-makers, or institutional designers. At the domestic level, the enactment and 
implementation of transnational rules occurs. In other words, transnational standards 
are translated into specific on-the-ground practices by local rule-takers. 
In the case of certification and labeling, rules are transnational voluntary 
standards that explicitly and formally describe desirable environmental and social 
behavior of firms or desirable characteristics of an object, e.g., a forest managed by a 
firm, or a production process (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000: 12-13). However, in 
contrast to formal authoritative rules, they are based on voluntary commitment, 
whereas enforcement mechanisms are not as strict and are based on membership 
privileges, e.g., ability to label products, and market benefits, e.g., access to markets 
(Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006a). Enforcement actors are transnational standard-
setting organizations themselves and the third parties, i.e., certification bodies, 
authorized by standard-setting organizations. 
The existing research has so far paid most attention to the processes that occur 
at the transnational level, including transnational coalition building and resource 
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mobilization and the formulation of rules and enforcement mechanisms. Less 
attention has been given to the translation of transnational rules into on-the-ground 
practices and the work of enforcement mechanisms on the ground. Why is the 
translation important? The literature often assumes that once certification rules are 
adopted, they will translate into improvements of firms’ practices where necessary 
and that practices can be therefore read off the standards. I show in my thesis that 
implementation is not a simple, automatic process of following transnational rules. I 
argue that this process is complex, situated and contested and involves political 
conflict settlement and collective learning. Moreover, implementation is important 
because the effectiveness of transnational private voluntary forms of regulation 
ultimately depends on the extent of change its implementation produces. Without 
implementation at the local level, transnational rules do not have much value added 
compared to other types of rules, including governmental and intergovernmental 
regulation. Therefore, I also seek to evaluate the implementation outcomes of 
implementation processes. 
In sum, I formulate the central questions of my research as follows: (1) How 
do organizations seeking to regulate environmental and social behavior of firms 
emerge? What are the driving forces of their emergence and what shapes their form 
and the content of rules and other institutional structures they generate? (2) How are 
the rules implemented at the domestic level? What social processes constitute the 
process implementation? What shapes the uptake and implementation of private rules 
in countries where successful implementation appears unlikely? (3) What is the 
impact of rules on local on-the-ground practice? How is it shaped by private 
regulation’s voluntary and market-oriented nature?  
In my thesis, I bring together these two perspectives in my thesis – 
transnational and domestic – and show that transnational rule-making and domestic 
rule implementation are the two phases of a process of cross-border institution-
building. I show that although these phases are analytically different and characterized 
by different dynamics, strategic, knowledgeable and creative actors, or institutional 
entrepreneurs, and their networks play a crucial role both during the transnational and 
domestic phases. Furthermore, I show that for both transnational rule-making and 
domestic rule implementation, the context into which transnational and local actors 
are embedded are of critical importance, since it both constrains and enables 
institution-building. 
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Moreover, important features of certification and labeling are the lack of 
traditional sanctions and their voluntary and market-based character. In contrast to 
more classical forms of governmental or intergovernmental regulation, actors cannot 
be punished for non-compliance. Participation and compliance is voluntary and the 
incentives to participate are associated with market benefits. From this follow a 
number of difficulties for private rule-makers that aim at setting additional constraints 
on firms’ behavior, which often exceed national legislation. Rule-makers have to 
create market incentives to encourage firms to accept new rules and construct new 
types of sanctions associated with membership and access to market benefits to ensure 
that firms go beyond symbolic commitment, implement rules and do not behave 
opportunistically. In my thesis I also explore to what extent private actors are 
successful in implementing and enforcing rules in challenging local contexts.  
1.2 Private Regulation in the Global Economy 
Global economic integration has profoundly transformed the patterns of regulation in 
the global economy. Contrary to early expectations, it has not led to the disappearance 
of rules, or deregulation, and the decline in the importance of states and national 
boarders. Rather, while some rules have been removed, a wide range of new and not-
so-new rules, actors and organizational forms have emerged in the transnational space 
to regulate economic and political behavior of states and firms (Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006a: 1-5; see also Kahler and Lake 2003b). Many states have agreed to 
eliminate rules constituting barriers to free trade and factor mobility. Simultaneously, 
they have created new rules and organizations to ensure that participating states would 
not break their commitment to free trade and would be punished if they did so 
(Fligstein 2005: 183-185). 
In addition, nonstate actors – firms and civic organizations – engaged in 
private rule-making to regulate corporate behavior across and beyond national 
boarders. In some cases, nonstate actors realized that to operate successfully in the 
transnational economy they needed more rules to regulate economic activity than 
states could effectively provide (i.e., international technical standards, cf. Mattli 2003). 
In other cases, firms attempted to preempt governmental action. Large transnational 
firms engaged in self-regulatory initiatives when they perceived a likely governmental 
intervention as a threat to their autonomy (Haufler 2003: 227). Growing global 
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integration and the availability of cheap means of communication and transportation 
also enabled nonstate civic actors to build cross-boarder coalitions and to criticize 
states as well as firms for damaging the environment, violating human rights and 
maintaining poor labor conditions, mainly in developing countries (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). Civic organizations launched campaigns against large multinational firms that 
threatened to damage their reputation and to potentially cause financial losses. In 
order to reduce reputation risks, firms started cooperating with their critics and 
increasingly subscribed to the private rules that they jointly made. 
As a result, a plethora of systems of global private regulation emerged. While 
some of them serve as means of facilitating production and exchange in the global 
economy (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999, ch.2-5; Mattli 2003; Mattli and Büthe 
2003), others seek to promote responsible use of natural resources, environmental 
sustainability and human and labor rights protection. The latter systems include 
various public-private and private initiatives, ranging from symbolic codes of conduct 
and self-reporting initiatives to more complicated global multi-stakeholder 
certification and labeling systems of environmental and labor practices. The most 
well-known systems and initiatives include fair trade initiatives in agriculture and 
handicrafts (Linton, Liou and Shaw 2004; Taylor 2005b), forest certification (Bartley 
2007b; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Lipschutz 2005; Taylor 2005b), labor 
conditions certification in the apparel industry (Bartley 2007b; Lipschutz 2005), 
Responsible Care program in the chemical industry (Garcia-Johnson 2000; King and 
Lenox 2000) and ISO environmental certification (Clapp 2005; Potoski and Prakash 
2005; Prakash and Potoski 2006). 
Despite significant differences between these systems, common to all of them 
is that they seek to provide producers with market incentives to reform their corporate 
environmental and social practices according to certain principles. Firms that accept 
these principles and demonstrate that their practices are in compliance with them 
expect to distinguish themselves from non-participating firms and maintain or 
improve their reputation. They send a signal to external audiences, including social 
movement organizations, consumers, governments and investors and are expected to 
generate financial benefits beyond mere reputation gains. However, the evidence on 
whether environmental and social responsibility of firms increases their profitability is 
mixed. Vogel (2005, ch. 2) shows that there is no systematic causal link between 
corporate social responsibility and higher profits. 
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Existing literature provides detailed analyses of the emergence and nature of 
this kind of systems of global private regulation. Scholars have analyzed why, how 
and under what conditions they emerge and become durable (Bartley 2007b), how 
firms and social movement organizations agree on the content of standards and 
programs (Pattberg 2005b), where nonstate actors derive their rule-making authority 
from, whether and how these rules emerge as legitimate alternatives to state-made 
rules, and why firms choose to limit their autonomy and subscribe to these rules 
(Bernstein and Cashore 2004; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004). Less is known 
about how these programs operate in specific local settings (Vogel 2008: 275) and 
how local contexts affect their implementation, especially in developing and transition 
countries. In these countries implementation of standards for environmental and social 
responsibility is expected to entail significant compliance costs, domestic 
environmental and labor standards are low and human rights are poorly protected. The 
systematic analysis of the concrete effects of global private regulation on the structure 
of markets, corporate behavior, domestic social and environmental policies and on the 
overall environmental and labor conditions beyond individual firms is still in the early 
stage (Schneiberg and Bartley 2008). 
Another crucial aspect that has received little attention in the existing literature 
is the effect of an important feature of private regulatory systems based on market 
incentives on the implementation dynamics at the national and local level: their 
voluntary and market-based character. Private actors increasingly rely on market-
based regulatory mechanisms. Since firms and activist organizations cannot impose 
their rules on producers by means of coercion and sanction non-compliant corporate 
behavior, they have to construct new kinds of incentives. Private actors redefine 
market forces as regulatory instruments and create market demand for certified or 
labeled products. Environmental or labor rights activists organize “naming and 
shaming” campaigns to convince consumers to ignore goods that were not produced 
in an environmentally and socially responsible way. They also publicly criticize 
reputation-conscious retailers and corporate consumers for buying such products. 
Under activists’ pressure, consumers and buyers are expected to demand goods 
carrying a proof that they were produced appropriately, for example a special label or 
a certificate. Firms, industry associations and social movement organizations develop 
standards for social and environmental responsibility. In order to be able to declare 
their goods as responsibly produced firms commit to following these standards. These 
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processes are defined as market-making and rule-making for market and are well 
analyzed in the literature (Bartley 2003; 2007b).  
In order to have a functioning market, however, the supply of goods has to be 
provided. How the supply of responsibly produced goods is made is not a trivial 
question. Similar to the making of rules and market demand, the supply of such 
products does not emerge automatically as a response to growing demand. Rule-
makers have to create a system of implementation and rule enforcement. This is 
especially relevant for programs jointly developed by industries and social 
movements. They have to ensure that the rules are actually implemented by all 
participating firms in order to preserve the credibility of programs and to avoid 
opportunism. In contrast to market demand, the constitution of market supply of 
produced goods through the implementation of standards in diverse local context has 
been neglected. Since standards have to be applied in diverse local contexts, they have 
to be adapted to local conditions. 
This generates additional difficulties for actors seeking to promote new rules. 
The introduction of new rules challenges existing practices often prescribed by 
domestic legal regulations and existing structures of power and control and generates 
conflicts. Moreover, new rules challenge existing local knowledge and systems of 
meanings by introducing new alien concepts often without describing how existing 
practices have to be change, if at all, and what new practices have to be introduced. 
This suggests that in order to enable successful implementation of transnational rules,  
conflicts need to be settled, contradictions between local regulations and global rules 
need to be resolved; and global rules should be integrated with local knowledge and 
practice.  
In my thesis I, therefore, focus on the question how private regulatory 
arrangements seeking to promote corporate social and environmental responsibility 
operate and deal with these challenges in local contexts characterized by traditionally 
poor environmental and social performance, economic and political turmoil, 
institutional instability and weak public participation in the regulation. I analyze how 
actors enable and support global markets of responsibly produced goods through the 
creation of supply of such products in a local context. I show that in order to 
distinguish responsibly produced products actors construct locally specific common 
knowledge, pools of experts and organizational infrastructure that facilitate the 
operation of regulatory programs. In addition to global standards and market demand, 
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these elements constitute the preconditions for emerging supply of responsibly 
produced goods to global markets and the expansion of regulatory programs. 
I also show how the creative translation of global rules into actual practices by 
local actors is necessary to facilitate the implementation of rules under unfavorable 
local conditions. The translation helps match and balance stringent global rules, 
unfavorable national conditions and limited capacities of local actors. It, thereby, 
leads to greater acceptance of these rules among producers. I also show that the 
translation enabling such acceptance has its price: The resulting quick expansion of 
forest certification generates only limited change in corporate practices. I argue, 
therefore, that the translation of global rules into local practices is a trade-off between 
adoption of rules and their actual implementation, i.e., effectiveness of the programs. 
Implementation lags behind adoption and is only selective. 
I will provide evidence and further specify these claims in my case study of 
the forest certification program of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC is 
a transnational multi-party organization running a program of certification of 
corporate social and environmental performance in the forest industry. I draw on my 
data on the Russian experience with the FSC’s forest certification program in order to 
show how the local social and political context affects the developing, functioning and 
implementation of this kind of private regulation. In the following section, I will 
present the case background and justify the case selection. 
1.3 Introducing the Case: The Forest Stewardship Council 
The FSC is a multi-stakeholder democratically-governed organization seeking to 
promote responsible management of forests in all regions of the world and thereby 
contribute to improving the world’s environmental conditions. The FSC certifies 
producers of timber and timber products across the world according to its principles 
of good forest management and supply chain management. Producers can use the FSC 
certificate and logotype to market their products as stemming from well-managed 
forests and benefit from it in the market. Large reputation-conscious retailers, printers 
and corporate consumers buy increasingly more products carrying an FSC logotype. 
To become certified, producers of timber and timber products have to demonstrate to 
independent certifiers accredited by the FSC that they manage their forests in 
compliance with the FSC principles and reform their forest management practices if 
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certifiers detect non-compliance. Forestry standards, certification procedures and 
internal rules are democratically set by the FSC’s members representing business, 
environmental, indigenous people, and community and worker interests. 
The FSC forest certification program is an interesting and relevant case for my 
analysis for several reasons. To begin with, it has been widely considered one of the 
most successful private regulatory initiatives, “a magic bullet” in promoting good 
forest management in all types of forests in all regions of the world “where 
governments cannot” (Lipschutz 2005: 120-121). The FSC has gained the support of 
the global forest industry, international organizations, social movement organizations, 
global environmental community and many governments. Since its foundation in 
1993, it has grown dramatically and has become a self-sustaining global organization 
operating in eighty-one countries, including such problematic regions as the Congo 
Basin, China and Russia. According to the FSC, over one hundred million of hectares 
of forests had been certified according to the FCS principles and criteria by April 
2008 – approximately seven percent of the world’s productive forests (FSC 2008b). 
Between 2005 and 2008, the estimated size of the global market in FSC certified 
products grew from five to over twenty billion U.S. dollars (FSC 2005; FSC 2008a). 
The FSC’s program has also been praised for its sound forestry standards, 
democratic decision-making and a system of independent verification of compliance. 
Several studies indicate that FSC forest certification has had a number of positive 
effects on the corporate forest management of certified companies (Cashore et al. 
2006a), as well as a number of indirect effects, including the diffusion of new norms 
and organizational models into other issue areas, including fisheries, mining and 
tourism (Pattberg 2006). 
However, studies have also shown that market benefits turned out to be 
illusory for many certified producers; the impact of forest certification on producers’ 
forest management practices was at best limited or uncertain; the program certified 
forests mainly in Europe and North America rather than in developing and transition 
countries where forest management standards are relatively low compared to 
developed countries and, therefore, urgently require reforms; and certifiers 
responsible for the verification of compliance performed poorly (Counsell and Terje 
Loraas 2002; Gulbrandsen 2005a; Rametsteiner and Simula 2003). These findings 
caused concerns among environmental and social stakeholders of the FSC and 
threatened to damage the credibility of the FSC forest certification program. Critics 
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have argued that FSC forest certification caters business interests and helps forest 
companies to “greenwash” their corporate performance.1 
From this perspective, explaining the success of forest certification and its 
rapid expansion despite growing challenges and uncertain impact may also shed light 
on the functioning and potential effectiveness of similar programs in other issue areas, 
including well-established labor conditions certification programs and the rising 
certification programs in mining, fisheries and tourism. The combination of rapid 
expansion and wide support of FSC forest certification with the growing concerns 
about its credibility and impact is by itself an interesting and theoretically challenging 
puzzle that may contribute to the debates on institutional emergence: how do 
institutions emerge and stabilize if their impact is uncertain and their legitimacy is 
questioned?  
Although the FSC was created to promote responsible forest management in 
all regions of the world, it operates in specific national contexts. The FSC designed 
generic globally applicable principles and criteria of good forest management, on the 
basis of which environmental and social performance of forest companies is evaluated. 
National environmental and social conditions, however, differ significantly. The 
principles and criteria, therefore, have to be adapted to national conditions and 
implemented in diverse national contexts. Studying how forest certification unfolds in 
local contexts well illuminates the relationship between global rules and local context 
and shows how local context shapes the adaptation and implementation of rules and 
their actual effects. The case of forest certification helps elucidate what role it plays in 
the expansion of certification as a form of transnational private regulation. 
Examining the interplay between global rules and national contexts is 
especially relevant for developing and transition countries. The difficult economic, 
social and natural conditions make the implementation of global rules especially 
difficult and costly. At the same time, governments, international organizations and 
                                                 
1
 One of the examples is a group of the FSC’s critics that put up a website that they called FSC-Watch, 
an Independent Observer of the FSC (www.FSC-Watch.org). At the website, they collect, systematize 
and comment news and publications related to the FCS’s poor performance, including controversial 
certifications and internal conflicts. Their message is that the FSC can no longer be considered an 
independent, reliable and objective certification organization because of its close relations with the 
industry and potentially corrupt verification of compliance system. Although the information on the 
web-site is not always accurate and up-to-date, it reflects growing concerns in the international 
environmental community.  
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social movements perceive the condition of forests in many developing countries as 
requiring immediate action because of the high rate of natural forest loss and forest 
degradation associated among other things with the poor or entirely absent 
management of forests. The question is then how private actors cope with these 
challenges and how successful they are in promoting forest certification in an 
unfavorable national context. 
 To summarize, the analysis of the experience of FSC forest certification helps 
understand why private forms of transnational regulation expand even under 
unfavorable national conditions in developing and transition countries, to what extent 
and under what conditions they become effective, what actual outcomes they bring 
about and how these outcomes are shaped by national contexts. Since its foundation in 
1993, it has grown significantly and has been widely accepted as a legitimate and 
successful private initiative. It has developed an organizational model for certification 
programs that has diffused into other issue areas. However, its credibility and 
effectiveness have also been questioned due to its limited or uncertain impact on the 
social and environmental practices of firms and due to the poor performance of 
certifiers accredited by the FSC. Thus, the experience of the FSC illuminates both the 
success and potential limitations of private regulation. Moreover, the analysis of the 
FSC’s functioning helps to understand what role local actors and local contexts play 
in shaping the effects of private regulation, especially in developing and transition 
countries characterized by problematic environmental, social, economic and political 
conditions.  
Specifically, I focus on the expansion of forest certification in Russia. 
Drawing on my data on the Russian experience of forest certification, I show how 
creative translation work by local actors facilitates the implementation of forestry 
standards designed by the FSC and how it fosters the expansion of forest certification 
under unfavorable local conditions. By interpreting global rules and making sense of 
local contexts, local actors balance stringent global standards of forest management, 
elements of national context and limited capacities and resources of local firms. This 
leads to the greater acceptance of forest certification standards among producers and 
ultimately to the expansion of forest certification in Russia but at the cost of only 
limited change in the corporate practices. 
Russia is a challenging case for explaining the operation, implementation and 
effects of FSC’s global standards of good forest management. The first discussions on 
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the potential of FSC forest certification took place in 1997 but it was not until 
approximately 2003-2004 that timber producers became interested in certifying their 
forests as well-managed with the FSC’s forest certification program. When forest 
certification took off, it expanded rapidly: After five years the FSC-certified forests 
amount to about one-fifth of Russian forests managed by private firms. Certified areas 
cover over twenty-one million of hectares of forests making Russia a country with the 
second largest certified forest area after Canada. Such expansion is puzzling, since 
Russia’s forest management standards have traditionally been relatively low resulting 
in poor environmental condition of forests. Forest legislation has been unstable and 
social movement organizations and the general public have been unable to participate 
in the management of forest resources. These conditions could have been expected to 
constitute serious obstacles to promoting forest certification in Russia and 
implementing global rules of forest management that significantly exceed national 
legal requirements and habitual forest practices. Yet, forest certification proceeded at 
an outstanding rate. Explaining this empirical puzzle is at the core of the empirical 
part of the theses. 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
The introductory chapter is followed by the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) which 
represents the background of my study and explicates its analytical approach. In this 
chapter I review the literature on certification and labeling in order to identify a 
research gap and draw building blocks for my analytical approach from the literature 
on public policy implementation, the organizational studies of diffusion/translation, 
the sociology and anthropology of transnational law and the literature on institutional 
entrepreneurship. I also identify how the voluntary market nature of certification and 
labeling affects its emergence and impact.  
In Chapter 3, I justify the case selection, introduce my case-study and 
formulate the empirical implications based on my analytical framework and describe 
my methods and data.  
Chapter 3 is followed by the chapter on the emergence of the FSC and forest 
certification as a transnational private regulatory instrument. This chapter familiarizes 
readers with the history of forests as an environmental and political issue at the 
transnational political arena. It follows the development of forest certification from 
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1993 to 2009 to illuminate the tendencies that also help to understand the dynamics of 
forest certification in Russia. It shows that the emergence of forest certification was 
problem-driven but was fundamentally shaped by the political conflicts over forest 
resources between the social movements, governments and industries, as well as by 
the institutional context into which transnational actors were embedded. 
Three subsequent chapters focus on the empirical analysis of the data collected 
in Russia. In Chapter 5, I describe the context, in which forest certification operates in 
Russia: the characteristics of Russia’s forests, its forest policy and forest sector. I start 
with the local and global economic, social and environmental significance of Russia’s 
forests. I then briefly outline the history of Russia’s forest policy and forest sector 
between the late nineteen’s century and today. 
In chapter 6, I provide a detailed account of the process of organizational field 
building for forest certification in Russia. By reconstructing the history of forest 
certification in Russia between 1997 and 2008, I analyze how local actors created a 
common knowledge base, pool of actors and organizational infrastructure that 
facilitated the development of the FSC certification program in Russia. 
In chapter 7, I analyze the impact of forest certification on the corporate 
practices and its limitations. I describe how transnational forest management 
standards were implemented in Russia and identify specific on-the-ground effects of 
forest certification and assess its overall effectiveness. I also present the analysis of 
the translation of global rules into nationally specific rules and practices in the process 
of forest certification. I explain why forest certification has had a limited impact on 
corporate practices and how these limitations have facilitated the expansion of forest 
certification in a difficult national context of Russia.  
In the concluding chapter I summarize the findings, discuss the contribution of 
my study to the debates on the effectiveness of transnational private regulation and 
review its review broad theoretical implications. 
 
 
  
2 An Analytical Framework 
In this chapter, I lay the ground for the subsequent empirical analysis and outline an 
analytical framework that has guided my research. First, I briefly provide an overview 
the transformation of regulation in the globalizing economy. Building on the review 
of the relevant literature, I show that private forms of regulation have emerged along 
with the transnationalization of public regulation. I show that in some cases private 
regulatory forms have challenged public forms of regulation as ineffective and overly 
politicized. I then provide a classification of private forms of regulation. After this I 
identify the research problems by identifying gaps in the existing literature dealing 
with certification programs. In the following section, I focus on the generic features of 
voluntary market-based forms of transnational regulation and identify what impact 
these features have on the implementation of global rules. I then review policy 
research literature, which can be used for understanding the dynamics of the 
implementation of global rules in domestic settings. Against this background, I justify 
the case selection and the methodology of the study.  
2.1 Transformation of Regulation in the Era of Globalization  
Globalization is defined in a variety of ways. Scholars have focused on economic, 
political, social and cultural facets and corresponding transformations in the 
contemporary world. In my analysis I follow the approach of Kahler and Lake (2003a: 
3) who define globalization as the emergence of one global economic space and a 
common global market. Kahler and Lake (2003b) explore how economic 
globalization affects governance. They convincingly show that the emergence of 
global markets brings about significant transformations in the patterns of governance 
in domestic and international political arenas. 
That markets cannot function without formal and informal institutions 
(Beckert 2007; 2001a; Fligstein 2005: 185; North 1990) is a widely accepted 
theoretical statement with profound implications for the studies of international 
markets. In modern capitalist societies, states define and enforce property rights, 
formal laws and exchange rules (Fligstein 1996; 2001a). These fundamental rules 
shape mutual expectations, enable national production and the exchange of goods and 
services through markets. States also intervene to prevent market failures and correct 
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undesired consequences of the market economy. They create welfare systems to 
protect workers and standardization systems to protect consumers. They also secure 
fair competition in markets. States provide rules that guide the behavior of actors and 
shape their expectations (North 1990: 3), help solve coordination problems and 
protect workers and their families and consumers. 
In international markets, actors face a similar set of problems (Fligstein 2005: 
184), but unlike national markets international markets lack a global state that could 
effectively create and enforce rules, intervene to solve coordination problems and 
alleviate negative consequences of the economic globalization. In response to the 
emerging demand for governance in international markets, the authority is moving 
upwards to regional and international arenas (Kahler and Lake 2003b) where states 
have created international organizations to regulate production and trade. When 
creating international economic governance regimes states have favored projects of 
negative integration (Fligstein 2005).2 Seeking to create a common economic space in 
which goods, capital and services would move freely and be efficiently allocated 
through open markets, governments have worked to reduce barriers to trade and to 
remove rules discriminating international firms and favoring national firms.  
It is, however, hard to imagine that perfectly free markets and purely negative 
integration projects could potentially be feasible. Chorev (2005: 319) suggests that 
free trade requires probably more rules and enforcement mechanisms than closed 
markets. Indeed, if states agree to significantly reduce barriers to trade and create a 
single economic space, they have to create rules and organizations that keep states 
from breaking their commitment to trade liberalization, impose free trade rules on 
domestic economic actors and punish them if they fail to follow. Fligstein and Stone 
Sweet (2002) show that the European Union (EU) moved from a negative integration 
project of creating a common European market to a more positive integration project 
of constructing a polity. The World Trade Organization (WTO) with its well-
elaborated dispute settlement mechanism replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and increasingly affects domestic trade policies. Chorev (2005) 
                                                 
2
 Fligstein (2005) follows the distinction between positive and negative integration introduced by 
Scharpf (1999). Negative integration is the removal of barriers to free trade in creating international 
markets for goods and services. Positive integration is the development of rules that regulate 
international trade.  
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shows that the U.S. imposed liberal trade rules on others under the GATT’s 
negotiations but WTO dispute settlement mechanisms also challenge and restrict 
U.S.’ own protectionist measures. WTO rules of dispute settlement, therefore, back up 
negative integration. 
Moreover, open markets and global trade trigger new regulatory issues, 
including cross-border mergers and acquisitions, intensified labor migration, 
recognition of foreign credentials and global environmental problems. States respond 
to emerging regulatory issues by creating more international rules that facilitate 
further development of free markets and tackle negative consequences of production 
and trade for global environment and social justice. These rules also should be 
consistent with free trade and open markets rules.  
Economic globalization, therefore, goes beyond mere dismantling of 
institutions that appear to constitute barriers to free trade. It can be viewed as a 
regulatory institution-building project embedded in the normative framework of neo-
liberalism which emphasizes the ability of open markets to efficiently allocate 
resources and to maximize collective wealth and which redefines the role of 
governments in the regulation of the global economy. 
However, states’ efforts to govern the international economy are not always 
perceived as adequate. For example, Meyer et al. (1997) show that the number of 
international environmental organizations and treaties grew dramatically from 1870 to 
1990 and formed an extensive and well-structured world environmental regime. Yet, 
many scholars, policy-makers and activists remain skeptical of the effectiveness of 
international arrangements for environmental protection. Levy, Keohane and Haas 
(1993: 398) found little evidence that international organizations enforce rules. Rather, 
the role of international organizations has been to promote concern among 
governments, monitor environmental quality, improve national policy measures and 
strengthen national political and administrative capacities (Haas, Keohane and Levy 
1993). 
Obviously, some institutions are more effective than others. It depends on a 
range of factors, including the nature of the problem, administrative capacities of 
intergovernmental bodies, power configuration among participating states and 
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exogenous environmental and structural factors (Young 1994). 3  While several 
environmental regimes have been very effective and significantly improved 
environmental protection, others failed or even never emerged. More than seventy 
countries signed a series of ozone treaties and committed to reduce the emissions of 
chlorofluorocarbons to protect the ozone layer. As a result, the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons dropped more than 20 percent between 1986 and 1993 (Parson 
1993). In contrast, the Climate Convention and Biodiversity Convention proved to be 
less effective; an international forest convention never emerged (Lipschutz 2001). 
Similarly, no international convention that would globally regulate labor conditions or 
effectively protect human rights has so far emerged. 
States and in particular governments of developing countries are often 
unwilling to sacrifice their autonomy in setting environmental and labor standards. 
They perceive low environmental requirements and low labor costs as their 
comparative advantages in the global economy. Moreover, governments in developing 
countries also often do not have enough resources to promote better environmental 
and social standards in their countries. As the failure to agree upon an international 
forest convention suggests, developing countries often demand more international aid 
and technology transfers in exchange for better environmental performance. 
Developed countries in turn are reluctant to increase their contributions to 
international aid and transfer technologies (Gale 1998; Humphreys 1996). The 
inability of states to effectively regulate negative social and environmental 
consequences of the global economy undermines citizens’ trust in states. 
Furthermore, critics claim that the authority of states over national societies 
and economies has declined and states have been retreating. Strange (1996) argues 
that the power to distribute resources increasingly shifts from states to nonstate 
authorities ranging from mafias to transnational business and international bureaucrats. 
Murphy (1994) suggests that a large number of international governmental 
organizations emerged to serve the interests of multinational corporations in 
promoting international trade and standardization of products. While states have 
invested significant efforts in building one economic space and have been relatively 
                                                 
3
 More on the topic of effectiveness of international regimes, see Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1995),  
Chayes and Handler Chayes (1995) and Miles, et. al. (2002) 
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successful, they have not created a global welfare system to protect globalization 
losers – workers, according to Murphy (1994) and Kriesi et al. (2008) – and a global 
environmental protection system to protect the environment. The benefits of economic 
globalization flow predominantly into multinational corporations based in the three 
wealthiest industrial regions, in which the world economy is centered – the United 
States, Japan and the European Union (Hirst 2000: 113-117). The analysis of the 
world’s income distribution, financial flows and foreign direct investment 
concentration reveals that most of the countries in Africa, Latin America and South 
Asia remain excluded from the global economy (Hirst and Thompson 1999, ch. 3).  
Globalization and technological advances empower nonstate actors to 
challenge the authority of the states over international rule-making. For one thing, if 
firms consider that states are too slow to react to their needs, they are likely to 
coordinate and set up private rules to regulate their own behavior. Mattli (2003) 
shows that private actors get involved into setting international technical standards 
when states lack technical expertise and financial resources and are, therefore, too 
slow in producing technical standards that firms need for the effective functioning of 
markets. Firms also engage in private rule-making when they perceive a likely 
regulatory intervention by states as a threat to their autonomy. They make rules that 
set constraints on their own behavior but prevent governmental regulation that may 
impose even greater constraints on them (Haufler 2003: 227) 
At the same time, globalization also empowers social movements around the 
world and facilitates building coalitions across borders. As national economies 
internationalized, production and supply chains stretched across national borders and 
connected producers, buyers, investors and consumers in different countries. Activists 
press consumers and governments in consuming countries, mostly Europe, North 
America and Japan, and international organizations to take action to protect citizens 
and the environment in producing, mainly developing countries. Utilizing new 
information technologies and ever cheaper means of communication and 
transportation, activists form transnational networks, organize cross-border campaigns 
and effectively challenge the hegemony of states, international governmental 
organizations and large corporations (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Activists mobilize 
wider constituencies through media and direct action campaigns and press 
corporations, governments and international publics to respond to multiplying global 
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environmental and social problems and improve their environmental and social 
policies and practices. 
Clearly, cheap means of communication (e.g., telephone and internet) and 
transportation (e.g., increasingly cheaper flights) are not the only preconditions for the 
success of campaigns organized by transnational networks of nongovernmental 
groups and organizations. The growing population of intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the U.N., serves as a forum for NGOs where they could meet, network, 
exchange experience, ideas and information and organize. The growing influence of 
nongovernmental groups on the debates in intergovernmental organizations has been 
documented in the literature (Arts 1998; Böhling 2011). Moreover, a strong moral 
appeal of the most nongovernmental organizations focusing commonly on violence to 
vulnerable people and injustice – environmental or social – does not allow the general 
public and therefore the states to ignore the NGO claims completely. The increasing 
organizational capacities, the growing number of NGO supporters and – not at least – 
increasing revenues associated with the growing standard of living in affluent 
countries provides important preconditions for the success of campaigs despite 
significan logistical problems. Moreover, since campaigns require temporary 
cooperation and are usually not long-lived, the problems of collective action are not 
formidable (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
Global economic players, in particular large reputation-conscious firms that 
become the target of the activists’ shaming campaigns, realize that the activity of 
social movement activists threatened to damage their reputation, that it could cause 
financial losses and inspire governments to adopt new regulations that would set 
additional constraints on their behavior. To respond to the growing concerns of 
activists and avoid potential threats to their autonomy, firms increasingly pursue self-
regulation strategies (Haufler 2003). Firms may individually or collectively commit to 
higher environmental and social performance standards developed by individual firms 
or industry associations in the form of various codes of conduct and self-reporting 
initiatives. Firms may also cooperate with activists in multi-stakeholder programs 
where they jointly negotiate standards for social and environmental performance. 
Such projects aim at making corporate behavior more transparent and accountable to 
wider constituencies beyond shareholders and governmental bodies as well as at 
demonstrating responsible social and environmental behavior and improving it.  
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Vogel (2008: 262) estimates that approximately three hundred codes of 
conduct now regulate major sectors of the global economy. A number of programs of 
voluntary certification of corporate social and environmental performance emerged in 
the 1990s and 2000s in forestry, fisheries, mining, tourism and apparel industry 
(Bartley 2007b). This indicates that rule- and standard-making authority is shifting 
sideways and the patterns of governance are fundamentally changing (Cutler, Haufler 
and Porter 1999; Hall and Bierstecker 2002; Haufler 2003: 226). 
How have private rules evolved? How do they differ from more traditional 
rules developed and enforced by states? Private rules are soft rules. They emerge as an 
alternative to more traditional hard rules at the core of public regulation and become a 
part of public and private policy repertoires. States may opt for soft law to facilitate 
international cooperation when enacting legally binding rules entails significant costs 
and is complicated by political conflicts among participating states (Abbott and Snidal 
2000). Nonetheless, while for states soft law is only one part of their repertoire 
complementing hard law, for nonstate actors it is the only option. Soft rules are not 
legally binding; they are voluntary; and they are increasingly flexible and open to 
interpretation. This means that firms voluntarily commit to these rules; they can easily 
withdraw or avoid strict implementation of rules due to their flexibility and openness 
to interpretation. Given that rule-makers cannot enforce rules through traditional 
sanctions, they have to construct new kinds of incentives and sanctions to encourage 
firms to commit to rules. These incentives are associated with market benefits, 
including reputation gains, increased market access and price premium (Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson 2006a: 5-6).  
While firms and industries may be better off when they strategically opt for 
soft private regulation to avoid governmental intervention, activists do not always 
perceive soft rules and voluntary forms of governance as producing the best outcomes 
in terms of environmental, labor and human rights protection. They may actually 
prefer hard regulation enforced by governments, including bans, but still regard soft 
rules as their second best option compared to no regulation. Using the examples of 
regulation of global forestry and apparel industries, Bartley (2003) shows that policy 
repertoires of both governments and private actors are often limited to these market-
based voluntary arrangements. 
Global rules of negative integration often prohibit statutory actions by states 
that could threaten free trade on the basis of methods of production, including 
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mandatory certification or import bans. Many policy options, for example bans and 
tariffs, can be interpreted as such barriers to trade and, therefore, are outlawed by 
WTO rules. Governments and private actors, therefore, increasingly opt for voluntary 
nonstate solutions, including voluntary agreements, self-assessment and self-reporting, 
codes of conducts, various forms of corporate social responsibility and voluntary 
certifications. Due to their voluntary nature and their reliance on consumer or investor 
choice, peer pressure and reputation risks, these new rules and forms of regulation do 
not constitute barriers to free trade. They, therefore, do not contradict the dominant 
normative framework of neoliberal globalization and shift the authority – and the 
burden of regulation – from governments to nonstate actors. 
The emergence and diffusion of private forms of regulation naturally led to 
various reactions of policy-makers, stakeholders and scholars ranging from an 
outright support to a sophisticated critique of private regulation. The supporters of 
private regulation believe that market-based solutions can be more effective than 
public regulation. They argue that privately made rules help improve corporate social 
and environmental practices, especially when governments are unable or unwilling to 
strengthen their control over social and environmental behavior of firms. In addition, 
unlike bans, tariffs and similar forms of public regulation, private rules fit the neo-
liberal framework of economic globalization reflected in the regulations of the WTO 
and are not prohibited as violations of free trade rules. Moreover, the legitimacy of 
private rules, or the acceptance by constituencies, is supposed to derive from scientific 
knowledge, independent expertise and quasi-democratic decision-making process. 
Several studies have shown that transnational private regulation has yielded direct and 
indirect positive effects (Cashore et al. 2006a; Pattberg 2006). These factors to a large 
extent explain why forms of self-regulation and multi-stakeholder regulation become 
increasingly popular and multiply quickly. 
While critics accept that market-based voluntary regulatory instruments may 
be the only feasible solution to growing environmental and social problems under the 
dominant neoliberal agenda of the globalization project, they also question whether 
these regulatory instruments are more effective than public regulation and whether 
they can be effective at all. Critics claim that these solutions are voluntary and do not 
have the kind of authority and universal legitimacy that hard law may have and, 
therefore, they can be easily ignored or violated. Some also point out that voluntary 
solutions often have a limited geographic scope and focus on the advanced countries, 
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reach only larger firms, have problems with securing long-term financial support and 
compete with each other (Gulbrandsen 2005b; Pattberg 2005a; Rametsteiner and 
Simula 2003). Critics also question the legitimacy of new rules and argue that they are 
fragmented rather than universal.  
Given these tensions and uncertainties, whether private arrangements are 
actually successful and effective is an open question. Few actually doubt that new 
private regulatory forms produce actual change but the extent of improvement and 
particularly the overall effectiveness of emerging regulatory forms are hardly 
measurable. In many cases, it is easy to identify specific changes in corporate 
practices but it is also almost impossible to judge whether these change will produce 
improvement in environmental protection, human rights and labor conditions in the 
long run and on a large scale. In other words, private transnational regulation does 
produce behavioral outcomes but it is unclear whether these changes in behavior of 
some companies and people will translate into larger improvement of social and 
environmental conditions nationally or worldwide. Even supporters of new models of 
regulation of the international economy accept that their impact has so far been 
limited. 
Transnational private regulation increasingly draws the attention of scholars in 
political science, sociology, policy studies, management and environmental studies. 
Scholars have so far mainly focused on the process of the emergence and 
institutionalization of private initiatives as legitimate forms of economic regulation. 
The actual operation of transnational regulation, its impact and effectiveness, however, 
have remained relatively neglected in academic literature. My thesis contributes to 
this neglected area of inquiry by exploring the impact of a specific form of private 
regulation of firms’ environmental and social performance – forest certification. In the 
next section, I will elaborate on this gap in the existing literature focusing on private 
regulation and outline the research questions of my study.  
Before I turn to the review of the existing literature and specifying in a greater 
detail the research problem, I review the classification of types of private rules and 
organizational forms. The emerging forms of transnational governance are very 
diverse. Private technical standard-setting organizations develop and function 
differently from public-private partnerships for labor protection. International 
intergovernmental organizations operate differently from multi-stakeholder 
organizations setting voluntary environmental standards. In this section, I will briefly 
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reproduce the classification of forms of transnational regulation (Pattberg 2006: 243-
246) to distinguish the form that is the focus of the dissertation and highlight its 
features comparing them with the characteristics of other forms of private 
transnational regulation. 
2.2 The Classification of Forms of Transnational Private Regulation 
Pattberg (2006) identifies three criteria that are useful for classifying forms of 
transnational regulation: (i) who the rule-makers are, (ii) what kind of rules they make 
and (iii) how they monitor and verify compliance.  
Based on the kind of rule-makers, forms of governance can be categorized into 
public, public-private and private forms of governance. Public regulation is the 
traditional form of regulation embodied at the international level in international 
agreements, administered by international organizations. Here states are responsible 
for making rules, implementing them, monitoring the compliance of national actors 
and sanctioning non-compliance. Although states also increasingly opt for softer 
forms of regulation without strictly defined sanctions at the international level, public 
regulation at the national level has been traditionally associated with hard law with 
traditional sanctions as compliance mechanisms. 
When governments cooperate with the private sector to make new rules, 
hybrid forms of regulation emerge, including public-private partnerships and 
voluntary agreements. One example is the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), an international association of approximately two hundred 
companies from thirty-five countries. It was founded in 1992 with the support of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) secretariat 
to ensure the participation of industry in the UNCED and has since cooperated with 
the largest international organizations, including UN departments and programs and 
the World Bank, nongovernmental organizations and business associations. Rules and 
programs created within the framework of this kind of organizations and partnerships 
are soft rules, guidance and voluntary non-binding standards.  
In my thesis, I focus on those forms of governance where rules are made 
exclusively by private actors, i.e., firms and social movement organizations. While 
rule-making is formally independent from governments, governments may still 
support such rules as substituting or complementing legal rules. Private actors design 
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rules to guide their own behavior and agree upon a set of constraints. When firms 
cooperate to design technical standards or codes of conduct, such forms of regulation 
are called industry self-regulation. One example is the Responsible Care initiative in 
the chemical industry. Chemical industries committed themselves to the improvement 
of their health, safety and environmental performance and developed a set of common 
principles. Regulation based upon agreements between firms is called self-regulation. 
When firms and social movements cooperate and jointly make standards, such forms 
are called co-regulation or multi-stakeholder regulation. The example and the focus of 
this thesis are the certification programs in forestry, labor standards and fisheries that 
bring together environmental, social and business interest groups to make 
environmental and social standards.  
A typology of private rules based on their content would have to be very 
diverse. Private rules range from conflict settlement procedures to technical standards 
to prohibition of trade in endangered species. They govern a variety of issue areas, 
including environment, labor conditions, technical standards, human rights protection, 
trade and many others. It is useful, however, to distinguish standards as one of the 
most important types of private rules (Abbott and Snidal 2001; Pattberg 2006: 244). 
In international industrial production markets, standards play an important structuring 
role Producers derive their identities in relation to how they meet the standard 
understood as a price-quality-delivery function, which is “largely determined by those 
who buy” and “embedded in international agreements, conventions and business 
culture” (Aspers 2008: 195-197). By providing identities to producers, standards order 
and structure the relationships between producers and buyers in industrial production 
markets. Social and environmental standards, which often relate to the ethical or 
moral aspects of markets in contrast to price-quality-delivery functions, also become a 
source of identity for producers and structure market relationships (Aspers 2006). 
The crucial distinction among standards is between product-related and 
process-related standards. Product-related standards specify the qualities and 
characteristics of a product, including technical, safety and quality characteristics, 
whereas process-related standards define production methods and management 
systems and practices and often focus on ethical, social and environmental aspects of 
production and trade. Technical standards often emerge as a form of business self-
regulation, while activists mainly involve in the setting of social and environmental 
standards. 
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The distinction between these two types of standards is important, since it may 
have serious implications for the ways actors negotiate, adopt and implement them. 
Using the analytical instruments of game theory, Scharpf (1996: 20-25) analyzes 
product- and process-related regulations in the EU and suggests that countries with 
different levels of economic development, productivity and revenues may have 
different substantive and procedural preferences concerning product regulation but are 
still likely to reach agreement on common product-related standards. Since member-
states previously agreed to create a common European market and different national 
product-related requirements are likely to foster the fragmentation of markets, 
members-states would also agree on common product-related standards facilitating a 
common market, although negotiations are likely to be difficult. 
In contrast, member-states are likely to prefer a non-agreement outcome on 
process-oriented regulations, which “do not affect the usability, the safety and quality 
of products” (p. 21). Imposing higher levels of process-related regulations could 
undermine the international competitiveness of economies with lower productivity, 
lower labor costs and higher pollution rates. Inversely, imposing lower standards 
might damage the competitiveness of the highly industrialized rich countries that may 
fear to become victims to “ecological dumping”. Therefore, both rich and poor 
member-states would prefer no European regulation of process-related standards, 
including environmental and labor regulations. According to Scharpf (1996: 25), the 
harmonization of process-related regulations at the European level has indeed proved 
to be much more difficult than the harmonization of product-related standards. 
Although this is an example of public regulations negotiated and adopted at 
the European level, it demonstrates that it is difficult for actors to achieve agreement 
on process-related standards, both private and public, since they may impose 
significant costs on producers and, thus, undermine their competitiveness in 
international markets. Moreover, it is unlikely that consumers would be willing to 
bear significant additional costs because the introduction of process-related standards 
does not affect the quality of the products, in contrast to product-related standards. To 
convince corporate buyers and individual consumers to buy goods produced in a 
socially and environmentally appropriate way, private actors have to appeal to the 
moral values of environmental protection and respect for labor and human rights and 
persuade buyers and consumers to invest in them. In addition to the lack of rule-
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making authority equivalent to those of states, this complicates the making and 
implementation of private process-related standards.  
Based on the compliance verification procedures, forms of regulation are 
divided into systems of first-, second- or third-party verification. In first-party 
verification systems, a company or an organization develops rules of behavior for 
itself, internally verifies its own compliance and reports the results to the interested 
public. In the case of second-party verification systems, organizations that develop 
standards also verify compliance with standards. Second-party verification is a 
common practice in industry associations. Associations develop standards and require 
its members to report their compliance to the association where the reports are 
reviewed and evaluated. A company that does not comply may be denied membership. 
Third-party verification of compliance requires that standard-makers and verifiers are 
formally separated and independent from each other. In this case, compliance with 
standards is verified by a third party, a verification organization independent from 
both standard-setting organizations and organizations under evaluation. Certification 
of environmental and social performance is based on systems of second- or third-party 
verification.  
Systems of verification of compliance can be also divided into system- and 
performance-based systems. In system-based verification, the compliance of systems 
of management with the standards specifying the characteristics of such management 
systems is assessed and evaluated. In performance-based systems, the focus is not 
only on the design of the management systems but also on their actual operation. The 
critics of system-based verification suggest that it is the weakness of such systems 
that they do no evaluate the actual performance of firms. For example, in the forest 
certification program of the FSC in addition to assessing the systems of forest 
management of forest companies, certification bodies organize field assessments of 
actual forestry practices and their effects. Although this imposes additional costs on 
companies, it is also expected to improve the control of firms and certification bodies 
over the environmental and social performance of firms.  
Despite the diversity of forms and types of transnational private regulation, 
common to all of them is that they are based on soft rules, that the participation in 
them is voluntary and that they rely on incentives associated with market benefits. By 
participating in private regulatory projects, firms expect to distinguish themselves 
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from non-participating firms and make use of the market advantages provided by 
regulatory initiatives.  
In the first two sections of the chapter, I have described the background of the 
thesis: the transformation of governance in the globalization era, including the rise 
and diffusion of private forms of regulation. I also provided a classification of forms 
of private regulation and outlined a research problem, i.e., the process of 
implementation of global private standards and their translation into corporate 
practices. The following sections review the existing literature related to the problems 
of adoption, implementation, and effectiveness of transnational private forms of 
regulation. I present existing theoretical and empirical studies focusing on the 
reception of global rules by local actors in specific domestic conditions. I argue that 
implementation of global rules and their translation into improved environmental and 
social corporate practices has remained a relatively neglected area. Studies that focus 
on domestic factors and processes shaping the unfolding of private regulatory 
programs in domestic contexts successfully specify the patterns of adoption of private 
standards by private firms, but they do not explain the very process of implementation 
of private standards and its outcomes. Studies that in turn identify the effects of the 
adoption and implementation of private standards do not explain what shaped the 
specific effects in specified domestic conditions. I will then proceed to the case 
selection and case background.  
2.3 Identifying a Research Gap: A Review of the Certification Literature 
The existing literature dealing with private forms of transnational regulation has 
focused almost exclusively on the emergence and institutionalization of the private 
rules and organizations that seek to improve firms’ environmental and social 
performance. Scholars have analyzed why, how and under what conditions specific 
private programs and rules emerge and become durable, how and under what 
conditions private forms of regulation become legitimate, how firms and social 
movements agree on specific rules and why firms opt to agree with the rules that 
social movement organizations impose on them. The studies emphasize the role of 
nonstate actors, including firms and activists, the neoliberal context shaping the form 
and content of rules and structural transformations associated with economic 
globalization of production and trade. 
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Bartley (2003) convincingly shows that social movement campaigns targeting 
large reputation-conscious firms and the neoliberal institutional context led to the 
emergence of programs for certification of corporate environmental and labor 
performance. In another article, he shows that these programs emerged both as 
problem-solving institutions looking to improve poor performance of firms and as 
institutionalized political conflict-settlement arena for firms and environmental and 
labor activists (Bartley 2007b). He emphasizes the role of institutional 
entrepreneurship, broad political conflicts over rules between states, social 
movements and industries in a transnational political arena, and dominant neoliberal 
agendas of economic globalization (for similar arguments see McNichol 2006). In line 
with Bartley’s argument, scholars emphasize the general transformations of the global 
economy reflected in the expansion commodity chains stretching between countries 
and growing organizational resources of nonstate actors, both firms and social 
movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Pattberg 2005b). 
Potoski and Prakash (2005) develop a model to explain why such forms of 
regulation based on voluntary commitment of firms to private standards of 
environmental and social performance often exceeding governmental regulations 
become durable. They suggest that for firms the participation in voluntary 
certification programs incurs private costs associated with the production of public 
goods, i.e., better environmental performance or higher labor standards. In return, 
participating firms receive benefits associated with the membership in voluntary 
programs: They can publicize their participation in voluntary programs and thereby 
improve their reputation. These benefits are neither private nor public but so-called 
club goods, i.e., accessible to members of voluntary programs only. Voluntary 
programs providing membership benefits, or club goods, solve the problem of free-
riding, since poorly performing firms or firms wishing to only rhetorically commit to 
these standards cannot become members. Such an institutional design is preferred by 
well performing firms because they can be confident that free-riders cannot benefit 
without sharing the costs of better environmental and social performance. Using this 
perspective, Prakash and Potoski (2005) show that firms that become certified in ISO 
environmental certification program ISO 14001 demonstrate improved compliance 
with governmental regulation. 
While these and many other scholars produced a number of theoretically 
interesting and empirically sound studies of the research problems associated with the 
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emergence and institutionalization of private forms of regulation, especially of various 
certification programs, the questions of the implementation of private rules and 
compliance with them in domestic contexts has remained a relatively neglected area 
of research. These questions are, however, crucial for understanding the operations of 
voluntary programs and their impact on global and national policy dynamics, the 
structure of markets, corporate practices and the actual impact of private rule on the 
environmental and labor conditions, especially in developing countries (Schneiberg 
and Bartley 2008). In a recent review of transnational private regulation research, 
Vogel (2008: 275) suggests that scholars have focused on the impact of private 
regulation in developed countries, most commonly the United States and that we 
know most about the origins, standards, governance and patterns of firm adoption of 
voluntary environmental standards in these countries. The effects of voluntary 
certification programs on the condition of the environmental or labor standards, the 
structure of markets, organizational practices and national and global policy dynamics 
received significantly less attention (Vogel 2008: 275-276).  
To approach the impact of private regulation, Cashore and Bernstein (2004) 
focus on the legitimacy of new forms of regulation with the focus on certification 
programs in the forestry sector. They identify two levels of legitimacy: the global and 
the domestic level. At the global level, legitimacy rests on the fit of programs in 
question with the global normative environment, i.e., the neoliberal framework of 
economic globalization, and on the consistency with existing multilateral rules and 
institutions. In other words, to be accepted rules and standards that voluntary 
certification programs impose should be embedded in pre-existing institutionalized 
normative structures. Domestic legitimacy, or acceptance of certification programs by 
domestic actors, depends crucially on domestic structural factors, including a 
country’s place in the global economy, the history of forestry on the public agenda 
and the structure of the domestic forestry sector (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004).4 
Later, Cashore, et al. (2007) added two additional factors that shape the forest 
                                                 
4
 In their analysis of domestic legitimacy, Bernstein and Cashore (2004) and Cashore, Auld and 
Newsom (2004) use a somewhat simplified concept of legitimacy that they label pragmatic legitimacy, 
following Suchman’s distinction between pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman 1995). 
Pragmatic legitimacy is the acceptance of rules by certain constituencies on the basis of short term 
material self-interest. In contrast, moral legitimacy is based on the belief that accepting certain rules is 
“the right thing to do” and cognitive legitimacy refers to the taken-for-granted acceptance of rules. 
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companies’ and forest owners’ support of the FSC: the kind of product exported by a 
country and the importance of the targeted region to the supporters of forest 
certification (see Table 1). They analyze the development of forest certification in 
Canada (British Columbia), Germany, Sweden, Britain, the U.S. and Finland to show 
that the acceptance of private standards was highly uneven and shaped by domestic 
forces. 
Similarly, McNichol (2006) analyzes the development of forest certification in 
the U.S. and in Great Britain and suggests a list of domestic factors that shaped 
relative success of FSC supporters in promoting forest certification in the British case 
and the failure of FSC supporters in the U.S. to gain equal support. These factors 
include the relative strength or weakness of coalitions of FSC supporters, buyers and 
retailers and their strategies, the proximity between prevailing cultural beliefs 
regarding forestry practices and the standards advocated by the FSC, the degree of 
support by governments and existing land tenure and forestry practices regulations. 
In order to explore how forest certification works in developing countries where the 
costs of compliance are expected to be significant, Espach (2006) analyzes the 
experience of two less advanced countries in Latin America, Argentina and Brazil. He 
asks what factors account for the greater effectiveness of forest certification in Brazil. 
In general, his findings are consistent with the theory of Cashore, Auld and Newsom: 
The structure of export and import, domestic consumption (what products are sold 
where), the structure of the domestic forest industry and the history of forest policy on 
the public agenda explain the relative success of forest certification in Brazil. An 
additional explanatory factor is the ability of transnational environmental 
organizations to mobilize the support of local environmental organizations. 
Research on the structural and political determinants of the support of private 
regulation explains the uneven adoption of private regulatory programs in various 
domestic contexts but it ignores the implementation of global rules in domestic 
contexts and its effects on corporate practices. Yet, the implementation of adopted 
standards is not a simple process of top-down execution of new rules that 
automatically leads to the improvement of corporate practices on the ground. 
Implementation may incur significant costs. The question is whether companies will 
modify their practices despite significant costs or whether the supporters of private 
programs of forest certification will alternatively adjust their standards in order to 
address the concerns of forestry companies.  
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Table 1: Factors Facilitating and Debilitating the Adoption of the FSC Forest Certification 
H 1.1 Forest companies and non-industrial forest owners in a country/ 
region that sells a high proportion of its forest products to foreign 
markets are more likely to be convinced to support FSC than those 
who sell primarily in a domestic-centered market 
1. Place in 
the global 
economy 
H 1.2 Forest companies and non-industrial forest owners selling wood to a 
domestic market in a country/region that imports a large proportion 
of the forest products it consumes are more likely to be convinced to 
support FSC than those in a country/region that imports a small 
proportion of the forest product it consumes 
H 2.1 Large and concentrated industrial forest companies are more likely to 
be convinced to support FSC than relatively small and less 
concentrated industrial forest companies 
H 2.2 Unfragmented non-industrial forest ownerships are more likely to be 
convinced to support FSC than fragmented non-industrial ones. 
2. Structure 
of domestic 
forest sector 
H 2.3 Forest companies and non-industrial forest owners in a country/ 
region with diffuse or non-existent associational systems are more 
likely to be convinced to support FSC than those in a country/region 
with relatively well-coordinated, unified associational systems. 
H 3.1 Forest companies and non-industrial forest owners in a country/ 
region with sustained and extensive environmental groups and public 
dissatisfaction with forestry practices are more likely to be convinced 
to support FSC than those in a country/region with less dissatisfaction  
3. History 
of forestry 
on public 
agenda 
H 3.2 Forest companies and non-industrial forest owners in a country/ 
region where access to state forestry agencies is shared with non-
business interests are more likely to be convinced to support FSC 
than those in a country region where forest companies and non-
industrial forest owners enjoy relatively close relationships with the 
state forestry agencies vis-à-vis non-business interests 
4. Kind of 
exported 
product 
H 4.1 When a country being targeted exports a common and substitutable 
forest product, the domestic forest sector is more likely to be 
susceptible to the converting strategies of FSC supporters 
5. Impor-
tance of 
targeted 
region  
H 5.1 The forest sector will be more likely to support FSC when FSC 
strategists view the region as key for gaining support elsewhere, 
rather than for addressing pressing problems within the region 
Source: Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Cashore, Egan, Auld and Newsom 2007 
 
Several studies have indeed focused on identifying the effects of private standards on 
corporate practices and market structures. Cashore, et al. (Cashore et al. 2006a; 2006b) 
identify a number of political, environmental, social and economic effects of forest 
certification in twelve developing and transition countries but they do neither evaluate 
nor explain these effects. Others focused on such effects of private rules as discursive 
changes and diffusion of new organizational models. Pattberg (2006: 242) claims that 
the analysis of the influence of private regulation should focus on discursive changes, 
norm diffusion, knowledge brokering, social learning and diffusion of new 
organizational models rather than on implementation and compliance issues. However, 
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the diffusion of knowledge and organizational models does not automatically produce 
desired outcomes and the implementation of rules cannot be, therefore, taken for 
granted. It is, therefore, essential to specify mechanisms and processes that lead to the 
actual changes on practices of concrete firms. 
Surprisingly, the studies that address the effects of forest certification in 
advanced industrial countries, even in countries where many firms quickly adopted 
new rules, show that forest certification has had little or no effect on firms’ 
environmental practices. Gulbrandsen (2005a) documents that forest certification in 
Sweden and Norway resulted into high participation of forest companies and growing 
demand for certified products by corporate purchasers but not by individual 
consumers and it reduced conflicts over forestry practices. In line with Vogel’s 
criticisms (2008: 275), he emphasizes, however, that surprisingly little is known about 
the environmental effects of forest certification and, therefore, its efficacy as a policy 
instrument (2005a: 145). Similarly to Gulbrandsen (2005a) and Pattberg (2006), 
Rametsteiner and Simula (2003: 96) also find that “few facts would support a 
conclusion that forest certification is a particularly effective instrument for 
biodiversity maintenance.” They suggest that forest certification is unlikely to work 
against biodiversity but its impact is rather limited. 
The existing studies addressing the effects of private regulatory programs, 
therefore, focus on a number of important aspects that, however, require further 
exploration if we want to understand how private regulation operates on the ground 
and what its potential is for changing environmental and social performance of firms, 
especially in countries other than wealthy countries of North America and Europe. 
Their main shortcomings include that they take the process of implementation of 
global rules in local contexts for granted and implicitly assume that, once established 
and adopted, rules may more or less automatically translate into environmental and 
social improvements; that they identify but do not explain the specific effects of forest 
certification; and that they focus almost exclusively on the experience of advanced 
industrial countries. Moreover, the studies differ in evaluating the effects of private 
rules. This observation may raise a number of questions addressing the conditions, 
under which private rules become effective and work towards the goals of rule-
makers. The implementation process can, therefore, be identified as a gap in the 
existing research addressing emerging transnational private regulation. 
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Issues of implementation are not new to the social sciences. During forty years 
of implementation research in public policy, European integration and international 
regimes – the pioneering study of Pressman and Wildavsky was published in 1973 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) – policy scholars have accumulated important 
theoretical insights and empirical evidence to explain implementation process and 
outcomes. They moved from viewing implementation as a technical top-down process 
of execution of orders to conceptualizing it as conflict-laden process of interpretation 
and negotiation of orders. In the following section, I will review the main 
contributions from policy implementation analysis and evaluate the usefulness of 
these arguments for explaining the implementation of global private rules.  
2.4 Lessons from Policy Implementation Research 
One of the central insights of the public policy implementation research is that 
implementation is a complex web of interactions between multiple actors connected 
into policy networks that include policy-makers, “street-level” bureaucrats responsible 
for the execution of orders from above, political parties, epistemic communities and 
individual experts, interest groups and international actors (Marin and Mayntz 1991).5 
Implementation is not only a technical process of realization of policy objectives, or 
putting laws and orders into practice. It is a political process that involves contestation, 
political conflicts over authority and distributional outcomes as well as negotiation of 
meanings that shape policy effects. Given that there is always a gap between general 
regulations and concrete situations, implementation is an interpretative process. 
Multiple, sometimes ambiguous and conflicting goals and meanings are embodied in 
polices that need implementation. Implementing actors confront these ambiguities and 
need to determine their meaning. Moreover, implementation cannot be completely 
isolated from policy formation, since through the process of implementation actors 
deconstruct and reconstruct policies (Yanow 1996). Through various feedback 
mechanisms, implementation may result into redefinition, substantial reform or a 
complete abandonment of a specific policy (Pülzl and Treib 2007).  
                                                 
5
 In writing this section, I benefited greatly from two comprehensive reviews of policy implementation 
research: Treib (2006) and Pülzl and Treib (2007) 
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Although policy scholars identified dozens of factors and forces which may be 
at work simultaneously when a specific policy is applied in a particular context, these 
factors can be roughly grouped into four broader categories: administrative, 
institutional, actor-related and cultural factors (Falkner et al. 2005, ch. 14, 15). Studies 
that emphasize administrative factors focus on technical aspects of the 
implementation process: the definition of policy objectives, legal procedures, 
administrative and financial capacities of implementing actors, effective monitoring 
and enforcement. It is argued that as long as policy objectives are clearly defined, 
domestic legal procedures are streamlined, state apparatus is well-organized and 
financial resources and administrative capacities are sufficient, policy implementation 
will be effective and will bring about planned policy outcomes.  
Institutional approaches to policy implementation in the EU suggest that the 
degree of “misfit” of a specific policy with the preexisting institutional structures 
explains the differences in its implementation (Duina and Blithe 1999; Knill and 
Lenschow 2000a; Knill and Lenschow 2000b). This argument rests on the assumption 
that institutions are “sticky” and resist change. Studies on European integration show 
that European policies have to be implemented in highly institutionalized regulatory 
contexts and if domestic regulatory structures and existing policies fit each other, the 
process of implementation will be unproblematic and smooth.  
This view is challenged by scholars who empirically show that the behavior of 
domestic actors is independent of the degree of regulatory fit or misfit (Mastenbroek 
and Kaeding 2006). They suggest that a multiplicity of interdependent actors and their 
properties should be taken into account. According to these contributions, a number of 
actor-related variables shape the implementation of European policies at the domestic 
level. These variables include institutional properties of policy networks, interest 
constellations, political party preferences and support or opposition of interest groups. 
In addition, exogenous factors, including developments in other policy fields and 
economic transformations, may have an impact on policy implementation (Pülzl and 
Treib 2007: 98). While these studies fully elucidated a complex political nature of 
domestic implementation processes, it became unclear how these findings could be 
generalized to form a coherent theoretical framework instead of being “sometimes-
true theories” (Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib 2007). 
As a solution to this problem, Falkner et al. (2005) propose a more culturalist 
explanation of implementation. They emphasize the importance of cultures of 
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compliance in the transposition of the EU regulations into domestic law and 
distinguish three “worlds of compliance” – clusters of EU member states with a 
varying degree of habitual law-abidingness in the political and administrative system. 
They argue that the implementation of EU regulations ultimately depends on whether 
a given country belongs to the world of law observance, the world of neglect or the 
world of domestic politics. In the world of law observance, abidingness is taken for 
granted and the implementation of EU policies proceeds quickly and smoothly. In the 
world of neglect, the absence of taken-for-granted compliance culture results in slow 
and ineffective implementation that, however, remains apolitical. In countries that 
belong to the world of domestic politics, which is also the largest cluster, culture of 
compliance is also absent. Actors in domestic political and administrative systems 
may or may not be willing to implement EU regulations but their implementation 
behavior depends on political conflicts and political preferences of powerful domestic 
players, including political parties and interest groups.  
Research on the implementation and effectiveness of international regimes has 
yielded similar results. Regime effectiveness, which can be viewed as an outcome of 
the implementation of international agreements, depends on a number of endogenous 
and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include the nature of a problem and the 
type of policy, administrative capacities of responsible governmental bodies and the 
power configuration among participating countries. Exogenous factors include 
environmental conditions and structural transformations (Young 1994). Additionally, 
international regime scholars emphasize that domestic compliance with international 
agreements depends on domestic costs and benefits as well as on the costs of defiance. 
They suggest that strengthening the monitoring and enforcement capacities of 
responsible international bodies and increasing the administrative and financial 
capacities of member countries could be a solution to non-compliance problems 
(Tallberg 2002)  
What can be learned from implementation research in public policy, European 
integration and international regimes fields that could help improve the understanding 
of the implementation of private voluntary standards of corporate environmental and 
social performance? As far as specific factors are concerned that have an impact on 
the process of implementation, only few can help to understand the dynamics of the 
implementation of private standards. While some general insights from public policy 
implementation literature are highly instructive for studies of private standards, the 
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variables dealing with the political and administrative capacities of international 
bodies and individual countries, preferences of political parties and interest groups 
and the number of veto players are not directly relevant to the study of private 
regulatory programs, since governmental bodies are excluded from decision-making 
and implementation of rules developed by transnational actors.  
In contrast, the question is how private actors are able to implement private 
rules without financial and administrative support equivalent to the support that 
governments can offer. Private actors, especially social movements and activist 
nongovernmental organizations, have to construct an administrative system and 
secure financial resource inflow themselves as they implement rules. Moreover, since 
private programs run by social movement organizations are market-based, the tasks of 
implementing rules and securing financial resources are interconnected. The more 
firms adopt and implement new rules, the greater is the inflow of financial resources, 
including administrative fees. Program administrators can be interested in increasing 
the number of certified firms but their rapid expansion may undermine their capacity 
to monitor and enforce rules. A growing market for certified and labeled products 
may deliver greater benefits for private programs but may drive the quality of 
implementation to the bottom. 
The degree of fit or misfit between private rules and local practices can be 
expected to have an impact on the ability of implementing actors to implement new 
rules and modify existing practices of firms. The more challenging question, however, 
is how and to what extent private actors are able to implement rules and to monitor 
and enforce compliance if the degree of misfit between private rules and local 
practices is significant. Similarly, political cultures of compliance or non-compliance 
may well affect the implementation of private rules. However, the argument in this 
case would become circular: Firms in countries with a compliance culture comply 
better than firms in countries lacking a compliance culture. In other words, in some 
countries firms comply because they have always complied. The question is then why 
firms in these countries always comply. Again, even more interesting is how and to 
what extent implementation can be successful despite such a culture of compliance.  
Nevertheless, several insights from implementation research are useful for the 
analysis of the implementation of private standards. As I will show in the subsequent 
chapters and as implementation research suggests, implementation of private rules is 
laden with conflicts. Implementation is the outcome of political and interpretative 
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conflicts, negotiations and compromises; it is indeed a complex web of interactions 
between transnational and domestic actors; it requires the adaptation of global norms 
to specific local and political situations. On the one hand, implementing actors have to 
convincingly translate global rules into the domestic policy language, and on the other 
hand, they have to challenge the existing practices prescribed by domestic policies 
(and the policy itself can never be fully separated from its language). 
To sum up, implementation is not a mere top-down execution of orders in a 
hierarchically organized bureaucratic systems but a multi-level multi-actor process of 
translation, which includes searching for appropriate local meanings and language, 
negotiating, compromising, trying, learning and reshaping rules. It is driven by the 
contradictions within rules and between rules and reality, diversity of contexts and 
situations, to which rules are applied, and political conflicts between rule-makers and 
rule-implementers. In the following section, I argue for substituting the notion of 
implementation with that of translation because it allows integrating an independent 
role of implementing actors, or rule-takers, in the analytical framework and elucidates 
the interpretative and transformative aspects of implementation. It reveals how actors 
renegotiate and reshape rules during implementation.  
2.5 From Implementation to Translation 
In their fundamental article on institutional change, Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
emphasize the crucial but often ignored role of rule-takers, as opposed to rule-makers, 
for institutions as rules and regimes. They suggest that through enacting rules, rule-
takers may deliberately or unintentionally reshape rules and, thus, contribute to 
institutional change. Streeck and Thelen suggest that “the enactment of a social rule is 
never perfect” and “there is always a gap between the ideal pattern of a rule and the 
real pattern of life under it” (p. 14, emphasis in the original). Although they identify 
imperfect enactment as the main source of institutional change, the analysis that I 
present in the subsequent chapters shows that imperfect enactment and 
implementation of global rules also contributes to the institutionalization of rules in 
the first place. 
Streeck and Thelen further argue that the meanings of rules are never self-
evident and are always “a subject and in need of interpretation”. The real meaning of 
rules has to be negotiated and established before it can be implemented and it has to 
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be continuously renegotiated in the process of implementation. This provides a rule 
with a certain degree of flexibility that facilitates its reproduction in uncertain 
situations that by definition cannot be fully reflected in the rule. Empirical situations, 
to which rules are applied, are always significantly more diverse than rule-makers can 
potentially foresee. Streeck and Thelen argue that “… rules cannot be unambiguously 
and definitively stated facilitates their creative applications in uncertain circumstances, 
keeping them valid in spite of the inevitably imperfect information of their designers 
on the circumstances of their implementation” (p. 15). This inherent property of rules 
– the need for interpretation – is at the center of the concept of translation I propose. 
The concept of translation is more telling than that of implementation, since it 
emphasizes the creative, interpretative and contested nature of implementation 
processes. It was first developed in French sociology by Latour (1986) and Callon 
(1986). For Callon (1986: 223-224), translation is a process of creating one’s own 
power over other entities. It involves defining and redefining actors representing the 
natural and social world, continuous displacement and transformations of goals and 
strategies, devices, human beings, natural objects and texts (Bardini 1994). Latour 
(1986) contrasts the model of diffusion of objects, i.e., organizational models, 
practices and ideas, with that of translation. He argues that diffusion is a metaphor 
from physics and focuses on the initial force, which triggers the object’s movement, 
and the medium, through which the object moves and which resists the movement. In 
this sense, either the power of those who trigger the movement, for example of a 
manager executing an order, or the resistance of the medium, i.e., of the subordinates 
responsible for executing an order, explains the outcome. The model of translation 
emphasizes instead the multiplicity of ways, in which people can get involved in the 
process of diffusion and shape its outcomes:  
… the spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, artefacts, goods – is in the 
hands of people; each of these people may act in many different ways, letting the token 
drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it 
(Latour 1986: 267).  
Czarniawska and Sevon (1996) adopted Latour’s model of translation to theorize 
organizational change. They emphasize the richness of meaning of the term 
translation: It is not only rendering from one language into another; it is also 
transference, removal from one place to another, transformation, change and adoption 
of an object or idea for another use (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996: 6). Latour’s 
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concept of translation enables them to overcome the mechanistic metaphor of 
diffusion and explain why and how ideas, organizational models, management 
practices and administrative reforms travel and transform when actors realize them in 
diverse time-space settings, i.e., localities (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996: 23-24). 
The main mechanism of translation is the success of ideas elsewhere, or 
fashion, that fuels imitation, but translation is something more than imitation. It is 
conceptualized as an “active learning process” that involves both imitation and 
innovation “far from being passive adoption” (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996: 9; 
Sahlin-Andersson 1996). When organizations translate ideas, they adapt external ideas, 
appropriate them, modify and edit them and add to them, thereby creating and 
enacting new ideas and practices.  
Following the work of Czarniawska and others, Campbell (2004: 80-82) 
defines translation as “a combination of new externally driven elements … as well as 
old locally given ones inherited from the past.” He argues that the study of translation 
enables the identification causal mechanisms that explain institutional emergence and 
change. He emphasizes that the degree to which ideas are translated into local 
practices and what the outcomes of the translation are depends on local institutional 
contexts, power struggles and implementation capacities. For example, Djelic (1998) 
demonstrates in her study of the translation of the American model of industrial 
production to France, West Germany and Italy that party politics, the lack of ties to 
the U.S., blocking of implementation by local administrations and pre-war structure of 
industry based on small and medium-sized family firms shaped the outcome of the 
translation. The translation in Italy was much less complete than in France and West 
Germany. 
Drawing on the work by Czarniawska (1996), Campbell (2004) and Djelic 
(1998), Schneiberg and Bartley (2008: 49-50) propose to address how rules and 
organizational models get reframed during their implementation. They emphasize the 
importance of studying how new organizational forms shape behavior on the ground 
and how rules are translated into practices in diverse domestic contexts. They argue 
that such research requires “clear specification of mechanisms and channels through 
which global/translocal rulemaking shapes local policy and local policy shapes local 
practice”, although they admit that such research is associated with serious 
methodological difficulties related to the documentation of translation and local 
effects of transnational governance. The framework for analyzing translation is, 
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therefore, organized around three elements – global rules, actors and context – that are 
interconnected though various mechanisms of translation.  
Yet, whereas this approach provides a useful tool – the concept of translation – 
for understanding the implementation of transnational standards, its application is 
limited by the lack of an explicit account of the role of conflict and politics in shaping 
translation outcomes. This is an important drawback, since the introduction new rules 
in a local context may redefine preexisting power and control structures. The 
translation literature also does not explicitly deal with potential feedback effects that 
may influence the initial ideas. It may indeed be argued that global ideas – e.g., 
principles and standards – are also reshaped and edited when they are implemented in 
domestic settings. Yet, recent contributions to sociology and anthropology of law 
suggest that global norms are not creatively edited when they are implemented in 
domestic settings. Global norm implementation is negotiated between interest (or 
stakeholder) groups and therefore shaped by political struggles. 
The second body of literature that informs my study deals with this issue and 
analyzes global law-making and domestic law implementation. The overall argument 
of this literature is that the translation of global legal norms into domestic law and 
practice is multifaceted, contested, and is shaped by complex interactions between 
global norms and domestic context as well as between global and local actors. 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) and Merry (2006a) also demonstrate that global norm-
making and implementation occur at two levels: Global norms are made in 
transnational forums whereas implementation occurs at the domestic level. I review 
this literature in the next section. 
2.6 Translation in a Multi-Level Governance System 
Whereas the sociological-organizational studies of diffusion inspired by the work of 
Czarniawska and others provide a useful tool – the concept of translation – for 
understanding the implementation of rules, its application to transnational private 
voluntary standards is limited, first, by the lack of an explicit account of conflict and 
politics in shaping of translation outcomes and, second, by its focus on a horizontal 
movement of ideas between localities, i.e., in space and time. In the case of translation 
of transnational voluntary rules (e.g., environmental and social standards), we deal 
rather with the top-down movement of rules and standards that are designed in the 
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transnational forums, such as the FSC, and should be enacted and implemented at the 
local level.6 In other words, they have to be blended into everyday practice in order to 
become an effective regulatory tool. The recent contributions to the sociology and 
anthropology of transnational law also provide useful insights on the translation of 
rules in multi-level and multi-sited systems of governance, both private and public 
(Halliday and Carruthers 2009; Merry 2006a; Quack 2007).  
The students of transnational law distinguish between two conceptual levels, at 
which the making and implementation of transnational legal norms occurs: the 
transnational and domestic levels. The first level is the transnational level where 
transnational norm making occurs. Global norm enactment and implementation 
occurs at the domestic level. Global norms, both hard and soft, are negotiated in 
transnational public, private and hybrid forums, including international organizations, 
clubs of nations (e.g., G-7 or G-22), international nongovernmental organizations, 
international business associations and international professional associations 
(Halliday and Carruthers 2009: 73-77). Transnational norms are directly rarely 
imposed by powerful states, such as the U.S., as is often argued in the literature on the 
hegemonic dominance of the U.S. and other developed nations (Halliday and 
Carruthers 2009). Clearly, these actors play an important role in shaping of 
transnational norm- and law-making, but not only because of their economic power 
(e.g., manifested through their investment flows) but also because of their expertise, 
technical assistance capacities (Halliday and Carruthers 2009: 73-77) and cultural 
dominance (e.g., Western cultural account, see Meyer, Boli and Thomas 1987). 
Empirical evidence presented by Halliday and Carruthers on bankruptcy law (2009) 
and by Merry on human rights (2006a) suggests that global norms emerge at the 
transnational level as a result of iterative cycles of consensus-building and negotiation 
of rules reflected in documents, resolutions and standards between groups with 
diverging interests. 
Why is consensus-building important? Fair participation and consensus-based 
decision-making represent sources of formal legitimacy and make rules more 
legitimate and the acceptance of transnational norms more likely (Mayntz 2010; 
                                                 
6
 Seeing this movement as top-down is simplified. As discussed later in this section, it is better 
explained as cyclical in nature. 
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Werle and Inversen 2006).7 In turn, broad acceptance is likely to make norms more 
effective. Transnational law-making is usually problem-driven. The systemic financial 
crisis in the late 1990s and the need for a regime that would govern multinational 
corporate insolvencies motivated states, international organizations, multinationals 
and international legal professional associations to negotiate a set of transnational 
standards of corporate insolvency law (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). The growing 
awareness of gender violence as a violation of human rights motivated the UN to 
establish the Commission on the Status of Women that developed the Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women signed in 1993 (Merry 2006a: 21-24). 
Yet, it would not have been enough to produce a convention or a standard to 
make autonomous states accept these rules addressing a specific problem. Their 
participation in the consensus-based norm-making makes them co-authors and co-
owners of rules. As Merry argues (2006a: 23), the declaration on violence against 
women was adopted unanimously and therefore possesses “a moral force of world 
consensus,” even though it is not legally binding. Clearly, world consensus, or more 
often compromise, is not per se a guarantee that global norms will be adequately 
implemented as the study of Halliday and Carruthers (2009) demonstrates. In other 
words, acceptance and compliance are not equal and are not necessarily causally 
connected. As Mayntz (2010: 13) argues, “the functional importance of legitimacy is 
easily overestimated.” Yet, such co-ownership of global norms makes them more 
legitimate and is likely to facilitate broad acceptance, if not implementation, of global 
norms at the national level. It is particularly important, since many transnational rules, 
ranging from international conventions, agreements and protocols (hard law) to 
transnational standards (soft law), lack enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms and 
can only rely on their moral appeal.  
 However, it should be noted that transnational norm and rule-making should 
not be understood in functionalistic or deterministic terms. First, problems that 
motivate rule-making do not emerge “objectively” but are constructed, or framed, by 
                                                 
7
 Following Max Weber, Mayntz (2010: 5) defines legitimacy as “the belief in the exemplary and 
binding nature of a social order” (emphasis in the original) and identifies two sources of legal 
legitimacy, the rational form of legitimacy prevalent in the modern world (p. 6): formal (or procedural) 
legitimacy and substantive (or material) legitimacy. Substantive legitimacy is associated with dominant 
societal values and ideas of justice. Formal legitimacy is associated with procedurally correct decision-
making according to pre-specified criteria.  
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strategic actors who make a problem out of an issue by attracting attention to them, 
e.g., by organizing campaigns, and motivating collective political action (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998: 2-3). Not every issue becomes a political problem, and if it does, the 
specific timing depends on many factors, including organizational capacities of 
intersted groups and alliances, resource availability or contingent events, such as 
economic crises, natural disasters or environmental catastrophes (Keck and Sikkink 
1998).  
Second, if we accept that much of transnational norm making is driven by 
problem-solving efforts of national and transnational actors, we should also recognize 
that the solutions they produce do not always effectively solve or mitigate motivating 
problems. During the process of negotiation, even the initial goals may change. It is 
possible that emerging rules and institutions do not correspond to the early 
expectations of those who initiated rule-making process. The content of rules and the 
design of emerging institutions are shaped by the political struggles between interest 
or stakeholder groups during consensus- or compromise-building, on the one hand 
(Bartley 2007b; Halliday and Carruthers 2009), and by the dominant institutional, 
economic and cultural context, in which actors are embedded, on the other hand 
(Bartley 2003). 
The second level in the transnational governance system identified in the 
recent studies in the sociology and anthropology of transnational law is the domestic 
level, where global norms are translated into national law on books and law in 
practice (Halliday and Carruthers 2007). Basically, global norms are made in 
transnational forums, whereas implementation occurs in two steps at the domestic 
level. Through the process of national lawmaking, transnational norms are 
implemented in national laws that in turn are translated into specific practices and 
institutions, i.e., law in practice. Here political conflicts as well as a national context 
also play an important constitutive role. Domestic actors translate global norms into 
national law and into local practices, but this is not a one-to-one adoption. The 
outcomes – i.e., national law and practice – are not imposed by powerful transnational 
actors, but are shaped by the domestic legal, political and social context (e.g., legal 
arrangements, cultural scripts and interest group constellations) and thus differ across 
counties (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). 
Moreover, domestic implementation is affected by struggles among global and 
local actors or coalitions of actors with diverging interests and unequal influence. 
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Similarly to global norms, domestic law and practice are negotiated. Local actors are 
not passive recipients of global norms, but are their active makers. Halliday and 
Carruthers (2009) demonstrate empirically that bankruptcy law in Indonesia, China 
and South Korea converged over the last twenty years towards a model reflected in 
the transnational standards for insolvency law (mainly UNCITRAL’s Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency 8 ), but never become identical. The degree of proximity 
between global standards and national law depends critically on the balance of power 
between global and local actors, as well as on the distance between global norms and 
local legal tradition. Yet, they argue that “not only formal rules are incomplete and 
ambiguous but also that their implementation never follows a mechanical and 
determinant fashion” (p. 37). 
Why are the implementation of global legal norms have to be negotiated and 
conflicts settled? Domestic implementing actors may be less powerful as compared to 
transnational actors that design transnational rules but they are not passive and can 
delay or even undermine implementation; they may exploit local knowledge and 
manipulate local institutions in order to carve out zones of independence and to avoid 
compliance (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). As a result, implementation gaps emerge 
and trigger new cycles of legal reforms in order to provide solutions to emerging 
implementation problems. During the revisions, not only technical innovations, such 
as sanctions, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, are negotiated and inserted 
into law, but also the interests and capacities of implementing actors may be taken 
into consideration.  
From this perspective, global norm creation, domestic lawmaking and 
domestic law implementation is not exactly a top-down process. It is cyclical in 
nature, or recursive (Djelic and Quack 2003b; Halliday and Carruthers 2007; Halliday 
and Carruthers 2009).  In order to explicate this cyclical nature, Halliday and 
Carruthers (2007) develop a recursivity of law framework that provides an analytical 
tool for capturing feedback loops between domestic lawmaking and implementation 
and the political character of implementation. They suggest that technical and political 
problems that emerge during implementation trigger new legal reforms aimed at 
solving emerging problems and facilitate the negotiation and accommodation of 
                                                 
8
 UNCITRAL – United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
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conflicting interests, which is believed to make implementation more effective at the 
national level over time. Clearly, this also does not always occur. New problems and 
unintended consequences may emerge and trigger further reforms or even lead to 
large-scale institutional change or to the disruption of rules and institutions.  
2.7 The Role of Actors in the Translation of Transnational Standards 
into Practice 
In the previous two sections I have reviewed two bodies of literature that help 
understand how the process of transnational voluntary standard-setting and 
implementation occurs. The organizational literature on diffusion/translation focuses 
more on the cognitive aspects of translation, including learning, sense-making and 
creative adaptation of ideas to locally specific conditions. The recent literature on the 
sociology and anthropology of law focuses rather on political aspects of transnational 
rule enactment and implementation. They emphasize political conflicts, asymmetries 
of power and compromise-building efforts of transnational and domestic actors. At 
the same time, both highlight human agency and the important role of the context – 
legal, cultural, institutional and economic – that shapes the translation of ideas across 
settings and levels in a multi-level governance system. The question is then how we 
should best conceptualize the relationship between actors and their context.  
Contemporary economic sociology and organization theory has come to see 
actors as embedded into and situated in their societal context. According to Beckert 
(2003: 769), embeddedness “refers to the social, cultural, political, and cognitive 
structuration of decisions in economic contexts. It points to the indissoluble 
connection of the action with his or her social surrounding” (Beckert 2003: 769). The 
conception of embedded and situated action stands in sharp contrast to an 
“undersocialized” conception of man associated mainly with neoclassical economics 
and several rational choice theories that view individual and collective actors as 
unified entities with fixed known preferences and independent decision making in a 
world of full information (Beckert 2003: 769). 
At the same time, the economic sociology and organizational theory do not 
maintain that actions are always strictly prescribed by different sorts of societal 
structures, e.g., formal rules, social norms, cultural scripts, cognitive structures, 
discourses and language or political, legal and institutional arrangements. In contrast 
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to such an “oversocialized” conception of man associated mainly with the work of 
Parsonian and constructivist schools of social thought (Gronow 2008; Wrong 1961), 
contemporary sociology and organization theory allow for intentional strategic action 
by knowledgeable and creative individuals and organizations that is simultaneously 
restricted and enabled by its institutional and cultural context  (Emirbayer and Mische 
1998). From this perspective, intentional agency and institutional structures are 
interdependent (Beckert 1999: 777), whereas actors are intelligent, knowledgeable, 
creative and institutionally situated (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 219). These 
properties of human agency are of crucial importance for understanding the processes 
of institution-building and enactment. 
DiMaggio (1988) introduces the concept of institutional entrepreneurship into 
neo-institutional organizational analysis in order to capture the impact of actors and 
strategic action on their institutional context. With this concept, DiMaggio (1988; 
1991) brings agency, power and interests, as well as change back in organizational-
institutional analysis that has mainly focused on explaining societal stability, 
institutional continuity and reproduction of social life by profound effects of cultural 
scripts, routines and symbolic systems on action (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 215-
216; Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this tradition, practices of individual and collective 
actors are commonly seen as sticky and repeated and thus facilitating the reproduction 
of institutions over time, institutions being defined broadly as “cultural-cognitive, 
normative and regulative elements” that govern actors’ behavior (Scott 2001: 48). In 
contrast, institutional entrepreneurs initiate institutional change, create new 
institutional and organizational patterns and invest efforts in their implementation and 
diffusion (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum 2009: 68-69). According to DiMaggio 
(1988: 14), institutional entrepreneurs are “organized actors with sufficient resources” 
who “see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly.” 
Going back to the question above, what is the relationship between action and 
its institutional surrounding? Does it enable or restrict action? In fact, it does both. 
The context in which individual and collective actors operate is restrictive in the sense 
that it represents certain more or less explicit rules that govern the behavior of actors 
by constraining the repertoires of legitimate action available to actors (Swidler 1986). 
This does not mean that actors do not do things that are considered to be illegitimate, 
but they are commonly aware of sanctions that may follow deviating behavior, 
ranging from public disapproval to prison sentence. 
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At the same time, context is enabling, since actors may use existing 
institutional arrangements, legal norms, cultural traditions and other elements of the 
context they are embedded into as resources and exploiting contradicting elements 
within the context in order to achieve their goals (Rao 1998). Social and cultural 
anthropologists have shown that culture is not consensual, rigid and fixed but is 
contentious, flexible, heterogeneous and fluid and can be changed as a result of 
intentional action. Merry (2006: 12-16) in her treatment of violence against women 
suggests that it is often justified as a cultural tradition and that it is commonly argued 
that prohibiting it would result into the destruction of culture (culture as tradition) and 
identity (culture as national or ethnic essence). Yet, if culture is viewed as contentious 
and flexible, actors struggling for eliminating gender violence can activate and use 
certain elements of culture (e.g., beliefs, values, habits, practices and traditions) 
consistent with their goals as a resource in order to justify their actions. In Merry’s 
words (2006: 15), “[L]ocal norms can be paths to change as well as barriers.”  
Similarly to Merry’s results, recent studies in the sociology of law also point 
out that local legal norms and traditions are used when transnational norms and 
standards are introduced into local law. Halliday and Carruthers (2009) show that in 
the process of translation of transnational law into national law and practice global 
norms or ideas in general are combined in different ways with locally available 
elements in order to make transnational and  local norms appear consistent and 
acceptable to local audiences, even if not perfectly consistent. They call this process 
transplantation that combines appropriation and adjustment. According to Merry 
(2006a: 135-136), appropriation involves taking ideas, practices and organizational 
models developed in one setting and replanting them in another setting; transplants 
are then adjusted to local soil, i.e., to local circumstances. She also argues that it is 
important to dress new transnational ideas into familiar costumes and blend them into 
preexisting legal and/or cultural systems in order to increase their acceptance among 
locals and eventually make them more effective (p. 138). 
Obviously, translation is not the only kind of institutional work actors do in 
order to accomplish their goals and to deliberately or unintentionally to create 
institutions. Institutional work is a broad category that Lawrance and Suddaby (2006) 
to conceptualize various the efforts of knowledgeable, creative and pragmatic 
individual and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, transforming and 
disrupting institutions. Since the present study deals mainly with the institution-
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building and enactment at the domestic level, the summary of several types of 
institutional work aimed at institutional creation relevant for an empirical study in the 
subsequent chapters are provided in Table 2. Institutional entrepreneurs mobilize 
political and regulatory support by providing meaning to events and processes 
(framing), developing causal stories and employing direct techniques of persuasion 
(Snow et al. 1986). They construct new identities for actors and create networks 
between actors in order to enable collective action (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The 
provide actors with new knowledge and skills in order to diffuse, enact and implement 
new rules (Perez-Aleman 2011).  
Table 2: Types of Institutional Work Aimed at Creating Institutions 
Forms of institutional 
work 
Definition 
Advocacy The mobilization of political and regulatory support through direct 
and deliberate techniques of social suasion 
Constructing identities Defining the relationship between an actor and the field in which 
that actor operates 
Constructing 
normative networks 
Construction of interorganizational connections though which 
practices become normatively sanctioned and which form the 
relevant peer group with respect to compliance, monitoring and 
evaluation 
Educating The educating of actors in skills and knowledge necessary to 
support new institution  
Source: Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 221, for a comprehensive list and review see pp. 220-229) 
 
The previous literature review shows that actors and their social context are closely 
interrelated. The institutional and cultural context enables and constrains human 
action. Its enabling effects are particularly important for institution-building and 
institutional change when habitual ways of doing things are being challenged by 
institutional entrepreneurs and new ways are being introduced. Yet, a further question 
is when or under what conditions institutional entrepreneurs are able to develop and 
enact new rules and build new institutions. The organization literature on institutional 
entrepreneurship has provided a long list of factors and conditions that enable it. In 
their review of this literature, Battillana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009: 73-78) divide 
the factors in two groups: field-level conditions and actor-level conditions related to 
actors’ social position. Field-level conditions range from contingent exogenous 
shocks and crises to the degree of heterogeneity and institutionalization in an 
organizational field. Actor-level conditions refer mainly to the structural and social 
positions of actors in the field. Actors’ ability to mobilize support, innovate and 
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implement their institutional innovations may depend on their structural position 
(center vs. periphery), as well as on their social position: The innovations produced by 
certain actors may be seen as more legitimate. These conditions affect the kind and 
the amount of resources that actors have at their disposal or can mobilize externally, 
as well as what kind strategies actors pursue. 
The emerging literature on the transnational private market-based regulation of 
environmental and social behavior of firms also pays attention to the resources 
available to actors creating and implementing rules. It suggests that in the 
transnational space social movements and particularly social movement organizations 
play a significant in developing new rules and creating new institutions, including 
certification and labeling (Bartley 2003; 2007b; McNichol 2006). Espach (2009) 
shows that organizational capacity of environmental groups defined as “the social and 
material resources of local groups and coalitions” supporting transnational regimes (p. 
131). Comparing the experience of forest certification in Brazil and Argentina, he 
demonstrates that the degree of success of forest certification in two countries cannot 
be explained by the demand-side factors, such as the demand for certified timber in 
international markets, market premium for certified products and the pressure of 
transnational NGOs. Neither do the supply-side factors explain the degree of success 
of forest certification, including the degree of centralization of industry or the support 
of governments. Instead, after the introduction of forest certification program in Brazil 
and Argentina, its implementation depended largely on the participation and advocacy 
of local environmental groups and coalitions that has been much stronger in Brazil 
due to preexisting networks and campaign experience and therefore explains the 
greater success of forest certification in Brazil than in Argentina. 
2.8 How Does the Market Nature of Private Rules Affect Their 
Translation? 
This study seeks to explain the implementation and evaluate the impact of 
transnational voluntary market-oriented standards through certification and labeling 
programs. Several bodies of literature I have reviewed above provide a number of 
theoretical building-blocks that form an analytical framework for this study. Yet, the 
question remains what is so special about private, voluntary, market-oriented 
certification and labeling programs that has not been captured in the literature above? 
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I argue that certification’s market orientation makes the creators, the advocates and 
participants of these programs vulnerable to market pressures that shape the content of 
transnational rules and the structure of the programs at the transnational level, on the 
one hand, and limit the potential impact of these forms of governance at the local 
level, on the other hand. This influence, therefore, goes beyond the broadly discussed 
fact that certification labeling are voluntary instruments and, thus, can only reach a 
limited number of enterprises, commonly large reputation-conscious manufacturing 
and retailing firms and their suppliers (through their supply chain). Moreover, it goes 
beyond a mere fact the market demand for certified products is not significant, and 
voluntary market-based programs have their “natural” limits. In this section, I will 
show how market forces can limit the impact of through several more subtle ways. 
At the transnational level, actors developing certification and labeling 
programs can pursue two sorts of strategies. According to Taylor (2005a: 441-442), 
they may challenge the conventional market logic and the dominant market 
organization by developing a niche in the market open only to producers of goods that 
comply with specified standards and that have had no access to conventional markets. 
They establish retailer chains that sell certified products for higher price than a 
standard market price and persuade consumers to buy certified product and thus 
support disadvantaged producers. In other words, they are positively discriminated. 
This is the basis of the fair trade approach that has gained a particular prominence in 
coffee trade.  
Alternatively, transnational actors may pursue a conventional market approach 
without challenging the dominant market structure. They target the market as a whole 
– not a specific niche – that consists mainly of large retailers of products which in turn, 
start demanding increasingly more certified products but do not offer any price 
premium, since there are few consumers willing to pay it. This pushes certification 
and labeling associations to expand and favor large-scale producers that can provide 
the market with large quantities of certified products, often the members of retailers’ 
supply chains (Taylor 2005a: 441). Standards are developed for all producers to avoid 
both positive and negative discrimination, but as a result they favor those who already 
have advantage in the market, that is large well-doing firms practicing good 
management. Small-scale producers that are not part of the large-retailers’ supply 
chains – they are located mainly in the less developed countries, i.e., in the global 
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South – do not come on board. This is the case of forest certification and FSC which 
have been criticized for their strong focus on the dominant market actors for support.9  
At the domestic level, which is also the implementation level, the growing 
demand for certified products in international markets may put pressure on local 
producers who become willing to become certified quickly. This growing pressure if 
combined with a strong competition among certification organizations responsible for 
assessing producers’ compliance with a specified standard may push certification 
organizations to issue certificates even if noncompliance with the standard is detected. 
Provided that certification programs are voluntary, certification organizations may 
reduce their requirements in order to prevent their clients from looking for less strict 
inspectors or withdrawing from certification at all. Whereas such a behavior of 
certification organizations can be intentional and strategic, it does not always have to 
be like this. 
If standards are formulated broadly enough and if sanctions are not well 
specified or not strict enough, certification organizations and their compliance 
assessment teams receive discretion in interpreting both the written standard and the 
performance of firms. From this perspective, the process of compliance assessment 
turns into a process of closing the gap between the standard and practice, but within 
the framework of the standard. This means that it is unlikely that any outright 
noncompliance would be ignored, but if noncompliance is not considered as 
significant, it may be treated less rigorously than the standard prescribes. Assessment 
can be therefore conceptualized as a search for a compromise between strict 
requirements and deviating practices. As a result, certifiers’ discretion facilitates the 
expansion of certification and labeling but may limit its potential to induce 
environmental and social change.  
                                                 
9
 It has to be noted here that assessing this development as positive or negative requires specifying a 
point of reference. As such, this development is a result of the early conscious decision of the FSC to 
pursue a mainstream strategy. This was one of several options. It helped the FSC to gain support 
among many NGOs, and influential market players mainly from the global North, i.e., advanced 
industrial economies of Europe and North America, and expand significantly during the 1990s and 
2000s. Yet, for those who hoped that the FSC would primarily target tropical forestry in order to halt 
deforestation in the global South, this was a source of disappointment and frustration. This 
development will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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2.9 Understanding the Translation of Certification Standards: An 
Analytical Framework 
The present study seeks to open up the black box of the implementation of forest 
certification and labeling conceptualized as a relatively new form of transnational 
private voluntary market-driven regulation in the environmental and social rights 
fields. It addresses the gap in the literature on certification and labeling and more 
general on transnational standards that has so far paid less attention to the problems of 
implementation. Most of the studies focus on the process of standard-setting at the 
transnational level or at best explain who – what kind of firms or what kind of 
countries – adopts transnational standards. Whereas these studies help understand the 
emergence and diffusion of certification and labeling, they stop short of explaining 
what actually happens when standards become adopted. The idea that in order to 
become effective, transnational standards – and more generally, rules – need to be 
enacted, appropriated and blended into everyday practice by implementing actors 
embedded in a domestic legal, institutional, social and political context has remained 
largely missing from the literature. I seek to explain how exactly implementation 
occurs and how implementation affects the local impact of forest certification and 
labeling. 
Building on the theoretical insights from (1) rich implementation literature in 
the public policy analysis, (2) the neo-institutional studies of diffusion/translation, (3) 
the recent studies in the sociology and anthropology of law, and (4) institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, I conceptualize the emergence of certification and labeling 
and their local enactment and implementation as two phases of active institution-
building that occurs at two levels, as I demonstrate in the following chapters. First, I 
show that at the transnational level, actors, or institutional entrepreneurs, negotiate 
transnational standards of good environmental and social behavior of firms and lay 
down the foundations of certification and labeling systems (e.g., governance 
structures, decision-making rules, enforcement mechanisms, and membership and 
participation criteria). This process is problem-driven and is shaped by fundamental 
conflicts between parties in a specific area (e.g., firms vs. activists) (Bartley 2007b) 
and by the context, in which actors are embedded. More specifically, the context 
shapes the building of certification and labeling systems in two ways. First, the 
dominant neoliberal formal rules and scripts restrict the set of alternatives available to 
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local actors (Bartley 2003). Second, actors are exposed to market pressures that also 
shape their choice of specific contents of transnational standards and their choice of 
institutional elements that make up the new institution of certification and labeling.  
Second, I show that at the domestic level, the enactment and implementation 
of transnational standards occurs. I follow Streeck and Thelen (2005: 13) who argue 
that rules and their enactment and implementation should be treated as analytically 
different. This view is reinforced by Wittgenstein’s idea that “formulations are unable 
by themselves, that is, in the absence of established ways of following/applying them, 
to fix determinately what people do in observing them. … To follow a rule is to join 
in with how the rule is used/applied” (Schatzki 1997: 291). This means that those who 
observe rules play an important role in defining what specifically they have to do in 
order to follow rules. This study is aimed exactly at identifying ways local actors 
“join in” and argues that this is a critical condition for effective translation of 
transnational standards into local practice. Local actors are therefore not passive 
recipients of transnational rules. They have to adjust transnational rules and structures 
to their local context. They need to devise ways in which transnational rules are 
expected to be followed. 
They face two types of difficulties that they have to overcome in order to 
make transnational rules locally effective. First, the introduction of new standards 
challenges habitual environmental and social practices and thus questions not only the 
preexisting practices but also preexisting structures of power and control, which in 
turn may cause conflicts over new rules. Since transnational certification standards are 
voluntary, their advocates cannot directly impose them on firms but have to persuade 
them to adopt and follow certification standards. This requires active interest 
negotiation, conflict settlement and compromise building. Clearly, if the advocates of 
certification and labeling have enough influence to impose standards, they do not have 
to negotiate them, but as discussed in Section 2.6, voluntary adoption increases the 
likelihood of effective implementation, even though it does not guarantee it. 
Second, transnational standards per se do not precisely specify what those who 
intend to follow them have to do in order to comply. Certification standards are based 
on broad and relatively unspecific principles commonly applicable to all types of 
enterprises in all regions of the world and do not specify explicitly what practices are 
in compliance with the standards. Practices are defined as specific ways in which 
production and work are actually done (Perez-Aleman 2011: 174). Moreover, 
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transnational standards contain concepts and requirements unfamiliar to local 
implementing actors, who may find it difficult to establish exactly how they should 
reform their practice in order to comply with alien requirements that have been 
formulated in distant transnational forums, such as the FSC. Significant gaps in 
meanings between global requirements and local practice make such translation 
problematic. 
Therefore, when habitual practices are challenged and new standards are 
provided, implementing actors need to specify broad principles and adapt them to a 
particular domestic legal and social context and then establish how they should 
modify their practices and what new practices they should introduce. This requires 
creative and knowledgeable work of local implementing actors that involves sense-
making, creative adaptation and learning defined as new knowledge and skill building 
that helps individuals and organizations change existing practices and introduce new 
ones (Perez-Aleman 2011: 174). They often experiment with different concepts and 
methods for implementation and proceed by trial and error. 
To sum up, local enactment and implementation involves political and 
cognitive processes that are analytically different, even though they often overlap and 
are barely distinguishable empirically. They may run in parallel, but they also may 
reinforce each other: Learning about interest of different involved parties may 
facilitate (or potentially impede) conflict settlement whereas conflict settlement may 
enable learning. 
These processes may also occur at different settings at the domestic level. 
Actors may negotiate their interests and develop new knowledge in formal 
intentionally devised settings, such as conferences and meetings, and on an everyday 
basis in implementation settings, such as in firms that seek certification and try 
different ways to achieve compliance.  
Similarly to the transnational level, implementation at the domestic is also 
shaped by the local context that both enables and restricts implementing actors. For 
one thing, the structural factors identified by Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2004; 
Cashore et al. 2007, see also Table 1) may facilitate or impede the implementation 
work of actors. The factors, including the vulnerability of a country to activist 
campaigns, the dependence of a country on international trade flows in targeted 
products (import and export), the structure and the degree of concentration of a 
targeted industry and the kind of the products targeted by activists, may facilitate or 
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impede the uptake and diffusion of certification and labeling across countries and/or 
firms. These structural conditions shape the scope and room for institution-building 
action. Yet, this approach focuses on structural factors and therefore fails to consider 
actor-related characteristics that enable the diffusion of certification and the 
translation of certification standards into local practices. Organizational capacity of 
certification and labeling systems’ advocates shapes to what extent actors can exert 
their influence, make use of facilitating conditions and go around impeding factors. 
Following Espach (2009: 131), organizational capacity is defined as social and 
material resources that actors and their coalitions may use to pursue their goals. 
The concept of institution-building work discussed in Section 2.7 facilitates 
understanding how actors use their resources to enact and implement certification and 
labeling in the local context. They may persuade firms to join certification programs 
(advocacy), provide actors with new identities (e.g., responsible producer), mobilize 
their connections to other organizations for a greater resonance (constructing new 
identities and normative networks), and provide actors with new knowledge and skills 
(educating).  
Organizational resources of actors also shape their capacity to use the elements 
of the context in which they are embedded as a resource to support the 
implementation of transnational environmental certification standards. Cognitive 
creative processes that enable the translation of transnational standards into actual 
practices, i.e., sense-making, adjustment and learning, occur in implementation 
settings when local actors, including managers, certifiers, activists and other 
stakeholders, evaluate existing practices against prescribed requirements and 
experiment with the implementation of transnational standards. Although they may 
consult commentaries and guidelines provided by the transnational standard-setting 
organizations, they often proceed by trial and error as they search for “correct” 
practices that would fit global standards. Particularly challenging are the situations 
where transnational standards considerably contradict national regulations and where 
they include concepts unknown to most local actors. I argue that during 
implementation, new knowledge concerning good forest management practice and 
compliance with FSC standards emerges as a result of actors’ continuous 
interpretation and recombination of external “global” concepts and local concepts 
given by national regulations and common on-the-ground practices, as is described by 
Campbell (2004: 79-80). 
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I will show that not all transnational requirements are translated in a one single 
manner. When global requirements appear clear and unproblematic to local actors – 
i.e., when actors understand how their practices need to be changed in order to 
achieve compliance – the requirements are directly implemented. In some cases, 
however, global requirements appear obscure or completely alien to local actors, or 
concepts imposed by the transnational standards do not have any equivalents in 
national law and policy. When local actors do not understand what is required, they 
seek local categories and concepts that overlap at least partially with global categories 
and concepts. When categories (or even individual practices) fully overlap with global 
requirements, it is enough to reframe local concepts in terms that are consistent with 
the language of transnational standards. When the overlap is partial, they are then 
combined with categories that are either borrowed or transplanted from other settings 
(cross-border learning) or invented specifically for an implementation setting. The 
practices used to implement transnational requirements adopted for a local use may 
also be borrowed or invented. 
Basically, the argument is that local practices cannot be simply read off 
transnational environmental standards. They are borrowed, appropriated, (re-) 
interpreted, adjusted, (re-) combined with local practices and invented. The process of 
translation is not a one-to-one adoption and implementation of transnational rules and 
concepts, but involves creative adaptation to local conditions by knowledgeable actors 
with social and material resources. Moreover, the creative adaptation does not follow 
one single pattern depending on the availability of local elements that fit transnational 
standards and on the gap between transnational standards and local practices. The 
context sets certain limits to certification and labeling but it also provides actors with 
resources they can use to push their goals and their normative agenda. 
Finally, whereas these arguments emphasize the importance of creative and 
knowledgeable actors and their work for enacting and implementing transnational 
environmental and social standards, I do not claim that the process of translation is 
necessarily harmonious and always brings about perfect implementation. Whereas 
implementing actors invest effort in enacting and translating transnational standards, I 
argue that at least two factors limit their effectiveness at the local level. On the one 
hand, preexisting social and legal rules, i.e., domestic laws and regulations, do not 
only provide building blocks for new practices, but also limit the impact of 
transnational standards if there are serious contradictions between transnational 
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standards and national law. Because of the primacy of domestic law and regulations, 
transnational standards may be unable to challenge practices with questionable 
environmental effects. 
Moreover, following the discussion on the market nature of certification and 
labeling in Section 2.8, I argue that market pressures and competition among certifiers 
limit the effectiveness of certification and labeling systems. On the one hand, an 
increasingly growing demand for certified products may put certifying organizations 
assessing compliance with standards under pressure to certify as many firms as 
possible within a short period of time. Coupled with the competition between 
certifying organizations, the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms and discretion given to certifying organizations by the system, this 
pressure may translate into deficiencies in the quality of certifying organizations. This 
would lead to a rapid expansion of a certification system, but at the same time limit 
the potential of certification and labeling to induce social change.  
Before I present the analysis of my case-study informed by the literature 
reviewed above, I justify my case selection, provide background information for the 
case-study, formulate empirical implications structuring the empirical analysis in 
Chapters 4 to 7 and describe the sources of data and methods of data collection and 
analyses.  
 
   
3 Case Selection, Empirical Implications and 
Methods 
For examining the emergence of certification and labeling as a new mode of 
regulation in a global economy and in particular for explicated the process of 
translation of transnational certification standards into practices, I have selected the 
case of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and its forest certification program. 
This case enables tracing the process of global standard-setting and the process of 
global standards implementation in a domestic context, since the FSC certification 
program has a multi-level structure. For a study of translation of global standards into 
practices, I selected the case of Russia because its forests have high global economic 
and environmental value and because Russia presents a challenging and understudied 
case of a success of forest certification in relatively difficult domestic context. In this 
chapter, I present my case-study, formulate the empirical implications and describe 
my methods of date collection and analysis. 
3.1 Case Selection: Forest Certification and the Forest Stewardship 
Council in Russia 
The FSC’s forest certification program is a multi-stakeholder environmental 
governance project based on process-related standards and third-party verification of 
compliance. I investigate how FSC’s global standards of good forest management are 
translated into locally accepted domestic standards and practices under unfavorable 
conditions of unstable political and legal environment, traditionally poor forest 
management practices resulting in a poor condition of forests and weak mechanisms 
of public participation in forest governance. These conditions could hinder the 
expansion of forest certification in Russia but it is puzzling that Russia has quickly 
become one of the leaders in certifying forests as well-managed. How was the rapid 
expansion possible under unfavorable local conditions? How did local implementing 
actors cope with these unfavorable conditions? What were the mechanisms and 
processes that explain such a puzzling dynamic of forest certification in Russia? 
These are the central questions to be answered by the empirical investigation. 
Before I specify my arguments and outline the empirical narrative, I will 
briefly describe the background of forest certification and of the FSC and explain why 
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it is an interesting and challenging case to explore. To put it simply, the case of forest 
certification illustrates well the contradictory and political nature of the 
implementation of private global rules in specific local contexts, especially those 
featured by difficult local conditions that private programs seek to improve. It has 
been widely considered one of the most promising regulatory initiatives dealing with 
a set of specific environmental and social problems and it is supported by industry, 
social movements, governments and international organizations. At the same time, it 
has emerged as a relatively fragile organizational arrangement and its fate remains 
uncertain and contested (McNichol 2006: 350). The system of decision-making, 
standard implementation, monitoring and control that the FCS developed is extremely 
dynamic: the conflicts over legitimacy and control are recurrent and the credibility of 
the FSC is continuously contested by its own members and external critics.  
The FSC was founded in 1993 by a handful of environmental organizations, 
producers and retailers that sought to create a system to distinguish timber from 
sustainably managed tropical forests from timber harvested illegally or 
inappropriately. Environmentalists were disappointed by multilateral efforts to stop 
deforestation and forest degradation, in particular in tropical countries of Latin 
America, South-East Asia and Africa, because they perceived governments as largely 
ineffective and often unwilling to look for solutions to forest problems. With the help 
of the media, they publicized growing forest problems in tropical countries and 
criticized large brand-name retailers for their direct or indirect support of destructive 
forest practices. Reputation-conscious producers and retailers became interested in a 
program that would help them distinguish between “good” and “bad” timber, avoid 
conflicts with the environmental movement and improve their reputation. After a 
series of meetings, the FSC was established to develop such a program.  
The first years of the FSC were extremely difficult. The FSC had to solve 
numerous internal problems, including tensions between constituencies, deadlocks 
over forest management standards and funding deficits. It also had to deal with 
counter-mobilizations in countries where it sought support, including quickly 
emerging competitor programs that threatened to undermine the FSC (McNichol 2006: 
357-362). Yet, in 1996 the FSC forest management certification programs started to 
operate. In 1998 the forest management certification program was complemented by 
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the Chain of Custody certification program that helped producers trace timber from 
certified forests through the supply chain from forests to final consumers.10 
Since the start of the FSC’s certification program, it has grown dramatically. 
The FCS has national offices in forty-six countries and operates in eighty-one 
countries, including both advanced industrial countries like Canada, the U.S. and 
Sweden and problematic regions like the Congo and Amazon Basins, China and 
Russia. According to the FSC, over one hundred million hectares of forests had been 
certified according to the FSC principles and criteria by August 2008 (FSC 2008c). 
This approximately equals seven percent of the world’s productive forests (UNICE 
and FAO 2006: 13). The largest players on the global forest product markets – 
producers, retailers and publishers - support the FSC. Among them are Home Depot, 
B&Q, IKEA, Random House and Stora Enso. From 2005 to 2008, the estimated size 
of the global market in the FSC certified products grew from five to over twenty 
billion U.S. Dollars (FSC 2005; FSC 2008a). Another indicator of the success of the 
FSC is the diffusion of the certification model into other issues areas, including 
fisheries, mining and tourism. 
The FSC is a membership organization committed to democratic decision-
making and consensus-building. The members representing the environmental 
movements, workers, community and indigenous rights activists and business are 
divided into three chambers: environmental, social and economic. Every chamber is 
divided into two sub-chambers: one representing the advanced industrial countries, 
the so called global North, and one representing the poorer developing countries, the 
so called global South. All decisions are consensus-based: All three chambers (and 
sub-chambers) with equal veto powers must agree on a decision and no chamber can 
outvoted. The consensus requirement helps avoid the potential marginalization of 
weaker groups in decision-making. Members decide on principles and criteria, 
certification procedures and internal rules. 
                                                 
10
 The study presented in the thesis focuses on the certification of forest management, rather than Chain 
of Custody mainly because Chain of Custody is a technical standard and does not require changes in 
forest practices. Briefly, Chain of Custody requires companies to collect all documentation on the 
timber they buy from their suppliers to make sure it really comes from certified forests and to transmit 
this information further up the supply chain. Forest management certification deals with companies’ 
own forest management and its improvements. 
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The essence of the FSC forest certification program is to enable producers and 
consumers to recognize raw materials and products that stem from well-managed 
forests. Good forest management is defined as environmentally appropriate, socially 
beneficial and economically viable. This means that companies managing forests 
should protect biodiversity and ecological functions of forests, respect the rights of 
workers, local communities and indigenous people, contribute to their welfare and to 
the welfare of society at large and yet be sufficiently profitable. The FSC developed 
ten global principles and fifty-six criteria specifying the concept of good forest 
management and it established a system of third-party verification of compliance with 
these principles and criteria. FSC standards are widely accepted as the most 
comprehensive and the FSC system of compliance verification is considered the most 
rigorous (i.e., Ozinga 2004).  
Companies seeking certification have to demonstrate to independent 
certification organizations accredited by the FSC – certifiers or certification bodies – 
that they manage forests and supply chains in compliance with FSC principles and 
criteria and reform their forest management systems and practices if their if certifiers 
detect non-compliance with FSC standards. Certifiers annually inspect certified 
companies and conduct major re-assessment every five years. Certified producers can 
label their products with an FSC logotype and market them as stemming from well-
managed forests and in general publicize their engagement with the FSC to improve 
their reputation. The third-party verification of compliance by certifying organizations 
independent from both the FSC as a standard-setting organization and companies as 
applying standards is aimed at assuring that companies go beyond rhetoric 
commitments and actually implement FSC standards.11 
The inclusive and democratic structure of the FSC, sound standards of forest 
management and supply chain and its comprehensive system of third-party 
verification of compliance enabled the FSC to win broad support of various 
constituencies ranging from nongovernmental environmental organizations to 
multinational corporations, international organizations and governments. However, 
the development of the FSC also showed a number generic limitations of forest 
                                                 
11
 For a detailed description of the fundamentals of forest certification see Meidinger, Elliott and 
Oesten (2003) and Upton and Bass (1995), as well as Section 3.2 
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certification as a market-based regulatory instrument: Certification so far did not lead 
to increased profits; the impact of forest certification on forest management practices 
is limited or uncertain; the FSC certified forests mainly in Europe and North America 
while developing countries, being the sources of most global forest problems, were 
the initial target of the FSC; and certifiers responsible for verification of compliance 
often perform poorly (Gulbrandsen 2005a; Pattberg 2005a; Rametsteiner and Simula 
2003). The most exacting critics have argued that the FSC forest certification helps 
forest companies to “greenwash” their performance (Counsell and Terje Loraas 2002). 
The credibility of its performance emerged as serious problem that has threatened to 
undermine the support of environmental and social constituencies.  
The FSC was able to bring together constituencies with different and 
sometimes contradicting interests: business, environmentalists and worker, 
community and indigenous rights activists. Moreover, it managed to reconcile their 
diverging interests and develop certification rules and procedures based on 
compromise and consensus. Even though the consensus is fragile and needs to be 
continuously renegotiated, it can be argued that the FSC’s program of forest 
certification, forest management and supply chain standards and verification 
procedures became established as legitimate rules accepted by firms, certifiers and 
other constituencies. Yet, the application of rules, their effects and the FSC’s capacity 
to solve motivating problems, in other words the credibility and reliability of the 
FSC’s program and uncertain impact, has caused concern among the FCS’s 
constituencies. From this follows that in order to be regarded as legitimate and 
credible rules need not only be well-designed through inclusive, fair and consensus-
based decision-making procedures but they need to be effectively implemented. If 
they are not, the question is then why and how voluntary programs and standards 
continue to expand and institutionalized despite their limited impact.  
The case of the FSC lends itself to studying the role of the implementation of 
private rules in the legitimization of new institutional forms of regulation. While 
inclusive consensus-based decision-making, impartial and fair procedures and the 
fitness of new rules with the existing normative structure are important sources of 
legitimacy, uneven or limited implementation may undermine the legitimacy of 
regulatory projects and affect their development. The study of the implementation of 
the FSC’s rules, therefore, sheds light on the emergence and institutionalization of 
regulatory forms, the effectiveness and legitimacy of which are questioned and 
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contested. The experience of forest certification illuminates how, on the one hand, the 
process of implementation contributes to the expansion of private regulatory programs 
and, on the other hand, how it may simultaneously undermine its legitimacy.  
Moreover, the examination of rule translation requires departing from the 
global, more abstract level of rule-making and focusing rather on concrete interactions 
in specific domestic contexts. The FSC’s forest certification system provides a 
striking example of the translation of global rules into domestic practices. FSC global 
principles and criteria that serve as a basis for the evaluation of environmental and 
social performance of firms have to be adapted to national and local conditions that 
vary significantly across and within countries.  
For an in-depth study of the implementation process of FSC forest certification, 
I selected the case of Russia. The Russian experience is a challenging case for 
investigating the operation of the FSC’s global program of forest certification and its 
effects. Environmental movement organizations began the first discussions of the FSC 
in Russia in 1997 but companies showed interest only in 2003. However, after the 
FSC became operational in Russia in 2003 it has expanded dramatically: After five 
years only, the FSC certified forests increased from virtually none to about one fifth 
of Russian forests managed by private companies. Certified areas amount to more 
than twenty-one million hectares (FSC-Russia 2008). Russia now has the second 
largest certified area in the world after Canada. 
Such expansion is puzzling given that Russian forest management standards 
and practices have been traditionally low and have caused significant forest 
degradation since the 1920s. Moreover, due to the drastic economic recession and 
dramatic political transitions of the 1990s, forest legislation has been unstable and the 
state has been unable to enforce rules; forest service12 and forest research institutes 
have been underfunded; social movement organizations and the general public have 
been unable to participate in the forest policy-making and management of forests. 
These conditions could have been expected to hinder the promotion of forest 
                                                 
12
 Forest service is a sector of government responsible for the regulation of forestry and forest industry. 
Russian forest service (in Russian Federalnoe Agentstvo Lesnogo Khozyaystva, or the Federal Forestry 
Agency) is a department of the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Russian forest service is 
hierarchically organized and consists of the federal agency in Moscow, regional agencies in the federal 
regions and local agencies the districts of federal regions. I will use the term “forest service” to refer to 
the whole system of forestry regulation. Otherwise, I will use the terms “federal”, “regional” or “local 
forest service.”  
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certification rules in Russia and the implementation of FSC standards of forest 
management that exceed national legal requirements and habitual practices. Yet, 
forest certification has proceeded at an unexpected rate.  
In addition, the data collected for this study suggests that similar to the 
emerging disappointments and concerns expressed by a number of international 
environmental organizations, skeptical voices have also been raised in Russia. 
Environmentalists and forestry experts have gradually become concerned with the 
poor performance of certifiers and certified companies. They emphasize the ambiguity 
and vagueness of standards and the discretion that certifiers enjoy in interpreting 
ambiguous standards. They also stress their own decreasing capacities to control the 
implementation of standards and the performance of independent certifiers. They 
describe a number of structural difficulties, including unpredictable legislation, 
underfunded forest service and weak state monitoring and control of forest use by 
state forest bodies, that forest certification is unable to overcome. Although 
environmental organizations and other stakeholders still support forest certification as 
a private policy instrument, these difficulties have caused growing skepticism among 
local constituencies. This may suggest that the rapid expansion of forest certification 
can be explained by the fact that the reform of forest management required by the 
forest certification was only limited. 
A number of questions emerge from this puzzling development of forest 
certification in Russia. First, what explains the rapid development of forest 
certification in Russia? Structural factors described by Cashore, Auld and Newsom 
(2004; Cashore et al. 2007), including the place of Russian forest sector in the global 
economy, the growing demand for certified timber and the structure of Russia’s 
domestic forestry sector, may explain why Russian producers become interested in 
certifying their forests. However, this theory does not specify the processes and 
mechanisms that enabled the rapid expansion of forest certification under unfavorable 
conditions and it does not explain the specific timing of the FSC’s development in 
Russia. Cashore and his colleagues do not test their theory against evidence from 
developing and transition countries where the enforcement of rules is traditionally 
weak, forest practices are poor and predictable legislation is lacking. This makes 
Russia an interesting case, since despite of the institutional and environmental 
complexities characteristic to developing and transition countries, it experienced a 
somewhat delayed but rapid expansion of forest certification. 
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A second set of challenging questions refers to the effects of forest certification 
in Russia. What specific effects and impact has forest certification had on corporate 
practices? To what extent can forest certification have an impact on the condition of 
forests and corporate practices in difficult situations? How does domestic context 
interact with global rules and to what extent does domestic context shape the 
implementation of global rules to produce specific outcomes? What is the role of local 
and global actors in the translation of global rules? The evidence presented in the 
subsequent chapters explicates how local actors – environmental movement 
organizations, certifiers and firms – adopt and translate global rules into locally 
specific rules and practices, i.e., how they interpret and reinterpret global rules and 
domestic conditions. I show that the process of translation enables practical 
implementation of standards but the price is only limited change that forest 
certification brings about in corporate practices. 
In the following section, I provide background information on the Forest 
Stewardship Council and its forest certification program in order to show how the 
analytical framework developed in Section 2.9 applies specifically to the selected 
case-study and thereby present a brief case-study preview.  
3.2 The Multi-Level Structure of the FSC’s Forest Certification System 
The FSC forest certification system consists of three core elements: forest 
management standards, third-party verification of compliance and accreditation 
program. Forest management standards are based on ten principles of good forest 
management (see Table 3) and fifty-six criteria specifying the ten basic principles 
(FSC 1996). The FSC principles and criteria are global, i.e., they are generic and 
applicable for all countries. In order to be applied in a domestic context, they have to 
be specified in a set of country- or region-specific indicators. Certification bodies 
assess company forest management on the basis of national or regional indicators. 
National and regional indicators can be developed either by national initiatives, i.e., 
associations representing national environmental organizations, business, workers and 
forest-dependent populations and acting as FSC’s national partners, or by certification 
bodies (if no national standard developed by national initiatives has been approved). 
National standards, therefore, combine global principles and criteria with national 
indicators. 
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Table 3: The Forest Stewardship Council Principles for Forest Stewardship 
Principle 1: Compliance with laws and FSC Principles 
Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of the country in which they occur, and 
international treaties and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and comply with all 
FSC Principles and Criteria. 
Principle 2: Tenure and use rights and responsibilities 
Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and defined, documented and legally established. 
Principle 3: Indigenous peoples’ rights 
The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, 
territories, and resources shall be recognized and respected. 
Principle 4: Community relations and worker’s rights 
Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance the long-economic well-being of 
forest workers and local communities. 
Principle 5: Benefits from the forest 
Forest management operations shall encourage multiple products and services to ensure 
environmental and social benefits. 
Principle 6: Environmental impact 
Forest management shall conserve biological diversity and its associated values, water 
resources, soils, and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain 
the ecological functions and the integrity of the forest. 
Principle 7: Management plan 
A management plan – appropriate to the scale and intensity of the operations – shall be 
written, implemented, and kept up to date. The long term objectives of management, and the 
means of achieving them, shall be clearly stated. 
Principle 8: Monitoring and assessment 
Monitoring shall be conducted – appropriate to the scale and intensity of forest management – 
to assess the condition of the forest, yields of forest products, chain of custody, management 
activities and their social and environmental impacts. 
Principle 9: Maintenance of high conservation value forests 
Management activities in high conservation value forests shall maintain or enhance the 
attributes which define such forests. Decisions regarding high conservation value forests shall 
always be considered in the context of a precautionary approach. 
Principle 10: Plantations 
Plantations shall be planned and managed in accordance with Principles 1 - 9, and Principle 
10 and its Criteria. While plantations can provide social and economic benefits, and can 
contribute to satisfying the demand for forest products, they should complement the 
management of, reduce and promote the restoration and conservation of natural forests. 
Source: FSC (1996) 
 
The FSC defines responsible forest management as environmentally appropriate, 
socially beneficial and economically viable. Ecologically, all forests should be 
planned and managed to preserve biodiversity, protect valuable forests and 
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endangered species and maintain forest productivity without undermining natural 
ecosystems. Socially, FSC forestry standards require protection of worker rights and 
indigenous people rights. The FSC also requires that forest use should not undermine 
the livelihoods of the local forest-dependent communities and enhance the wellbeing 
of society at large. Economically, crucial to the FSC is that forest operations generate 
enough profit but not at the expense of ecosystems, indigenous people or local 
communities. 
Verification of compliance of firms with FSC forestry standards is performed 
by accredited certification bodies, or certifiers, formally independent from both the 
FSC and producers seeking certification. As a rule, certification bodies are for-profit 
organizations offering professional services in certification and auditing in several 
sectors. They are responsible for assessing the compliance of firms seeking 
certification with FSC standards. Certification bodies hire experts in forestry, forest 
biology, labor law and worker rights, community and indigenous people rights that 
form assessment teams. Their task is to check company management plans and other 
documentation and to visit logging sites and forests in order to inspect company 
logging and silvicultural practices on the ground. The heads of these assessment 
teams produce assessment reports, which are subject to review by external experts. If 
compliance can be verified, certification bodies are entitled to issue complying firms 
five-year certificates on behalf of the FSC. Certified firms are allowed to label their 
products with the FSC logo and use FSC certification for marketing purposes. The 
FSC requires that certification bodies should conduct annual assessments of firms 
during five years and full re-assessments every five years. Assessments are 
conventionally called audits; the members of assessment teams are called auditors.  
Non-compliance does not automatically lead to the refusal or withdrawal of 
certificates. Auditors document non-compliance and issue Corrective Action Requests 
(CARs). CARs form a list of principles, criteria and indicators that a company has not 
met by the time of the assessment. CARs can be minor and major. They specify terms 
and conditions for meeting the requirements. Major CARs are issued when several 
criteria within a principle are not met or when non-compliance is systematic and may 
cause significant damage to the environment, workers or local communities. They 
should be closed before a certificate is issued. Minor CARs are issued when auditors 
judge non-compliance as occasional and not leading to significant damage. After non-
compliance has been detected and terms of correction have been specified a company 
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should develop an action plan that includes measures to correct non-compliance. After 
the certification body has reviewed the plan it may issue a certificate but require 
auditors to check for correct implementation at the next annual inspection. Companies 
may be given from several months up to several years to meet all requirements. 
Auditors play a key role in forest certification. They are experts in their fields 
and are extensively trained in internal and external training programs. Although 
certification bodies often employ internationally recognized auditors to lead 
assessment teams, they commonly hire additional local experts to help foreign 
auditors that often lack local knowledge, including local laws and habitual practices, 
and are, therefore, unable to evaluate the performance of forest operations. Through 
identification of non-compliance auditors also become “agents of change”, since in 
CARs auditors identify specific aspects of forest management that companies have to 
reform. 
In order to ensure transparency and credibility of the FSC certification system, 
certification bodies and national initiatives are subject to the FSC’s accreditation 
program. For this purpose, the FSC founded a separate accreditation body, the 
Accreditation Services International (ASI). Its task is to assess the compliance of 
certification bodies and national initiatives with the FSC’s mission and rules, as well 
as external guidelines accepted by the FSC as relevant and legitimate (for example, 
ISO/IEC Guide 65: 1996 – General Requirements for Bodies Operating Product 
Certification Systems). National standards developed by national initiatives also have 
to be accredited and, therefore, assessed by the ASI. On the basis of ASI reports, the 
FSC delivers accreditation decisions. National initiatives are usually accredited once; 
national standards are revised and re-assessed every five years; the performance of 
certification bodies is assessed annually. ASI can also conduct additional assessments 
of certification bodies, including spontaneous audits, if there is reason to believe that 
their performance is dissatisfactory.  
The FSC’s forest certification program has a multi-level organizational 
structure. At the transnational level, the FSC’s membership and its International 
Center design global rules, including standards, certification procedures, accreditation 
rules, guidelines and grievance resolution rules that are valid for all countries and all 
parties involved. At the national level, certification bodies, national initiatives and 
stakeholders develop generic principles and criteria (see Table 3) into national or 
regional standards adapted to the national or regional natural environment and legal 
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and social context. At the local level, individual firms, certification bodies, auditors 
and consultants transform national standards into concrete practices. They can 
redefine their existing practices to make them consistent with standards or reform 
them if non-compliance is detected.  
At the transnational level, the FSC’s standards reflect global norms on 
sustainable natural resource management codified in many official documents of the 
United Nations. Sustainability, or sustainable development, is an overarching 
paradigm that emphasizes the balanced use of natural resources that guarantees the 
access to resources for future generations. It is based on the belief that economic 
growth and environmental protection can be successfully combined to secure justice 
for the generations to come. According to Bernstein (2000), this paradigm emerged by 
the early 1990s – he terms it liberal environmentalism – and was endorsed at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992. FSC global principles of good forest management are consistent with 
the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All 
Types of Forests, or simply the “Forest Principles”, that were developed for the 
UNCED and enacted in Rio in 1992 together with the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The Forest Principles 
provide a framework for sustainable management of forests in the world and 
emphasize the need to consider multiple functions of forests – environmental, social, 
cultural and economic – when managing and using them.  
At the national level, domestic actors, i.e., the bearers of local knowledge, 
operationalize generic principle and criteria in national indicators. Yet these indicators 
remain sufficiently general to be applicable to diverse situations in a country or region 
that are never completely identical. Domestic actors, including nongovernmental 
organizations, companies, forestry scholars and certification bodies, search for global 
and local meanings, negotiate formulations and accept compromises to avoid 
deadlocks. Although they may seem to be like-minded, the negotiation involves 
contestation over alternative interpretations of global standards and local practices. In 
order to be comprehensible to those who implement standards as well as to those who 
assess compliance, national indicators have to be consistent with national legislation, 
habitual practices and the very policy language. This is an interesting paradox of 
translation of global norms into local practices. On the one hand, the idea of the FSC 
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is to challenge and change unsound local practices. On the other hand, they have to be 
consistent with local norms and policy language in order to be accepted by firms. The 
challenge is to make largely alien global norms understandable and acceptable to 
implementing actors that perceive their habitual taken-for-granted practices as 
legitimate.  
Finally, at the local level, national standards are implemented in companies 
operating in concrete environmental and social contexts. The implementation of 
standards, however, is never perfect. Auditors, company managers and other groups 
have to manage gaps between ideal prescriptions on paper and real difficult situations 
that often do not fit the assumptions of standards. Auditors play a key role here. When 
they decide whether specific practices are in compliance with standards or not, they 
do not only evaluate the performance of companies but also make sense of the 
contexts, in which companies operate, and the standard, which they apply. 
Figure 1: The Structure of the FSC’s Forest Certification System 
 
Source: Own design 
 
Figure 1 describes the system of FSC forest certification and its multiple levels at 
which translation takes place. It can be expected that through formal and informal 
feedback local implementation of rules leads to the modification and reform of global 
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rules. Although this is an interesting problem for a separate investigation, in my thesis 
I explore the process of translation and implementation of global standards in a 
specific local context. I am interested in the translation of global standards into 
national standards and into local practices and in the role of local actors in this process.  
Based on the background information provided above, the next section 
specifies how the arguments presented in Section 2.9 on the analytical framework of 
the study are applied to the case-study of forest certification in Russia.  
3.3 Translating Global FSC Standards into Local Practices: A Case-
Study Preview 
Within a multi-level FSC system, the formulation and translation of transnational 
environmental and social standards of good forest management occurs in three 
analytical steps: (1) At the transnational level, transnational standards of good forest 
management are formulated and the system of certification and labeling is constructed; 
(2) at the national level, broad transnational standards are translated into more specific 
national and regional standards, mainly by national actors, that provide more specific 
rules to be applied at the local level; (3) at the local level, i.e., in the implementation 
settings, national and regional standards are translated into specific on-the-ground 
practices that are expected to be in compliance with global principles and criteria. The 
empirical analysis presented in Chapters 4 to 7 is structured along these three steps.  
(1) In Chapter 4, I show that the making of the transnational standards and the 
building of a certification system occurs at the transnational level where different 
coalitions of actors, including nongovernmental organizations, individual 
environmental, labor rights and indigenous rights activists, firms and certification 
bodies, joined together to negotiate forest certification rules and structures as a 
solution to a problem of unsustainable management of the tropical forests leading to 
deforestation and forest degradation. The solution, i.e., a forest certification and 
labeling system, was shaped by the fundamental conflicts between environmental-
social and business coalitions over the management of forest resources and production 
of forest products and emerged as a compromise-based solution to the motivating 
problem and did not necessarily provide an effective remedy to the initial problem of 
deforestation in the tropics. 
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The existing literature suggests the specific organizational form that forest 
certification took was shaped not only by the fundamental conflicts over forest 
management and by the dominant neoliberal rules that exclude certain measures, such 
as bans and import restrictions by individual countries as contradicting free trade rules 
(Bartley 2003; 2007b). I show that in addition to these factors, international market 
demand for increasingly more certified timber, particularly in the European and North 
American markets, also explains the choice of specific contents of the rules and 
institutional elements that make up the FSC system of certification and labeling.  
I start Chapter 4 by describing the problem – deforestation and forest 
degradation as an environmental and political problem – that drove the emergence of 
forest certification as a new form of governance of forest management. In the 
subsequent sections of Chapter 4, I explicate the process of forest certification 
emergence understood as a process of institution-building by institutional 
entrepreneurs in specific structural and political conditions and explain how these 
conditions shaped the content of FSC rules and its organizational structure. 
In contrast to the following chapters based on the original data collected 
during my research (see Section 3.4), this chapter is based mainly on the review of the 
secondary literature in addition to several interviews with transnational actors, 
including the representatives of the FSC (see Appendix 1).  
(2) In Chapters 5 and 6, I show how the enactment of forest certification 
occurs in a specific context of Russia. Following the formulation of Schatzki (1997: 
291), I show how local actors with their knowledge and organizational resources 
“joined in” in creating a reliable, truly “high-road” instrument of forest management 
regulation by their active involvement in institution-building work at the domestic 
level. I show that environmental NGOs acted as institutional entrepreneurs and used 
their knowledge, skills and resources to enact forest certification as a mechanism to 
award forest companies that practiced decent or good forest management and to 
provide incentives to less responsible companies to make their practice comply with 
internationally recognized standards of good forest management. I show that local 
activists engaged in several kinds of institutional work (see Section 2.7) aimed at 
building a functioning forest certification system and thus created preconditions for a 
successful start and quick expansion of forest certification in Russia. 
One of the most important activities aimed at building a working forest 
certification system was the development of the national standard for Russia by the 
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Russian national initiative. In the national standard, broad and unspecific FSC 
principles and criteria were adapted to local conditions. The national initiative became 
a formal forum for negotiating stakeholder interests and settling conflicts between and 
within stakeholder groups that helped forest certification gain acceptance and support 
among different stakeholder groups as a legitimate source of rules for forest 
management. At the same time, it has become a formal forum for creating new 
knowledge and skills concerning good forest management and its practical 
implementation, i.e., for collective learning. These two processes facilitated the quick 
expansion of forest certification Russia, since they helped increase the support of 
forest certification by many parties and provided implementing actors with practical 
knowledge of forest certification. Other types of institution-building activities 
included creating compliance guides for companies, educating certification auditors 
and consultants, persuading companies to join forest certification system, offering 
consulting serviced to companies and monitoring certification and labeling at the local 
level.  
After describing Russian forest resources and the Russian forest sector in 
Chapter 5 and thus providing the reader with the understanding of the context into 
which forest certification was introduced, in Chapter 6 I show that identifying positive 
effect of several structural conditions on forest certification expansion is not enough 
to explain the success of forest certification in Russia. An understanding of a role of 
institutional entrepreneurs and their institution-building work is required for grasping 
the mechanisms that connect favorable or unfavorable structural conditions with 
specific outcomes. In sum, in Chapter 6 I show how local actors with their knowledge, 
skills and resources – coupled with favorable structural conditions and transnational 
market and reputational pressures – came together in Russia and created preconditions 
for a rapid expansion of forest certification in Russia.  
 (3) The final step of my analysis deals with the translation of the FSC 
principles, criteria and indicators of good forest management into specific on-the- 
ground practices in local implementation settings and the evaluation of the effects of 
forest certification. I argue in Chapter 7 that one-to-one translation of transnational 
standards into local practice is only one possible mode of translation. I show that 
implementing actors, e.g., firms seeking certification as well as activists, consultants 
and auditors, can use different strategies to implement global principles and criteria in 
specific settings. In the implementation process, the context (e.g., legal arrangements 
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and habitual practices) plays a critical role, since it provides implementing actors with 
building blocks that they can use in combination with global ideas reflected in 
transnational standards in order to achieve compliance with certification standards. 
From this perspective, practices can be read off the standards, or implemented directly; 
local habitual practices can be also reframed to fit the FSC requirements; local 
practices can be combined with global ideas borrowed from other settings (e.g., in the 
process of cross-border or cross-setting learning); or local practices can be invented. 
The previous analysis may suggest that implementation in Russia goes 
smoothly and leads to improvements in forest management. Indeed, my analysis 
documents some positive changes in the forest management. Yet, it also shows that 
forest certification has had a limited effectiveness in Russia. In the last two sections of 
Chapter 7, I argue that national forest regulations and certification’s compliance 
assessment procedures limit the effectiveness of forest certification. 
National regulations can do so in two ways. First, since forest certification 
principles require compliance with all national laws and regulations, national 
certification requirements have to be adapted to national legislation. It is, therefore, 
possible that the national standard does not challenge certain environmentally 
unsound practices prescribed by law. There may be different reasons for this. In some 
cases, challenging certain prescribed practices may lead to serious contradictions 
between national regulations and certification standards and increase certification 
costs. In turn, this may decrease the willingness of forest operations to pursue 
certification. Second, forest operations are the primary objects of forest certification 
as a nonstate regulatory instrument. At the same time, private forest operations are not 
the only organizations that may be responsible for forest management. Some forest 
management practices may be conducted by other organizations, including national or 
local forest service, and may turn out to contradict the certification standard. Yet, this 
is not a common reason for certification organizations to withdraw a certificate. 
The second limitation deals with the compliance assessment system in forest 
certification programs. Due to its market nature, it is commonly based on the 
competition between organizations that offer certification services to forest operations. 
Certified companies bear direct certification costs (e.g., the costs of assessment, an 
assessment team’s accommodation and transportation costs and certification 
organizations’ charge fees). Since there is more than one certifier on the market, they 
compete with each other over companies seeking certification. This may lead to lower 
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certification costs but at the same time may negatively affect the quality of 
compliance assessment. In order to generate an advantage on the market for forest 
certification services, certification organizations may try to reduce costs by reducing 
personnel or working time required for a compliance assessment. This may, however, 
negatively affect the quality of compliance assessment, since due to the lack of time 
or personnel noncompliance may be overlooked.  
3.4 Methods and Sources of Data 
To address the questions and problems proposed in the previous sections, I use 
qualitative case-study analysis based on extended semi-structured interviews with 
global and local organizations that have been actively involved in the structuring of 
the FSC’s forest certification program – at the global level and locally in Russia. 
Interviews were combined with observations at various official meetings and seminars 
in Russia and in the FSC’s International Center in Germany. Since the study focuses 
on the previously undocumented history of forest certification in Russia,13 I relied on 
interviews with key individuals and representatives of organizations that played a 
crucial role in the development of forest certification in Russia. Interviews were also 
important for reconstructing the positions of key actors on forest certification and the 
history of forestry and forest politics in Russia. Moreover, interviews served to 
document processes of rule negotiation and translation that cannot be reconstructed by 
quantitative methods. In addition, I used position papers, discussion papers, internal 
documents and newspaper articles to reconstruct events and opinions related to forest 
certification. 
In total, I conducted forty-seven interviews with the FSC officials in the FSC 
International Center in Bonn, with the representatives of Russian environmental 
groups, certified company managers, forestry experts, certification bodies, auditors 
and members of the FSC’s national initiative (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, 
Syktyvkar, Segezha, Vladivostok, and Khabarovsk, 2006-2007, see Appendix 1 for 
the list of interviews and Appendix 2 for the map of Russia). All interviews were 
                                                 
13
 Tysiachniouk (2006) documents the first years of the FSC’s development in Russia and its early 
effects but her latest interviews are dated 2004. A number of important developments of the FSC’s 
forest certification program after 2004 are not covered, including the FSC’s dramatic growth between 
2004 and 2008 from less then three to over twenty one million of hectares of forests certified and 
managed (FSC-Russia 2008). 
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transcribed. Since the process of translation and implementation in the focus of the 
study involves the search and negotiation of meanings and struggles over appropriate 
policy vocabulary and language, the interpretative analysis of interviews and texts 
was required to document these struggles. For this purpose, I conducted the analysis 
of the interview transcriptions with the text analysis software MAXQDA. 
Another source of empirical evidence are the observations and interviews that 
I conducted during three months of fieldwork in 2006 and 2007 in several forest 
operations in the Russian Far East, in the Arkhangelsk federal region and in the 
Republic of Karelia. The goal of the fieldwork was to closely examine to what extent 
rules and standards of the FSC are applied in concrete situations on an everyday basis 
without immediate control of the FSC, national initiatives or certification bodies 
(certifiers inspect forest operations once a year). Field research combined 
observations and semi-structured interviews with forest workers, local populations 
and managers as well as foresters responsible for logging and other forestry practices 
and, therefore, for the immediate implementation of the FSC rules.  
In the following chapters, I concentrate on the empirical analysis of 
implementation processes on the ground and the development of forest certification in 
Russia based on the collected materials. In the first empirical chapter dealing with the 
Russian experience, I analyze the history of forest certification in Russia and its 
impact and outcomes. I identify the sequence of the events and key actors and 
evaluate their role in the forest certification expansion in Russia. I evaluate its mixed 
outcomes and specify problems that emerge as forest certification develops. In the 
final empirical chapter I will analyze the role of local actors, including certifiers and 
auditors of the FSC in enhancing forest certification set of rules that are meant to 
guide the behavior of Russian forest companies. I will show how they routinely deal 
with the problems of evaluation and judgment of forest management.  
Before I move to the analysis of Russian experience, I will first describe the 
history of global forest politics and the rise of forest certification as a private 
regulatory mechanism to address unsustainable forest management practices of forest 
companies worldwide. In this chapter I focus on the early evolution of the FSC and 
identify what factors affected its organizational transformation. This chapter provides 
background knowledge of the FSC system required for better understanding the 
subsequent chapters based the evidence from Russia. 
   
4 The Rise and Development of the Forest 
Stewardship Council 
In this chapter I show how forest certification emerged and how the FSC 
developed to take its contemporary form. In the literature, the emergence of private 
regulation in forestry is associated with two factors. One is the activity of 
environmental groups. The second is the dominance of the neoliberal institutional 
context (Bartley 2003). Environmentalists were motivated by the growing rates of 
tropical deforestation in the 1980s but were disappointed with the way the 
governments worked towards finding solutions. At the same time they were 
encouraged by the success of their ‘shaming and naming’ campaigns against well 
established large brand-oriented corporations that agreed in response to change their 
purchasing policies. Activists were convinced there could be a potential market 
leverage that could encourage companies to adopt better environmental and social 
practices voluntarily. Environmental NGOs hoped that changes in purchasing policies 
of large players in the market would also influence practices down their supply chain. 
Corporations were willing to change their practices because it could protect them 
from activists’ campaigns, improve their corporate image at a relatively low cost and 
bring them a comparative advantage in a new market for responsibly produced goods. 
Moreover, this was consistent with the dominant neoliberal institutional 
context and many international organizations, states, and charity foundations 
supported the idea of forest certification. International organizations whose credo was 
to promote the idea that market regulation is more efficient than state regulation were 
eager to support forest certification as long as it remained a voluntary program. 
Through funding, charity foundations also channeled the activity of NGOs from 
radical forms of protest to the idea of forest certification (Bartley 2007a). Based on 
voluntary participation and market incentives, i.e., a perceived consumer demand for 
responsibly produced goods, forest certification was consistent with GATT/WTO 
rules and could not be defined as a non-tariff barrier to trade and could be considered 
instead a form of civil regulation. 
The reaction of states was mixed but many governments at least rhetorically 
supported the idea of forest certification because they felt that forest certification 
could be one way to shift the burden of regulation of forest use, pacify the concerned 
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public and remain within the rules of free trade enforced by GATT/WTO. Some states, 
however, mainly in the tropical countries, feared that forest certification was a threat 
to their sovereignty and control over forests. To oppose NGO-led forest certification 
they created national certification programs that were not accepted by the 
environmental groups as credible and reliable. 
Furthermore, forest certification was consistent not only with the specific free 
trade regulations but also with more encompassing dominant policy frames. First, it is 
consistent with the frame of sustainable development that in principle holds possible a 
combination of economic growth and environmental protection. The idea of forest 
certification is rooted in the notion that production and specifically timber production 
can be sustainable. This means that in the long run if the world’s forests are managed 
in a sustainable way they can satisfy the needs of forest-related industry and 
consumers around the world without being devastated. This frame became 
institutionalized after the Earth Summit in 1992 and dominates contemporary 
international environmental politics (Bernstein 2000).  
Second, forest certification is embedded in another institutionalized frame of 
corporate social responsibility that may also be viewed as a part of neoliberal 
institutional context. This neoliberal frame is based on the notion that the primary task 
of company executives is to make profits and thereby maximize shareholder value and 
making a company responsible and accountable to a wider community of stakeholders 
is one element of a successful business strategy (Vogel 2005). This new philosophy of 
corporate social responsibility views investment in forest certification as a clear 
business case that helps large companies increase their profits. This frame was 
embraced by several influential environmental NGOs, especially WWF, in a “new 
cooperative, market-based moderate philosophy (McNichol 2006: 358). 
Finally, in the late 1980s environmental NGOs and commercial organizations 
designed first certification programs to certify companies’ environmental performance. 
They thereby created important organizational models that activists could refer to in 
the negotiations of forest certification organizational structure, procedural rules and 
certification standards. They also created organizational infrastructure, on the basis of 
which NGOs could launch first certification programs. In 1991 Rainforest Alliance 
based in the US established the SmartWood program, the world’s first forest 
certification program. Rainforest Alliance was one of the founding members of the 
FSC and the SmartWood was among the first certification programs to achieve FSC 
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accreditation in 1996 and has become one of the most influential certification bodies 
operating globally. In what follows I will show in a greater detail how this story 
unfolded throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the following sections, I first show the 
global relevance forests and forest conservation issues to introduce the problem that 
motivated nonstate actors to create the FSC and identify how they  
4.1 Deforestation and Forest Degradation as Global Environmental 
Problems 
Deforestation and forest degradation significantly contributes to the growing loss of 
the world’s biodiversity. Harvesting forests endangers hundreds of species both in 
tropical and temperate forests by destroying their natural habitat. Biodiversity is 
valuable for scientific and ethical reasons but its loss also directly affects the 
wellbeing of people. Many drugs and pharmaceutical products, including antibiotics, 
antivirals, analgesics and tranquilizers, are produced of materials derived from 
tropical forest plants (Myers 1996: 158). Moreover, Mendelsohn and Balick (1995) 
estimated the value of yet “undiscovered” drugs equal to US$ 147 thousand million. 
They also argue that tropical forests contain several yet unidentified plants that could 
be used to produce drugs against cancer.  
Furthermore, deforestation threatens natural habitat and livelihoods of 
communities of indigenous peoples who traditionally depend on forests for food and 
housing and often attach a cultural value to forests. Indigenous people and forest 
communities are displaced as forests are logged both in tropical and temperate forests 
and their traditional habitat is destroyed. 
Forests also fulfill important ecological functions, including natural watershed 
management and soil protection. Deforestation is a damaging factor for soil fertility 
and may increase the likelihood of droughts and contribute to soil erosion and 
desertification that in turn harms local community wellbeing.  
Finally, although no epistemic consensus has emerged on the causes (and 
consequences) of global warming and climate change many believe that deforestation 
is one of many factors contributing to the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. Houghton (2005) estimated that throughout the 1990s tropical 
deforestation released about 20% of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gas. 
Moreover, if deforestation remains at its current rate further clearing of forests, forest 
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fires, drought-induced tree mortality resulting from global warming and reduced sink 
capacities due to decreased forest areas will further increase carbon dioxide emissions 
in the atmosphere (Gullison et al. 2007). The contribution of deforestation is much 
less significant than that of fossil fuel combustion but some scholars suggest that 
slowing down deforestation may become one of the least expensive solutions to 
emissions reduction problem (Gullison et al. 2007). Yet, no significant reduction in 
the deforestation rates has been achieved. 
The issues of deforestation became prominent in the late 1970s and 1980s 
when several influential scholars pointed out the growing rates of deforestation and 
forest degradation in the tropical countries (Elliott 2005). The media and 
nongovernmental organizations confronted consumers in North America and Europe 
with shocking pictures of tropical forests burning or being clear-cut in Brazilian 
Amazon, the Congo basin and the South-East Asia. NGOs organized ‘naming and 
shaming’ campaigns against large retailers and producers importing tropical timber or 
selling tropical timber products to final consumers. These campaigns effectively draw 
the attention of retailers and end consumers to the tropical deforestation and triggered 
some reaction from governments, consumers and business but essentially international 
trade in tropical timber is only a minor cause of tropical deforestation.  
Contrary to some popular beliefs, international trade in tropical timber and 
poor forest management are not the main causes of deforestation in the tropical 
countries. The share of tropical timber traded internationally equals to six per cent of 
the total timber harvested in the tropical countries, the rest being traded and consumed 
domestically (Elliott/Donovan 1996: 3). Deforestation in the tropics is a highly 
complex subject and has multiple causes profoundly rooted in the structure of 
international inequality (Humphreys 1996). 
Tropical Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
Virtually all tropical countries belong to the developing world. Many are classified by 
the UN as the least developed countries. The majority are deeply indebted to 
international organizations and banks. Governments are weak and corrupt. Under 
these conditions, governments are often unable to exercise proper control over forest 
land and use forests to alleviate economic and demographic pressures. Forests are the 
least valued lands and governments readily allow destructing forests for a ‘better’ use, 
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including converting forests into agricultural holdings and industrial areas and clear-
cutting forests for timber. 
The most of the deforestation comes from the lack of any forest management 
and results from massive and often uncontrolled agricultural expansion and land 
conversion, which is in turn an outcome of population growth and extreme poverty in 
many tropical countries. With the significant population growth in the tropical 
countries in the last three decades, the displaced communities practicing slash and 
burn agriculture multiply. These people are at the margin of societies and are forced to 
migrate and remove forests as they move on to provide themselves with food and 
firewood. Expanding urban and rural populations also need increasingly more 
construction materials, firewood and land for agricultural smallholdings extracted 
from tropical forests without a proper state control (Humphreys 1996: 8). 
Another important source of deforestation is industrial agriculture and other 
export-oriented industries, such as gold, beef, oil and timber (Humphreys 1996: 5). 
National and transnational corporations remove forests to develop plantations and 
pastures or to build extraction facilities. Alternatively, they buy deforested lands from 
shifting cultivators and rural communities to establish palm oil, soy beans or 
mahogany plantations. These destructive practices are often tacitly approved by 
governments who use forests to alleviate country’s economic and demographic 
problems. In Brazil if a group of people removes the forest and cultivates crops for 
only one year the state officially acknowledges their ownership of the land. 
Corporations can then legally buy this land from the cultivators and establish a soy 
beans plantation there and shifting cultivators move further. 
Deforestation is also closely interlinked with national economic and poverty 
reduction policies. Forests are not recognized as a global common and are, therefore, 
a national jurisdiction and a subject to national policy-making. Governments provide 
companies and individuals with incentives to remove forests to convert them into 
agricultural lands or to extract timber for domestic and international markets. In the 
tropical countries forests are considered to be the cheapest land and governments 
easily trade it for revenues from plantations and industrial facilities. Governments 
contribute to tropical deforestation hoping to increase their revenues to improve 
country’s economic position and reduce external debts. The revenues that 
governments extract from clearing tropics could be used for organizing and 
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supporting forest management system but they have to be transferred to creditors to 
settle external debt payments and alleviate pressing social problems. 
Many countries are so poor that their governments lack the capacities and 
resources to inventory and assess forests and develop an adequate legal framework to 
regulate forestry and a forest management system to enforce these legal norms. 
Tenure and ownership rights are not specified and regulated. Where tenure and 
ownership is regulated the traditional rights of indigenous people and forest 
communities are often not respected. Where legal framework is in place governments 
are often too weak to enforce existing legal norms and national forest management 
systems are ineffective and unable to monitor forest activities of corporations and 
local populations and protect forests. Where governments initiated policy reforms 
their implementation is often undermined by corruption and informal norms 
regulating forestry industry. Ineffectiveness of national forest management systems 
and weakness of governments is, therefore, often coupled with widespread corruption 
and illegal activities. Tropical forests suffer from various forms of illegal activity, 
illegal logging and illegal burning of forests being the most widespread. 
In South America, particularly in Peru, Colombia and Guatemala, forests are 
cleared for drug cultivation. In some cases illegal clearings of forests are protected by 
corrupt state and military officials that profit from working relationships with 
cultivators and traffickers (Humphreys 1996: 8). In the South East Asia, corruption at 
the national and local levels of government blocks effective implementation of 
forestry policies and programs. Informal norms that govern business-state 
relationships in the Asia-Pacific shape corporate logging practices more than national 
corporate and environmental laws and international agreements. State officials at all 
levels of state organization are tied to loggers and benefit from allowing illegal 
logging in exchange for bribes and personal security. Covered up by state officials, 
loggers also evade taxes, avoid environmental responsibility and hide illegal logging 
and smuggling. In response to international pressures, governments in the Asia-
Pacific initiated environmental and forest policy reforms in the 1990s but these 
reforms remain largely rhetorical and their implementation on the ground is 
undermined by informal norms governing forestry industry and corrupt ties between 
bureaucrats and corporate loggers (Dauvergne 2005: 176-191).  
Finally, internationally sponsored development contributed directly and 
indirectly to deforestation in the 1970s and 1980s (Humphreys 1996: 3; Keck and 
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Sikkink 1998). External debt, structural adjustment programs and infrastructural 
programs of the 1980s and 1990s developed by international organizations, such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to promote development also 
forced governments to encourage extraction of timber and conversion of forest lands. 
Some programs have directly sponsored tropical forests destruction by financing road 
building in the tropical forests. NGOs criticized structural adjustment programs for 
promoting export-oriented economic growth models and resource mining rather than 
effective management of resources (Humphreys 1996: 3-5). Responding to 
environmentalists’ concerns, the World Bank created an environmental department in 
1987 to incorporate environmental criteria into the Bank’s decision-making. In 1991 it 
developed a forest strategy, in which it committed under any circumstances not to 
finance commercial loggings that involve clear-cutting primary moist tropical forests 
(Crossley 1996). 
Deforestation had long been thought to be the problem of the tropics. However, 
forest management in relatively safe European countries, USA and Canada has been 
increasingly criticized by environmental groups and environment and forestry 
scientists. 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Temperate and Boreal Forests 
Forest management in temperate zones and the status of temperate and boreal forests 
were long considered unproblematic. European and North American governments and 
industry associations that were concerned with the state of tropical forests and 
participated in developing policy instruments to combat tropical deforestation had 
long refused to accept that their own countries’ forest management norms regulating 
practices in temperate and boreal forests had to be reconsidered and reformed 
(Humphreys 1996). However, forest management of temperate and boreal forests was 
problematized in the early 1990s in several international forest forums, including the 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED). After UNCED held in Rio de Janeiro in 
June of 1992 boreal and temperate forests were included in the international forest 
policy agenda (Elliott/Donovan 1996: 1).  
Temperate and boreal forests cover more than a half of the world’s forest land. 
The countries hold the majority of temperate forests: Canada, USA and Russia, with 
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Russia alone 41% and Canada and USA 32%. 10% is located in northern Asia and 
another 8% in Europe. The remaining 9% are in Australia and Oceania, Latin America 
and Africa (Dudley 1992). These forests are, therefore, located mainly in countries 
where the most of the world’s reforestation occurs and where many believe good 
forest management is practiced. Indeed, the world’s total area of temperate forests 
increases (Dudley 1992; FAO 2005) due to reforestation efforts mainly in Europe and 
North America but environmentalists claim that this only masks continuing regional 
deforestation and overall lowering forest quality and inappropriate forest management 
of temperate and boreal forests (Dudley 1992). The set of problems in boreal and 
temperate forests is, therefore, different from tropical forests. Instead of large-scale 
massive deforestation and the lack of forest management in the most of the tropics, 
boreal and temperate forests suffer from imperfect forest management practices and 
deforestation in some regions.  
Although for different reasons, national governments, including tropical 
countries, and environmentalists drew attention to the deforestation and the loss of 
forest quality in temperate and boreal forests in the early 1990s. Governments argued 
that international forest policy programs and action plans, including certification 
programs, should include all types of forests in all regions of the world to avoid 
discrimination of tropical timber in the global market. They claimed this 
discrimination would be based on production methods and would, therefore, 
contradict GATT/WTO rules. Environmentalists criticized governments, companies 
and industry associations for obsolete forest management norms and practices, such as 
clear-cutting, over-logging and logging of old growth native forests. 
Environmentalists claim that inadequacy of forest management in temperate 
and boreal forests in countries including Russia, Canada and the US, is rooted in the 
traditional production-oriented approach to forest management based on the concept 
of sustained timber yield. Put simply, sustained timber yield means that the amount of 
timber harvested on a certain area should not exceed the amount of timber produced 
on the same area within a certain period of time. In other words, companies should not 
harvest more trees than can potentially grow on a certain area within a certain period 
of time. This approach neglects environmental and social aspects of forestry and 
reduces multiple functions of forests to sole timber production and is widely criticized 
by activists. Some environmentalists and forestry scholars claimed that this approach 
had led to the loss of forest quality (Dudley 1992; Elliott/Donovan 1996: 3). The 
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majority of governments and forest industry have been, however, equally reluctant to 
accept that the reform of forest norms and practices was necessary. 
Environmentalists emphasize the destruction of old growth native boreal and 
temperate forests in the US, Russia and Canada (Dudley 1992; Greenpeace 2007; 
Vogel 2005: 115-117) that are often not recognized as environmentally valuable forest 
in legal norms regulating forestry. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s environmental 
nongovernmental organizations, including Greenpeace, the Friends of the Earth, Taiga 
Rescue Network, Rainforest Action Network and Forest Ethics have campaigned 
against large high-profile brand-oriented forest product producers and retailers, 
including Home Depot, Sears and Lowes in the US, B&Q in the UK, OBI, UPM, 
Stora Enso and IKEA in Europe, for logging ancient forests in Europe, Russia and 
North America (Vogel 2005). 
Environmentalists and forestry scientists also stress that behind the official 
statistics of growing forest area in Europe and North America is the increasing 
regional deforestation in temperate and boreal forest zones. While in some regions 
North America and Europe forest area increases deforestation continues in other 
regions. For example, Hobson, Bayne and van Wingelburg (2002: 1530) show that the 
annual rate of deforestation in Saskatchewan in relatively safe Canada between 1975 
and 2002 was 0.89%, “a rate approximately three times the world average,” and 73% 
of boreal transition zone had been converted into agricultural land since European 
settlement. 
Finally, in Russia in the North-West, Siberia and the Far East massive illegal 
logging and uncontrolled forest use under conditions of vague forestry legislation and 
weak state enforcement of forestry norms contribute to the degradation of the most 
environmentally important forests. In addition, illegal loggers evade taxes, avoid 
environmental responsibility and thereby indirectly contribute to the lowering of the 
quality of replanted forests because without these resources the state forest agencies 
are unable to restore forests (WWF 2006).  
Although temperate and boreal forests are damaged significantly less than 
tropical forests, essentially the causes of deforestation are similar in temperate and 
tropical forests. Initially the forests were cleared to provide Europe’s and North 
America’s growing population with building materials, firewood and agricultural land. 
In the industrial era industrial logging had become the most important damaging 
factor for temperate forests, mainly for domestic consumption, but international 
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timber trade had also negatively affected forests in many export-oriented countries, 
including Russia, Finland, Sweden and Canada. However, industrial logging itself 
cannot be considered a damaging factor. Inappropriate forest management, of which 
logging is only one element, and inability or lack of political will of governments to 
adopt better forestry norms and strengthen control over industry is the main cause of 
forest degradation and deforestation.  
In general, it is still an open question for many what is the extent of the impact 
of timber industry and timber trade on the state of the world’s forests. While in 
countries with the boreal and temperate forests industrial logging has been widely 
accepted as the main cause of forest loss and forest degradation, in the tropical 
countries it is probably the conversion of land that is the main cause of deforestation. 
However, at least in some tropical areas, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea among others, logging for timber industry is the main cause of 
deforestation. Moreover, only a small proportion of timber enters international 
markets. Most of the timber is consumed domestically. It is, therefore, questionable 
that public and private regulation of timber trade can help significantly address the 
non-forestry causes of deforestation, including poverty, population growth, corruption 
and weak government. It is certainly important to regulate timber trade but at the same 
time it may be misleading and even dangerous to claim that forest certification and 
similar programs is “a magic bullet” (Lipschutz 2005) in combating world’s forest 
problems. In the next section, I will look at how governments and international 
organizations addressed the problems of global forest degradation and describe how 
these developments affected the rise of forest certification. 
4.2 Deforestation and Forest Degradation as Global Political Problems 
The tropical deforestation and forest degradation became an international political 
issue after scientists, environmentalists, local and international NGOs and media 
brought it to the forefront of public attention in the early 1980s. The first evidence of 
the growing deforestation in the tropics and its impact on the Earth’s climate, energy 
balance, soils and watersheds, and forest dependent communities appeared in the late 
1970s but it was not until the mid-1980s that governments and intergovernmental 
bodies developed the first major policy responses to the tropical deforestation pressed 
by the nongovernmental organizations, media and the general public. 
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In the 1980s and up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in June of 1992 there were several intergovernmental 
initiatives to combat deforestation in the tropical countries but ultimately international 
organizations proved to be unable to resolve internal conflicts and produce viable 
policy instruments to slow down deforestation in the tropics. Notably, the participants 
of the UNCED in June 1992 (the Earth Summit) failed to adopt a legally-binding 
global forest convention and instead produced a non-legally binding authoritative 
statement on forest management, conservation and sustainable development. For 
many environmentalists this was a source of frustration and disappointment in 
government-led initiatives. In response, they started looking for alternative 
instruments to control deforestation. 
While still completely absent from the international political agenda in the 
1960s, tropical deforestation quickly gained importance in the 1970s when influential 
environmental organizations drew attention to the disappearing tropical forests (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998: 133). The International Union for Nature Conservation (IUCN), 
the influential conservationist organization, and WWF were among the first to take up 
the tropical deforestation issue. In 1972, the presidents of IUCN and WWF wrote an 
open letter to the President of Brazil, in which they expressed concern with the plans 
of Brazilian governments to promote further extensive colonization and development 
in the Amazon. In 1974, both organizations declared deforestation one of the crucial 
issues for the next decade. Urged by NGOs, in 1973-1980 several UN agencies and 
international organizations, governments and NGOs organized meetings of scientists, 
government representatives and international organizations to discuss the problems of 
tropical deforestation but some of the most important tropical countries did not 
acknowledge the need for reform and often refused to participate in such meetings. 
Moreover, the network of scientists, activists and policy-makers was still relatively 
small and their efforts produced only limited results (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 134-
135). 
By the mid-1980s, disappointed with poor results and limitations, NGOs 
started looking for new ways to strengthen their influence. They sought, on the one 
hand, to intensify their participation in the intergovernmental policy-making, 
including lobbying and joint projects. On the other hand, they worked to mobilize 
wider constituencies, including consumers and active citizens, for their campaigns 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998: 135). 
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About the same time, in the beginning of the 1980s the threatening scope of 
deforestation became evident. Forestry scientists and conservationists published the 
first assessments of the tropical forests resources in the late 1970s (Lanly and Clément 
1979; Myers 1980; Sommer 1976). At that point systematic forests surveys were 
practically non-existent, the required information was unavailable and the available 
information was often inadequate (Sommer 1976). To assesses tropical forest 
resources properly, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
initiated the first systematic forest assessment study in 1980 called Forest Resources 
Assessment 1990 Project that was finalized in 1993 after four assessment surveys. 
FAO’s project revealed that in some countries deforestation rates doubled or even 
tripled each two-three years in 1981-1993. Independent assessments (Myers 1984) 
also showed dramatic increase of deforested areas and the growing rates of 
deforestation. These reports also documented growing forest fragmentation and the 
loss of forest quality in the tropical forests. These results helped governments and 
international agencies recognize the significance of forest degradation and 
deforestation and contributed to initiation of global discussions of policy responses to 
forest problems (Humphreys 1996). 
NGOs’ lobbying, the growing evidence of tropical deforestation and forest 
degradation and public and media concern with tropical forests in the 1980s in 
different ways triggered the development of international policy responses. In 1983, 
the first international agreement to deal with the problems of tropical forests, the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), was signed and became operational 
in 1985. The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) was set up to 
administer this agreement. In 1987, FAO in cooperation with the World Resources 
Institute, an influential NGO, the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) published the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), a set of 
common non-legally binding guidelines for the development of national forestry 
action plans in participating countries. 
These two initiatives were crucial for the development of forest certification as 
a private forest policy instrument. First, they served the source of frustration and 
disappointment for many NGOs that felt that intergovernmental policy responses were 
not effective enough to reduce the rates of deforestation and promote forest 
conservation and sustainable development of forests. Moreover, many NGOs felt that 
their participation is very limited and they were too often excluded from decision-
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making. Many found that conflicts of interests between countries blocked effective 
policy making. Second, they significantly contributed to the institutionalization of the 
sustainable development policy frame in forest politics. Finally, the ITTO 
continuously rejected the proposals for forest certification schemes in 1988-1993. 
This decision was among the most important factors that shaped the development of 
forest certification and the FSC. 
FAO’s Tropical Forestry Action Plan 
After the publication of FAO’s reports on deforestation rates in the tropical countries 
in the early 1980s, in 1985 FAO started working on five action programs that later 
became the core of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP): Forestry in Land Use, 
Forest-Based Industrial Development, Fuelwood and Energy, Conservation of 
Tropical Forest Ecosystems and Action Program on Institutions. In the same year an 
influential NGO the World Resources Institute initiated a project on developing a 
program for reversing deforestation in the tropics and brought together bilateral 
development agencies, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program. 
The World Resources Institute saw its initiative as a complementary to FAO’s project 
and adopted FAO’s five action programs. In 1987 two initiatives formally merged and 
published TFAP that combined the work of two initiatives in one document. 
Basically, TFAP was a set of guidelines for national forestry bodies for 
devising a national forest action plan (NFAP). It was not a legally-binding agreement; 
it only provided a general comprehensive framework for designing national forestry 
action plans given the diversity of conditions and types of forests across and within 
countries. TFAP was designed as project-oriented policy arrangement that allocated 
financial resources made available by donors among national governmental bodies to 
implement specific projects in the framework of NFAP.  
By 1990 TFAP secured support from many donors, including development 
banks, UN agencies, governments and international organizations. Many tropical 
countries became interested in developing national forestry action plans. By 
November 1994 forty-two countries had national forestry action plans formulated; 
thirty-one of them were implementing their plans. In thirty-two countries national 
forestry action plans was being formulated or planned (Humphreys 1996).  
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At the same time in 1990, the World Resources Institute, the World Rainforest 
Movement and FAO’s own independent reviewers along with many other NGOs 
strongly criticized TFAP. The criticisms centered on failing to reduce deforestation 
rates; ignoring the interests of local populations and indigenous people; biased and 
unbalanced decision-making; failing to address the main causes of deforestation – 
poverty; and excluding NGOs from decision-making. TFAP initiated a lengthy 
restructuring processes but the majority of NGOs remained skeptical about the 
potential of FAO and TFAP to produce change in forest management and reverse 
deforestation in the tropical countries.  
Many hopes of NGOs did not realize. The decision-making powers remained 
in the hands of nation-states and international organizations and NGOs only retained 
their consultative status. NGO’s initiative to form independent consultative groups at 
the international and national levels that would ensure genuine involvement of all 
stakeholders, such as disadvantaged indigenous peoples and forest dwellers was 
blocked. Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan (1995:116) wrote in 1995: “It [TFAP] has 
not provided an integrated policy, nor produced a coherent set of country policies, 
some of which have actually resulted in increasing the level of timber production 
from primary forests” (emphasis in the original). By 1995, all significant 
environmental organizations as well as the three original founders of the TFAP had 
withdrawn their support of TFAP.  
The experience with TFAP and FAO was significant for the rise of forest 
certification because it contributed to the feeling of frustration among activists. 
Conservationists felt that FAO failed to become a forum for a genuinely inclusive 
dialogue for all groups that have stakes in forests and very soon lost its leadership in 
international forest politics (Humphreys 1996). Moreover, environmental 
organizations felt that TFAP’s major focus was a sustainable timber production 
(Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995: 115) that neglected ecological, social and 
cultural aspects of forests. For activists, stakeholder participation and indigenous 
people as well as effectiveness of TFAP-sponsored projects were the key issue and 
they were increasingly disillusioned by the international agencies’ inability to respond 
to their demands without violating two of the basic assumptions of the international 
post-war political economy: state sovereignty and free trade. This tension became 
strikingly apparent during the negotiation of the international tropical timber trade 
regime in the International Tropical Timber Organization.  
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The International Tropical Timber Organization 
The ITTO was set up in 1985 to administer the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement (ITTA) The ITTA was created to coordinate the international market for 
tropical timber and alleviate negative consequences of tropical timber trade using soft 
coordination tools. ‘Hard’ regulatory tools, including quotas, buffer stocks, bans and 
tariffs, were excluded from the ITTO’s policy toolkit. The ITTO member states were 
divided into two groups: producing and consuming countries. Essentially the division 
was between developed and poorer developing counties. 
The ultimate goal of ITTA was to facilitate timber market expansion and 
balance demand and supply in the timber market by providing an effective framework 
for cooperation, supporting research and development, improving market intelligence, 
encouraging reforestation and forest management and encouraging further processing 
of timber in timber producing countries. In addition to market-related goals, one of the 
ITTA’s objectives was “to encourage the development of national policies aimed at 
sustainable utilization and conservations of tropical forests and their genetic resources, 
and at maintaining the ecological balance in the regions concerned” (ITTO cited in 
Gale 1998: 80). This gave environmentalists a hope that the ITTO would become the 
first trade organization that would incorporate environmental concerns into 
international trade coordination. These hopes waned quickly as it became clear that 
the ITTO was unable to overcome internal tensions between producing countries, 
consuming countries, environmental NGOs and timber trade organizations. 
The ITTO was among the first organizations that attempted to specify 
sustainable forest management in a set of principles for producing countries. The 
ITTO Guidelines for Sustainable Forest Management of Natural Tropical Forests 
were adopted in 1990. The document consisted of forty-one principles of sustainable 
forest management and thirty-six recommendations specifying how to realize these 
principles. In 1991-1992 these guidelines were followed by two other documents: The 
Guidelines for the Establishments and Sustainable Management of Planted Tropical 
Forests and The Guidelines for the Conservation of Biodiversity in Tropical 
Production Forests. 
The Guidelines were important for the development of forest certification for 
three reasons. First, the debates on the guidelines highlighted that actors had very 
different ideas how sustainability could be achieved and how conservation of forests 
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could be combined with their utilization provided the growing demand for timber and 
unpredictable price fluctuations on the timber markets. The available definitions of 
sustainable development or sustainable forest management were very unspecific and 
open to interpretation. Gale (1998:157) argues that the ITTO guidelines enabled 
industry and governments to argue that they were moving towards sustainability when 
it was rather the definition of sustainability moving in the direction of ‘legitimating 
clearly unsustainable practices’. Environmental and indigenous people rights activists 
perceived this compromise as unacceptable and dysfunctional for their own agenda. 
Second, although the ITTO recommended its members these guidelines as an 
international reference standard, by the middle of 1990s none of the ITTO countries 
had openly admitted that it used the ITTO guidelines in the development of its 
national guidelines (Humphreys 1996: 70). Moreover, forest management practices 
and the behavior or producing country governments and industry remained 
completely unaffected by the guidelines (Gale 1998: 157). This perceived failures of 
the ITTO stimulated NGOs campaigns against it (Humphreys 1996: 70).  
Finally and most importantly, the adoption of guidelines put forward an issue 
of compliance with guidelines and time horizons for their implementation. This gave 
rise to two important initiatives of NGOs. In 1990-1994 NGOs attempted to lobby the 
adoption of 2000 as a target year (i) for implementing sustainable forest management 
in all types of forests in all participating countries and (ii) for the introduction of strict 
mechanisms of compliance verification. 
In 1989 WWF proposed the ITTO to adopt 1995 as a target, by which all 
tropical forests should be managed sustainably. While the ITTO refused to adopt 1995 
as a target, they adopted 2000 as a target year, by which all tropical wood traded in 
the international market should stem from sustainably managed forests. The decision, 
however, was largely rhetorical and did not result in any specific action. 
In 1992-1994 during the negotiations of the new ITTA the issue of the Target 
2000 reappeared on the agenda of the ITTO. Consuming countries proposed to 
include the Target 2000 as a deadline for producing countries to introduce sustainable 
forest management. Producing countries refused to accept it unless the agreement was 
extended to include all types of forest and all regions of the world. After lengthy 
discussions the compromise was achieved. Producing countries agreed that only 
tropic forests remained in the scope of the agreement and committed to reform their 
forest management by the Objective Year 2000. Consuming countries committed to 
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reform their forest management by 2000, increase their contributions to the ITTO, 
transfer technology and to return to the extension issues later (Gale 1998: 92). 
NGOs were highly skeptical of the new agreement. The feared the new 
agreement weakened of the producing countries’ commitment to immediately reform 
their forest management. They also criticized consuming countries for applying 
double standards when they refused to immediately revise their own forest 
management. Moreover, NGOs doubted that financial contributions of consuming 
countries would meet the costs of forest management reforms in producing countries. 
They were unable to convince delegations to reconsider the agreement and left the 
ITTO after the new agreement was signed in 1994. 
Before this happened, NGOs proposed to develop a forest certification and 
labeling scheme as mechanism to monitor the implementation of the ITTO Guidelines 
of Sustainable Forest Management. Environmentalists were disturbed that the only 
incentives for reforms were country reputation, self-reporting and relatively small 
funding for forestry projects (Gale 1998). They were convinced that developing a 
more rigorous mechanism of verification compliance with guidelines involving the 
specification of incentives and sanctions would help encourage countries and 
industries to adopt better forestry standards and practices. 
In 1989, the Friends of the Earth-UK (FoE-UK) prepared a pre-project 
proposal on certification and labeling schemes and market incentives for sustainable 
forest management. In October 1989 the British delegation presented the proposal on 
behalf of FoE-UK in the ITTO. The goal of the proposal was to investigate the 
feasibility of a certification and labeling scheme that would help buyers distinguish 
between timber produced in sustainable and unsustainable way. The project suggested 
devising a mechanism by which individual timber consignments could be verified as 
coming from a sustainably managed forest and marked as such with a special label. 
The project was aimed at exploring the feasibility as well as potential problems and 
pitfalls of such a certification scheme. The authors of the project believed that 
certification and labeling would create market incentives for timber producers to 
adopt sustainable forest management. They defined certification and labeling as a 
market policy instrument to create additional market demand for eco-labeled timber as 
incentives for sustainable forest management. 
Despite the market character of the proposed eco-labeling scheme, major 
producing countries severely criticized FoE-UK’s imitative. Malaysia, Indonesia and 
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Cameroon characterized the proposal as overly ambitious, unrealistic and lacking any 
potential to significantly contribute to achieving sustainable forest management. The 
main fear of the producing countries was that “the pre-project was a veiled attempt to 
install a system which was only an incentive to encourage the current campaign of 
boycott against the imports of tropical timber products…” (ITTC cited in Gale 1998: 
160). The critics called for an extensive revision of the proposal in search for a 
working compromise. However, all subsequent revisions proved to be unacceptable to 
environmental NGOs.  
In 1991 the Oxford Forestry Institute released a report that was supposed to be 
the revised version of FoE-UK’s proposal: Incentives in Producer and Consumer 
Countries to Promote Sustainable Development of Tropical Forests. However, the 
Oxford Forestry Institute omitted all references to certification and labeling that 
significantly disturbed environmental activists. Two subsequent studies commissioned 
by the ITTO in 1992 and 1994 to the ITTO to inquire into the nature of incentives and 
feasibility of certification recognized the importance of certification and labeling, 
suggested that country-level certification schemes were feasible and desirable and 
tacitly recommended the ITTO picking up on this issue. Producing countries, however, 
continued opposing any form of certification and labeling. The discussions resulted in 
a deadlock. The ITTO systematically refused to take action to resolve it (Gale 1998). 
The negative reaction of the ITTO members to certification and labeling 
proposals, the consequent reports and the unwillingness of the ITTO to devise 
effective compliance mechanisms inevitably upset the environmental coalition. They 
did not believe in the feasibility of country-level certification schemes. They feared 
that country-level certification programs would be corrupt and ineffective and called 
for an international certification program. To environmentalists, the debates on 
compliance mechanisms clearly showed that the ITTO was dysfunctional for a 
genuine promotion of sustainable forest management. Timothy Synnott, the first 
executive director of the FSC, notes: 
Any hopes that ITTO or some other international agency would take the lead on 
certification were depressed by the reactions to the FoE-UK proposal in 1989, and by 
several subsequent ITTO studies of certification. … They [the events in ITTO] indicated 
that ITTO was unlikely to promote certification and labeling in a form acceptable to 
environmental and social interests (Synnott 2005: 10). 
4 The Rise and Development of the FSC 
 
102 
To sum up, the experience with the ITTO was crucial for the development of forest 
certification and the FSC. Most importantly, it was the forum where the first 
proposals for forest certification and labeling schemes were discussed and rejected by 
tropical timber exporting and importing countries. The rejection by the ITTO of 
certification and labeling proposals contributed to the growing activists’ frustration 
with the intergovernmental forums. It became clear to environmentalists that they 
have to look for other ways to achieve their goals.  
Second, in the ITTO NGOs in a coalition with producing countries first 
brokered the idea of including all types of timber and all types of forests in 
international negotiations. This idea later became an important part of forest 
certification because only instruments with global scope were non-discriminatory and 
consistent with free trade rules: certification should apply to all forests and products 
to avoid discrimination on the basis of origin and production methods.  At the same 
time the idea of global scope allowed NGOs to win support of key actors in producing 
counties as well as consuming countries.  
UNCED (the Earth Summit)  
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, the 
Earth Summit) took place in June of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Two years of preparatory 
meetings, conferences and consultations preceded the conference and demonstrated 
before the conference even started that a legally binding forest policy instrument was 
unlikely to emerge. The United Nations convened the Rio Summit to address the most 
pressing environmental problems, including climate change, biodiversity loss and 
protection and conservation of land and natural resources. Deforestation and forest 
problems were one of the central themes of the Earth Summit but the participants 
predictably failed to produce a legally-binding convention on forests. Instead, they 
produced the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All 
Types of Forests (the Forest Principles). 
Furthermore, the Earth Summit institutionalized a new environmental policy 
frame of sustainable development based on the idea that economic development and 
environmental conservation were in principle compatible goals of a global society 
(Bernstein 2000). This new complex of norms that Bernstein (2000; 2001) labeled 
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liberal environmentalism rested on the assumption that the promotion and 
maintenance of a liberal economic order did not undermine the goals of the 
environmental protection and nature conservation. Rather, environmental protection 
was consistent with the liberal normative order (Bernstein 2000: 464). Traditional 
command-and-control policy approaches were defined inferior to and less effective 
private and public-private solutions that are “the most innovative and potentially 
rewarding solutions” to combating global environmental problems (Cashore, Auld 
and Newsom 2004: 10-11).  
Why were the Forest Principles designed as unbinding? Developing countries 
were politically and economically dependent on the forestry sector (Gale 1998) and 
would have agreed to sign a global forest convention only if the developed countries 
committed to financial redistribution and technology transfers. Developed countries 
were in turn reluctant to commit to various financial and technology transfer programs 
before the developing countries would have proved their progress toward good 
governance of forest resources. Developed countries were willing to extend 
international cooperation on forest problems based on the principles of global 
stewardship of forests and shared responsibility. This would entail giving more 
powers to international organizations. Developing countries feared that such an 
approach would jeopardize their sovereignty. They argued that the North with its 
production and consumption patterns was responsible for forest loss and demanded 
financial and technology transfers (Humphreys 1996: 98). Country coalitions were 
unable to resolve this deadlock in a legally-binding convention and produced a set of 
broad unbinding principles to govern forest use and conservation. 
The emergence of a new policy frame of sustainable development motivated a 
number of governments and international organizations to start developing regional 
and national criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management. In 1993 in 
Europe thirty-eight countries launched an intergovernmental project on devising 
criteria and indicators for measuring sustainable forest management of European 
forests. This project is known as Helsinki process. In the same year Canadian and US 
governments launched a so-called Montreal process aiming at developing criteria and 
indicators of management of boreal and temperate forests. In 1995 the governments of 
Latin American countries initiated the development of sustainable forest management 
criteria and indicators for Amazonian forests. These processes, however, did not result 
in any binding agreements and never merged.  
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Nongovernmental organizations, including WWF, were suspicious of these 
independent attempts to specify sustainable forest management. They were convinced 
that they lacked a common ground and were not universally applicable and global in 
scope (Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995). They believed that a global system of 
sustainable forest management criteria and indicators should emerge and that this 
global system should be adjusted for specific forests, countries and regions. This was 
ultimately an additional motivation to support the FSC in its quest for globally 
applicable standards of sustainable forest management.  
The significance of UNCED is, therefore, threefold. First, the frustration of 
environmental groups with intergovernmental organizations dealing with forests 
problems peaked after UNCED failed to produce a legally binding convention on 
global forests and revealed tensions between the developed and developing counties 
that governments were unable and unwilling to resolve. Second, UNCED provided 
environmental groups with a new policy frame that legitimized their attempts to create 
a private organization to regulate forest management and timber trade. Finally, forest 
principles and other documents produced at the Earth Summit provided a legitimate 
framework for designing universally applicable FSC principles, criteria and indicators. 
Ultimately, for many observers (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Humphreys 1996) 
the perceived failure of UNCED to make forest principles legally binding was the 
final and the most powerful spur to actively promote the development of private forest 
certification and the FSC. 
Although the Forest Principles were only a non-binding statement, they 
formed an important policy framework that provided guidance on what good forest 
management should be like. It institutionalized general principles of sustainable forest 
management stressing the balance of economic, environmental and social components 
of sustainability. While it was still unclear how sustainability of forest management 
could be specifically defined, measured and achieved environmental groups adopted 
this new policy frame. Making their standards consistent with the Forest Principles 
helped forest certification supporters legitimize their initiative in the future (Synnott 
2005: 27). 
The discussion in this section shows that the emergence of forest certification 
and the rise of the FSC resulted from the failure of environmental nongovernmental 
organizations to push their agenda in the intergovernmental forums, strengthening of 
neoliberal free trade rules and the rise of the new environmental policy frame of 
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sustainable forest management. In the next section I will review the first years of the 
FSC to explain how the organization emerged and developed in the first years. I will 
describe how the FSC moved away from solving tropical forest problems to 
concentrate on certifying boreal and temperate forests in Europe and North America 
where problems are less severe. 
4.3 The Rise of Forest Certification 
The FSC is one of the most successful private governance initiatives created in the 
1990s. A handful of committed individuals with virtually no funds and governmental 
support crafted an organization that now competes with governments and 
international organizations for the authority to set up international norms and enjoys 
greater support from social movement organizations and timber product buyers and 
consumers than governmental agencies. It has grown from a small project of a few 
concerned individuals into an influential private actor that regulates a certain sector of 
the international timber market. The leaders of the FSC successfully brought together 
the representatives of business, environmental groups, labor and indigenous people 
and reconciled their competing interests to produce a workable and acceptable 
certification program. It has effectively defended itself against competing programs in 
a forest certification market, for which the FSC paved a way.  
The FSC’s path has not always been smooth. The success has been uneven. 
Although FSC founders were motivated mainly by tropical forest problems and only 
later extended FSC’s scope to include less problematic boreal and temperate forests, 
most of the FSC-certified forests are now in boreal and temperate zones in the 
countries of the so-called global North. In economic terms, the FSC certification 
turned out to benefit mainly large producers and retailers whereas small-scale and 
community operations were marginalized. Competing certification programs have 
emerged to contest the legitimacy of the FSC. In 2006 environmental, labor and 
indigenous people activists strongly criticized FSC management for an ineffective 
monitoring and control system and links between certification bodies and certified 
companies that they perceived as corrupt. Several environmental groups remained 
skeptical about FSC’s potential and highly critical of the FSC’s approach to forest 
certification. Some certifications were controversial and even scandalous. The FSC is 
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constantly underfunded and depends significantly on donor contributions. It has to 
struggle constantly, and its future is still uncertain. 
Environmental Campaigns against the Destruction of Forests 
Environmental NGOs launched first naming and shaming campaigns in the end the 
1980s. In the mid-1980s the Friends of the Earth-UK investigated the links between 
timber trade and tropical deforestation and launched a tropical timber boycott in 
Britain (Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995: 109). Following this and other 
numerous campaigns, B&Q, the Britain’s largest home improvement store, as well as 
Texas Homecare and Home Base agreed to stop selling tropical timber products from 
endangered forests (Vogel 2005: 115). In 1988 German, British and Dutch 
organizations initiated boycotts against imports from Malaysia to protest against 
logging policies and practices in the Sarawak, a Malaysian state in the northeast of the 
island of Borneo. These campaigns are believed to result into 50% decline in tropical 
timber imports into the Netherlands between 1990 and 1995 (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 
158-160). In USA Rainforest Action Network protested against Mitsubishi and the 
world’s largest lumber retailer Home Depot. Forest Ethics, Dogwood Alliance and 
EcoPledge targeted Staples, the world’s largest office retail store chain. By 2005 
hundreds of firms, including the largest Lowe’s, Staples, Office Depot, Kinko’s, 3M, 
IBM, Hallmark and Hewlett-Packard, agreed to stop using pulp, paper and lumber 
from ancient forests (Vogel 2005: 116). Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network 
activists climbed corporations’ office buildings to hang boycott banners. Greenpeace 
and Taiga Rescue Network organized local and international campaigns in Siberia and 
the North-West of Russia against logging of valuable intact forests. 
Although boycotts are typically short-lived and have only a marginal financial 
effect (Vogel 2005: 51-52) timber campaigns turned out to be an effective tool to 
draw the attention of the media and general public and connect timber trade and 
consumption with the deforestation and forest degradation. Campaigners mainly 
targeted large reputation-conscious firms and many of them were responsive to 
environmental criticisms. 
The initial response by many firms was to declare that their sources were 
reliable and sustainable. A range of labels, logos and seals of approval appeared on 
the market. In the early 1990s, WWF examined the reliability of such claims and 
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found that out of 626 surveyed companies only three were able to justify their claims 
(Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995: 141). Furthermore, many companies in North 
America and Europe designed internal self-certification programs to prove that their 
sources were sustainable but environmentalists also questioned their credibility and 
reliability. In Britain, in 1993-1994 WWF filed claims to the UK Advertising 
Standards Authority against NHG Timber Ltd and Magnet Trade, British producers 
using tropical timber in their products, as well as Malaysian Timber Industry Board, 
that advertised their timber as coming from “sustainable”, “best conserved” and 
“renewable” forests. The Advertising Standards Authority upheld the claims because 
companies were unable to provide proofs of sustainability of their sources (Dudley, 
Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995: 142).  
Gradually it became clear to both companies and NGOs that a great deal of 
confusion existed regarding the sources of timber and their sustainability. Much 
deliberate fraud regarding the origins of timber existed in the market but often 
companies simply did not know where the timber used in their products came from 
and what good forest management was about. Neither did they realize what impact 
timber trade had on tropical forests. WWF’s affiliates Dudley, Jeanrenaud and 
Sullivan (1995: 141) noted in 1995: “Self-regulation within the industry has allowed a 
situation to develop, in which fraud, semi-fraud and straightforward confusion 
combined to create a state where pressure from consumers is being countered by a 
strong of deliberately misleading or at best naïve and disingenuous, claims from 
producers.” In fact, threatened by naming and shaming campaigns, many firms 
became willing to cooperate with social movement organizations and in a stepwise 
matter change their business practices provided the costs of such change remained 
modest (Vogel 2005: 116). 
One form of such cooperation was company-NGO partnerships. In 1990, B&Q, 
the largest British home improvement store, blacklisted in 1988 in FoE-UK’s Good 
Wood Guide (Synnott 2005: 8), started working with WWF on building the first 
buyers group called the “1995 Group.” Members of the group committed to phase out 
the use and sale of all products that came from unknown or non-certified sources by 
the end of 1995 (Bartley 2003: 445). In 1995, the requirements for membership in the 
1995 Group included commitment to use only FSC-certified timber and ignore other 
labels (Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995: 152-153). In the US, firms, including 
Home Depot, also changed their procurement policies and declared to stop selling 
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products from endangered forests. Now buyers groups exist in many countries and 
constitute the Global Forest and Trade Network (GFTN), a network of producers, 
traders, dealers and retailers of sustainably produced forest products coordinated by 
WWF. 
Furthermore, in addition to companies’ empty claims of sustainability, NGO 
boycotts also came under strong criticism. Boycotts and similar campaigns were 
successful in attracting public attention to the deforestation and created a problem for 
timber industry that they had to solve but did not provide a solution. 
Environmentalists increasingly questioned the ethical appropriateness and desirability 
of boycotts. Many argued that boycotts also harmed timber producers that managed 
their forests a good, sustainable way. They stigmatized tropical timber consumption 
and could not communicate to buyers and consumers that sustainable tropical forest 
use was a viable alternative to existing patterns of timber production and consumption. 
It did not provide any alternative forest management model and did not specify how 
producers and retailers could improve their business practices. Finally, consumer 
boycotts could potentially harm forest-dependent communities and communities 
whose livelihoods depended on their employment in logging companies. Some argued 
that boycotts “devalued forest land”, encouraged land conversion and, therefore, could 
potentially increase deforestation (Bartley 2003: 444). 
To provide guidance for dealers, retailers and consumers and to respond to 
controversies around boycotts environmental organizations began working on 
alternatives to naming and shaming campaigns. In 1988 the Friends of the Earth-UK 
published the first Good Wood Guide and set up Good Wood Seal of Approval. The 
Good Wood Guide distinguished a small group of retailers and dealers who they 
believed were “actively helping to save rainforests by obtaining timber from an 
ecologically benign source” and who could use the seal of approval. The rest were 
helping but “still using some non-sustainably produced” timber or “contributing to the 
destruction of tropical forests” (Synnott 2005: 8). 
However, the Friends of Earth soon realized that at least some guidance in 
their consumer guide was misleading. Many seal of approval winners did not use 
tropical timber but whether their sources of temperate and boreal timber were 
sustainable was unclear. Moreover, it contained no criteria for identifying benign 
sources (Synnott 2005: 8). The seal of approval was stopped and the authors of 
subsequent editions were more careful in their judgments. In the US, Rainforest 
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Action Network made similar experience with their 1991 Wood User’s Guide. It 
showed that tracking of timber was a difficult, almost impossible task for “a single 
campaigning NGO” (Bartley 2003: 444; Synnott 2005: 10). It also demonstrated the 
need for a sound tracking system and widely recognized system of criteria and 
standards of good forest management. 
Governmental Action 
NGO and media campaigns and environmental lobbying also triggered governmental 
action to address tropical deforestation. In 1988 the European Parliament 
recommended all member states to discontinue importing timber from Sarawak to 
protest against over-logging. In the same year, the European Parliament adopted a 
proposal that member states should only import tropical timber products if they were 
produced under proper forest management programs and these products should be 
certified. Both of these initiatives would be GATT-illegal and did not produce any 
outcomes. Member states did not pick up the initiative to ban timber imports from 
Sarawak. The second proposal was rejected by the European Council of Ministers 
(Synnott 2005: 33). 
In 1992 the Austrian government passed a law to ban the imports of tropical 
timber unless it was labeled as sustainably produced and to increase import tariffs by 
70%. Malaysia and Indonesia threatened to file a complaint against the law to WTO 
because they believed that it constituted a nontariff barrier to trade and were GATT-
illegal. In 1993 the Austrian government revoked the law (Bartley 2003: 447; Synnott 
2005: 26). Subsequently, WWF-Austria convinced the government to donate funds 
allocated for executing the law for establishing the FSC. This funding helped set up 
the FSC in Mexico and supported its activity for the first two years (Bartley 2003: 448; 
Synnott 2005: 26). 
Bartley (2003: 448) argues that this particular sequence of events had two 
important effects on the development of the FSC. On the one hand, it clearly 
demonstrated that bans were against free trade rules defined in GATT and 
discouraged them from direct governmental action on timber trade. On the other hand, 
it provided an alternative to bans. Governments did not have to ban or limit timber 
imports but could support private initiatives. Subsequently, the Swiss, Dutch, British 
and Mexican governments supported the FSC financially. Governmental aid agencies, 
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such as German GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zussamenarbeit), 
continue to provide funding for specific projects. 
The previous discussion shows that leading actors in the global forestry sector 
felt that it was ripe for forest certification. Environmental groups connected timber 
trade and deforestation and attacked large brand-oriented firms that they believed 
contributed to deforestation. As a response, self-certification, unverified sustainability 
claims and labels proliferated. Environmentalists and firms both learned that they 
needed a complex international timber tracking system and sound sustainability 
criteria to verify sustainability claims. Frustrated with failed governmental and 
intergovernmental actions and limitations of international forums, environmental 
groups started working to set up a private forest monitoring organization to promote 
sustainable forest management in the tropics and distinguish sustainably produced 
timber products. 
The Birth of the Forest Stewardship Council 
The FSC grew out of two proposals: previously discussed FoE-UK’s proposal 
submitted to the ITTO and Hubert Kwisthout’s proposal for an independent 
international monitoring agency. Hubert Kwisthout was a bagpipe maker and used 
tropical timber for his instruments. Concerned with the growing deforestation in the 
tropics he organized a trading company in the UK – the Ecological Trading Company 
– to trade in tropical and temperate timbers produced in a sustainable way. He quickly 
realized, however, that he had nothing to rely on when he had to decide whether the 
sources he used was sustainable or not (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004: 3-4; 
Synnott 2005: 11). He was the first one to come up with an idea of an independent 
body for sustainability standard setting, monitoring and verification. In 1990-1991 he 
discussed his proposals with people in Oxford Forestry Institute, WWF, Soil 
Association, Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection (WRAP) and B&Q. 
B&Q’s Alan Knight and Francis Sullivan of WWF became particularly interested in 
the proposal and supported the idea of international monitoring agency (Synnott 2005: 
11). 
At about the same time a number of Canadian and US tropical timber trading 
companies became concerned with the sustainability of their sources and formed an 
organization called the Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection. At the 
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founding conference in 1990 the representatives of these firms discussed Kwisthout’s 
proposal. The conference set up a Certification Working Group that had two meetings 
in San Francisco in 1991 and Washington D.C. in 1992 that led to the foundation of 
the FSC in October 1993 (Synnott 2005: 11). 
This was a period of intense communication and information exchange 
between many interested parties led and coordinated by a handful of committed 
individuals with very little funding. In these first years the main elements of the FSC 
and its certification system were coined and the first conflicts and disagreements 
emerged. The FSC proceeded extremely fast. As a result, many issues had to be 
resolved as the FSC already functioned and some still remain unresolved. In addition 
to two certification working group meetings in 1991 and 1992, dozens of meetings 
and consultations were held and numerous drafts were written, circulated and 
discussed. For example, several drafts of FSC forest stewardship principles and 
criteria were discussed in 1991-1993 before the seventh draft was finally presented to 
the FSC’s founding assembly. Moreover, country consultations were conducted in 
Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, Ghana, Malaysia, USA, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Sweden and United Kingdom (Synnott 2005: 20). WWF-UK and MacArthur 
Foundations provided funding for national consultations. 
In the beginning, it was still unclear what an international forest monitoring 
organization would look like and what sorts of function it would have. Many were 
skeptical whether any credible form of forest certification was possible and feasible. 
Many, including the majority of country delegates in the ITTO, doubted whether there 
was actually a need for such an organization and whether it could significantly 
contribute to the attainment of sustainable forest management (The Nature 
Conservancy 1990 cited in Synnott 2005: 12; Gale 1998). Nonetheless, those who 
believed in this idea started working to clarify the goals and functions of the future 
organization, its organizational structure, procedural rules and stakeholders’ concerns 
and expectations. 
During the 1990-1993 the idea crystallized that the future international forest 
monitoring agency would be an umbrella watchdog organization. It became clear that 
this organization, then tentatively called the FSC, would be based on a single 
document the Forest Stewardship Charter that would provide general guidelines for 
all actors involved. This central document would be based on the ideas of long-term 
stewardship and sustainable use of forests worldwide. In 1991 the certification 
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activists agreed that the new initiative should cover all forest products, all forest types, 
including plantations, and all regions of the world. This idea was supported during 
international consultations that the FSC founding group organized in 1992 prior to the 
FSC founding assembly in October 1993. 
The first ideas what the new organization should look like were significantly 
influenced by the professional certification organizations that later became FSC’s 
accredited certifiers. Although the idea of international forest monitoring organization 
and forest certification was very fresh and diffuse it immediately attracted attention of 
Rainforest Alliance, a US-based NGO working in the tropical rainforest regions, 
which was already experimenting with forest certification. In 1990 Rainforest 
Alliance devised a sustainable forestry standard to evaluate logging concessions in 
Indonesia and launched SmartWood forest certification program. US Scientific 
Certification Systems (SCS), British Soil Association and Swiss SGS (Société 
Générale de Surveillance) also indicated an interest in developing forest certification 
programs. All were well established organizations that offered certification, auditing, 
inspection and testing services. Soil Association and SCS had significant experience 
in certifying ‘green’ products, such as organic agricultural products. 
For these professional certification bodies, it was clear that an operational 
international certification system needed a set of widely accepted standards and an 
accreditation and monitoring body that would guarantee the legitimacy and authority 
of certification bodies and their judgments. In 1992 the term accreditation first enters 
FSC’s official documentation. In the second draft of FSC’s Charter and Statutes 
Richard Donovan of the Rainforest Alliance wrote that the FSC was to be “an 
organization that monitors, evaluates and provides official accreditation for … 
certification programs” (cited in Synnott 2005: 14). The FSC was becoming an 
international accreditation body for existing and emerging forest certification 
programs. 
FSC activists also shared a view that extensive international consultations with 
all concerned actors were necessary to ensure inclusiveness and support from diverse 
interest groups representing different regions. Many NGOs and other stakeholders 
were disappointed that they were unable to truly influence global forest politics 
through intergovernmental forums, such as the ITTO and the Earth Summit. They 
wanted to create a new forum that would be conductive to diverse and often 
conflicting interests of stakeholders. They also hoped to collect suggestions that 
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would not only improve the proposals for FSC’s forest management standards and 
FSC’s governance, structure and procedures but more importantly spread information 
about FSC and guarantee wide acceptance of the future organization and its standards. 
The FSC’s founding group was skillfully creating a momentum for the FSC 
foundation in October 1993. 
In March of 1992 the FSC founding group decided to hold the founding 
assembly in October of 1993 and committed to finalize the drafts of the FSC Charter 
and Statutes and FSC Principles and Criteria and conduct global consultations on 
these documents. By September 1993 the consultations on the FSC principles and 
criteria had been completed in Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, Ghana, 
Malaysia, USA, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Sweden and United Kingdom (Synnott 
2005: 20). It had become clear that the FSC would be an international accreditation 
body global in scope; it would cover all types of products, all types of forests in all 
regions of the world; it would equally consider economic, social and environmental 
functions of forests and equally respect economic, social and environmental interests 
(Synnott 2005: 20-21). 
In October 1993 the FSC founding general assembly took place in Toronto, 
Canada, with 134 participants from 26 tropical and temperate countries. Although not 
everything went smooth, the general impression of the leaders of FSC founding 
process and future FSC officials was that the meeting succeeded. Despite a number of 
disagreements, the majority of participants established the FSC “to work in the broad 
field of mainstream forestry, from small scale community management to large scale 
commercial operations, from natural forests, through heavily altered forests to exotic 
plantations, and from the equator to the arctic circle” (Synnott 2005: 23). 
This choice was consistent with the non-discrimination rules underlying free 
trade and liberal market ideology. FSC founders sought to create global standards that 
would apply equally to all market participants to avoid positive and negative 
discrimination on the market (Taylor 2005a: 441). This decision significantly shaped 
FSC’s organizational trajectory. FSC founders did not seek to challenge existing trade 
relationships. Rather, they attempted to modify the structure of market incentives to 
encourage producers to alter their forest management practices or procurement 
policies. The FSC chose to work within the pre-existing free trade and liberal market 
institutional framework. The FSC founding members adopted market ‘rules of the 
game.’ They adhered to the conventional market logic and worked though 
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conventional market channels (Taylor 2005a: 441-442). They hoped that increased 
consumer demand for sustainably produced products would translate into equal 
market incentives and benefits for all market players from small scale community to 
large scale commercial operations, from natural forests to plantations, and from 
tropical to boreal zones. However, individual players are not equal in the global 
timber product markets. They differ in their position in the structure of international 
trade relationships, market share and, therefore, economic power. The incentives, 
therefore, could not potentially equally affect all market participants and the 
distribution of benefits could not be even. 
The definition of the broad scope of forest certification revealed also the first 
tensions within and between the groups of stakeholders involved in the creation of the 
FSC. Some of these tensions were successfully resolved; others turned into lasting 
issues that still remain unresolved. These initial conflicts and their outcomes 
significantly affected the future of the FSC and forest certification in general. These 
conflicts and their outcomes demonstrate that the FSC moved, on the one hand, to 
create a broad support coalition for the FSC and, on the other hand, to broaden the 
scope of the FSC to include all forests, operations and regions. 
The earliest disagreements concerned the distribution of decision-making 
powers in the FSC and its organizational structure. First, the FSC founding assembly 
had to decide if the FSC would be an association of members or a foundation. Second, 
it had to decide on the distribution of decision-making power. 
Initially, the FSC was planned as a membership organization. The first draft of 
the Charter and Statutes stated that members would meet once a year at the general 
assembly, the highest decision-making authority in the FSC. Members would elect 
board of directors and delegate it operational and executive functions. In April 1993, a 
legal advisor recommended the FSC’s working group to design the FSC as a 
foundation without membership. He believed that this organizational structure would 
allow cutting potential costs, reduce complexity of decision-making and enhance 
organizational flexibility. The founding assembly, however, unanimously voted for a 
membership organization. The participants of the assembly wanted to have a voice in 
the future organization and feared that the FSC as a foundation managed by a small 
group of people would be soon dominated by one interest group. 
FSC activists were aware of the frustration and disillusionment that many 
environmental and indigenous people rights activists experienced in the 
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intergovernmental forums and organizations, such as the ITTO. They were aware that 
these people would only support the FSC if they had at least an equal voice in 
decision-making. They feared at the same time that negotiation and decision-making 
could be co-opted by representatives of business interests. To avoid the domination of 
one specific interest group the FSC founders initially suggested organizing FSC 
membership in two chambers, environmental with 75% of votes and economic with 
the remaining 25% of votes (Humphreys 2006: 118). To avoid the domination of the 
representatives of the more powerful Northern developed countries each chamber had 
to be divided into two sub-chambers representing respectively the countries of the so-
called global North and global South. This arrangement aimed at ensuring that 
decision-making was dominated neither by a single chamber nor a single region. 
However, at the founding assembly a number of representatives of environmental 
interests objected granting individuals and organizations with commercial interests in 
forests a decision-making power. Ultimately, these people were unable to convince 
the majority of participants to support their view. The assembly voted for a two-
chamber organizational structure with 25% of votes for economic chamber. The 
leaders of the opposition, including the representatives of Greenpeace and the Friends 
of the Earth abstained from voting and refused to take any official positions in the 
FSC (Humphreys 2006: 118; Synnott 2005: 22-23).  
Subsequently, the FSC reformed its governance structure to respond to the 
demands of the stakeholders representing so-called ‘social’ interests of forest workers, 
forest dependent communities and indigenous people in the FSC who felt that the 
FSC had not paid sufficient attention to the social and cultural issues associated with 
forests. FSC divided the members of the environmental chamber into environmental 
and social chamber and equally divided decision-making powers between three new 
chambers. Environmental chamber now includes representatives of environmental 
interests whereas social chamber now includes representatives of labor unions, forest 
workers and indigenous people. Each of the three chambers was collectively granted 
one third of votes and can only vote as a chamber (Humphreys 2006: 118).  
These decisions profoundly influenced development of the FSC. The FSC’s 
officials believe that they shaped the success of the FSC (Synnott 2005: 24; 
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interviews 37 and 38).14 With the three-chamber equal-vote decision-making system 
FSC was able to secure support of diverse groups and balance differentiated power 
and reconcile conflicting interests of various actors. Depriving forest owners and 
forestry sector and retail sector members of voting rights could jeopardize business 
support of forest certification that was crucial for a workable certification program. 
Without a system that guarantees that a single interest or region group cannot 
influence a decision by simply outnumbering other groups, labor, indigenous people 
and environmental groups would soon withdraw their support. 
The decision-making has ever since been based on the deliberative democracy 
assumptions and consensus. FSC membership is involved in the making of the 
majority of decisions, standard setting and policy formulations at all levels of the FSC 
system. The FSC sets up working groups to draft policies and standards. Working 
groups usually include members that have expert knowledge and stakes in an issue in 
question. Working groups work on drafts of proposed documents that are then 
circulated among members of the FSC and other stakeholders. Extensive 
consultations, meetings, online communication and information exchange and 
lobbying have become effective tools to ensure inclusiveness, genuine participation 
and compromise.  
Deliberative democracy and thorough consensus-building certainly have their 
cost. The decision-making in the FSC is extremely complex, time consuming and 
costly. The compromise is fragile and needs to be continuously renegotiated. 
According to Synnott (2005: 24), “there was no possibility of the smooth operation of 
a small group of like-minded individuals that might have been constructed in a 
foundation or a private company.” Yet, 
… the decision-making process is not only to reach a decision. Any scientist can make it, 
any manager can, but a decision is a decision-making process, and it’s also there to 
create co-authorship in the decision. If you don’t have any command and control over 
constituencies, they need to come on board. They need to take ownership over a decision 
before you can actually go out and announce it as a decision (interview 38). 
Although the FSC could potentially cut its costs by making its decision-making 
system less bulky and more efficient, it is unlikely that a radical reform will take place. 
                                                 
14
 Interviews are numbered according to the listing in Appendix 1. 
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The FSC leaders are aware that such a system creates legitimacy and presents a forum 
where interest groups can pursue their agenda and work on the compromised solutions. 
Emerging Controversies: Tropical Forests, Small-Scale Operations and 
Plantations  
The second set of disagreements concerned what kinds of forests and forest operations 
would be the main target of forest certification. The people early involved in setting 
up the FSC also had different and even conflicting perceptions of what the goals of 
the FSC were. Here again the FSC membership initially opted for the broadest 
application of forest certification. Instead of focusing on mainly or even exclusively 
on small-scale community-based operations, the FSC focused on all kinds of 
operations, including industrial commercial logging. Instead of concentrating on 
natural forests and opposing plantations, the FSC opted to certify both natural forests 
and plantations. Finally, the FSC formulated its goal as promoting good forest 
management by distinguishing forest management operations and forest products that 
were produced in a way that the FSC identified as responsible.  
Synnott (2005: 15-17) provides a detailed description of a number of the initial 
conflicts within FSC membership. World Rainforest Movement, a radical US-based 
environmental NGO, suggested that the FSC should focus on small-scale community 
forestry to provide advantage and access to markets traditionally dominated by 
powerful large-scale highly mechanized logging operations. WWF and Rainforest 
Alliance argued that strategically it was important to include large industrial 
operations, including plantations. The FSC opted to include all kinds of forests and all 
kinds of producers in its scope. 
Moreover, many NGOs felt that the FSC’s goals were incompatible with 
certifying plantations provided their documented negative impact. For many 
environmentalists it was and still is unacceptable that the FSC included plantations 
into its certification program. At the same time, by the time of the founding assembly 
in 1993 Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood certification program was already 
certifying plantations. In 1992, it was clear that plantations would be included in 
FSC’s scope. However, it has remained unclear how they would be included and how 
responsible plantation management would be defined. In 2003, World Rainforest 
Movement in cooperation with many other NGOs called to ban plantation certification 
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before the FSC finalized its position on plantation certification and produced a 
plantation policy. In response, the FSC initiated a plantation review process that has 
not yet been finished. In summer 2007 a number of NGOs organized a campaign 
against endorsing and promoting monoculture plantations through FSC certification. 
The issue of plantation certification is still unresolved but many activists feel that it is 
unlikely that the FSC will suspend plantation certification (interview 43) provided the 
amount of plantations already certified. For example, in Brazil, one of the leaders in 
certification in Latin America, the majority of FSC certified forests are plantations 
(Espach 2006). 
Finally, an interesting turn in the FSC’s development was the shift in goal 
formulation of FSC. The whole FSC movement was motivated by the problems of 
tropical forests that governmental and intergovernmental solutions could not 
effectively solve. In 2004 many FSC supporter still shared a view that the FSC was 
originally planned to stop tropical deforestation. However, these objectives “boiled 
down to promoting good forest management” (Synnott 2005: 16). Any mention of 
tropical forests as its target, and their specific problems disappeared from the FSC’s 
agenda.  
What were the implications of this change? Many regard the transition from a 
regional, tropical scope to a global one as a natural and inevitable change in the FSC’s 
scope and only mention it in passing (Synnott 2005: 7; Elliott/Donovan et. al. 1996: 2). 
However, this was an important shift that shaped FSC’s organizational trajectory. 
Founding members of the FSC believed that broadening the scope of forest 
certification would help avoiding discrimination of any type of timber, as well as 
types of operations and forests, in the global timber market. This was consistent with 
the rules of free trade and WTO rules prohibiting the discrimination of goods on the 
basis of production methods. However, the unintended consequence of this decision is 
that the majority of the FSC certified forests are now in temperate and boreal forests 
located in the developed countries of the so-called global North. The leading countries 
are Canada, Russia and Sweden. 
Moreover, the majority of certified forest operations are large-scale industrial 
logging companies. The FSC officials see this development as a natural course of 
events. Some observers, however, characterize this development as an irony (Fischer 
et al. 2005: 13) and some critics describe it in a straightforward manner as a failure to 
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improve the quality of forest management where it was urgent (Counsell and Terje 
Loraas 2002; Mäntyranta 2002). 
Moreover, from the very beginning the FSC has strategically worked mainly 
with large industrial forest owners, large forest product producers and world’s largest 
retailers to create the demand for certified products. The FSC, therefore, had to 
respond and satisfy the demand for certified timber and timber products and increase 
certified areas. The critics characterized the efforts of the FSC to quickly increase the 
number of certified forests and producers a ‘fast growth strategy’ (Counsell and Terje 
Loraas 2002). Furthermore, the small-scale producers and community forest 
operations became marginalized in the FSC system. The growing demand for certified 
forests also created negative incentives for FSC’s certification bodies to lower the 
quality of forest certification (interview 40).  
Finally, many NGOs find that FSC’s accreditation unit that monitors and 
controls the performance of certification bodies that actually assess forest 
management and issue FSC certificates of good forest management is unable to 
exercise full control over certification bodies and thereby contributes to the lowering 
of forest certification standards.  
In addition, the FSC also paved a way and provided an organizational model 
for competing organizations. Forest owners that were unhappy about FSC’s policies 
mobilized to create competing certification schemes to undermine FSC in the market 
for certified products. Forest owners and producers in Canada, USA and later in 
Europe launched alternative certification programs, usually with weaker standards and 
less strict assessment procedures. Forest owners hoped to avoid FSC certification and 
at the same time use the real and potential benefits of forest certification. Facing the 
competition in the certification market, the FSC had to defend its position in the 
market and struggle for legitimacy that its competitors tried to damage.  
This lowering quality of certification bodies’ performance, plantation 
controversy and marginalization of small-scale and community producers, mainly in 
tropical developing countries, allows a number of environmental and social NGOs to 
question the FSC’s legitimacy and effectiveness. Competition with other certification 
programs and the market pressure to produce more certified timber combined with the 
legitimacy problems creates a volatile and uncertain environment where FSC has to 
continuously adjust and readjust its certification scheme and maneuver among 
conflicting interests of stakeholders and activists’ and observers’ criticisms. 
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In this chapter I described the history of the global forest politics and the 
emergence of the FSC as an alternative to governmental action. The chapter has 
highlighted that a compromise and consensus are at the core of the new regulatory 
form but the compromise is very fragile. As the FSC certifies increasingly more 
companies as managing forests and supply chains responsibly, new problems emerge 
and the FSC leaders have to renegotiate the compromise. I show in the subsequent 
chapters that many of these problems also emerge in Russia and deal with the 
credibility of the FSC.  
In the following chapters, I shift my focus to the local level, at which the FSC 
operates. I concentrate on the experience of Russia as a transition country with 
problematic natural and social conditions in the forest sector. I start with the 
characterizing Russian forests and identifying structural factors that can be expected 
to facilitate and impede the development of forest certification in Russia (Chapter 5). I 
The goal of Chapter 6 to explain why and how forest certification develops in Russia 
despite the lack of well-enforced forest legislation, traditionally poor forest 
management practices and the lack of mechanisms of public participation in forest 
governance. Chapters 7 analyzes the effects of forest certification in Russia and 
emphasize forest certification expanded dramatically but the effectiveness of forest 
certification has been limited. 
4.4 Discussion 
Based on the analysis of the secondary literature and the data from several primary 
sources, I start this chapter by describing the rise of a transnational forest governance 
regime as an attempt to solve the problem of deforestation and forest degradation that 
was emerged as a global environmental and political problem in the twentieth century 
and as an attempt to settle the fundamental conflict between the protection of forests 
seen both as a global public good and as a resource under sovereign rule of individual 
states. I show that the attempts of governments to create an effective forest 
governance regime that would prevent massive deforestation and forest degradation 
largely failed in the 1980s and in the early 1990s and thus caused frustration among 
nongovernmental environmental actors, such as NGOs, who started to work on their 
own alternatives to a global forest convention that would enable both forest use and 
forest protection.  
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Whereas the emerging forest environmental regime was perceived by the 
NGOs as ineffective in halting deforestation and promoting forest protection and 
conservation, it generated a discursive policy frame built on the concept of sustainable 
development and, more specifically, on the concept sustainable use and management 
of forest resources. This frame emphasizes multiple values and functions of forests 
(e.g., natural, economic, environmental, cultural and social values and functions) and 
multiple interests in forests (e.g., multi-stakeholder approach). The coalition of actors 
led primarily by NGOs developed a system of forest certification as compatible with 
the dominant policy frame institutionalized and legitimized in the intergovernmental 
forums – most notably the United Nations and its bodies and conferences, including 
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Forest certification includes many organizational and 
substantive elements (e.g., multi-stakeholder approach and multiple functions of 
forests) that were formulated and gained prominence during various 
intergovernmental negotiations. From this perspective, the political-discursive context 
into which activists was embedded had an enabling effect on forest certification, since 
it provided the actors with a set of institutionalized legitimate ideas and institutional 
elements for a new organization.  
Activists created the FSC and forest certification as an alternative arena to 
intergovernmental forums for settling fundamental conflicts over the use and 
management of forests (Bartley 2007b). The first certification program proposals were 
discussed in intergovernmental forums, such as the International Tropical Timber 
Organization, but were declined by the representatives of governments. The first 
proposals focused on tropical forests, and governments of tropical countries were 
skeptical whether such a system was a workable solution to deforestation problems 
and feared that such programs would lead to the discrimination of timber and wood 
products from tropical countries in the international markets. At the same time, the 
activists’ campaigns against the producers and retailers of tropical timber products 
successfully drew the attention of the public as well as reputation-conscious 
companies to tropical deforestation. Aware of potential reputation losses, several 
firms showed interest in the program that would help them recognize “good” timber 
on the market and communicate it to consumers and stakeholders. Forest certification, 
thus, emerged as a forum for solving the problems of reputation and information in 
the market and for the settlement of conflicts over existing practices in the forest 
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sector among different interest groups, primarily environmentalists and business 
(Bartley 2007b).  
Furthermore, I describe in this chapter that the specific form of the emerging 
institution has been shaped not only by the existing organizational models and policy 
ideas (e.g., multi-stakeholder approach and multiple functions of forests), but also by 
the larger neoliberal institutional context (Bartley 2003), which Bernstein (Bernstein 
2000) also calls “the liberal environmentalism”, as well as by the mainstream market 
orientation of forest certification. The neoliberal context limited the repertoire of 
policy alternatives available to actors developing a system of forest certification and 
labeling by ruling out several measures that have been attempted by governments, 
such as legislative bans of tropical timber or legislative requirements for sustainability 
labels in Europe, because these measures conflicted with neoliberal free trade rules 
(Bartley 2003). In contrast, forest certification was designed as a voluntary instrument 
for “a private use” by private actors and was, therefore, compatible with the free trade 
framework. 
The argument that forest certification and labeling emerged as a response to a 
specified market and political problem is in fact far less functionalistic as it may 
appear at the first sight. Forest certification was initially driven by the deforestation 
and forest degradation in the tropical forests but has so far failed to achieve this goal 
(Marx and Cuypers 2010). Moreover, the mission and goals of the FSC were 
formulated differently from what initially guided forest certification debates relatively 
early. Forest certification moved away from its initial focus on tropical forests and 
included all types of forests and all types of operations (in contrast to small-scale and 
community forest operations in the tropical forests) in all regions of the world into its 
scope. 
On the one hand, it is also compatible with the neoliberal free trade rules that 
do not favor neither positive nor negative discrimination of products on the market 
based on their origin and methods of production. On the other hand, since campaigns 
targeted large retailers and producers of timber products, the demand for certified 
products grew rapidly and did not always targeted tropical forests. Many large 
companies source their products from boreal forests that also had to be included into 
the scope of forest certification. Plantation – another controversial issue – were also 
included into forest certification programs. In sum, the turn towards more 
conventional market players (large companies) and more conventional market logics 
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generated market pressure on forest certification that explains its move to a focus on 
all forests, including plantations, instead of just natural tropical forests. This enabled 
the “fast-growth strategy” of the FSC that helped it to certify millions of hectares of 
forests quickly – mainly of boreal and temperate forests in Europe and North America 
– but caused concern over the credibility and reliability of the FSC forest certification 
program. 
The history of the emergence and development of the FSC and its forest 
certification program at the transnational level shows the important role of actors 
situated in a specific contexts that limits their repertoires of action but at the same 
time enables their action by providing organizational and institutional resources that 
actors can use to build new institutions in order to govern environmental and social 
behavior of firms in the global economy. It shows that the context also shapes the 
specific form of an emerging institution, but still in a way that allows for independent 
strategic choice of actors. It also shows that even though it may appear over years that 
the initial goals may not be completely accomplished, the emerging institutional 
forms may become enduring and legitimate instruments if they allow for compromise 
and provide a forum for discussing and reconsolidating conflicting interests. 
The FSC forest certification program emerged as a result of lengthy rounds of 
negotiations of its rules, standards and procedures between actors with diverging and 
at times conflicting interests. This process took place over years and is ever 
incomplete because new technical issues and political conflicts emerge, the fragile 
compromise between and within stakeholder groups has to be continuously 
renegotiated and the solutions for emerging problems have to be found. This process 
is not easy because of the FSC three-chamber structure and deliberative decision-
making system, but it does help keep all key stakeholder groups on board of the FSC 
ship – social, environmental and economic – that accept the FSC and its forest 
certification program as a legitimate private regulatory instrument, despite its limited 
effectiveness. 
The examination of the process of institutionalization of forest certification 
and labeling would be incomplete without explaining how forest certification and 
labeling are enacted at the local level and what its impact on forest management 
practices is. Transnational Principles and Criteria developed by the FSC are 
implemented in local settings and are influenced by the domestic dynamics at the 
national level. In the following chapters, I focus on the experience of Russia where 
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nongovernmental organizations were able to achieve considerable success in 
promoting forest certification despite difficult environmental, economic and social 
conditions. I show in the following chapters that local enactment and implementation 
are not straight-forward smooth processes where the results can be easily predicted or 
read off the transnational rules. They involve the negotiation of stakeholder interests 
and creative adaptation and learning about forest management and implementation of 
transnational standards across settings in formal and informal forums.  
 
   
5 Forestry Problems in Russia 
In this chapter I specify in greater detail the context, in which forest certification 
developed. I identify the factors that could be considered as facilitating and impeding 
the translation of FSC standards into local practices. The development of Russian 
forestry sector after the breakdown of the Soviet Union has been strongly influenced 
by the legacies of the Socialist past. It was also affected by the weakness of the state 
during the post-Socialist transformation as well as by the new liberal market ideas 
dominating economic policy since the fall of the Soviet Union. This has resulted in a 
number of important problems for Russian forestry that could have been expected to 
impede the development of forest certification. I start this chapter with presenting the 
characteristics of the Russian forest resources. I then describe the history of forestry in 
Russia between the late nineteenth century and post-Socialist period. 
5.1 The Characteristics of Russia’s Forest Resources 
About twenty percent of the world’s forests and eighty-one percent of Europe’s 
forests are located in Russia. Russia’s total forest area amounts to 808,790 thousand 
hectares. This is about 4.2 times more than in Europe in total. Forests cover about 
47.9 percent of Russia’s total area, making it one of the leading forest countries of the 
world (FAO 2007: 27). About seventy-seven percent of Russian forests are Northern 
boreal coniferous forests (Russian Federal Forestry Agency 2008). Russia has 
approximately nineteen percent of the world’s forest growing stock, about the same as 
Brazil. However, only about sixty-eight percent of the stock is available for 
commercial use, since many forests are distant from processing facilities and logging 
in these forests is not economically viable (Roshchupkin 2008). In terms of biomass 
and carbon stock, Russia’s stocks are about as large as a biomass and carbon biomass 
in Asia in total (FAO 2007: 31, 118-119). This makes Russian forests economically 
and environmentally important.  
Russia is, on the one hand, an important exporter of raw materials and simple 
processed products, including industrial roundwood and sawn wood, to Western 
Europe and to Japan, South Korea and China. About thirty-two percent of industrial 
roundwood and around sixty percent of sawn wood is exported. Twenty-eight percent 
of wood-based panels, twenty-six percent of pulp for paper and forty percent of paper 
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and paperboard are exported. In absolute terms, however, exports of wood panels, 
pulp, paper and paperboard are significantly less than the exports of roundwood and 
sawn wood (FAO 2007: 127, 134; see Table 4 for details). On the other hand, final 
products, such as furniture, are mainly imported to Russia. In 2007, the imports of 
furniture amounted to 1484.6 thousands US dollars (Federal Customs Service of 
Russia 2008), exports being insignificant. Russia also imports high-quality paper, 
paperboard and construction materials (Sharipova 2008). This means that Russia is an 
important supplier of raw materials and primary processed forest products to 
European and Asian markets and is itself an important market for final products. 
Table 4: Production, Exports and Imports of Timber Products in Russia, 2000-2004 
 Industrial Roundwood Sawn Wood 
 Production 
(1,000 m3) 
Imports 
(1,000 m3) 
Imports 
(1,000$) 
Exports 
(1,000 m3) 
Exports 
(1,000$) 
Production 
(1,000 m3) 
Imports 
(1,000 m3) 
Imports 
(1,000$) 
Exports 
(1,000 m3) 
Exports 
(1,000$) 
2000 105,800 525 13,100 30,835 1,338,300 20,000 21 3,790 7,764 733,100 
2001 117,800 625 12,649 31,693 1,391,731 19,600 15 3,015 7,700 697,390 
2002 118,600 220 5,200 36,800 1,647,800 19,240 16 3,837 9,020 869,460 
2003 126,600 852 19,751 37,518 1,803,538 20,155 11 4,260 10,544 1,177.321 
2004 130,600 1,004 26,110 41,553 2,338,086 21,355 13 5,630 12,621 1,518,232 
 
 Pulp for Paper Paper and Paperboard 
 Production 
(1,000 
tonnes) 
Imports 
(1,000 
tonnes) 
Imports 
(1,000$) 
Exports 
(1,000 
tonnes) 
Exports 
(1,000$) 
Production 
(1,000 
tonnes) 
Imports 
(1,000 
tonnes) 
Imports 
(1,000$) 
Exports 
(1,000 
tonnes) 
Exports 
(1,000$) 
2000 5,310 357.9 25,3345 2,253.3 835,827 5,752 36.2 26,185 1,614.6 562,413 
2001 5,624.8 495 38,0965 2,347 924,083 6,021.7 33 18,340 1,715 493,320 
2002 5,978 638 56,2773 2,458 864,890 6,377 42 18,926 1,800 523,588 
2003 6,377 776 73,1132 2,459 957,434 6,605 41 20,816 1,806 578,631 
2004 6,830 883 86,2406 2,707 1,243,628 6,780 23 15,226 1,744 634,194 
 
 Wood-Based Panels 
 Production 
(1,000 m3) 
Imports 
(1,000 m3) 
Imports 
(1,000$) 
Exports 
(1,000 m3) 
Exports 
(1,000$) 
2000 4,750 375.5 81,003 1,404 266,770 
2001 5,150 567 104,734 1,408 290,602 
2002 5,684 601 121,944 1,567.2 335,352 
2003 6,397 982.4 181,769 1,668 370,381 
2004 7,237 983.4 224,772 2,013.2 536,098 
Source: FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ Statistical Database. 
 
Beside their economic value, boreal forests of Russia have a significant environmental 
value. Russian forests are considerable carbon and biomass stocks that contribute to 
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preventing global warming and climate change. In future, biomass may potentially 
become one of the alternatives to oil as a safe and competitive source of energy and 
may thereby mitigate climate change. Clearing Russian forests would significantly 
contribute to climate change. The protective potential of boreal forests, most of which 
are located in Russia, is considered vital for the global environmental wellbeing 
(Luyssaert et al. 2008). 
Moreover, relatively large areas of forests in Russia have remained intact. The 
study of the World Resources Institute shows that in 1997 Russia possessed twenty-
six percent of the world’s native forests, or 344,800 thousand hectares (Bryant, 
Nielsen and Tangley 1997: 45). For many nongovernmental environmental 
organizations, protection of large intact forest landscapes is a task of a paramount 
importance, since many governments, particularly in developing countries, do not 
have special policies to protect intact forests from destruction and degradation. Intact 
forests are a type of natural forest ecosystems that have not been affected by human 
activity and follow the natural cycle of the ecosystem development. Intact forests are 
also called frontier, native, old-growth or pristine. Environmentalists insist on 
preserving unique intact ecosystems with high degree of biodiversity because of their 
high scientific and ethical value. Large intact tracts are crucial for a long-term 
survival of many species. Fragmented, non-native forests lack many features that 
many species need in order to survive (Bryant, Nielsen and Tangley 1997: 9). 
Russian forests, therefore, have high global value because of their considerable 
environmental and economic potential. Their poor environmental condition has, 
however, long disturbed both the Russian and the international environmental 
community, policy makers in Russia and international organizations, including the 
World Bank (Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995). What once had been considered 
“an unbroken belt of boundless wilderness” is no longer a reality (Aksenov et al. 2002: 
5). Although Russia still possesses a large proportion of the world’s forests, including 
intact forests, and the annual rate of forest loss is only about 0.01 percent, or 96,000 
hectares a year (FAO 2007: 27), 15  Russian forests have become increasingly 
fragmented and degraded. The degradation and fragmentation of forests, in particular 
                                                 
15
 The global rate of deforestation in 2000-2005 was 0.18%. In some regions of the world, the rate of 
forest loss exceeds one percent. For example, in Southeast Asia it equals to 1,3%, in West Africa 
1,17% (FAO 2007) 
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close to human settlements and, therefore, easily accessible for logging, results mainly 
from massive human intervention, including industrial logging, human-induced fires, 
agricultural use, road and pipeline construction and mineral resource extraction 
(Aksenov et al. 2002: 5). Forests located close to human settlements and, therefore, 
easily accessible for logging are particularly affected. Human activity significantly 
damaged the state of Russian forests and their economic, protective and 
environmental potential. 
Human intervention, although disturbing to the environment, is not necessarily 
per se the cause of forest degradation and fragmentation. In the course of human 
history, forests have always been the source of fuel and raw materials to satisfy many 
human needs, including housing and energy. Rather, it is inappropriate management 
of forest resources or the lack of it that causes the loss and degradation of the world’s 
forests. The analysis of forest problems in Russia would be, therefore, incomplete 
without addressing forest policy problems. In Russia, inadequate use and management 
of forest resources is profoundly rooted in the past institutional structures that shape 
the behavior of individuals, companies and of the state forest service officers. It has 
also been affected by the drastic transition from the Socialist economic system to 
market economy in a variety of ways. In this section, I describe how the legacies of 
the Socialist planning system coupled with dramatic transformations affect the state of 
forests and forest policy problems in Russia. They constitute the local context for 
forest certification as a new global private market-based tool for improvement of 
forest management and allegedly the condition of forests. 
5.2 A Brief History of Forestry in Russia: The Late 19th Century – 1991 
In Russia, forest policy was guided by the notion of forest resources exploitation and 
the primacy of industrial and economic development over forest management and 
protection. Forests were viewed as a renewable resource that could be freely exploited 
to promote economic growth. As early as 1899, Vladimir Lenin argued that the forest 
reserves of Russia had been exploited to the smallest extent only. After the revolution 
of 1917, Lenin identified forest resources of the Northern Russia as the key resource 
to generate revenues from exports of timber to Western Europe. He called the forests 
of the Russian North “a foreign currency mill” that provided monetary resources for 
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the restoration and industrialization of the Soviet economy after the revolution of 
1917 and the civil war of 1918-1922 (Ovchinnikov 1980: 5-8). 
Indeed, the revenues from the exports of roundwood and sawn wood were 
significant. In 1921, they amounted to seven million rubles in the northern 
Arkhangelsk federal district alone, while the investment in forest logging and primary 
processing equaled one million rubles. In the following five years, exports from the 
Arkhangelsk district generated 134 million rubles (Ovchinnikov 1980: 5-8). For the 
whole country, total exports rose from 750 thousand cubic meters of timber in 1921 to 
3,584 thousand of cubic meters in 1924. In 1929, revenues from exports amounted to 
143 million rubles (Bobrov 2001). The country also needed increasingly more 
firewood for individual and industrial use. This created a tremendous demand for 
timber that forestry sector could only satisfy by rejecting any environmental 
restrictions on logging. 
Did such restrictions exist at that time? Before the revolution of 1917, forestry 
was a relatively advanced science in Russia. The leading forestry scientists developed 
their own theory of forest management based on the idea that forests had to be 
cultivated in order to generate continuous yield of timber and, therefore, income. They 
realized that adequate forest management required restricting forest removals and 
investing in forest restoration, including the planting of trees and thinning of young 
forests. These techniques were meant not to bring about immediate income but to 
improve the quality of forests and increase potential income in the long run. After the 
revolution, Mikhail Orlov, Russia’s leading forestry scientist in the 1910-1930s, and 
his colleagues designed a standard for forest evaluation and inspection that was 
adopted by the government in 1926. They based this standard on the principles of 
long-term continuous planning and balanced use of forest resources that they believed 
would secure high long-term income from forests but require reducing harvesting in 
the short term (Knize and Romanyuk 2005; Pisarenko and Strakhov 2004). 
This approach was, however, in sharp contrast with the dramatically growing 
demand for fuel for the Soviet industry and population and the need of the political 
elite to generate revenues from exports of timber. The new generation of Socialist 
economists soon labeled the arguments of the forestry scientists “bourgeois”. They 
accused Orlov and his school of forestry of resisting the development of a new 
Socialist economy. They claimed that restricting logging hindered economic 
development. By the early 1930s, the classical theory of forest management was fully 
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abandoned. The predominant principle that governed the development of forestry 
sector was from then on that exploitation of forest resources should be defined by the 
current needs of the Socialist economy. In practice, this meant harvesting as much 
timber as possible, preferably close to the most populated areas and with the cheapest 
technology available. The proponents of this approach believed that forests were able 
to completely regenerate without any human intervention. This laid a ground for the 
future forest policy in the Soviet Union and Russia that sought to promote vast 
exploitation of forest resources that seemed to be an infinite source of revenues 
(Knize and Romanyuk 2005: 4). 
In the subsequent years, the pressure on forests continued to grow dramatically. 
Exports of timber remained an important source of state revenues. The Socialist state 
continued to generate considerable income from selling timber, mainly roundwood 
and sawn wood, to foreign counties, especially from the regions close to the borders. 
Domestic consumption of timber and timber products also increased significantly. 
During the Second World War and immediately after it, Russian forests were 
seriously damaged. To restore country’s destroyed cities and industries, the 
government increased logging assignments in a centrally planned economy. Growing 
demand for timber for export and domestic consumption resulted in logging 
increasingly more forests. Coupled with the availability of large accessible forest 
tracts in relatively densely populated regions and inadequate forest policy, this 
pressure created incentives for extensive use of forests.  
In the 1920s, 1930s and after the Second World War in the 1940s and 1950s, 
thousands of forest operations were established to satisfy the growing demand for 
timber. Forest settlements were founded to attract workforce for the operations. 
Millions of prisoners were forced to work in logging operations. Large pulp and paper 
mills and sawmills were built in the North of Russia, in the Central European part of 
Russia and in Siberia. Clear-cutting of large forest areas was a predominant harvesting 
method. Loggers moved further into the forests after clearing easily accessible forests. 
Logging operations competed between each other to over-log their annual and five-
year plans assigned to them by the Socialist central planning system. By the late 
1980s, when the first symptoms of the systemic crisis of the Socialist economy began 
to slow down the extensive expansion of forestry sector, Russia’s forests were 
severely damaged. Their regeneration was mainly spontaneous and contributed to the 
further degradation of forests. 
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The Soviet forest service officials and forestry scientists were not entirely 
unaware of the negative effects of excessive logging on the environment and economy. 
They continuously tried to remedy the symptoms of forest degradation but their policy 
responses often came to late and were only weakly reinforced (Knize and Romanyuk 
2005). The first visible environmental effects of disproportionate logging were 
identified as early as 1931. Since logs were mainly rafted along rivers due to the lack 
of roads, the forests nearby the rivers were destroyed first. This caused damage to 
rivers, including riverbank erosion and sandbank formation. In 1931 in order to 
remedy these negative effects forests were divided into commercial forests for 
industrial use and silvicultural forests. In silvicultural forests, extensive logging was 
prohibited. Large parts of forests along the river banks were allocated as protective 
buffer zones to reduce the negative effect of logging on river systems. 
In 1943, the government divided forests into three groups. The first group of 
forests included mainly protective forests where logging was prohibited. This group 
also included protected wildlife areas, such as nature reserves and national parks. The 
second group included forests where logging was restricted. These forests included 
forests in the regions with high density of population, protective forests and forests in 
the regions with fewer forests. The rest of forests were included in the third group of 
forests, also conventionally called exploitation or commercial forests. In these forests, 
logging restrictions and protection measures were minimal. Up to the early 1990s, 
these forests were continuously and increasingly severely damaged or completely 
destructed. 
The notion of three groups of forests persisted in Russia’s forest policy 
language throughout its history. This was an important category in the discursive 
struggles between environmentalists and forest industry: The forest industry used it to 
show that forest protection system in the Soviet Union was good enough to ensure 
forest protection and reproduction. In contrast, environmentalists argued that the 
forests that were officially identified as the first group were only a small portion of 
forests that needed special protection.  
After the war and up to the late 1980s as the economic situation and the 
infrastructure improved and the condition of forests deteriorated, measures for forest 
protection and against forest degradation also got better. Forestry norms and rules 
became more elaborate, comprehensive and systematized. A number of forestry 
research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a system of vocational 
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training in forestry emerged. The area of protected forests of the first and second 
group grew. A broad system of nature reserves and national parks was developed to 
protect wildlife and natural ecosystems. The government also developed programs for 
artificial forest restoration. In 1959-1965, forty-five percent of logged territories were 
replanted. These measures did not, however, suffice to improve the condition of 
forests. 
Forest industry continuously demanded more raw materials of the best quality. 
Central planning bodies designed the Socialist plans based on the demand of forestry 
industry and often ignored the specific characteristics of forests and environmental 
restrictions on logging in the forests that were allocated for harvesting. To satisfy this 
demand manifested in the plans, which were developed in the central planning system, 
logging operations often harvested only the best timber, mainly conifers for the 
production of high quality sawn wood, leaving the timber of lower quality behind. 
Moreover, to meet the requirements of the Socialist plans, forest operations often 
simply ignored forestry norms and rules. In addition, artificial restoration measures 
were to a large degree inadequate. Although much of the deforested area was 
artificially replanted or regenerated naturally, young forests were not properly 
cultivated and taken care of after replanting. As a result, forests that developed 
naturally after logging or were planted were no longer the same forests. The quickly 
growing deciduous forests were replacing economically more valuable conifer forests. 
Environmentally, the transformation of forests affected biodiversity and the condition 
of natural ecosystems.  
As a result, by the early 1990s forest loss, depletion and degradation were the 
most serious environmental problems of Russian forestry sector. Even forest service 
officials recognized the problem. In 1992, one of the top officials of the Federal 
Forest Service announced that “over-exploitation of forest resources, violations of 
ecological and forestry regulations and poor forest management during the last 
decades has drastically depleted forest resources; if timber continues to be logged at 
the present rate, assuming there is no waste in timber processing, climax forests will 
be completely destroyed in 40-60 years” (quoted in Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 
1995: 58). Although in the late 1970s and 1980s forestry scientists and policy makers 
made important steps towards improving forest regulation by including environmental 
and silvicultural aspects in the planning and management of forest use, these efforts 
did not suffice to improve significantly the condition of forests. In addition, the Soviet 
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government developed a systematic and elaborate legislation on nature protection but 
it was not integrated into forestry norms. Moreover, the capacity of the state to 
monitor and enforce forestry norms decreased. It, therefore, resulted in ever-growing 
gap between forestry rule-making and rule-implementation.  
5.3 Forests and Forestry in the Transition Period: 1991 – 2009  
At the end of the 1980s, the systemic crisis of the Soviet economy began to unfold. 
Production declined and investments in the forestry sector decreased substantially. 
The crisis, on the one hand, slowed down forest removals significantly. In the 1990s, 
wood removals decreased from approximately 330 million cubic meters in 1990 to 
150 million in 2000 (FAO 2007: 31). On the other hand, the crisis prevented any 
further reforms of forestry law and practice towards more sustainable management of 
forest resources. While the government had to extensively reform the legislation 
regulating forest use and forest sector to introduce private property and market 
principles sector, environmental and silvicultural aspects were to a large extent 
ignored. 
In the early 1990s, as a result of the comprehensive liberal market reforms, a 
whole set of new institutions governing the forest sector of the economy slowly 
emerged to support the transition to a market economy. In line with the reforms, forest 
management and forest use were legally separated from each other. Since forest lands 
were not privatized, the management, control and monitoring of forest resources 
remained the responsibility of the state. Forest use, including logging and timber 
processing, was transferred to the emerging private sector. Former state Socialist 
enterprises were privatized; the state withdrew their support of forest logging and 
processing. To ensure that the newly privatized enterprises had access to forest 
resources, the institution of concession was introduced. Private companies could lease 
land from the state for a specified term, under specified conditions and for a specified 
rent. The state retained functions of concession distribution, supervision, forest 
restoration, monitoring and control of the forest sector. Additionally, in a new system 
the state or companies leasing the forests were able to sell parts of tree stands without 
leasing forest land itself. The mechanism of distribution of concessions and stands 
were public competitions and auctions. This system of property relations and a set of 
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rules further specifying forestry practices and relationships between different actors in 
a forestry sector was fixed in the forest code enacted in 1997.  
The 1997 forest code was the first attempt to specify the rules to govern the 
behavior of actors in the forestry sector on the basis of liberal market economy 
principles. The major task of legislative bodies was to provide actors with the basic 
rules of the game, even though perceived as temporary and imperfect, which would 
sustain economic activity in the forest sector. This was an enormous task given that 
eventually no history of liberal market relationships in Russia’s forestry sector existed 
and severe economic recession was undermining the capacity of the state to control 
country’s economy and to enforce rules. The priority was to enable new economic 
relationships between actors and to simply get the exhausted forest sector back going, 
while environmental, protective and silvicultural aspects of forest policy were largely 
neglected in the first forest laws. Forced by the strong criticisms of both 
environmentalists and forest industry and apparent inconsistencies within the forest 
law, Russian legislators soon started working on the new forest code that was enacted 
in 2007, ten years after the first code. 
The main deficiency that forestry scholars identified in the forest code of 1997 
was that it set perverse incentives that discouraged forest companies from investing in 
the appropriate forest management to improve the condition of forests in a concession. 
According to the forest code, a concession payment was based on the species 
composition and estimated size of trees on a specific territory. This means that the 
price of forest increases with the quality of the tree stand. If a company invests in 
silviculture, forest regeneration and improvement, the only thing it can expect is the 
increase of the amount it has to pay for leasing forest. Instead, they suggest that the 
payment should be based on the assessment of several parameters, including the 
characteristics of soils and predominant species. Yet, the adequate system of 
comprehensive forest assessment, however, was, and still is, ultimately non-existent 
(Knize and Romanyuk 2005: 15). 
The main driver of the new reform of forest legislation was still not the 
environmental considerations but the growing concern of the government with the 
perceived inefficiency of the forest sector and the lack of investment. They expected 
that investment could boost forestry-related sectors and generate economic growth 
and additional revenues in the forest sector. In addition to this, due to the severe fiscal 
crisis, the government was no longer able to support forest management activities, 
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including planting and taking care of forests. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, federal 
and local forest service and forestry research institutes and centers were severely 
underfinanced. The government laid off a significant proportion of the employed in 
the state system of the forest service and forest protection service. Forestry research 
institutes declined. The Federal Forest Service was merged into the Ministry of 
Natural Resources. The lack of resources, weak enforcement of rules, as well as 
ambiguity and inconsistency of legislation, provided structural opportunities for 
growing corruption, informalization of the transactions on the forestry sector and for 
illegal activity. The government hoped to solve these problems by creating market-
oriented institutional preconditions for domestic and foreign investment in forestry-
related sectors.  
For this purpose, the new forest code substantially redefined the institutional 
structure of relationships within the forestry sector. Most importantly, the new forest 
code re-distributed functions between the private sector, local governments and the 
federal government. In the forest areas under concessions, main management 
functions were transferred to the immediate forest users, i.e., companies that leased 
forests from the state and formed concessions. The important implication of this 
transfer is that forest users became able to plan the use of their forests and log, plant 
and take care of forests on their leased land. The indicator for it is a turn from a 
permit-based system of forest regulation to the declaration-based system. In the 
declaration-based system, forest companies declare their forest use and management 
plans, rather than obtain permissions to perform certain activities in the forests. The 
government hoped that this increased independence in what companies could do in 
their leased forests would create incentives and favorable conditions for investment. 
The federal and local governments, as well as self-governing municipalities, retained 
their regulatory, monitoring and control functions. In the new system, the role of the 
government was to provide rules and norms that would govern companies’ behavior, 
including environmental requirements, and to monitor and control companies’ 
performance in the forests, rather then prescribe exactly how companies had to 
manage their forests. 
Although environmentalists and business, at least larger companies, positively 
evaluated the transfer of forest management functions from the state to the private 
sector, the general attitude of the environmental movement and forestry science 
remained very skeptical of the new forest code. They doubted that the new forest code 
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indeed provided favorable conditions for creating an economically, environmentally 
and socially balanced forest economy. First, environmentalists believed that the new 
forest code further institutionalized the dominant approach to forests as a self-
regenerating resource that had to be exploited (Yaroshenko 2008; interview 25). They 
argue that the new forest law encouraged further extraction of forest resources without 
adequate specification of forest restoration measures. They emphasized that 
environmental and social aspects were merely declared in the forest code but were not 
specified and, therefore, left to much freedom of interpretation for forest users 
(Dmitriev 2007). According to many environmentalists, the new forest code 
jeopardized the protection and conservation of designated forests that required special 
protection, including protective forests and riparian buffer zones (Dmitriev 2006: 11-
12; Shvarts 2006: 6).  
In addition, due to a severe fiscal crisis, underfinanced research institutes and 
forest service agencies were no longer able to provide reliable up-to-date information 
on the condition of Russia’s forests. This forced the forest service to rely on the 
outdated data, often collected still in the Soviet times. According to the new forest 
code, the forests should be inventoried and assessed only by 2020. This means that up 
to 2020, the government and forest service would continue to operate on the basis of 
outdated and imprecise information on Russia’s forest resources. Environmental 
organizations and forestry scholars feared that this could lead to incorrect forestry 
planning and further harm forests. 
Second, environmentalists and forestry scientists warned that decentralization 
of forest governance and the transfer of numerous responsibilities from the federal to 
local governments might yield unpredictable outcomes for the forest sector. They 
feared that the loss of central control and incompetence of local authorities may harm 
economic, social and environmental aspects of forestry in many regions. Among other 
things, they were concerned that decentralization might hinder the maintenance of the 
existing special protected reserves and parks, as well as the creation of the new ones 
located in more than one federal district (Dmitriev 2007). For large forest companies 
that worked in several federal districts, the decentralization of control might cause 
problems in harmonizing their corporate practices across federal districts (Komarova 
2007). 
Finally, environmentalists and business were concerned that the only 
mechanism of forest land allocation provided by the forest code was the mechanism 
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of public auctions. Ultimately, the bidders offering the highest price might receive a 
concession regardless of their vision of environmental and social responsibility of 
forest business. Environmentalists were disturbed, since they believed that forests 
might be leased to the companies that did not plan to invest in forest regeneration and 
did not accept social responsibility for its workers and forest communities (2004; 
Shvarts 2006; Yaroshenko 2008). Although large companies realized that the new 
forest code actually served their interests vis-à-vis weaker small and medium-sized 
forest users, they were concerned that this mechanism may open an arena for forest 
takeovers and corporate conflicts over forest land and hostile repartition of property in 
the forest sector (Komarova 2007). While they are likely to take over small and 
medium-sized business, they fear that they may as well be taken over by even stronger 
competitors. 
These were concerns, worries and fears that might at the first glance seem to 
be subjective, contradictory, biased and at best speculative but they were in fact 
symptomatic of the fundamental uncertainty as an outcome of the institutional 
instability, in which actors had to operate. They were unable to form adequate 
expectations about the future and had to perform in a highly uncertain and volatile 
economic and political environment. Although the new forest code was enacted in 
January 2007, the supporting statutory acts, instructions and standards were not 
operational. In February 2008, thirteen months after the enactment and about two 
years after the beginning of the reform, a number of statutes were still under review 
and revision. At that time, basically two forest codes were simultaneously operated 
(Yaroshenko 2008: 2). For example, while the system of logging permits issued by 
the local forest service to control logging was formally abandoned and the system of 
logging declarations was introduced, no regulations specifying the operation of the 
declaration-based system were effective. In order to secure logging operations, 
companies were forced to obtain logging permits for two years in advance, often 
informally.  
Yaroshenko (2008) also reported that government officials and forest users 
started to experiment with informal solutions to the problems that emerged after the 
enactment of the new, poorly specified forest law. Since not enough funds were 
allocated to support the reform process, local governments in many federal districts 
were unable to reform the forest service and local legislation effectively and on time. 
Managers of the largest forest-related companies in Russia agreed that local 
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government and local legislation is “a complete mess” (Komarova 2007) and were, 
therefore, uncertain about their future. Experts from business and environmental 
sector agreed that the new forest code was hardly viable and that it was unlikely that it 
would last longer than the first forest code. 
Another factor that contributed to the uncertainty in the forest sector was the 
introduction of prohibitive export tariffs. In order to encourage forest companies to 
invest in domestic timber processing and to reorient the forestry sector from exporting 
raw material towards producing high value-added products for domestic consumption 
and exports, the government planned to introduce high prohibitive tariffs on exported 
roundwood in 2008. The government aimed at restricting exports of raw materials to 
Europe and China and at encouraging producers to construct timber processing 
facilities. The government provisionally postponed tariff introduction but even the 
very plans added to the instability and uncertainty among producers, in particularly 
among those who were highly dependent on exports of roundwood. They feared that 
they would not survive this measure or would be displaced into the illegal segment of 
the forest economy. These fears were also speculative but they demonstrated that 
actors were uncertain about their future in the reformed forest economy. 
Another problem that the government hoped to tackle with the introduction of 
the new forest code was the wide-spread corruption in the forest sector and the 
informalization of forest economy. During the severe fiscal crisis of the 1990s, the 
forest service was not longer able to fulfill its functions. The forest service remained 
responsible for silvicultural functions, including forest maintenance, re-planting and 
taking care of young forests and forest quality improvement but did not receive 
financial support from the government. The underfunded local forest service had to 
extract resources informally. One of the most common examples of informal 
resource-mining by the state forest service is improvement thinning. It is one of the 
measures for maintaining the quality of young forests: certain trees are cut to allow 
other trees grow better. These trees are usually low-quality fast-growing trees. Instead, 
to raise funds, forest service logged or allowed its subcontractors to log the best trees 
leaving the ones that it actually had to cut behind. Moreover, budgetary deficits forced 
the government to lay off thousands of forest inspectors throughout the country. Ever 
weaker control over forest resources and forest users resulted into growing illegal 
activity at the local level. Especially prominent are the illegal loggings that flourished 
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mainly in the regions close to the boarders in the 1990s, including the Far East and 
North-Western borders of Russia. 
However, corruption and illegal activity is probably the most extreme 
manifestations of the informalization of forest economy. In fact, a comprehensive 
system of informal relationships emerged that supported the system of formal 
relationships, at least on the surface. For instance, in order to get access to forest 
resources controlled by underfunded local governments or municipalities, large 
companies had to overtake additional responsibility to support social infrastructure 
and provide social services to their workers and local rural communities. In turn, they 
were able to sign a concession agreement with local government and access local 
forest resources. This opportunity, however, disappeared because auctions were 
introduced as the main mechanism of allocation of forest land, according to the new 
forest code.16 
The new forest code aimed at making the system of forest relationships less 
corrupt and at providing favorable conditions for investment and production growth in 
the forest economy. Although it might yet be too early to evaluate the actual effects of 
the new forest code, its introduction obviously generated a great deal of instability and 
uncertainty about the future among the key actors of the forestry sector, including 
companies, environmental organizations and local governments. They feared that the 
transition period to the new system of relationships in the forestry sector might last 
another several years and that this transition might have unintended consequences that 
no-one is able to foresee. 
To sum up, the current forest policy in Russia and the condition of forests 
were to a large degree shaped by the legacies of the Socialist past, the fundamental 
economic and political crisis of the early 1990s and the troublesome transition to the 
liberal market economy after 1991. In the Soviet period, forest policy and economy 
were governed by the notion of forests as a self-regenerating resource that should be 
exploited to provide resources for economic growth in the forestry sector and be 
regulated according to the forestry-related industries’ needs. Forests were increasingly 
                                                 
16
 In future this may have a negative effect on the wellbeing of local communities, since companies 
may decide to withdraw their support if they do not benefit from it.  
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depleted, while forest regeneration measures did not suffice to improve the condition 
of forests. 
In the 1980s, as the forestry-related environmental legislation was actually 
improving, the capacity of the state to enforce rules was decreasing. The systemic 
political and economic crisis of the Socialist system began to unfold. The early 1990s 
saw the drastic decline of the economy, including the forest sector. Production and 
investment fell dramatically; the existing institutional framework had to be reformed 
to accommodate the transition to the liberal market economy and democratic political 
system. The first forest code was enacted in 1997. Its aim was to provide new 
institutional bases for forest economy and to get the forest sector going in the first 
place. It was in many respects flawed and ambiguous and ignored environmental and 
social aspects of forestry that resulted in the persistence of the exploitation approach 
to forests. The introduction of the new forest code enacted in 2007 created legal chaos 
and uncertainty among producers. 
5.4 Discussion 
How is the previous description relevant for understanding the development of forest 
certification in Russia? In this final section of this chapter, I will identify the factors 
that are likely to facilitate and impede the adoption and expansion of forest 
certification in Russia based on the data on the Russian forest resources and forest 
policy presented above. 
The facilitating factors are associated mainly with the position of the Russian 
forestry sector in the international market for timber products, as well as its structural 
features, including fragmentation and the strength of industry associations. Since 
many Russian companies depend on exporting their products to international markets 
(see Table 4), they are particularly susceptible to pressure from European buyers and 
environmental groups to certify their forest management. For international and 
Russian companies that are not threatened by environmental campaigns, reputation 
gains and potential market benefits, including higher price and increased demand for 
certified timber, have become important incentives to certify. Moreover, Russian 
companies mainly export simple products, such as roundwood (unprocessed logs) and 
sawn wood (products of primary processing of logs, i.e., of sawing). Since these 
products are relatively easily substitutable in the competitive international market, 
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producers perceive the lack of a certification as a potential disadvantage and are likely 
to certify their forest management. 
The structure of the Russian forest sector is also an important facilitating 
factor. The large-scale segment of the forest sector is dominated by vertically 
integrated industrial groups with large and medium-size pulp and paper mills, 
woodworking mills or sawmills at the core. These groups are highly visible and 
reputation-conscious and, therefore, easily targeted by environmentalists. Moreover, 
many of them have multinationals as their parent companies. At the same time, due to 
the vertical integration, they are likely to be able to impose forest certification on the 
operations down the supply chain. It is also likely that a strong large-scale segment of 
the Russian forest sector should be able to create an alternative to the FSC that should 
better address industry interests and defeat the FSC, as it happened many European 
countries, including Norway, Germany and Finnland (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 
2004; Cashore et al. 2007; Gulbrandsen 2005a) This large-scale segment is relatively 
fragmented. In contrast to countries where strong associations of forest owners and 
producers were able to create industry-led forest certification programs, the Russian 
forestry sector was unable to coordinate and to create quickly a viable alternative to 
the FSC certification program. 
While these factors were likely to facilitate the expansion of forest 
certification in Russia, several potential impeding factors can also be identified: 
traditionally unsound forest management and poor condition of forests, political and 
institutional instability, and the lack of established mechanisms of public participation 
in the forest governance. 
In the early 1990s Russian forest management was severely criticized (Dudley, 
Jeanrenaud and Sullivan 1995: 58-60). In the Soviet era, forests were considered a 
strategic source of state revenues and were overharvested for domestic consumption 
and export. Forests in densely populated areas were depleted and dramatically 
degraded during Socialism. In the transition period, the federal government 
significantly reduced its expenditures on forests and weakened its control over forest 
resources and their use. Illegal logging and other illegal activities became widespread 
phenomena. Underfinanced research institutes and federal and local forest services 
were no longer able to provide reliable up-to-date information on the condition of 
Russia’s forests and to adequately enforce forestry rules. The forest service had to rely 
on the outdated data from the Soviet time. The government focused exclusively on 
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introducing market economy foundations in the forest sector, including the 
specification of property rights, and almost completely ignored environmental and 
social issues in forestry. Environmental activists, as well many forestry scholars and 
professional foresters, unanimously criticized the government and existing forestry-
related legislation. They believed that as a result of the ineffective forest policy the 
condition of forests continued to deteriorate (Knize and Romanyuk 2005). 
Traditionally poor forest management and poor condition of forests were likely to 
become important obstacles for forest certification because reforming forest 
management was likely to entail high costs of certification for companies.  
Second, imperfect forest legislation and slow and ineffective reforms 
constituted another set of difficulties that the FSC had to deal with in Russia. All 
forests were federal property and could only be leased to companies for up to forty-
nine years. The federal forest service retained many responsibilities, including 
reforestation and taking care of younger forests that the FSC expected companies, not 
state forest service to fulfill. As a result, it was unclear how to implement FSC 
requirements while remaining within Russian legal framework. Contradictions 
between FSC standards and government regulation complicated the situation even 
more. 
In 2007 the new forest code, the basic law regulating forestry, was enacted. 
The introduction of the new forest code was far from smooth. Although 
environmentalists and forestry experts considered the new forest code to be better 
than the previous one, its introduction created a legal chaos. When it was enacted, the 
majority of supporting regulations were not in place. Underfinanced regional 
authorities in federal regions were unable to implement and reform regional forest 
management systems properly. As a result, two forest codes operated simultaneously. 
Companies were unable to develop forest management plans because they had to be 
consistent with the new forest code that did not yet operate in its full scope. Yet the 
FSC’s first principle was exactly the compliance with all national laws, which was 
almost impossible to achieve. It became unclear how to manage forests and assess 
forest management. Uncertainty about the implementation of FSC standards under 
two forest codes created additional complications for companies that had to comply 
with both governmental regulations and FSC standards. In addition, the new forest 
code unsettled the forestry sector: Managers were seriously concerned with the 
reform’s unpredictable consequences long before the new forest code was enacted. 
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Economic restructuring, imperfect legislation and its continuous reforms and 
weak enforcement of governmental regulations discourage companies from making 
any long-term investment into sustainable forest management. Since Russia’s 
northern forests grow slowly, it requires significant resources to maintain their good 
quality and productive potential over decades before timber can be harvested. Forests’ 
productive potential depends on various forest maintenance measures, including forest 
planting and interim logging ten, thirty or fifty years after planting. These measures 
require a scientifically sound long-term management plan for forest resources. 
However, producers lack a long-term perspective. Since current legislation only 
allows concession agreements for up to forty-nine years, producers often are 
discouraged to invest in forests. Long-term planning is difficult because producers 
lack stable rules and up-to-date reliable information on their forests. An unstable 
economic situation and fluctuating prices at the global market also discourage 
companies from long-term investments. Forest certification requires, however, that 
companies manage their forests according to a long-term forest management plan that 
includes measures to ensure forest productivity, environmental protection and long-
term social benefits to local communities and society at large. It is unclear, however, 
how companies could achieve this under in such a difficult context. 
Furthermore, significant contradictions between were likely to complicate the 
implementation of the FSC principles and criteria of good forest management in 
Russia. Whereas the FSC standards require the protection high conservation value 
forests and more specifically old-growth forests and the introduction of biodiversity 
protection measures on logging sites and in managed forests, the Russian forest law 
does not prescribe such measures. Moreover, the concept of high conservation value 
forests is missing from the Russian legislation, which makes its implementation 
problematic in the Russian context.  
Finally, the third factor that might have impeded the expansion of forest 
certification in Russia is the lack of institutionalized mechanisms of public 
participation at all levels of the forest governance system. FSC’s forest certification 
requires that organizations representing all groups that have stakes in forests should 
have a voice in the forest certification system. These stakeholder groups include 
environmental movement organizations, organizations for worker rights and 
indigenous people rights, local community organizations, as well as any other 
organizations or individuals claiming to have a stake in forests. The FSC requires that 
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all interested parties should be involved in forest certification at all levels of the 
system – from standard-setting to the implementation of standards. However, this has 
been a challenging task for the supporters of the FSC in Russia. 
While international environmental organizations quickly have won the support 
of the Russian environmentalist community, after the first certifications it has become 
clear that it would be harder to engage local communities and worker rights activists 
in forest certification. The majority of forest operations are located in poor remote 
forest settlements where people have experienced hardships of the severe economic 
recession of the 1990s. Many have lost their jobs and have to face dramatically 
decreasing incomes. Many cherish the memories of their hard but happy lives under 
Socialism and criticize the new owners of forest companies. Moreover, activists 
seeking to promote forest certification, auditors and companies lack skills to engage 
frustrated people into forest certification. It is a serious obstacle that forest 
certification supporters have to overcome to make sure forest certification 
requirements are met. 
These impeding factors – traditionally poor forest management practices, 
institutional and economic instability and lack of mechanisms of public participation 
– constitute major obstacles that the FSC and its supporters in Russia have to 
overcome to assure the functioning of the forest certification programs in Russia. 
Facilitating factors, the export orientation of the Russian forestry sector, its 
susceptibility to pressure from European buyers and environmental groups and 
inability to create a viable alternative to the FSC, partly explain the expansion of 
forest certification in Russia but they alone cannot be held responsible. An adequate 
explanation requires specifying why and how the supporters of the FSC were able to 
make use of these structural advantages and to overcome the obstacles identified 
above. In the following sections I explain who the supporters of forest certifications 
are, what their role is and how they have become involved in forest certification. 
 
 
   
6 The History of Forest Certification in Russia 
The central goal of this chapter is to describe how organizational preconditions for the 
successful start of the forest certification in Russia emerged as a result of the strategic 
and skillful action by environmental movement organizations. Environmental activists 
started promoting forest certification before companies became interested in certifying 
forest management. They developed national standards, experimented with forest 
certification in their project, disseminated information on forest certification and 
trained certification experts. They thus created a common knowledge base related to 
forest certification, a pool of certification experts and organizational infrastructure. 
These elements were crucial for the operation forest certification program and thus 
enabled its launch when forest companies later decided to certify their forest 
management. 
6.1 The Weakness and the Strength of the Russian Environmental 
Movement 
There is a general agreement in the literature that citizens’ involvement in 
environmental activism in Russia has been relatively low. Citizens’ activism rose 
dramatically in the late 1980s – after the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant, but has been steadily declining since then (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008: 449). 
According to Dalton (2005, cited in Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008: 450), on the basis 
of the World Values Survey, membership in environmental groups in Russia was 1.7 
percent in 1990 and dropped to 0.7 percent in 1999 (the average for 56 countries 
surveyed was 5.2 percent). Despite this fact, the influence of the environmental 
movement organizations grew in the 1990s and 2000s: While environmental 
organizations were still unable to take part in the development of the first forest code 
in the mid-1990s and its authors ignored their proposals, in the 2000s environmental 
organizations became the strongest opposition to the government in the debates on the 
new forest code (Shvarts 2004: 8). 
This growing influence was also critical for the expansion of forest 
certification in Russia. For the development of forest certification, not the domestic 
membership per se, but environmental organizations themselves – and more 
specifically, their expertise and domestic and transnational networks – mattered 
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considerably. Transnationally connected NGOs were the first movers in the field of 
forest certification and relied less on public protests or consumer activism. Rather, 
they mobilized grass-roots “indigenous” NGOs and individual scientists and activists 
to support and propagate forest certification in many parts of Russia.  
By 1992, there were more than 840 environmental NGOs in Russia 
(Mirovitskaya 1998, cited in Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008: 450). In the mid-1990s, 
their number continued to grow (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008: 450). 
Organizationally, they range from highly institutionalized organizations to loose 
groups that “consist of a name and a handful of individuals” (Henry 2010: 10). 
Moreover, they can be roughly divided into two groups: branches of influential 
international NGOs, most notably Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), and “indigenous” organizations, many of which have their roots in the Soviet 
time (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008: 450; Weiner 1999). Many of these originated in 
scientific institutes, universities and student environmental organizations called 
Druzhina (from Russian brigade or squad) and are still led and staffed by scientists 
and former scientists (Weiner 1999). 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, environmental NGOs quickly integrated into 
the international environmental movement and gained access to international funds. 
Two leading international NGOs – WWF and Greenpeace – opened their country 
offices in Russia. Preexisting environmental organizations gained access to the 
international resources provided by foreign governments, international governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations and charity foundations. New organizations 
emerged out of pre-existing networks of domestic environmental, organizations of the 
Soviet time, research institutes and individual activists. Moreover, many NGOs rely 
mainly on foreign donors, since they have no sustainable domestic sources of revenue 
– e.g., membership (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008). Greenpeace and the WWF are 
funded by their international headquarters and branches in other countries (interview 
13). They cooperate closely with many grass-roots NGOs. The integration of Russian 
activists into the heterogeneous international environmental network therefore 
provided the Russian environmental movement with a special impetus.  
The internationalization of the Russian environmental movement had a 
number of important consequences for Russian forest policy. First, environmentalists 
joined ongoing international debates on forest problems and this new experience in 
the international forest policy arena enabled them to acquire new experience, 
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knowledge, conceptual frames and strategic repertoires that enabled them to redefine 
forest problems and develop alternative conceptualizations to the dominant visions of 
forests and forest problems in Russian forest policy landscape. The knowledge 
embodied in the novel frames was not entirely new in Russia. Rather, 
environmentalists were able to skillfully combine elements of old and new frames, 
pre-existing networks and material infrastructure and deploy available international 
resources to redefine forest policy options. Their success in lobbying federal and local 
governments was uneven but they put a number of previously non-existent issues on 
the political agenda. 
Two issues are particularly prominent in this respect. International 
environmental organizations, including WWF and Greenpeace, put a special emphasis 
on the protection and conservation of particularly valuable types of forests and on the 
sustainable forest management of the remaining forests. In Russia, they challenged a 
widely accepted view among policy makers, forest service officers and company 
managers that the existing system of nature protection and conservation was good 
enough to effectively protect valuable forests and that existing forest practices were 
not overly harmful as long as all existing rules were observed. In contrast, 
environmental organizations argued that the existing system of forest protection and 
conservation was deficient and severely underfunded and that the habitual forest 
management practices had to be considerably reformed to improve the condition of 
forests. 
In terms of forest protection and conservation, environmentalists insisted that 
the government protected only an extremely small portion of valuable forests. The 
authors of the Atlas of Russia’s Intact Forest Landscapes argue that only five percent 
of Russia’s intact forests were officially designated as protected territories, such as 
nature reserves, wildlife refugees and national parks (Aksenov et. al. 2002: 5). 
Nongovernmental organizations, therefore, worked to promote more protection for 
high conservation value forests, nationally and locally. They lobbied the federal 
government to increase officially protected and conserved areas in the forest 
legislation and engaged local governments in cooperative projects to promote forest 
protection at the local level. 
Environmental organizations’ efforts to promote better forest management also 
had mixed outcomes. On the one hand, the impact on the federal legislation regulating 
forest practices was relatively limited. A number of proposals of environmental 
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organizations and forestry scientists were integrated in the newest forest code but the 
majority of environmental organizations remained highly skeptical. They believe that 
the new forest code at best benefits large vertically-integrated industrial companies, 
since it provides a clear and more transparent procedure for the access to the forest 
resources but the cost of this access is fewer environmental and social restrictions on 
the forest use. They claim that the new forest code does not address severe 
environmental problems of Russian forests and focuses exclusively on the economic 
aspects of forest resource use. They emphasize that the new forest code does not 
provide incentives for forest companies to take a good care of forests according to the 
international standards and will result into further decline of Russia’s forests.  
On the other hand, environmental organizations’ cooperation with local 
governments yielded better results. WWF reported their success in inserting 
sustainable forest management standards in the local legislation of the federal districts 
of the Arkhangelsk federal region and the Republic of Komi. The standards of forest 
management that WWF and local government designed together to be implemented at 
the local level were approved by the government. Simultaneously, environmental 
organizations worked to convince companies to change their unsound practices. They 
provided them with guidance of what sustainable forest management is and how to 
change the existing practices for the better.  
Moreover, environmental organizations organized consumer boycotts and 
other kinds of naming and shaming campaigns to press companies logging in the old-
growth native forests of the Russian North-West and the Far East. Environmentalists 
were able to engage international media and expose importers of Russian timber and 
general public to the growing degradation of Russia’s valuable forests and illegal 
logging in them. As a result, any products that stemmed from Russian forests were 
perceived as “bad timber”. These campaigns were crucial for convincing business to 
stop logging intact forests and seek cooperation with the environmental movement. 
These environmental campaigns and their direct work with companies and local 
governments were the first step towards the success of forest certification in Russia. 
Environmental NGOs became the most active proponents of forest 
certification in Russia. Organizations that took the leading role in building an FSC 
forest certification system were the WWF, Greenpeace and two Russia-based NGOs 
which are also active internationally: the International Social-Ecological Union and 
the Biodiversity Conservation Center (see Table 5). Founded in 1988, the 
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International Social-Ecological Union is an umbrella organization for 349 social and 
environmental NGOs from seventeen countries, mainly Russia and other former 
republics of the Soviet Union, but also the U.K., Israel, Spain, Norway and the U.S. 
The Forest Campaign, a division of the Social-Ecological Union dealing with forest 
issues, took an active part in the campaigns for conservation of old-growth forests in 
northwest Russia and was a pioneer of forest certification in Russia. The Biodiversity 
Conservation Center was founded in 1992 by the representatives of the Druzhina 
movement and set up by the Socio-Ecological Union. Its Forest Program, together 
with the Socio-Ecological Union’s Forest Campaign, Greenpeace and the WWF, 
initiated forest certification in Russia and took an active part in mapping Russia’s old-
growth forests and campaigning for them. 
Moreover, since these key organizations cooperated closely with many grass-
roots environmental NGOs and individual activists all over Russia, they were able to 
mobilize them in the forest certification system (see Table 5). Many smaller regional 
and local NGOs participated in the development of national and regional standards, 
research and publications, auditing, consulting, auditor and stakeholder training and 
stakeholder consultations. They perceived forest certification as a new opportunity to 
gain access to forest companies, access additional funding and further propagate 
forest-related environmental issues. Due to their broad expertise and established 
networks with research institutions and each other, they were able to construct an 
effective alliance, quickly build a working forest certification system and successfully 
promote forest certification in Russia. 
6.2 The First Discussions of Forest Certification in Russia 
Although forest certification emerged as a market-based mechanism to promote and 
reward the responsible management of forest resources throughout the world, it is not 
the market demand for certified timber per se that drove the initial start of forest 
certification in Russia. Environmental movement organizations created local 
organizational infrastructure that facilitated the start and the subsequent expansion of 
the FSC’s system of forest certification in Russia. They worked with companies to 
convince them to become certified. They worked with federal and local governmental 
bodies to convince them to informally endorse and support forest certification. They 
organized training workshops for company managers, certifiers and interested third 
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parties, or stakeholders. They published recommendations, guidelines and instructions 
to help companies comply with forest certification requirements. They developed 
national standards of forest management to be applied to specifically Russian 
economic, social and natural conditions. They employed their networks and resources 
that the FSC could not provide to promote forest certification in many different ways. 
Table 5: Leading Social Movement Organizations Promoting Forest Certification in Russia 
The World Wide 
Fund for Nature 
Russia (WWF-
Russia) 
An influential international 
environmental 
nongovernmental 
organization; a global leader 
in the promotion of forest 
certification 
National standard making Training of 
auditors and company managers 
Direct work with forest companies 
Integrating forest certification into 
current management projects 
Monitoring of certified companies 
Consulting 
Lobbying the government 
Establishment of certification centers 
Greenpeace Russia An influential international 
nongovernmental 
environmental organization 
National standard making  
Direct work with companies 
Lobbying of the government 
Monitoring of certified companies 
Biodiversity 
Conservation 
Center 
Russian environmental 
nongovernmental 
organization 
National standard making  
Consulting 
Monitoring 
International 
Social-Ecological 
Union 
An international association 
of environmental 
nongovernmental 
organizations, with the 
majority of members from 
Russia and former Soviet 
republics 
National standard making  
Consulting 
Monitoring 
The Silver Taiga 
(Priluzie Model 
Forest) 
A regional environmental 
fund (The Republic of Komi) 
supported by the government 
of Switzerland; main project 
Priluzie Model Forest, a 
large-scale sustainable forest 
management project 
National standard making 
Integrating forest certification into 
the Silver Taiga’s projects 
Monitoring 
Consulting 
Pskov Model Forest, A joint project of WWF and 
Stora Enso, one of the 
world’s largest timber 
companies (Pskov) 
Forest certification as a part of the 
project 
Consulting 
SPOK Regional environmental 
nongovernmental 
organization (The Republic 
of Karelia) 
Monitoring 
Consulting 
Forest Certification 
Support Group at the 
Center for 
Independent Social 
Research 
A group of social scientists 
researching, supporting and 
promoting forest certification 
(St. Petersburg) 
National standard making  
Consulting 
Monitoring 
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However, by the time environmental organizations started taking concrete steps to 
promote forest certification, two important preconditions were already in place to 
facilitate the expansion of forest certification. First, inappropriate forest management, 
illegal activity and poor protection of endangered or valuable forests had been 
identified as important problems in the global context. Leading international 
environmental organizations, including the Taiga Rescue Network, the World 
Resources Institute, the WWF and Greenpeace, investigated the condition of Russia’s 
forests, dominant forestry practices, illegal activity and timber trade patterns and 
conducted forest policy analyses to emphasize the problems and challenges for 
Russian forestry in the global context (Aksenov et al. 2002; Brukhanov et al. 2003; 
Kotlobay and Ptichnikov 2002; Kotlobay et al. 2004). The studies defined the 
inappropriate management of forest resources, illegal logging, illegal timber trade and 
inadequate protection of endangered or valuable forests as the most significant 
problems. International organizations, including the European Commission and the 
World Bank, also conducted similar studies and also emphasized inadequate forest 
management and forest policy as major obstacles for the development of the Russian 
forest sector (The World Bank 1997). 
Several studies also emphasized the link between foreign buyers, especially in 
Europe, and the destruction of Russia’s valuable forests. The study of the WWF 
(Kotlobay et al. 2004) claimed that ultimately every consignment of timber exported 
to Germany was of uncertain origin and both sellers and buyers were unable to prove 
that timber came from legal sources and that harvesting of this timber did not harm 
forests in Russia. The report on the illegal logging in the Russian Far East also 
commission by the WWF showed that massive illegal logging and trade in illegal 
timber with China and Japan may result into the extinction of unique Far Easter taiga, 
a home for relict species of cedar, Amur tiger and Far Eastern leopard (Kotlobay and 
Ptichnikov 2002). Forest certification later addressed these problems and was, 
therefore, viewed as a solution by companies that sought to distinguish themselves as 
managing their forests appropriately and operating according to Russian laws. 
At the same time, Russian and international environmental organizations 
started a number of projects to develop and test systems and practices of sustainable 
forest management and use. WWF started a project on sustainable forest management 
with the focus on endangered and valuable forests, biodiversity conservation and 
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legality of timber in the Arkhangelsk federal region that contains a large portion of 
Russia’s ancient forests. WWF launched several model forests in different regions of 
Russia. Model forests are projects aimed at developing and testing innovative systems 
of forest management. For many of these projects, the idea was to adjust global 
principles of sustainable management of natural resources manifested in international 
conventions and agreements to the specifically Russian natural and social conditions 
and to develop “best practices” that Russian forest service and companies could use 
for their forest management systems and concrete practices. 
Second, environmental organizations organized a series of campaigns against 
illegal logging and logging in the Russia’s intact forests. These campaigns affected 
mainly large logging and processing companies in the North West of Russia shipping 
timber from Russian’s native forests in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. In 
Arkhangelsk, Greenpeace activists chained themselves to the ships that took timber 
from Russia to Europe. Together with journalists from major European networks, 
activists filmed logging operations to be later broadcasted in Europe. In Karelia, the 
Taiga Rescue Network and a number of Finnish organizations campaigned against 
harvesting in the ancient forests at the border with Finland that later became Kalevala 
National Park (Tysiachniouk and Reisman 2004). In the Far East, Greenpeace 
together with the Vladivostok-based environmental organization BROC traced illegal 
timber from a logging site in the Far East to its final destination in Japan. They 
followed the ship that took an illegal timber consignment to one of the Japanese ports 
where it was sold to local firms. Greenpeace activists managed to deliver their report 
to the heads of the G-8 member-states that at that time convened for a summit in 
Japan (interview 46). These “naming and shaming” campaigns significantly damaged 
the reputation of both logging companies selling timber in the international market 
and foreign buyers that did not know sources of the timber they were buying. 
These campaigns and many others around the world created a strong pressure 
on large corporations producing or selling timber products potentially stemming from 
controversial or unverified sources. It forced them to look for a solution that would 
help them restore their reputation and protect themselves from further campaigns. 
Several companies started to get involved with environmental organizations in joint 
projects. For many others, forest certification became an option that could help them 
demonstrate that they managed their forests appropriately, harvested and traded 
timber legally and did not violate the rights of workers and local communities. This, 
6 The History of Forest Certification in Russia 
 
153 
however, did not happen spontaneously. Before forest companies actually became 
interested in forest certification and took the first steps to certify their forest 
management, environmental organizations had already started working on Russian 
national standards for forest certification, incorporated forest certification into their 
ongoing projects on sustainable forest management and actively promoted forest 
certification among producers and federal and local forest service.  
6.3 The Development of FSC National Standards 
The first steps to bring forest certification to Russia were taken by the environmental 
nongovernmental organizations that organized a series meetings and conferences to 
introduce forest certification to Russian forest companies, governmental forest 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations. The first meeting took place in 1996 in 
Petrozavodsk (the Republic of Karelia). Several Russian and Finnish environmental 
organizations met to discuss the prospects of forest certification in Russia. The next 
meeting took place in 1998 also in Petrozavodsk. In 1996-1998 WWF, Greenpeace 
and two leading Russian environmental organizations the Biodiversity Conservation 
Center and the International Socio-Ecological Union started promoting forest 
certification among forest companies and tried to win the support of governmental 
officials responsible for forestry and environmental protection. Environmental 
organizations invited forest companies, governmental bodies, research institutes and 
their colleagues from other environmental organizations to join the 1998 meeting. 
Companies almost completely ignored the meeting: The representatives of Russian 
governmental bodies strongly opposed the idea of private forest certification system. 
At that time, Russian federal forest service worked on its national mandatory 
certification system of forest companies and perceived environmental organizations as 
their competitors.17  
Despite the failure to attract forest companies and win the support of 
governmental bodies, environmental organizations continued to promote forest 
certification. They organized a series of conferences on forest certification, 
                                                 
17
 In 2002 the Russian parliament banned mandatory certifications in a number of sectors, including the 
forest sector. The Federal Forest Service then decided to develop a national voluntary certification 
program that would become a competitor to the FSC. In 2008 such program still did not exist 
(interview 14).  
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continuously met with company managers and published reports, books and other 
materials on forest certification. Greenpeace regularly sent out information to four to 
five thousand recipients in their email databank. Environmentalists established a 
national initiative for Russia in 1998 and started working on national standards. The 
first meeting of the national initiative took place in 1999. Only environmental 
organizations attended. Business, governmental bodies and worker and community 
activist organizations did not participate. Since FSC rules required that business and 
social interests should be also represented in the national initiative, their non-
participation was a challenge that environmental activists had yet to overcome. 
At the first meeting in 1999 participants decided to apply for the FSC 
accreditation as a national initiative to start developing national indicators for FSC 
forest management standards for Russia. They formed a working group on standard-
setting and elected the coordination council, an administrative body of the national 
initiative that organized and coordinated the national initiative, relationships with the 
FSC and standard-setting. The coordination council became an organizational core of 
the national initiative. It took the most active part in the accreditation and standard-
setting. It consisted of nine members of the national initiative representing three 
chambers required by the FSC.  
Due to the limited resources that the FSC has at its disposal and due to the 
many difficulties that the national initiative faced, the national initiative achieved FSC 
accreditation only in 2006. For example, a challenge for the Russian national initiative 
was to build a three-chamber organizational structure required by the FSC to ensure 
that economic, social and environmental stakeholders were equally represented in the 
decision-making. According to the FSC’s standard for national initiatives, national 
initiatives have to be officially registered nonprofit nongovernmental membership 
organizations according to the legal requirements of their home countries. Each of 
three chambers has 1/3 of total votes and equal veto rights regardless of how many 
members are in each chamber. The Russian civil law does not allow such an 
organizational structure and requires organizations to endow each member with an 
individual vote. To overcome this obstacle the national initiative de facto created two 
organizations. The coordination council was officially registered as a legal entity, as a 
nonprofit nongovernmental organization, in which each member was endowed with 
one vote. The national initiative itself remained an informal arrangement that also 
developed a set of by-laws regulating its behavior. It is not, however, an officially 
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registered legal entity. The coordination council thus became the official partner of 
the FSC but major decisions continued to be made by the national initiative (interview 
25). 
After the national initiative achieved accreditation, it took it another three 
years to develop national standards and accredit them. Only in November 2008 the 
FSC granted accreditation to Russian national standards. Because of insufficient 
resources the national initiative could not proceed as quickly as it planned whereas the 
FSC and ASI could not quickly assess the compliance of national standards with FSC 
rules and effectively respond to the needs of the national initiative.  
Moreover, the very process of standard-setting was full of contradictions, 
controversies and conflicts over standard formulations. Members of the national 
initiative had to search for formulations that had to be endorsed by all stakeholder 
groups. The formulations had to be general enough to be applicable in a wide range of 
natural ecosystems, companies and social situations but at the same time specific 
enough to provide concrete guidance to those responsible for standard implementation 
– certification bodies and forest operations. In the process of the negotiation of 
standards diverse interests and worldviews of actors often clashed. 
The main debates occurred between the major environmental organizations 
that practiced different approaches to the nature protection and conservation grounded 
in different organizational philosophies, i.e., sets of shared ideas about the 
relationships between natural and social worlds and ways the nature should be 
protected. Although environmental organizations pursued one common goal of 
environmental protection, they differed significantly in their approaches to the 
problem. In the Russian case, the positions of WWF and Greenpeace diverged with 
regard to the series of key issues in forest management standards.18 
The global philosophy of WWF is relatively moderate compared to the more 
radical philosophy of Greenpeace. WWF essentially believes that nature protection 
can be effectively combined with economic activity as long as economic activity is 
                                                 
18
 It might have been expected that economic interests would rather clash with the environmental and 
social interests but in the Russian case forest industries were relatively passive in the standard-setting 
process. Their interests were not completely ignored. Rather they were indirectly represented by 
moderate environmental organizations and research institutions specializing in forest policy and 
economics. 
 
6 The History of Forest Certification in Russia 
 
156 
properly regulated on the basis of sustainability and nature stewardship principles. 
WWF accepts donations from industry, mainly large corporations, and international 
organizations, including the World Bank. Prominent examples include the partnership 
of WWF and IKEA and the WWF-World Bank Forest Alliance. The WWF’s position 
is that through the compromise and cooperation with large industries environmental 
organizations can effectively influence their behavior. It is not surprising that WWF 
has become one of the most active proponents of the FSC forest certification globally, 
even though it was not among FSC’s founding members in the early 1990s. Forest 
certification is a compromise-based solution that proved to be a more moderate and 
constructive alternative to consumer boycotts and other types of ‘naming and 
shaming’ campaigns practiced by more radical environmental organizations. 
In contrast, an important part of Greenpeace philosophy is not to accept 
donations from industry to remain completely independent from governments and 
business interests. Greenpeace is well-known for its reliance on naming and shaming 
campaigns, consumer boycotts and spectacular protests that Greenpeace activists 
organize to draw the attention of the media and general public to acute environmental 
problems. Greenpeace, for example, attacked Home Depot by hanging a protest poster 
on the building crane in front of its headquarters. In Russia, Greenpeace activists 
chained themselves to the fence of the large wood-processing plant in Arkhangelsk to 
draw public attention to the destructive logging practices of this plant in ancient 
boreal forests in the Arkhangelsk federal region. The position of Greenpeace and 
other like-minded environmental organizations is less tolerant towards industries and 
often leads them to reject compromises with industry and require immediate action to 
improve their performance. For example, in 1993 Greenpeace together with the 
Friends of the Earth rejected to accept any official positions within the FSC to protest 
against its decision to endow industry with equal voting rights as environmental and 
social stakeholders in the FSC’s decision-making system. However, it remained 
FSC’s member and active supporter. 
Two issues were at stake for WWF and Greenpeace at the early stages of the 
national standard making. One was the actual scope of the FSC forest certification in 
Russia and, therefore, the stringency of standards. The second issue – separate but 
related – was the high conservation value forests and above all intact forests. The FSC 
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developed the concept of high conservation value forests to indicate all types of 
forests that required special protection measures.19 Large intact tracts of forests can be 
classified as type one, type two or type three of high conservation value forest (see 
Table 6) 
Table 6: Types of High Conservation Value Forests 
1 Globally, regionally or nationally significant concentrations of biodiversity values 
2 Globally, regionally and nationally significant large landscape level forests 
3 Rare, threatened or endangered ecosystems 
4 Forest areas providing basic services of nature in critical situations 
5 Forest areas fundamental to meeting basic needs of local communities 
6 Forest areas critical to local communities’ traditional cultural identity 
Source: Jennings, et. al. (2003) 
 
The initial position of Greenpeace was that the national standard for forest 
management should be well-elaborate and demanding and companies should be 
certified only if they immediately comply with this high standard. In this case, only a 
small portion of producers would be able to qualify for the certificate. In contrast, the 
position of WWF was that forest certification should be treated as a process of gradual 
improvement and standards should be formulated in such a way as to allow many 
producers to join forest certification and slowly improve their forest management 
(interview 13). 
As far as intact forests is concerned – and this problem had always been one of 
the core issues for Greenpeace – Greenpeace insisted on a more detailed and strict 
specification of the requirements that dealt with Russian intact forests. The initial 
position of WWF was that although the forests that Greenpeace identified as intact or 
old-growth forests was missing in the Russian forest policy, there was no need in 
introducing this category into standards, WWF insisted that the existing categories 
such as protective forests, the first groups of forests or specially protected forest areas 
could be used to protect intact forests and was familiar to companies, forest service 
officials and environmental organizations.  
                                                 
19
 The concept of high conservation value forests was later further developed by the Oxford based 
environmental consulting and training company ProForest in partnership with the WWF-IKEA Project. 
Since then the concept has been applied more broadly and widely promoted by WWF.  
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In contrast, Greenpeace claimed that old-growth forests were a special type of 
valuable forests that needed special protection and that this category had to be 
introduced in the FSC standards to ensure that certified companies protect them. 
Greenpeace insisted that the principles six (environmental impact of forest operations) 
and nine (maintenance of high conservation value forests, which also includes old-
growth forests) had to be well specified to eliminate any freedom of interpretation by 
companies and certification bodies. Greenpeace activists feared that vague standards 
would cause confusion and would allow companies to avoid protecting intact forests. 
WWF proposed to keep Russian terminology familiar to local companies and auditors 
and to provide more general and flexible formulations. Greenpeace activist reported 
that if they had been unable to agree on this issue with WWF, it could have resulted in 
the deadlock in the standard-making and Greenpeace’s withdrawal from the FSC 
discussions (interview 13). 
These tensions could have potentially hampered the development of the 
national standard and in general forest certification. The FSC could have lost its initial 
advantage against competing schemes that significantly lagged behind the FSC in 
Russia. For example, in Sweden Greenpeace stepped out of the process in the early 
1990s, since they were unable to reach compromise with other environmental 
organizations and business on the terms of the FSC’s national standards for Sweden 
(interview 13). Cashore et al. (2007) report that the resistance of a number of 
environmental organizations, including Greenpeace, to compromise on a number of 
issues, which to Greenpeace appeared to undermine the environmental value of forest 
certification, resulted into slowing down development of the FSC forest certification 
in Finland in the late 1990s. 
In Russia, however, environmentalists were able to overcome these tensions 
and agree on the formulations of standards in a series of long rounds of negotiations. 
As the participants of the discussions admit, the tensions described above proved to be 
rather conceptual or definitional and the parties were able to compromise on the issues 
of high conservation value forests and intact forests of Russia. Greenpeace was 
satisfied with the level of requirements on the principles six and nine that were at the 
core of the debates between two fractions in the national initiative led by WWF and 
Greenpeace. 
Greenpeace suggested a scheme – a zoning system – that allowed forest 
companies to continue logging in old-growth forests but at the same time to protect 
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these forests. Zoning is an internationally recognized approach for managing large 
protected areas such as nature reserves and national parks. Forest areas that 
Greenpeace mapped as old-growth forests were divided into three zones marked red, 
yellow and green. Red zones were relatively large tracts of forests where logging was 
completely prohibited. Yellow zones were the buffer zones of forests where 
companies could log only using soft logging techniques and no clear-cutting was 
allowed. In green zones companies could continue logging using standard logging 
techniques, according to the operational logging plan. Greenpeace would prefer more 
protection for the old-growth forests, while WWF was initially inclined to make the 
criteria for principles nine and six broad but agreed with the more elaborate 
formulations suggested by Greenpeace. The zoning approach was clearly a 
compromise but it enabled standard-makers to avoid a deadlock. 
The standard-designers also had to almost literally translate broad and vague 
concepts and terms used in the international standards into the policy language of 
Russian environmental, forest and labor law – both law on the books and in practice – 
to make the standards meaningful for the Russian managers and forest auditors. Broad 
principles and criteria of the FSC generic standards of forest management had to be 
transformed into more specific, concrete requirements – indicators – that would make 
sense to company managers and certifiers themselves. Initial concepts and categories 
were largely alien and, therefore, meaningless for the majority of managers and 
foresters in Russia. For example, the concept of high conservation value forests or 
old-growth forests was missing from Russian environmental and forest legislation but 
the categories used in Russian law, such as special protected areas, at least partly 
overlap with the concepts used by the FSC and international environmental 
organizations. Standard-designers searched for overlapping or compatible categories 
in the domestic laws and regulations that would be familiar to Russian managers and 
foresters and at the same time fit the FSC’s broad framework.  
The activists that were actively involved in the standard-making reported that 
initial conflicts rooted in different environmental protection philosophies of 
environmental coalitions proved to be largely illusory. Through the lengthy rounds of 
negotiations of standards formulations and empirical testing of the standards these 
conflicts were mitigated. Even though Greenpeace remained generally more skeptical 
about the effect of the FSC certification on forest management than WWF, it fully 
supported the FSC forest certification. The activist also reported that it became clear 
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that when it came to specific formulations of standards the differences in the positions 
were less significant that it appeared before. They also say that empirical testing of 
standards significantly facilitated the making of the ‘right’ standards (interviews 13, 
14 and 25). 
The standards were formally tested in 2001 in the Moscow federal region and 
twice in 2002 in Siberia and in the Far East. By this time, the first versions of national 
standards that included the checklist of national indicators were finalized. The goal 
was to understand whether company managers and auditors could easily understand 
the requirements of the standard and whether the indicators could be easily checked 
by auditors to verify compliance with standards. The usefulness of the standards for 
the reform of company practices was also assessed. As a result, standard-makers 
collected literally hundreds of amendments and comments from various parties and 
produced another several revised versions of the standard.  
Moreover, standard-makers became increasingly involved as auditors, invited 
experts or observers in the first certifications that environmental organizations, mainly 
WWF, sponsored as parts of their larger projects on the development and promotion 
of sustainable forest management. By this time, the first companies showed interest in 
forest certification. WWF and Greenpeace secured funding to enable all interested 
individuals and organizations to attend first certification audits. As a rule, assessment 
teams consisted of professional auditors from abroad and were complemented by a 
group of Russian trainees and observers from environmental organizations. The 
experience accumulated during certification allowed them to modified substantially 
national standards to make them more ‘realistic’ and comprehensible. 
Standard-makers reported that empirical testing of standards and the first 
certifications within the WWF-led projects on forest management in Russia facilitated 
the search for compromised solutions on many disputed indicators. Initial 
disagreements were slowly eliminated. Empirical testing of standards in 2001-2003 
resulted into over two hundreds amendments to the earlier versions of standards. After 
several rounds of revisions the national initiative approved the final version of 
standards in October 2003. The only part of the standard that remained conditionally 
approved was the indicators for the most controversial principle nine on the protection 
and maintenance of high conservation value forests. It took another year to reach a 
consensus on this principle. It was included in the final version in December 2004. 
The national initiative planned to submit this version to the FSC for accreditation.  
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In 2004, however, the FSC introduced new rules regulating the process of 
standard-making and the structure of the standard. The national working group had to 
revise the already available standard to comply with the new rules. In May 2005 the 
conference of the national working group approved the newly revised version of the 
standard. The coordination council of the national initiative incorporated final remarks 
into this version and adopted it as the standard to be submitted to the FSC. At this 
point in 2005-2006, several members of the national initiative took part in the 
harmonization project organized by the national initiatives of Sweden, Germany, 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Poland and Russia. As a result of the project, a set 
of new amendments based on the recently accredited standard for boreal forests in 
Canada were implemented in the final version.  
After the FSC reviewed the standard and issued several major and minor 
CARs, the national initiative had to revise it again. After another round of 
consultations with the members of the national initiative, certified companies, 
certification bodies and other interested parties, the coordination council adopted the 
final standard in December 2007 and submitted it to the FSC in the early 2008. In 
November 2008 the FSC accredited Russian national standards.  
6.4 The Start of Forest Certification 
Beside the development of national standards, environmental movement organizations 
facilitated the start of forest certification by creating organizational preconditions for 
its successful operation. WWF took the most active role. As the head of the WWF 
Forest Program reported, FSC forest certification was for WWF one of the high-
priority tasks at the end of the 1990s: “… three fourth of our tasks in Russia [related 
to forestry] had been directly or indirectly connected with the development of forest 
certification here” (interview 12). 
First, together with Greenpeace and the FSC, it offered financial support to the 
national initiative. Although the financial aid to the national initiative was occasional, 
for example for organizing meetings and conferences, it was crucial during the first 
years of the standard development. Moreover, WWF was a member of the national 
initiative and participated actively in the development of the national standards. 
Second, WWF published books, brochures and other materials to spread information 
about forest certification among all interested parties (Pautov et al. 2000; Ptichnikov 
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2000). Third, it offered initial support to the so called certification centers – for-profit 
organizations that worked to convince forest companies to certify their forest 
management and than consulted companies or performed forest management 
assessments as certification bodies’ subcontractors. Fourth, they organized a series of 
workshops, seminars and trainings in forest certification for forest management 
auditors and company managers on forest certification. Fifth, in 1999 they organized 
the Association of Environmentally Responsible Forest Companies as a part of the 
WWF’s Global Forest Trade Network (GFTN). Finally, WWF integrated forest 
certification into its ongoing projects – two model forests and a sustainable forestry 
project in Arkhangelsk. These projects became a ground for experimentation and 
testing of the forest certification system, on the one hand, and provided forest 
certification designers with the “best practices” that were transplanted into the 
national standards. 
Certification centers were founded in several regions of Russia with high 
concentration of forests and significant share of forest sector in the regional economy: 
Novgorod, Arkhangelsk, Kirov, Syktyvkar, Vologda, Krasnoyarsk and Khabarovsk. 
WWF provided initial funding to the first centers in Novgorod and Arkhangelsk. The 
center in Kirov was initially supported by IKEA in cooperation with WWF. These 
first centers started with informing forest companies about forest certification, 
organizing trainings for company managers. People who worked in the centers 
became the first Russian auditors and forest certification consultants for companies 
that decided to become certified when certification took off. The certification center in 
Novgorod worked with SGS Qualifor; the certification center in Arkhangelsk worked 
with GFA Terra Systems. The centers in Syktyvkar, Vologda, Krasnoyarsk and 
Khabarovsk emerged later as for-profit consulting organizations when forest 
certification started expanding in Russia after 2002. 
In 1999 after a series of environmental campaigns in Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
to protect Russia’s ancient forests WWF organized an association of producers that 
claimed to practice responsible forestry but were not yet interested in the certification 
– The Association of Environmentally Responsible Forest Companies. This 
association became a part of the WWF’s Global Forest and Trade Network (GFTN). 
WWF created GFTN to facilitate exchange between responsible producers of timber 
and timber products and retailers that were interested in selling products from well-
managed sources. WWF hoped that the membership in this association would be an 
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incentive for companies to practice better forest management and potentially certify 
their forest management systems. Companies that joined the association in turn sought 
to signal their good intentions to foreign buyers and environmental organizations. 
WWF developed a set of criteria that companies should comply with to become a 
member of the association. These criteria to a large extent overlapped the FSC’s 
principles and criteria but it was not yet independent third-party certification. Instead, 
one of the WWF’s criteria was that companies had to commit to certifying their 
forests in the FSC’s forest certification program in the future. 
Among other things, the membership in this association was one of the ways 
to familiarize producers with forest certification and its requirements and thereby 
promote it as a new mechanism for companies to prove the legality of their operations 
and environmental responsibility. Through the membership in the association, 
companies were able to benefit from WWF’s technical assistance in pursuing better 
forest management according to the WWF’s definitions and conceptions that was also 
compatible with the FSC standards. More importantly for the FSC, WWF introduced 
a stepwise approach to the transformation of forest management practices and their 
improvement to comply with the forest certification requirements in future. To join 
the association, companies did not have to comply with all of its principles and 
requirements but should have had a well-developed program of achieving compliance 
with the association membership requirements, including commitment to forest 
certification in future. Although formally the FSC forest certification program does 
not allow for a stepwise approach to certification, informally it became one of the 
ways for both companies and certifiers to come to terms with difficult situations, in 
which both had to implement forest certification requirements. 
Furthermore, in 2002 WWF and IKEA formed a global partnership to develop 
and promote sustainable forest management globally. Russia was one of the core 
target regions for the WWF-IKEA Project. IKEA was under pressure to green its 
production and buying practices and developed a policy of the gradual transition to 
sourcing its timber from forests verified as well-managed and certified through forest 
certification programs. As a part of its environmental strategy, IKEA extensively 
supported various WWF’s projects aimed at promoting good forest management and 
forest certification. In Russia, it supported WWF’s work on high conservation value 
forests, illegal logging and timber trade, controlled wood, corporate environmental 
responsibility and forest certification training programs. These projects were all 
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directly or indirectly related to forest certification. In the framework of the WWF-
IKEA Project, WWF and experts it hired for the project activities develop a variety of 
concepts, methods, techniques and guidelines on sustainable forest management that 
companies, certifiers and other nongovernmental organizations used during the 
certification of companies (interview 12).  
Two important examples are high conservation value forests and controlled 
wood. Forest certification standards require that high conservation value forests 
should be protected. WWF’s projects were aimed at defining and mapping high 
conservation value forests and creating a tool-kit to identify them and design a system 
of protection measures. Certification bodies, auditors and company managers later 
widely used these tools and guidelines as a reference in their activities. IKEA also 
supported WWF’s projects aimed at developing tools for building companies’ 
controlled wood systems. The FSC invented the concept of controlled wood to 
distinguish certified timber from well-managed forests from timber that can still be 
considered as acceptable, even though it is not certified.20 Controlled wood is added to 
the certified timber in the production process to enable producers to label their final 
products as made of timber from mixed sources – certified and controlled. To be able 
to label timber as controlled wood companies should verify that (1) it was harvested 
in natural forests, (2) legally and (3) without violations of traditional and human rights, 
(4) it does not come from protected or valuable forests and (5) forests that contain 
genetically modified trees. The FSC developed a special standard for the verification 
of controlled wood. WWF implemented a number of projects to develop concepts 
related to controlled wood and tool-kits to help companies design systems for 
controlled wood verification and help certifiers to evaluate these systems and verify 
compliance with the FSC’s controlled wood standard. 
Another important component of the partnership of WWF and IKEA was a 
series of forest certification seminars and trainings. It became an important channel 
                                                 
20
 At the first glance, the difference between certified and controlled wood is unclear. However, the 
standard for certified forest management is significantly more demanding than the controlled wood 
standard. According to the FSC early standards, companies could label their products as FSC-certified 
if at least 70% of raw materials came from certified sources. The question, however, was raised where 
the remaining part should come from. The FSC revised its standards, according to which companies 
were allowed to label their products as certified if at least 10% of raw material was certified and the 
rest controlled wood. In this case, the logo the companies used for products had to specify that raw 
materials stemmed from “mixed sources” 
6 The History of Forest Certification in Russia 
 
165 
for distributing among companies and certifiers WWF’s concepts and tools for 
responsible management of forest resources that were consistent with FSC standards. 
In 2002, WWF started a program to train professional forest auditors for the FSC 
forest certification. Around twenty-five participants from all parts of Russia were 
selected for the program and were trained to assess companies’ forest management 
according to the FSC’s forest certification standards. For two and a half years 
participants attended seminars every three months and took part in forest management 
assessments. The leading national and international experts instructed participants the 
FSC forest certification program, taught broad principles and concrete practices of 
sustainable forest management and trained their practical certification assessment 
skills. Many of the program participants later became forest certification auditors and 
consultants.  
The WWF-IKEA training program for auditors and forestry experts was a 
significant contribution to the development of the FSC forest certification in Russia, 
since even before forest certification began to expand in Russia the pool of forest 
certification professionals emerged. These experts were familiar with both FSC global 
standards and local forest policy and practices in Russia that were difficult to match 
with each other. Russian experts were able to bridge the gap between broad principles 
and specific natural conditions, national political and economic environment and 
capacities of forest companies for change. 
Beside WWF, numerous other environmental organizations – large and small, 
country-wide and local – took part in the forest certification project. Organizations 
running special projects in the sustainable forest management called model forests 
played a special role in the development of forest certification. These projects were 
also sponsored by WWF. They became a testing ground for forest certification and 
were themselves among the first certified operations in Russia.  
A model forest is a project aimed at the development, implementation and 
promotion of sustainable forest management. According to the International Model 
Forest Network (IMFN 2006), it is, on the one hand, a forest territory large enough to 
represent a range for natural ecosystems and landscapes characteristic for a country or 
region and to have a range of ecological, social and economic functions. It is, on the 
other hand, a specific model of governance of forest resources based on the principles 
of sustainability and stakeholder partnership. The common task of model forests is to 
develop “best practices” of forest management that would simultaneously maintain 
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and enhance commercial value of forests, effectively protect forest ecosystems and 
protect the living space of local populations and indigenous people in a country or 
region. Model forests are governed jointly by stakeholders with economic, 
environmental and social interests. Model forests are committed to encourage 
participation of local population, local civic organizations, social movements and 
indigenous people in the decision making and sustainable management of forest 
resources. 
The idea of model forests is largely compatible with principles underlying the 
FSC’s forestry standards, i.e., responsible management of forests based on multi-
stakeholder consultation and maintenance of economic, ecological, social and cultural 
values of forests. Forests are not only natural resources that can be used commercially 
to produce goods and extract profits. They are sources of wellbeing of local 
communities and indigenous people. They are part of their social, cultural and 
religious life. It is, therefore, not surprising that two model forests functioning in 
Russia committed to certify their forest management in the FSC’s forest certification 
program: Pskov Model Forest and Priluzie Model Forest. They were both launched 
the by WWF and later became independent organizations. For both model forests, 
independent forest certification was a good way to show to their donors and other 
external audiences that model forests were indeed managed in a responsible way. The 
FSC benefited from these certifications, since it was able to test its program in Russia. 
The members of the national initiative and FSC supporters were able to experiment 
with standards, gain experience and demonstrate the feasibility of forest certification 
in Russia to companies and external audiences.  
Priluzie Model Forest in the Republic of Komi in the North-West of Russia 
was among the first organizations in Russia that became interested in certifying actual 
forest operations. WWF organized Priluzie Model Forest in 1996 and was its main 
donor up to 2002 when the project secured funding from the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation. The project staff established a new organization to 
administer the project – a regional nonprofit organization the Silver Taiga Foundation 
that took the full responsibility for the implementation of the project but continued to 
actively cooperate with WWF.  
Already in 1998 WWF decided to certify the model forest. Moreover, it 
included forest certification and its development and promotion into the goals of the 
project. In 1999 a team of international auditors and experts from the Rainforest 
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Alliance SmartWood Program, the world’s leading forest certification body, 
conducted the first assessment of forest management in the model forest. The 
MacArthur Foundation sponsored the assessment. A number of Russian experts and 
trainees also attended the assessment to gain experience in forest certification. The 
first assessment showed that forest certification was in principle feasible in the model 
forest but required significant reform of the existing forest management practices. 
Problems occurred during the audit because communication between international 
auditors and Russian foresters was distorted by different interpretations of the context.  
Apart from detecting non-compliance with the standard, the assessment of the 
Priluzie Model Forest showed that the global standards that the SmartWood’s 
assessment team used required substantial adaptation to the national natural and social 
conditions. One of the observers at the assessment reported that foreign experts were 
often confused and could not judge whether Priluzie met the requirements of the 
standard because the categories and concepts did not match the categories, concepts 
and practices of Russian foresters: 
 The auditors came and asked: What about your environmental protection planning? And 
they [Priluzie staff] said we have groups of forests [in Russian legislation]. Certain 
groups are protected. The auditors stood there and wondered whether it was a good or a 
bad thing. And they all stood and did not understand each other. I mean it was necessary 
for auditors to understand what the groups of protected forests were to assess them. 
When people cannot compare, they cannot assess (interview 35). 
The international experts lacked local knowledge of the management practices and 
legislation and were unable to assess the existing practices. 
Ultimately, the same holds for the social and worker rights criteria and 
indicators. Most of the corrective action requests issued by the assessment team 
related to the labor conditions, worker safety and local population rights. Formally, 
some principles and criteria were not met but in other cases the requirements did not 
make sense when they were applied to the local social situation. As the observer 
reported, one of the international experts suggested introducing the system of 
communal forest management based on self-government in forest villages (interview 
35), which was impossible in the legal and social context of Russia. He notes 
describes in an ironic tone: 
The principles [the FSC’s principles of forest management] are beautiful but in practice 
it [audit] was the theater of the absurd. Or something close to it (interview 35). 
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Finally, criteria and indicators related to the economic performance of forest 
operations were difficult to formalize and comply with. Many forest companies in 
Russia did not perform well financially. Logging is often unprofitable. Logging 
operations are in many cases parts of larger industrial groups emerging around large 
pulp and paper mills or sawmills. They redistribute profits from processing timber and 
selling products with high value added to unprofitable logging operations. This is a 
very habitual practice that was hard to formalize in the framework of the FSC 
principles and criteria, since logging operations are certified as separate legal entities. 
It was unclear how notions and concepts perceived as alien to many Russian foresters 
and company managers should be implemented in Russian context. The standards had 
to be, therefore, adjusted and reformulated to accommodate common for Russian 
practices and legal requirements. 
The staff of the Silver Taiga Foundation decided to pursue certification and 
started working on correcting non-compliance. At the same time, they started working 
on the regional standards of forest management for the Republic of Komi that they 
hoped to accredit later in the FSC. They also participated actively in the national 
standard-making. As they worked towards certification, they developed and published 
detailed and extensive guides for companies that planned to certify their forests 
management systems. In 2000, another conference on the prospects of forest 
certification in Russia took place in Komi; the conference proceedings were published 
to popularize the idea of forest certification. In 2000-2005, the foundation published a 
dozen of brochures and books on forest certification ranging from the protection of 
rare species and old-growth forests to the organization of public participation in the 
management of forest resources. 
Although these publications are not the official guidelines of the FSC in 
Russia, their goal was to develop and provide companies, auditors and stakeholders 
with the solutions that specified broad international principles and criteria of 
sustainable forest management. Above this the Silver Taiga Foundation took part in 
the development of Russian national standards. When companies became interested in 
the forest certification, the foundation offered consulting services. They worked with 
the largest forest companies in Komi – Mondi Business Paper, a part of the Mondi 
Group, a large international paper and packaging group. The foundation also offered 
seminars for companies and auditors from other regions. They also offered seminars 
for forest managers, forest service officers and auditors. One of the leading Russian 
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forest auditors started in the Silver Taiga Foundation and continues to cooperate with 
it. 
The Pskov Model Forest, a joint project of WWF and Stora Enso, one of the 
largest international industrial forest groups, became certified in 2003. The goal of the 
project was to develop, introduce and promote sustainable forest management models 
for the four federal regions in the North-West of Russia: Pskov, Leningrad, Vologda 
and Arkhangelsk federal regions. The ambition of the model forest was to create a 
model system of industrial forest management that enabled companies in these 
regions to increase profitability of logging operations, restore and cultivate forests and 
effectively protect valuable and endangered ecosystems, rare species and the 
wellbeing of workers and local forest-dependent population. The model forests project 
collaborators developed models, exemplary systems and guidelines compatible with 
the FSC requirements and even surpassing them. 
The Pskov Model Forests also contributed to the development of forest 
certification, since WWF and other experts extensively used the experience of the 
model forests in developing standards and guidance for companies seeking to certify 
forest management. The Pskov Model Forest staff also started consulting companies 
that sought forest certification to help them obtain a certificate. In 2006, the model 
forest and WWF founded a for-profit environmental consulting firm Greenforest that 
now offers consulting services to forest companies in the North-West of Russia on the 
basis of the models, systems and methods developed in the model forest.  
6.5 The Emergence of the Demand for Forest Certification 
The previous section has described various activities of environmental movement 
organizations that led to the emergence of an organizational infrastructure, a common 
knowledge base and a pool of certification experts that facilitated the development of 
forest certification in Russia. These elements of the FSC’s forest certification system 
emerged before the actual market demand for certified timber reached Russia. 
Moreover, company managers reported that market signals had never been strong 
enough to undermine the imports of Russian timber to the countries of Western 
Europe. For many large companies, forest certification rather appeared to be a way to 
strengthen their reputation and to send signals about the sustainability of their forest 
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practices to the wider domestic and international audiences, including buyers, 
investors and environmental movement organizations. 
Only in few cases, foreign buyers indeed threatened to cease buying unverified 
wood from Russian suppliers. Several companies were targeted directly by campaigns 
of environmental organizations, including Greenpeace and the Taiga Rescue Network, 
to prevent logging in large tracts of valuable ancient forests in the Russian North-
West. Under the pressure of environmental organizations, six large buyers of Russian 
timber from the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, and Belgium established a European 
Platform for Ecological Russian Timber (EPERT) in 2002. The buyers aimed at 
eliminating timber sourced from uncertain or illegal sources and harvested in intact 
forests in the North-West of Russia, mainly in the Arkhangelsk federal region. They 
declared that from January 1, 2007 they would buy uncertified wood from Russian 
companies at a considerably lower. The letter was sent out to the major sawmills in 
the Arkhangelsk region that sourced parts of their timber from endangered forests and 
did not have any system of verification of legality of their sources (interviews 16, 17). 
The information in Table 7 suggests that the members bought a significant portion, 
i.e., approximately twenty-five percent of the annual production of the targeted eight 
sawmills. This was an important threat that motivated them to certify their forest 
management. 
Table 7: EPERT Members and Their Suppliers in the Arkhangelsk Region 
EPERT Members  Country of Origin Targeted Sawmills  
Cordes GmbH Germany 
Jansen Nielsen Pilkes Ltd. UK  
Jansen Nielsen Pilkes B.V. 
Lubox-Holland B.V. 
Satim B.V./Halba Houtimbport B.V.
The Netherlands 
 
Van Hoorebeke Timber N.V. Belgium
Sawmills No 2, 3, 25, 
and 26  
Tsiglomen Sawmill 
Solombala Sawmill 
Onega Sawmill 
 
Annual sawn timber purchase capacity of EPERT members 
Annual timber purchases from Russia 
Annual production of sawn timber of the targeted sawmills
 
1 500 000 m3 
   500 000 m3 
2 000 000 m3
Source: EPERT’s website www.epert.info 
 
Greenpeace and the Taiga Rescue Network campaigned against companies logging in 
the intact forests of the Arkhangelsk region. A company manager from the 
Arkhangelsk largest group of logging operations reported that after a number of 
European broadcasting networks showed a film on logging in intact forests in 
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Arkhangelsk region shot by a German television network together with Greenpeace, 
buyers refused to buy timber from companies mentioned in the film for several 
months (interview 20). Similar campaigns also took place in Karelia, Komi and the 
Far East. In Karelia, campaigns against logging in the tracts of intact forests that were 
later designated as the Kalevala National Park were also threatened to affect the sales 
of local logging operations (Tysiachniouk and Reisman 2004). To avoid further 
conflicts with environmental organizations, companies had to declare moratoria on 
harvesting timber in the intact forests that they previously planned to log. They 
increasingly considered certifying their forest management systems to demonstrate 
their responsible approach to forests and verify legality of their operations and 
purchases from external suppliers. Arkhangelsk companies became the earliest 
supporters of the FSC forest certification in Russia.  
In Arkhangelsk and Karelia, timber exporters actually risked to be excluded 
from the international market and to lose a significant share of their sales. They 
perceived forest certification as a means of preserving their market and avoiding 
financial losses associated with the anti-logging campaigns of the world’s major 
environmental organizations. Initially, timber exporters expected that forest 
certification would bring about additional financial benefits due to the price premium 
that international buyers would pay for certified timber. However, green premium 
proved to be illusory. International buyers rather threatened to reduce the price paid 
for uncertified materials or to cease buying uncertified timber at all. Managers 
reported that buyers offered price premium mainly for small consignments of timber 
that could not bring substantial additional benefits: “The larger the consignment is, 
the less the exporters are interested in paying a price premium for certified timber” 
(interviews 21 and 26). 
In many other cases, however, the immediate demand for certified timber and 
expected market benefits associated with this demand did not play a key role in the 
decisions to certify. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the liberal market reforms 
of the 1990s, international companies became interested in Russian forest resources 
and forest industry, as well as Russian companies became increasingly integrated in 
the international forest economy. International forest corporations acquired logging 
operations and mills, leased forests from the federal government and built new 
processing facilities in the leading forest regions of Russia. Having been affected by 
environmental campaigns, they declared their commitment to responsible forestry in 
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Russia and guaranteed the legality of timber sourced from Russian forests. By the 
time they came to Russia forest certification had become a standard element of their 
social and environmental responsibility strategy. As a result, they committed to certify 
forests they managed and used in Russia.  
Russian companies also used forest certification to build an image of 
responsible forest users to preempt potential conflicts with environmental 
organizations, even if they were not directly targeted in the campaigns. They also 
intended to send important signals to other external audiences, such as international 
investors. Practicing legal and responsible forestry had become a matter of 
international prestige and reputation risk avoidance for many large Russian companies, 
at least rhetorically. For them certifying forest management systems and practices was 
also an endorsement of their practices by the influential environmental organizations 
that value not only environmentally and socially appropriate forest management and 
production but also openness and transparency of producers. In this sense, for both 
international and Russian industrial forest companies forest certification has become a 
mechanism for acquiring legitimacy.  
Swedish-Finnish Stora Enso, the second largest industrial forest group with 
mills in seventeen countries (see Table 8), acquired logging facilities in the Leningrad 
region and in Karelia to provide raw materials to its four Russian mills and to a 
number of mills located in Europe. Being a target for the continuous critique of 
environmental organizations for logging endangered forests and importing illegally 
harvested timber in Sweden, Russia and elsewhere, Stora Enso included forest 
certification in its sustainable forestry policy applied to all of its subsidiaries, logging 
operations and mills. In Russia, Stora Enso became a WWF’s partner in the Pskov 
Model Forest project. It allocated a part of its leased forest land for a model forest and 
supported the project financially. The forest operation logging in the model part of 
Stora Enso’s forests was among the first operations to be certified in Russia. Stora 
Enso certified all of its logging operations in Russia from 2005 to 2007. 
Another large international industrial forest group, Mondi, acquired a large 
pulp and paper mill as well as logging operations providing the mill with raw 
materials in Syktyvkar, the Republic of Komi. Mondi’s largest mill and plantations 
are located in South Africa and were among the first companies in the world to be 
certified. Mondi decided to certify the Syktyvkar pulp and paper mill and cooperated 
with a local environmental organization – the Silver Taiga Foundation – and the 
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regional forest service in promoting forest certification among timber suppliers. After 
having been criticized for its forestry practices across the world, especially for the 
conversion of natural tropical forests into plantations, Mondi committed itself, at least 
rhetorically, to developing a responsible forestry approach and certifying its natural 
forests and plantations to demonstrate environmental responsibility. Forest 
certification became a part of Mondi’s global sustainable forestry policy. 
Table 8: Leading Forest Industries in 2007 (by total turnover in billion EUR) 
Europe   World  
Stora Enso 13,4  International Paper 16,0 
SCA 11,7  Stora Enso 13,4 
UPM-Kymmene  10,0  Kimberly-Clark 13,3 
Metsäliitto 7,7  Weyerhaeuser 11,9 
Smurfit Kappa Group 7,2  SCA 11,7 
Mondi 6,3  UPM-Kymmene  10,0 
Sequana Capital 4,3  Procter & Gamble 9,3 
Norske Skog 3,4  Oji Paper 8,4 
Burgo 2,3  Nippon Paper Group 7,8 
Holmen 2,1  Metsäliitto 7,7 
Source: Finnish Forest Industry Federation (2008) 
 
In Komi, the Mondi pulp and paper mill supported the Silver Taiga Foundation that 
worked on the certification of two local forest service units, where the suppliers of 
Mondi harvested timber and where the Silver Taiga Foundation developed a model 
forest – Priluzie (see Section 6.4). 21  Mondi’s mill in turn certified its logging 
                                                 
21
 As I have discussed in section 5.3, up to 2007 forest management and forest use were separated in 
the Russian forest law. Forest land was publicly owned and managed by the federal forest service and 
its regional divisions. Forest companies leased forest land from the state and were able to use forest 
resources according to the plans developed and approved by the forest service. Federal, regional and 
local units of the forest service were responsible for planning the use of forest resources, planting trees, 
taking care of forests and monitoring logging companies. According to the new forest code enacted in 
January 2007, forest land remains a public property but forest management functions were transferred 
to the regional and local forest service units that in turn have to transfer these responsibilities to 
companies when they lease forest land. A regional and local forest service retains only regulatory and 
monitoring functions. Put simply, this means that before 2007 companies were unable to plan and 
manage their forests, log, replant and take care of forests independently but had to follow plans, 
instructions and regulations of the forest service. Forest service was in turn responsible for managing 
and planning forests, even those leased by companies. Since forest certification applies de jure to forest 
management units, the Silver Taiga Foundation and Mondi decided to certify the local forest service 
units as actually responsible for forest management. Local forest service was obligated to enforce local 
operations to follow FSC requirements. As of January 2007, this division between the management and 
the use of forest resources became obsolete but forest service units so far remained certificated holders. 
These cases are, however, exceptional. The majority of Russian companies certified their own systems 
of forest management. 
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operations and encouraged external suppliers harvesting in certified forests to become 
certified. Initially, it introduced a three-percent premium for certified timber but in 
2007 it decided to stop paying the premium. It, however, declared that it would 
continue to give preference to certified suppliers (interview 32). According to the 
company manager, this was by itself an important advantage for certified logging 
operations, since the potential supply of pulpwood, the kind of timber the mill needed 
for the production pulp and paper, available in Komi exceeded the actual needs of the 
mill. The mill developed a system of supplier selection that favors certified suppliers. 
These incentives motivated a number of smaller companies in Komi that supplied 
timber to Mondi mill to become certified in 2004-2007. 
Other large international companies operating in Russia, including Europe’s 
leading Finnish UPM Kymmene and Metsäliitto and Swedish IKEA, also certified 
logging operations and mills to be able to export their products, to avoid 
environmental campaigns and to improve their reputation. 
Russian companies also became interested in forest certification. They 
expected to avoid environmental campaigns and establish cooperative relations with 
environmental organizations, to respond to the demands of international buyers and 
win market benefits, to verify the quality of their forest management and to improve 
their reputation among external audiences, including environmental community, 
international forest industry and investors and improve their forest management. The 
justifications were very diverse but the primary incentive to become certified was 
potential market benefits and reputation gains. 
Russia’s largest industrial forest group, Ilim Group (formerly Ilim Pulp 
Enterprise), was one of the first companies that got interested in certifying its forest 
operations, sawmills and pulp and paper mills in the early 2000s. Ilim Group manages 
millions of hectares of forest land and dozens of large processing facilities in the 
North-West of Russia (Leningrad and Arkhangelsk federal regions) and Siberia 
(Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk federal regions). Although the company does not belong to 
the ten larges companies in Europe by turnover, it is one of the leaders by available 
forest resources and annual logging volume. Ilim Group is also a European leader in 
pulp production and an important exporter of pulp and packaging cardboard: It 
exports two-thirds of its production, mainly to China. Approximately forty percent of 
its total production is exported to China (Ilim Pulp Group n.d.).  
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For Ilim Group, a range of issues were at stake when they decided to become 
certified. It early became clear to Ilim Group managers, that in order to be able to 
compete successfully in both product and investment markets, company reputation 
and image were important. On the one hand, according to the estimations of the Ilim 
Group’s managers, the group exports around eighty percent of its total produce, partly 
to the European markets where buyers became sensitive to their suppliers’ forestry 
practices and sources of timber. On the other hand, Ilim Group was also interested in 
attracting international investment. For its managers, it was clear that for risk-averse 
Western investors the lack of open conflicts with environmental organizations, 
verified supply chain transparency and effective forest management would be an 
additional advantage. They perceived forest certification as a tool to demonstrate 
buyers, investors and environmentalists the responsibility of its forestry practices, 
transparency of its supply chain and good relations with environmentalists verified 
through an independent internationally recognized certification program. According to 
one Ilim Group manager, the lack of conflicts and sustainability claims verified by the 
FSC forest certification played a role in the decision of International Paper, the 
world’s largest forest corporation based in the U.S., to form for a joint venture with 
Ilim Group in 2007 (interview 26). For Ilim Group, therefore, not market access was 
the target but rather verification of environmental responsibility and the lack of open 
conflicts with environmentalists confirmed by the FSC forest management and supply 
chain certificates.  
Unlike many other companies that remained relatively passive in the 
development of forest certification in Russia beyond certifying their own forest 
management systems or supply chains, Ilim Group became an active player in the 
forest certification field. Its activity significantly affected the configuration of the 
field at the local and global levels. Together with other large companies, it lobbied the 
FSC to develop the standard that would allow large pulp and paper mills to minimize 
the portion of certified material in the final product. This standard was introduced in 
2007 and reduced the threshold of certified raw material in the final product to ten 
percent only. It required that the rest of the raw material should be controlled wood 
(see Section 6.4). According to the standards, in order to be able to label the products 
with an FSC logo, companies had to ensure that at least ten percent of the raw 
material used was FSC-certified and the remaining raw materials stemmed from 
controlled sources. Environmental organizations criticized the standard itself and the 
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way this standard was developed and introduced. They claimed that the opinions of 
the environmental community had been ignored and that it damaged the credibility of 
the FSC. As a result, the FSC significantly revised the standard and improved the 
concept of controlled wood (interviews 7 and 11).  
Ilim Group extensively supported the first Russian certification body 
EuroPartner that later became an important player in the Russian forest certification 
field. When Ilim Group applied for forest certification and looked for a certification 
body to perform forest management assessment, one of the conditions was that a 
certification body should train EuroPartner to become an FSC accredited certification 
body. EuroPartner earned the FSC accreditation in 2006. On the already highly 
competitive market for forest certification services, the emergence of another player 
resulted in the increased competitive pressure. Certification bodies and many experts 
criticized EuroPartner for apparently weak standards, poor assessment performance, 
connections with Ilim Group and further violations of the certifier ethics. Even though 
some of the violations were verified, most of the charges remained neither verified 
nor completely falsified. EuroPartner’s competitors, however, maintained that the 
emergence of the company contributed to lowering the quality of forest certifications 
in Russia (interviews 19, personal communication with the auditor of NEPCon in on 
June 15, 2008). In August 2008, the FSC terminated EuroPartner’s accreditation for 
failing to fulfill its liabilities to the FSC and to certified companies (FSC 2008c: 4).  
InvestLesProm, one of the Russia’s leading industrial forest groups that 
formed around the Segezha pulp and paper mill in the Republic of Karelia in 2005-
2008 was also motivated by the considerations of corporate image and reputation 
among international environmental and business communities rather than by direct 
market benefits. The company was not directly targeted by any of the environmental 
campaigns but voluntarily agreed not to log in intact forests and not to buy timber 
from illegal or unknown sources. Moreover, the company acquired a number of pulp 
and paper mills in Europe and sought to establish itself as a responsible international 
corporation with unified corporate policies and strategies, including environmental 
and sustainability forestry policies. Even before the company became certified it was 
clear to its managers that forest certification was unlikely to generate any calculable 
additional profits:  
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I think we will not have any direct benefits. I mean those that you can put on the paper 
and calculate, like here is an extra half a million dollars because our timber is certified 
(interview 4). 
The senior sales manager who is responsible for selling sawn wood to the UK 
reported that selling uncertified timber and uncertified final products, including sawn 
wood and paper products, was not particularly problematic: 
We can always sell it [uncertified timber] but why would we want to do it? We want to 
maintain our reputation. But we will always be able to sell uncertified timber. … I don’t 
see any significant pressure on us any more to become certified. It is a voluntary 
certification and in our case it is indeed voluntary. Nobody forced us. We decided to do it 
and I personally had been convincing the directors for two years that we needed to 
certify our mill. But if they had not been for it or if I had said we had not needed it, I 
would now be selling exactly the same things (interview 3). 
Reputation and image considerations were, therefore, the most important to Segazha’s 
managers. They hoped to benefit not directly from selling their products, but 
indirectly from maintaining and enhancing the reputation of an environmentally 
responsible company and thereby from avoiding any potential difficulties associated 
with unverified timber. 
In addition, Segezha started an expensive modernization process in 1998-1999 
and expected to significantly increase the production of pulp and paper by the end of 
the 2000s. One of the challenges that Segezha confronted was the availability of 
sufficient forest resources to secure continuous supply of timber and to satisfy the 
production needs of the mill. The forest supply and management department of the 
mill considered the intensification of forestry as a solution to the timber supply 
problem and sought to reform the existing system of forest management. They 
planned to reduce the turnover age of trees, i.e., start logging younger trees, and 
significantly increase commercial thinning, i.e., removing certain trees in young 
forests to model the future stand and create better conditions for remaining trees. This 
plan was inspired by the experience of Scandinavian countries, including Sweden and 
Finland, where forest companies were able to harvest significantly more timber under 
similar natural conditions as compared to Russian companies. The plan was based on 
a wide-spread idea that this was due to the better care of young forests, traditionally 
higher forestry standards and greater involvement of the state in forestry, including 
road maintenance (interview 25).  
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Some elements of this plan were controversial. For example, environmentalists 
claimed that commercial forests in Sweden and Finland had a much lower level of 
biological diversity and that most valuable old-growth forests with greatest 
biodiversity were almost completely removed. They feared that the introduction of a 
similar system of intensive forest management might damage valuable forests.  
Moreover, Segezha’s forest managers faced extreme shortages in timber 
supplies due to the degradation of forests that resulted from the overuse of forest 
resources in Karelia in Socialist time and perceived it as their responsibility to restore 
the forests for the mill and for the people living in Karelia. They continuously 
emphasized the importance of forests for the region’s economy and the wellbeing of 
the local population, especially in distant forest settlements that directly depend on 
forests (interviews 2 and 5).  
Such a mixture of rational economic and moral motives points to a complex 
incentive structure that underlies the technical aspects of forest certification. 
Economic benefits, real and anticipated, direct and indirect, rationalize moral 
arguments that social movement organizations put forward: Managing forests in an 
environmentally and socially responsible way is economically beneficial (“doing well 
by doing good”). At the same time, moral arguments that can also be mobilized by 
corporate actors may help them benefit from the morality of purely economic 
decisions: Certifying forests for economic reasons helps achieve environmental and 
social benefits for local populations and society at large (“doing good by doing well”).  
In the Far East, Terneyles, the largest certified company in the Far East, 
certified its forest management and supply chain in 2004. The company ships most of 
its wood to a large Japanese company, Sumitomo Corporation. The Japanese market 
is one of the largest consumer markets in the South-East Asian region. Japanese 
companies have long been criticized for their irresponsible buying practices. Many 
environmental organizations hold Japan responsible for buying timber from the 
endangered tropical forests of the Philippines and Indonesia as well as from the 
unique taiga of the Russian Far East. Environmentalists claim that they thereby 
support uncontrolled and often illegal destruction of these forests Japanese companies, 
however, have long been relatively immune to the environmentalists’ claims and 
never demanded forest certification from their suppliers. Sumimoto also did not 
require Terneyles to become certified but Terneyles, nonetheless, decided to pursue 
forest certification in order to benefit from forest certification in the future when it 
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would finally gain importance in Japan. The first sign of growing concern of the 
Japanese government with uncontrolled wood shipped into the country and the 
potential economic and political consequences thereof was the so called “Green 
Purchasing Law” that the Japanese government passed in 2007. According to this 
regulation, Japanese public bodies were obligated to procure wood products only from 
legally verified sources. It then became the responsibility of suppliers to verify the 
legality of timber origin, also through forest certification (interview 45 and 46).  
Terneyles had also always been in the focus of environmental organizations 
because it logged in the unique endangered forests of the Russian Far East, in the 
basin of the Samarga river, a home for the Far Eastern indigenous people Udege and a 
habitat for several extinct animal and plant species, including the Siberian tiger. In the 
early 2000s, the local environmental organization Bureau for Regional Outreach 
Campaigns (BROC) sued Terneyles for violating environmental regulations and 
indigenous people rights in the Samarga river basin. Even though the claims of the 
BROC were rejected in the court, Terneyles remained a controversial case for the Far 
Eastern environmentalists. When Terneyles became certified in 2004, the Far Eastern 
office of WWF Russia closely monitored the certification process (interview 46). 
Even though some disputes over the past and current practices of Terneyles remained 
open, WWF Russia fully supported the company. WWF appreciated it as the first 
certified company in the most controversial forest region in Russia, helped it improve 
its forest management and to achieve a compromise with the Udege in order to meet 
certification requirements (interview 12).  
The previous discussion shows that direct market benefits, including increased 
price for certified timber or improved market access, did not play a decisive role in 
the certification decisions. Even if the first certified companies expected to receive a 
price premium for certified timber, it soon became clear that forest certification would 
not bring direct monetary benefits to the certified companies on a large scale. 
Moreover, many managers also emphasize that the pressure of buyers decreased over 
time. The sales managers reported that forest management certificate was often an 
additional advantage when other characteristics, including price and quality, were 
equal. Companies that were directly affected by environmental campaigns in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s were able to keep their European buyers and minimize their 
financial losses. Companies that were not affected by campaigns expected to improve 
and maintain their reputation and hoped to benefit from it in future but were unable to 
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exactly predict how and when. Some also hoped to establish cooperative relationships 
with environmental organizations and signal their sustainable approach to natural 
resources and social responsibility towards workers, local populations and society at 
large.  
Responsible forest management and sustainable approach to natural resources 
became an established element of a corporate image in the industrial forest sector in 
Russia that helped minimize reputation risks that might potentially have an impact on 
the corporate financial performance. For the largest corporations seeking international 
recognition, including Segezha and Ilim Group, thought of forest certification as a 
tool to verify the sustainability of their approach to external audiences.  
In the next chapter I turn to the identification of social and environmental 
effects that forest certification brought about. I show that while forest certification led 
to the improvement in biodiversity protection, intact forest conservation, worker 
safety and community issues, forest certification supporters became concerned with 
the declining capacities of the FSC and stakeholders to control the performance of 
companies and certification bodies. 
6.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, I examine how transnationally connected and locally embedded actors 
promoted forest certification in difficult domestic circumstances reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 5. The evidence presented in this chapter is consistent with the typical 
arguments in the existing literature that if companies export a significant portion of 
their products to countries where activists, media, governments and consumers 
perceive forest products as controversial, they are likely to certify their forest 
operations or require their suppliers to certify in order to avoid controversies. Indeed, 
in the Russian case, the dependence of the part of the forest sector that consisted of 
large vertically integrated firms shipping timber to European or Japanese markets 
and/or having multinationals as their parent companies has facilitated significantly the 
rapid expansion of forest certification. 
Clearly, the cross-border pressure from international buyers and owners and 
from transnational activists in the form of campaigns was an important necessary 
condition for the expansion of forest certification (as Section 6.5 suggests), but not the 
only one. The literature taking only this condition into consideration ignores the 
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critical role of local actors that not only campaigned against companies and promoted 
forest certification but also invested time and resources into making forest 
certification a “high-road” instrument for achieving their overwhelming goals. I show 
in this chapter that the pressure on companies came not only from across borders, but 
also from inside. Beyond this, environmentalists also constructively supported the 
development of forest certification by building knowledge on its implementation, 
educating company managers, auditors and stakeholders and developing an 
organizational infrastructure for forest certification.  
The findings presented in this chapter are consistent with the literature that 
emphasizes the abilities of actors to mobilize resources and make use of emerging 
windows of opportunities for achieving their goals – in this case improving forest 
management. I show that organizational capacities, networks and expertise of local 
environmental NGOs and individual activists perceived forest certification as a 
window of opportunity to induce change in the forest sector, and this had a crucial 
effect on the expansion of forest certification in Russia.  
 The history of forest certification in Russia presented above suggests its 
development started before forest companies showed any real interest in certifying 
their forest management. Despite the lack of interest of business and opposition of the 
Federal Forest Service, environmental activists invested resources into designing FSC 
national standards, promoting forest certification, certifying model forests and training 
auditors and consultants. As a result an organizational infrastructure, a common 
knowledge base and a pool of forest certification efforts emerged as organizational 
elements necessary for the FSC certification system to function properly.  
Through various activities directly or indirectly related to forest certification, 
environmental organizations created a common knowledge base on forest certification 
that provided actors with the semantic and practical tools to understand and 
implement the requirements of the FSC. The common knowledge base is a shared set 
of negotiated ideas related to the FSC and its system of forest certification, implicit 
assumptions and formal norms codified in various standards, regulations, statutes and 
guidelines; it is knowledge that actors recognize and share. Its codified component 
includes (1) forest management standards specifying what good forest management is, 
(2) auditing procedures and guidelines that regulate the behavior of auditors and (3) 
documents that specify certain aspects of forestry related to forest certification and 
good forest management in general. Such documents include for example registers of 
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endangered species or maps of Russia’s high conservation valuable forests, which 
were not specifically designed for certification purposes but which the FSC 
recommends that companies and certification bodies use. 
In addition to codified rules of forest certification, a common knowledge base 
also includes shared implicit assumptions related to forest certification that also 
regulate the behavior of different actors. For example, many actors believe that 
auditors have to rely on their common sense and intuition and appeal to their reason 
when they make decisions in the process of assessment and certification. This appeal 
to common sense is very typical for the staff of certification bodies and auditors. 
Describing what qualities a good auditor should possess, many claim that they should 
not be overly scrupulous but at the same time they should not tolerate serious, 
systematic or continuous incompliance. One auditor describes how auditors make 
decisions in the following way:  
[But] in any checklist and in any standard there are disputable elements. They can be 
interpreted in different ways; there is no “one and only” interpretation. … Moreover, 
what one auditor saw and interpreted in one way, another one can see and interpret 
quite differently. We all are different and see things differently. But we have to 
realistically evaluate the situation and should not pick on small things. One shouldn’t be 
excessively fastidious but one should not tolerate soil pollution or that people work 
without protective clothing. I mean you have to evaluate the context and you have to have 
years of experience (interview 6).  
The boundary between excessive scrupulosity and excessive tolerance is blurred; they 
are intuitive and extremely hard to articulate and thus codify. As auditors interact and 
accumulate experience they develop shared tacit assumptions that help them make 
sense of reality and guide their behavior in uncertain situations.  
Both formal and informal components of the common knowledge do not 
remain uncontested. The common knowledge emerges as a result of the circular 
processes of negotiation and implementation of standards and procedures. Conflicts 
over specific content of norms and procedures continuously arise. Even if the 
formulations were negotiated and compromised, tacit tensions and open conflicts over 
elements of the common knowledge can be detected. Many company managers and 
experts question the validity of the data on the condition of forests used by the 
environmental organizations, the correctness of their standards and procedures, the 
legitimacy of some of their methods and in general their claim to make better rules 
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than already existing legal rules embodied in the national and local legislation. Many 
company managers and company foresters do not perceive forest certification as 
legitimate but reported that they feel forced to participate to keep their customers and 
protect their reputation. Open conflicts, however, rarely break out.  
Beyond the common knowledge, the leaders of forest certification movement 
mobilized other organizations to join them and created new organizations, for 
example certification centers, to promote forest certification. These organizations 
formed an organizational infrastructure which is defined as a network of 
knowledgeable organizations that can certify companies, consult them, monitor 
certifiers and certificate holders, make standards and create models for complying 
with these standards. Environmental organizations integrated forest certification into 
their current projects and thereby facilitated the creation of the common knowledge 
base and a relevant pool of experts - the producers and carriers of knowledge and 
skills. Organizations in the forest certification network tested national forest 
certification standards, developed their own standards for regions where they worked, 
certified their own systems of forest management, developed model practices 
consistent with forest certification requirements and extensively trained auditors and 
experts. Later, they consulted forest companies based on their own experience and 
interpretation of forest certification and monitored certifiers and thereby enforced 
forest certification rules. 
Certification centers worked directly with producers to familiarize them with 
forest certification in the first place and convince them to certify their forest 
management. Some of them started working as consultants to forest companies; others 
became contractors of certification bodies that did not have an office in Russia. Some 
combined certification and consulting services. Experts that worked in certification 
centers also participated in national standard-making. 
Environmental organizations also were able involve forestry departments in 
universities and research institutions for forestry and forest economics, trade unions 
and other social movement organizations, including organizations for indigenous 
people and local population rights, in the activities related to forest certification. 
Experts from these organizations could provide specific services to help companies to 
comply with forestry standards, including conducting research and collecting data on 
the condition of forests, designing logging plans or identifying rare species and 
valuable forests. 
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The organizational infrastructure that emerged out of the efforts of 
environmental organizations was crucial for the expansion of forest certification. 
When companies became interested in forest certification, a network of 
knowledgeable organizations was already in place that offered certification services, 
consulted and monitored companies in their efforts to implement the requirements of 
forest certification. Some company managers reported that it was important for them 
to have a Russian-speaking expert that had a sound knowledge of a specific local 
situation, including natural and social conditions, in which a company had to operate. 
Companies, therefore, knew where they could go to get information and advice and 
where they could apply for certification. They knew where they could contract experts 
that could help them prepare for the assessment of forest management systems. 
The pool of such experts in forest certification also emerged as result of 
environmental organizations’ efforts. They engaged and trained auditors and experts 
that became producers and carriers of common knowledge and skills required for a 
functioning forest certification system. The pool of experts included forest auditors, 
standard-makers, consultants and experts in forestry, social issues and community and 
indigenous people rights. WWF’s training program in forest certification was 
particularly important for creating the pool of experts. Several dozens of foresters and 
environmentalists from almost every important forest region participated in the 
program. Some of them were later hired by certification bodies as forest auditors; 
some founded consulting firms. Training programs in the framework of sustainable 
forestry projects, such as model forests also contributed to the formation of the pool 
of experts. 
Many of these experts combined several roles in the forest certification system. 
Forest management auditors consulted companies, which they did not audit. 
Consultants and auditors participated in developing national standards. Through the 
overlapping roles and positions, actors were able to exchange and multiply experience 
and thereby contribute over time to the growing common knowledge base. Experts 
were simultaneously carriers of knowledge and skills and their producers due to their 
involvement in the implementation of standards on the ground. Their feedback and 
experience was crucial for the development of national standards and certification 
procedures. 
These three elements of the institutional structure of certification – knowledge 
base, pool of experts and organizational infrastructure – were crucial for the FSC to 
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secure the leading position in Russia. When companies realized that forest 
certification could potentially solve their problems with their negative image and 
environmental campaigns, they turned to the FSC program because it was already 
available to them. Business and the government also tried to design an alternative 
certification program but so far they have been unsuccessful in doing so. Instead, the 
FSC was able to monopolize the emerging Russian market for certification and 
successfully use its first mover advantage.  
In addition, although it may seem that the process of the building of a 
certification system in Russia was a smooth and harmonious creation of relevant 
knowledge, persuasion of companies and training of auditors, consultants and 
managers, it also contained tensions and conflicts that had to be negotiated and settled 
for a working certification system to emerge. These tensions were particularly 
prominent during the negotiation of the national standard when coalitions led by 
WWF and Greenpeace discussed how the principle dealing with high conservation 
value forests and old-growth forests should be applied in Russia. Through the lengthy 
rounds of negation, both parties were able to reach a compromise reflected in the 
zoning approach introduced into the national standard. This shows that the enactment 
of forest certification did not only involve cognitive processes of learning and 
knowledge building, but also stakeholder interest negotiation and local conflict 
settlement. The solutions adopted by stakeholders were pragmatic in the sense that 
they did not necessarily matched actors’ conceptions of what the most effective 
solution would be, but they were acceptable to all stakeholders and helped avoid 
deadlocks in the negotiations.  
In sum, the chapter shows that knowledgeable and resourceful local actors 
were able to create a system that was likely to become a high-road instrument of 
improvement of forest management in certified enterprises. However, the question 
remains whether these improvements actually occurred. In the following chapter, I 
take the next analytical step in my analysis of the transnational global standards into 
local on-the-ground practices and analyze how the standards were implemented in 
implementation settings, i.e., in forest companies. In order to do this, I identify the 
changes in local practices induced by forest certification, systematize different modes 
of translation of standards into practices, and evaluate the effects of forest certification.  
   
7  The Implementation and Effects of Forest 
Certification 
The discussion of the companies’ motivations to certify their forest management 
systems in previous chapter suggests that direct market benefits, including price 
premium and potential increases of profits, was not a decisive factor in pursuing forest 
certification. The potential losses that environmental campaigns might have brought 
about stimulated companies to certify their forest management. Companies thereby 
sought to maintain their reputation as environmentally and socially responsible 
producers and avoid any potential future risks conflicts with environmentalists. Rather 
than seeing FSC certificates as an immediate advantage, they considered not having 
such a certificate as a potential disadvantage in the international timber market. 
Companies wanted to have a certificate at hand “just in case”, i.e., to be prepared if 
international and domestic buyers, investors and environmental organizations would 
ask for it. This observation suggests that it is unlikely that the emergence of forest 
certification significantly changed the structure of trade in timber products, both 
domestic and international. Forest companies reacted quickly to the threats of 
environmental organizations and international buyers to stop buying uncertified or 
unverified timber from Russia or at least lowering the price buyers would pay for 
these products. 
The question is then to what extent forest certification improved corporate 
forestry practices. Since standard forestry practices in Russia prescribed by various 
formal laws and informal rules are considered to be environmentally and socially 
inappropriate by many environmentalists and forestry scholars, it could have been 
expected that forest certification would bring about significant changes in forestry 
practice of certified companies. What are the actual changes in corporate 
environmental and social practices that forest certification brought about? How do 
companies, managers and foresters change their behavior?  
This section provides answers to these questions, although it which is, 
however, methodologically challenging for two reasons. First, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate the impact of forest certification on forestry practices from 
other factors that might also be at work in a particular situation. Companies may 
choose to adopt practices defined as more sustainable because these techniques and 
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practices better meet their economic interests. For example, many forest operations, 
including Segezha pulp and paper mill substituted chain saws with automatic 
harvesting machines in the early 2000s. They expected to improve the efficiency of 
forest operations and to increase the amount of harvested timber, but the introduction 
of new technology also led to the reduction of negative effects of logging on 
remaining forests. It was easier for Segezha’s forest operations to prove compliance 
with FSC standards. Forest certification and commercial interests may go hand in 
hand and jointly shape companies’ behavior. 
Secondly, it is often impossible to judge whether the changes in corporate 
behavior will actually bring about expected social and environmental changes, since 
the life cycle of trees and forests is significantly longer than available observations 
and the lifespan of foresters, managers, environmentalists and scholars. The long-term 
outcomes are uncertain, since the knowledge, both expert and traditional, on the large-
scale natural ecosystems remains relatively limited and is often contested. 22  It is, 
therefore, problematic to assume that specific changes in corporate behavior will 
sooner or later necessarily transform into the desired large-scale long-term positive 
outcomes for forests modified by logging and reforestation practices. These features 
considerably complicate the evaluation of the actual impact of forest certification on 
the forestry practices, their environmental and social aspects, the structure of timber 
markets and policy dynamics. Keeping these two limitations in mind, I will identify 
environmental and social effects of forest certification on the practices of certified 
companies.  
                                                 
22
 To avoid controversies, the FSC prefers to use for official purposes more neutral terms “responsible” 
or “good forest management” instead of value-loaded “sustainable forest management”, since the latter 
term becomes increasingly contested. It only uses the term “sustainability” or “sustainable forest 
management” for the promotion of the FSC certified products among consumers. For many 
environmentalists, it is not completely self-evident whether what is called sustainable forest 
management is actually sustainable. The FSC also insists that its affiliated organizations, including 
national initiatives, working groups and certification bodies, should abstain from using these 
problematic terms. The Rainforest Alliance, another important international environmental 
organization running an FSC-accredited SmartWood forest certification program, also prefers the term 
“responsible forest management” (personal communication with the Rainforest Alliance manager on 
June 16, 2008) 
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7.1 Implementing Environmental Requirements: Environmental Effects 
In Chapter 5, I have described a number of features of the Russian forestry sector that 
could have been expected to impede the development of forest certification in Russia 
because overcoming these obstacles would be overly costly and complicated. Many 
environmental organizations and company managers were convinced that Russian 
forestry legislation does not adequately address environmental aspects and often 
prescribes behavior that in fact contradicts the FSC’s forestry standards. Company 
managers also emphasized that some of the governmental rules and regulations did 
not address the economic needs of the forestry sector. Moreover, the monitoring of 
corporate behavior and the enforcement of rules are far from being perfect. The tasks 
that the federal and local legislation assigns to forest service officers, including forest 
inventorying and planning, systematically remained unaccomplished due to severe 
budget deficits. The legal uncertainty that emerged with the introduction of the new 
forest code contributed to the growing confusion in the forestry sector.  
What outcomes could forest certification accomplish under these difficult 
circumstances in terms of forestry practices and environmental protection? Managers 
of certified companies reported no revolutionary or completely unfamiliar changes in 
everyday practices. Forest managers emphasize that the main challenge was to 
complete paperwork and formalities required by FSC standards and to document the 
compliance with FSC requirements where companies already complied but did not 
have a written proof thereof. They reported that many requirements of the FSC were 
similar and in some cases identical to Russian regulations but were not observed 
appropriately due to the weak control of the responsible state agencies and financial 
difficulties. 
Environmental, forest and labor legislation in Russia is extensive but bulky, on 
the one hand, and prescriptive, on the other hand. Moreover, various branches, for 
example environmental and forest, are not harmonized and may contradict each other. 
Large companies follow regulations to the significantly greater extent compared to the 
less visible small-scale loggers that the state is unable to control. The FSC’s first 
principle of good forest management is compliance with existing national and local 
laws and regulations. It may constitute a challenge for the FSC in countries where 
environmental and forest law is weak or missing, but in Russia the problem is rather 
enforcement and compliance and internal consistency of laws. One of the most 
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common examples reported by environmentalists and managers was the 
incompatibility of Russian environmental and forest laws. Russia is a signatory to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity but its norms are not reflected in the forest law. 
Biodiversity protection measures prescribed by environmental laws as well as by FSC 
standards conflict with logging rules prescribed by Russian forest regulations. It is, 
therefore, a challenge for Russian companies to comply at the same time with FSC 
environmental standards and Russian forest regulations that are both relatively 
sophisticated and prescriptive (McDermott, Cashore and Kanowski 2008, interview 
25).  
Even though the image of the Russian forestry sector may be associated with 
blossoming corruption, non-compliance even with those laws that are consistent and 
effective, and other illegal activities, these phenomena are less characteristic of large 
companies that pursued certification. One of the most cited examples is illegal 
logging that environmentalists recognized as a serious environmental and economic 
problem of the Russian forestry sector, especially in the areas at the borders to China 
and Finland.  
There is no common definition of illegal logging and illegally harvested 
timber. The federal forest service defines illegal logging as logging of timber without 
appropriate permits and declarations prescribed by national or local regulations. 
Logging permits specify where logging sites are located and how much timber 
companies are allowed to harvest. In the new system, companies themselves select 
logging sites and declare them to the local forest service. The forest service considers 
logging without such logging permits and logging in places other than specified in 
permits or declarations illegal. Logging beyond specified limits is considered a 
violation but excessive timber already harvested is not considered strictly illegal. 
Environmental organizations, including WWF and Greenpeace, insist that the timber 
harvested beyond permitted or declared limits even in permitted locations should be 
counted as illegal. As a result, the estimates of the amounts of illegally harvested 
timber in the Russian forest sector provided by the federal forest service and 
environmental organizations persistently differ. They range from ten to sixty percent 
of the total timber harvested in Russia (Kotlobay et al. 2006). 
As a rule, large companies do not practice logging without permits or 
declarations for several reasons. They usually have their own large forest tracts where 
they can legally log. Moreover, large companies are usually visible to the federal and 
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local forest service that may make the legalization of illegally harvested timber a risky 
enterprise. Companies also prefer to avoid conflicts with the authorities, since the 
state has a final word in the decisions concerning the lease of forests. For exporting 
companies, illegal logging may become a serious problem if they are monitored and 
get caught by environmental organizations. Moreover, many large companies protect 
their forests from small-scale illegal loggers, since they see illegally harvested timber 
from their forests as the loss of their own resources (interview 15 and 21). Whether or 
not large companies seeking certification exceed the harvesting limits specified in 
logging permits or declaration – either occasionally or systematically – has to be 
verified by auditors during assessment.  
This discussion suggests that the problem that large companies had to deal 
with for certification was not that they had to significantly modify their behavior to 
eliminate illegal or non-compliant practices. Rather, companies seeking certification 
had to demonstrate to auditors that they did not violate national or local regulations 
when harvesting timber. Additionally, in case companies sourced timber from 
external suppliers, they had to check whether suppliers also did not harvest or trade 
timber illegally and present the proofs to auditors.  
To summarize, Russian companies had to deal with a set of problems different 
from what might have been expected. In many respects, companies did not have to 
reform their practices but had to document and report that their practices, both 
forestry and buying practices, were in compliance with domestic laws and FSC 
standards. One Greenpeace activist describes the situation in the following way:  
The FSC has ten principles and fifty-six criteria. This is about two hundred indicators. … 
Only about ten percent of them are key indicators. How do they [companies] comply with 
the remaining ninety percent? They are registered legal entities, they leased forests 
legally, and they have a logging plan. Here there can be no non-compliance. The FSC 
was initially created for tropical forests. … In Africa, for example, no-one knows where 
the borders of the leased forests are. Their legislation is terrible. Our level is a little 
higher. … The thing is then that in Russia these ten percent of indicators become 
critical. … These are old-growth forests, clear-cuts versus other logging techniques and 
some others. … So when they [companies] say that they comply with all requirements, 
except for logging techniques, it is a big question, since it determines fifty percent of the 
environmental condition of forests after logging (interview 13). 
This citation and the previous discussion suggests that while Russian companies 
seeking certification were initially in compliance with many principles and criteria 
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and had to document their compliance for auditors, they had to reform their practices 
in several critical areas. These areas were extremely important for environmental 
organizations. The credibility of FSC certification as a policy instrument depended 
crucially on the ability of the FSC and certified companies to improve their 
compliance with the critical requirements. Certainly, environmentalists also expected 
that companies seeking certification would be obligated to follow the requirements of 
the FSC’s forest certification and apply better forest management techniques than 
prescribed by the federal and local regulations. They also anticipated that forest 
certification would improve companies’ compliance with relevant environmental and 
labor regulations (for example, worker safety regulations) that had been often ignored 
due to weak control by responsible state agencies. 
However, even though improved compliance may constitute an important 
effect of forest certification, companies were already familiar with the ways to 
achieve compliance and did not have to reform their practices, while in case of the 
critical indicators they should have modified their practices and implement the 
requirements that they otherwise would not have implemented. It can, therefore, be 
expected that the most visible and important impact of forest certification on 
corporate practices can be detected when looking at these crucial indicators, including 
forest management planning, high conservation value forests, logging techniques and 
forest operations’ environmental impact. To what extent did companies implement 
these and other key requirements?  
The most notable examples are certainly the improvements in biodiversity 
protection during and after logging. As has been mentioned above, Russia is a 
signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity but biodiversity protection 
measures were not specified in national forest regulations that determined logging and 
post-logging practices of companies. In contrast, environmental organizations 
developed specific guidelines that helped companies seeking certification to reform 
their practices. The problem here was that many of these measures actually 
contradicted official logging regulations. Where the guidelines proposed by 
environmental organizations departed from Russian laws, companies had to negotiate 
exemptions from general rules with the forest service and other administrative bodies 
in order to accommodate FSC requirements. 
For example, Russian logging rules prescribed that for clear-cutting – the most 
used logging type in Russia – that all trees had to be removed from a logging site, 
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except for the trees that forest service officers designated when issuing a logging 
permit. Leaving trees after logging was considered a violation and was subject to a 
fine. In contrast, the requirements of the FSC prescribe that the key elements of 
biodiversity, including mother trees (trees left untouched after logging for seeds), 
dead trees and dead wood, rare and endangered species, aspen and trees with hollows, 
had to be left on a logging site to ensure appropriate regeneration of the forest and 
biodiversity preservation. Groups of trees that form key biotopes, including trees 
around permanent and temporary water streams, springs and bogs, trees on rocks, 
mountain slopes and along gullies, had to be preserved for biodiversity protection 
purposes. 
In order to comply with the FSC’s requirements, companies usually sought 
exemptions from legal rules shaping their logging practices for the purposes of forest 
certification. For example, in Arkhangelsk a number of companies were able to sign 
an official agreement with the forest service that allowed them to leave the key 
elements of biodiversity on their logging sites. Other companies agreed informally 
with the local forest service that officers would not fine them for leaving the key 
elements of biodiversity on logging sites. The third way practiced for example at the 
Segezha logging operations was to work together with forest officers that assigned 
logging sites and allocated tress to be left after logging (interviews 21 and 5). 
Additionally, companies had to protect large tracts of valuable forests, 
including old-growth forests and other types of forests that environmental 
organizations define as high conservation value forests (see Table 6). While some 
types of these forests were protected by Russian laws, including types five and six, 
intact forests were not recognized as a separate category of forests in the Russian 
environmental and forest law and, therefore, were not officially protected. Moreover, 
old-growth forests were traditionally designated as commercial forests and were 
subject to logging. Moreover, these forests often have the most commercial value 
because these forests contain trees, from which highest quality of wood is extracted. 
Companies logging in intact forests were the first to be targeted by environmental 
campaigns. They had to withdraw from these forests by declaring moratoria on their 
logging. Companies that were not directly targeted by the campaigns but wanted to 
become certified also had to develop a methodology for identifying and protecting 
old-growth forests and other types of high conservation value forests.  
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They also had to preserve so called representative plots of forests. Such plots 
should have equaled at least five percent of the leased forest land, Russian forest 
regulations specified what areas in forests required special protection and obligated 
companies designate and protect such areas in their leased forests. They are called 
special protected forest areas and include riparian buffer zones along water streams, 
protective forest areas and a number of other categories of forests. Protective forests 
are defined as forests that play a role in protecting landscapes, ecosystems and social, 
cultural and economic objects as well as forests in deserted areas, steppes and on 
mountain slopes. The FSC requires companies to additionally protect at least five 
percent of their forests beyond officially designated special protected areas. These 
parts of forests are supposed to be large enough to represent a range of types of forests 
and landscapes that are considered typical for a region where a company operates. 
This requirement is also meant to reduce biodiversity loss and to ensure the 
reproduction of these forests and prevent their transformation and degradation. 
Another environmentally important outcome that might be attributed to the 
impact of forest certification is that many large companies commissioned studies to 
identify rare species of plants and animals that may be found in their managed forests. 
Segezha, Mondi and Stora Enso hired forestry scholars, ecologists and biologists to 
identify special forest plots, key biotopes and rare species that had to be protected 
during and after logging.  
7.2 Implementing Social Requirements: Social Effects 
The FSC’s forest management standards required that forest companies should respect 
the legal and traditional rights of their workers, local communities and indigenous 
peoples who their logging operations might affect. When dealing with social aspects 
of forest certification, forest companies were expected to comply with domestic laws, 
international conventions, in particular the conventions adopted by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), and customary rights of communities and indigenous 
people to ensure that company forest management is socially beneficial..  
The situation with regard to the social aspects of forest certification in Russia 
is similar to the one concerning the environmental effects. On the one hand, Russian 
labor law was relatively elaborate and well-structured but enforcement and 
compliance were problematic. Companies seeking certification did not have to 
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introduce a significant number of new practices but they had to improve compliance 
with domestic labor regulations and ILO conventions and document it for forest 
management auditors. Salaries had to be paid regularly and should not have been 
lower than average salaries in the forestry sector in a given region. Workers’ safety 
regulations had to be observed. Workers had to be regularly trained in workers’ safety 
and provided with protective uniforms and helmets. Forest managers had to monitor 
workers to ensure that they followed safety instructions. 
Here the FSC’s requirements and domestic labor law and sectoral regulations 
were fully consistent and did not contradict each other. However, managers reported 
that after applying for forest certification they had to eliminate still common delays in 
worker payment. Almost universally, forest companies had to purchase special safety 
equipment certified according to international standards, including helmets and 
uniforms that could prevent injuries caused by saws. According to managers, these 
were the most costly innovations that forest certification brought about (interviews 5 
and 20). These changes show that forest certification stimulated better compliance 
with domestic labor and work regulations and did not require considerable change in 
existing practices. 
In terms of community relations, Russian companies often even exceeded the 
strict requirements of the FSC. Partly, this is due to the fact that when companies 
lease forest land from the state, they often negotiate with local authorities social 
clauses of leasing contracts. Before the introduction of the new forest code in 2008, 
community-related obligations were an advantage at public competitions, a 
mechanism of public forest land allocation. Traditionally, logging companies that 
were often the only employer in distant forest settlements supported their workers, 
their families, retired workers and local population. For example, logging companies 
provided local people, schools and libraries with firewood either free of charge or for 
a fee below its production cost. Companies also supported economic and social 
infrastructure of forest settlements located in or near company forests. They supported 
schools, libraries and social-cultural facilities and organized cultural events. They 
often helped to build and maintain roads that companies jointly used with the local 
population. These activities were in line with the FSC’s standards and companies only 
needed to document their compliance.  
In addition, companies had to regularly inform their workers and the local 
population about forest certification and its potential advantages. Moreover, in order 
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to comply with the fourth of the FSC’s principles (community relations and worker 
rights), companies had to regularly consult local populations on issues concerning the 
use of joint forest resources. Companies became responsible for identifying parts of 
forests that local people used for recreation, cultural and religious purposes, hunting, 
fishing or collecting mushrooms. Companies had to guarantee local people the 
participation in the development of management plans for forests, in which they had a 
stake. They also had to ensure that workers and local people had a possibility to 
express their concerns and grievances. For this purpose, companies developed 
grievance procedures. For example, they introduced special registers in which 
workers and local people could leave their comments, suggestions and complaints for 
managers of logging operations. Managers were obliged to reply to them. Finally, 
companies had to develop a methodology for the evaluation and compensation of the 
damage that logging operations might accidentally cause to individual and community 
wellbeing. 
The problems associated with forest-dependent indigenous people in Africa or 
Latin America, including displacement of indigenous people from their traditional 
lands and destruction of their social, cultural and economic organization, are not 
characteristic for Russia. Many groups of indigenous people are completely 
assimilated and no longer practice traditional use of forests and other natural 
resources. In this case, they are treated according to the third FSC principle on local 
populations.  
In some parts of the Far East and the European North, however, a number of 
indigenous people continue living in traditional communities and practicing 
traditional forest use. In these cases, companies had to respect the traditional rights of 
indigenous people, including traditional land tenure, hunting and fishing rights. They 
had to identify and to protect traditional territories and places that have a special 
religious and cultural value and restrict logging on these traditional territories if 
necessary. Forest management plans developed by companies had to be discussed 
with and approved by the representatives of the indigenous people. If a company 
sought to log in the forests traditionally used by indigenous people, it had to develop a 
system of the evaluation and compensation of the potential damage to the traditional 
livelihoods. 
Far Eastern company Terneyles was the only company in Russia that had to 
additionally define its relationships with the traditional communities of the Far 
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Eastern indigenous people Udege that lived in a close proximity to the forests leased 
by the company in the Samarga river basin. Terneyles concluded a special agreement 
with the representatives of the community that defined among other things the amount 
of annual compensation for the potential harm that logging caused to Udege 
traditional activities such as hunting. In addition, the company also committed to 
identifying areas and sites used by the Udege for religious rituals or associated with 
their traditional beliefs and excluding them from logging (Tysiachniouk et al. 2009). 
Terneyles hired an ethnologist to specify the terms and conditions of the agreement. 
Initially, Terneyles’ managers and even the auditors assessing compliance with FSC 
standards were also convinced that principles and criteria dealing with the indigenous 
issues were not applicable to Terneyles. However, after protests of the Far Eastern 
environmental organizations Terneyles had to sign an agreement with the Udege 
indigenous community (interview 12).  
In the Arkhangelsk federal region, the policy of the Onega sawmill, now a part 
of the Segezha industrial forest group, was challenged by a number of civic 
associations representing the Pomors, a group of ethnic Russians that claimed to 
practice traditional use of natural resources on the seashore of the White Sea. This 
group was not recognized as indigenous people by the federal government and was 
not included in the official federal register of indigenous peoples of the Far North, 
Siberia and the Far East, but a number of Pomor communities and civic organizations 
at that time worked to convince the government to recognize the Pomors as an 
indigenous people and to grant Promor communities special privileges, including 
special protection of their traditional land tenure rights and traditional use of natural 
resources. The civic associations that represented the Pomors claimed that Onega 
violated traditional rights and threatened to file a complaint to the FSC. In order to 
avoid a potential conflict, Onega started consultations with the representatives of the 
Pomors, despite the initial reluctance to recognize them as indigenous people. In 
2007-2008, Onegales conducted extensive consultations with Pomor populations on 
the Onega Peninsula in cooperation with the Pomor rights activists. As a result, 
Onegales concluded an agreement with the Pomors regulating its relationships with 
indigenous communities and committed itself to protecting sites on its leased 
territories that the population of the Pomor villages used for picking berries and 
hunting (Ovchinnikov 2009). 
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To sum up the local effects of forest certification identified in this section, 
companies started to identify and protect key elements of biodiversity, including but 
not limited to key biotopes, rare and endangered ecosystems, intact forests and rare 
animal and plant species. They commissioned field studies to identify rare species and 
valuable areas of forests and developed methodologies to monitor and consequently 
minimize the impact of their operations on the condition of forests. These measures 
are expected to reduce the loss of biodiversity. In terms of social outcomes, 
companies universally purchased new individual safety equipment certified according 
to internationally recognized safety standards. Companies that used to delay worker 
payments corrected their payment schedules. Companies that operated on the 
territories where communities of forest-dependent indigenous peoples lived and 
practiced traditional use of natural resources had to coordinate their operations with 
indigenous communities and to compensate damage to the wellbeing of indigenous 
peoples they cause. Companies also introduced measures to inform local people that 
have stakes in forests about their forest management plans.  
7.3 Systematizing Implementation: Modes of Translation 
The data on implementation provided in two previous sections (7.1 and 7.2) shows 
that implementation does not follow one single path. Clearly, implementation and 
compliance do not necessarily mean change. If a company complies with the FSC 
principles and criteria, it is certified without any reforms of its forest management 
system. However, as some analyses suggest, almost every company – regardless of its 
location – needs to implement at least some changes in order to comply with FSC 
principles and criteria (Newsom, Bahn and Cashore 2006; Newsom and Hewitt 2005). 
Yet, these changes may be quite different. As the data presented above demonstrates, 
in cases when requirements are clear and understandable to implementing actors (i.e., 
firms) and enforcing actors (i.e., auditors and certifiers), FSC requirements are 
directly implemented, and practices in these cases can be read off the standard. A 
good example is the requirement concerning safely equipment that was clear to most 
forest management and therefore easy to implement, at least technically, even though 
the costs were substantial. 
In some other cases, it is enough to document and report preexisting practices 
in order to meet FSC requirements. It is necessary to reformulate what companies 
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have already been doing in such a way that their formulations are compatible with the 
language of the standard and is clear to the auditors. In other words, practices have to 
be reframed in order to fit the standard. The requirements concerning the 
responsibility of forest companies towards local communities present a good example 
for this mode of translation of standards into practices.  
Furthermore, when transnational requirements, domestic regulations and 
habitual practices only partially overlap and when transnational requirements exceed 
domestic legal requirements or contradict them, actors implement these requirements 
by recombining in different ways global and local elements, such as concepts and 
practices, or invent new practices in order to achieve compliance. The most notable 
examples here are the requirements dealing with high conservation value forests and 
biodiversity protection measures that contradict and exceed substantially domestic 
requirements. This is also the areas where substantial change in operational practices 
on the ground has been detected. 
Finally, actors may avoid implementing certain requirements when they are 
interpreted as non-applicable in their context. However, once monitoring and 
enforcing actors, e.g., activists, certifiers or FSC accreditation managers, detect that 
some companies do not implement requirements that are actually applicable to them, 
companies may be forced to take measures and change their practices in order to 
comply. A good example is the discussion of the Pomors’ right to be treated as an 
indigenous people in the Arkhangelsk Oblast in North West Russia. 
In order to evaluate the impact of translating FSC principles and criteria into 
on-the-ground practices, it is also necessary to evaluate their “net effect” on the forest 
management practices in certified enterprises. In other words, it is necessary to 
systematically examine which requirements certain translation modes are applied to in 
order to achieve compliance with FSC standards, and under what circumstances. Is it 
mainly direct compliance or creative recombination? What modes of translation are 
applied in particularly difficult cases? My analysis suggests that in fact, a significant 
number of criteria and indicators do not require substantial changes in on-the-ground 
practices, which is also compatible with the evaluation of the Greenpeace activist 
cited on p. 191. Companies in Russia commonly comply with Principles 1 
(compliance with national laws) and 2 (tenure and use rights). Their implementation is 
not problematic, since problems with tenure and compliance with major national laws, 
7 The Effects of Forest Certification 
 
199 
including civil law, are rare and not typical for Russia (as compared to most tropical 
countries, such as Indonesia, where land tenure is a serious problem (Bartley 2010b)). 
Principles 3 (indigenous peoples’ rights) and 4 (community and worker’s 
rights) usually require a marginal adaptation of existing practices, such as improved 
documentation or reframing (clearly, there are also exceptions here). In the case of 
tenure, as well, in contrast with Canada (Tollefson, Gale and Haley 2008) and many 
tropical countries, indigenous peoples’ rights do not represent a significant challenge 
for forest certification in Russia. With a few exceptions, including the Udege 
communities in the Russian Far East, their interests and rights are not severely 
violated or threatened by forest companies, or at least are not perceived as such by the 
indigenous communities and NGOs. Moreover, the rights of recognized indigenous 
peoples are relatively well protected by national law. 
In contrast, recombination and invention are more often applied to Principles 5 
through 9, which deal with forest management planning, benefits from forests, 
environmental impact, monitoring and assessment, and high conservation value 
forests.23 Environmentalists have continuously drawn attention to the importance of 
high conservation value forests and operational forest management practices (e.g., 
logging) as their most serious concerns, not only because they perceived common 
practices of Russian companies as not environmentally sound, but also because these 
principles include criteria and indicators that are not regulated by the national forest 
law. The extremely important concept of high conservation value forests is absent 
from Russian legislation, whereas many types and subtypes of what are defined as 
high conservation value forests – e.g., old-growth forests – are not protected by 
Russian forest and environmental law as such. These are exactly the principles and 
criteria that are particularly important for environmental activists and scholars 
(interview 13). 
These are also the indicators that are particularly difficult to implement 
because of the gap between domestic law and practice and FSC requirements and 
environmentalists’ demands, and also because initially, there was not enough 
knowledge available concerning these principles and criteria and their 
implementation. In order to comply with these principles, implementing actors had to 
                                                 
23
 Principle 10 is not applied in Russia because of the absence of certified plantations.  
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use and recombine national concepts, common practices and international 
requirements and concepts in different ways at all levels within the certification 
system: in national standard-setting forums and in local implementation sites. 
Maintenance and protection of high conservation value forests includes a range of 
measures: from a zoning approach for old-growth forests (an internationally 
recognized approach to managing protected areas, e.g., nature reserves) to protective 
forests and especially protected areas (concepts taken from domestic regulations). 
Sometimes new practices and arrangements had to be invented (e.g., negotiated 
exemptions from national regulations) when neither a transnational nor a national 
practice would serve to fulfill FSC requirements. 
Recombination and invention are probably the most important and interesting 
modes of translation that produce most results as far as forest certification’s direct 
effects are concerned and that involve most new knowledge building and distribution 
as well as learning among firms, certifiers and NGO activists. Using the example of 
high conservation value forests, I will show in more detail how the recombination of 
local and global concepts and practices as well as the invention of new practices helps 
change habitual practices of Russian forest companies. 
High conservation value forests (HCVF) and biodiversity protection are 
probably the two most telling examples of the recombination of locally available, 
externally given global and new invented elements. HCVF is an umbrella term created 
by the FSC and adopted by many transnational NGOs. It denotes different types of 
forests and forest ecosystems that need special protection (see Table 6). There is no 
equivalent to this concept in the Russian legal discourse. Russian forest and 
environmental legislation defines different types of forests that have to be protected, 
but HCVF is a broader concept. For example, old-growth forests are not recognized as 
a separate category in the forest and environmental legislation and are therefore not 
protected unless they are part of protected areas, such as nature reserves or national 
parks. In contrast, for environmentalists, old-growth forests belong to Type 2 of 
HCVF (“Globally, regionally or nationally significant large landscape level forests”). 
According to the Atlas of Russia’s Intact Forest Landscapes, only 5 percent of old-
growth forests are included in protected areas (Aksenov et al. 2002: 5). This means 
that some of the HCVF, but not all of them, are protected under Russian forest and 
environmental legislation.  
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The types and subtypes of HCVF that overlapped with Russian categories 
were relatively easy for forest companies to identify, map and provide evidence of 
their protection. For example, forest areas around rural settlements were excluded 
from commercial use by law. Forest companies, therefore, had to document that they 
respected this requirement. Moreover, forest areas that had been officially designated 
as protective forests, special protective areas and especially protected areas – 
categories used in the Russian forest and environmental law – could be redefined by 
forest companies as HCVF that they had already protected.  
When areas of HCVF were not formally designated as any kind of protected 
areas by the authorized agencies, but fit the criteria of HCVF defined in the FSC 
standards, companies had to identify and protect such areas independently of the state 
agencies or take other measures to protect HCVF. After NGO campaigns against 
logging in old-growth forests in the northwest, several companies, including Titan and 
Onegales, declared moratoria on logging in the forests in question (interviews 17 and 
20). The companies had not practiced this before. Later they used these moratoria to 
demonstrate to certification auditors that they protected the old-growth forests, even 
when logging there was approved by the forest service. 
Another example concerns Types 5 and 6 of HCVF (“Forest areas 
fundamental to meeting basic needs of local communities” and “Forest areas critical 
to local communities’ traditional cultural identity”).  In order to identify forest areas 
used by local people to pick mushrooms and berries – i.e., areas essential for meeting 
their basic subsistence needs – several companies surveyed the population of the 
villages surrounding their logging sites. On the basis of the results of the surveys and 
individual consultations, they excluded these areas from logging.  Using interviews 
and surveys of the local population, they also identified sites that local people 
perceived as particularly important for their history, traditions and everyday life, 
including cemeteries, monuments, recreation sites and hunting and fishing areas 
located in the forests managed by companies. 
In fact, Russian forest law required forest companies to organize public 
hearings with the local population concerning forest management plans. However, 
public hearings and consultations were often a formality and the questions of sites 
relevant to community subsistence, identity and history were not discussed. Activists 
for community rights encouraged certified companies to conduct surveys and 
individual consultations with local forest officers, people interested in local history 
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and traditions, librarians, school teachers, as well as local people picking mushrooms 
and berries. Surveys and consultations were not a substitute for public hearings as a 
familiar instrument prescribed by the national law. They were adopted to complement 
public hearings as a new method for strengthening company relations with local 
communities and identifying social HCVF. Surveys and individual consultations 
became a common practice in villages located on certified territories. In 2009, a group 
of researchers and activists of the Forest Certification Support Group of the Center for 
Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, in cooperation with a certification 
auditor and a certification manager of a large pulp and paper mill, published a detailed 
184-page guide to the social aspects of the FSC certification (Tysiachniouk et al. 
2009). The guide recommends surveys and extensive individual consultations with the 
population of forest villages as an effective method for identifying Types 5 and 6 of 
HCVF. It is now available at the homepage of the FSC regional office in Russia.  
In the previous section, I also described how companies combined common 
and new practices in order to fulfill FSC requirements concerning biodiversity 
protection measures on logging sites without violating national regulations. Titan, a 
company in Arkhangelsk Oblast, negotiated exemptions from logging regulations 
with the forest service in order to be able to exclude key biotopes, dead trees, areas 
with endangered or rare species and other trees or areas critical for biodiversity 
protection. Segezha Pulp and Paper Mill, a company in the Republic of Karelia, 
trained a team of young foresters who assisted forest officers in identifying important 
trees and areas and listing them in a logging permit as excluded from logging. 
Moreover, both companies worked extensively with environmental scholars and 
activists and commissioned studies from them aimed at identifying key biotopes, 
endangered and rare species, habitats of certain species – e.g., birds – and HCVF. As 
a result, SPOK, a local NGO, published a guide to identifying key biotopes in the 
forests of Karelia (interview 3). The publication was supported by the Segezha Pulp 
and Paper Mill. Supporting research is clearly not a new practice per se, but 
commissioning studies and using the findings on an everyday basis is a new practice 
that has been encouraged by forest certification. 
It has to be noted at this point that although Russia faces a number of serious 
problems in the forest sector, including illegal activities and weak enforcement of 
environmental and forestry regulations, mainly in Siberia and the Far East 
(McDermott, Cashore and Kanowski 2010: 197), forest certification is prominent in 
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the relatively sound segment of the forest sector (Tysiachniouk 2006; interviews 14 
and 15). This sector includes usually large, vertically integrated companies – some of 
which have multinationals as parent companies – and their suppliers, who are not 
engaged in illegal activities and comply with domestic regulations. Therefore, the 
major challenges for activists and certifiers are not exposing and eliminating illegal 
activities or enforcing domestic regulations, but promoting the implementation of 
transnational standards that are different from domestic regulations, such as 
requirements dealing with high conservation value forests. 
7.4 Evaluating the Effects of Forest Certification 
Although the changes in corporate social and environmental practices discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter appear to be important local effects of forest 
certification, it is important to identify factors that limit the effectiveness of forest 
certification as an instrument for the improvement of forest management. This 
analysis will also help to understand why some environmentalists became skeptical of 
the potential effects of forest certification and even critical of the way forest 
certification operates in Russia.  
As I have already suggested above, it is unclear whether the reforms induced 
by FSC forest certification will transform into long-term large-scale positive effects 
on the condition of Russian forests and whether a multi-stakeholder and multi-
functional approach to the management of forest resources will be institutionalized. 
While, for example, the identification and preservation of rare species and key 
biotopes is generally believed to reduce the loss of biodiversity, the existing scientific 
knowledge is yet limited and often uncertain as far to the precise effects of these 
measures in the long run is concerned.  
Certainly, the fact that only a limited number of companies pursue forest 
certification plays a role. Even though approximately one fifth of the total forest land 
leased and managed by forest companies is currently FSC-certified,24 which can by 
itself be considered an important result, the FSC’s potential effects will only work on 
                                                 
24
 According to the Federal Forest Service Agency (2007), the area of the forest under private logging 
concessions amounts to 112 219.1913 million of hectares. The area of the certified forests amounts to 
21 172 million of hectares FSC-Russia. 2008. Forest Management Certificates (as of October 2008). 
Moscow: The Forest Stewardship Council Russia., which equals to 18.8 percent of the total forests 
under concessions. 
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the forest land leased by certified forest operations. Forest certification, therefore, 
does not target companies that for different reasons are not interested in forest 
certification or cannot afford it, including larger and smaller companies working for 
domestic markets and, therefore, immune to the environmental pressure of 
environmentalists and buyers. It can be disputed whether forest certification emerged 
to target these companies at all but it is exactly these operations that significantly 
damage Russian forests. 
Besides this, it is often unclear whether special procedures, plans and trainings 
designed by companies to ensure compliance with forest management are also 
implemented effectively in companies’ everyday operations and routines. Forest 
managers report that one of the outcomes of the certification is that they had to design 
plans, procedures and methodologies to achieve and document compliance with the 
FSC standards. Their implementation is, however, a separate issue. The interviews 
with the forest workers of the certified companies indicate that they do not always 
follow biodiversity protection instructions and are often reluctant to implement them 
at all. Managers often complain that it is difficult to ensure that workers wear 
individual safety equipment, including protective uniforms and helmets. Local 
population is informed about forest certification through articles in the newspapers 
that local people hardly ever read, as the interviews with the local population suggest. 
Companies organize public hearings to inform local people about company plans and 
involve them into discussions but do not make sure that people actually come and 
participate in the discussions. The effectiveness of public hearings can be questioned 
in this case. The danger that environmentalists and certifiers increasingly become 
aware of is the difficulties associated with the actual implementation of the standards 
and monitoring and control of certified companies. 
It can be therefore argued that depending on the concept of effectiveness used 
forest certification will have different impact. If effectiveness is conceptualized as the 
improvement of the condition of forests at the macro-level, e.g., country-level or 
landscape-level (for example, reductions in deforestation rates or biodiversity loss 
rates), it is unlikely to become a very effective instrument, since it is a voluntary 
instrument and not all companies managing forests become certified. Moreover, not 
all forests are managed by private companies or managed at all. This limits the 
potential pool of forests that can be targeted by forest certification. At the same time, 
if effectiveness is conceptualized the degree of uptake of forest certification and its 
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acceptance by different actors as a legitimate forest policy instrument, it can be 
argued that it has been effective in Russia: A significant number of companies joined 
FSC forest certification program; almost one fifth of forests managed privately has 
been certified; a broad coalition of supporting actors, including NGOs, companies and 
in some cases government representatives, has emerged.  
If effectiveness is conceptualized as a degree to which forest certification 
recognizes good on-the-ground practices and – more importantly – helps indentify and 
modify unsound practices in the ways that are likely to improve environmental, social 
and economic impact of forest management at the company level, it can be argued 
that forest certification has had a positive effect and has been at leas to some extent 
effective: The evidence presented in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 shows that practices in at 
least several areas – e.g., biodiversity protection, high conservation value forests 
protection, indigenous rights protection – have been improving. Yet, the question is 
how effective forest certification has been. I argue in this section that forest 
certification in Russia as defined in this paragraph has been effective but its effect has 
been limited.  
The central argument of the section is that Russian national forest regulations 
and certification’s compliance assessment procedures coupled with the market nature 
of the FSC forest certification system restrict the effectiveness of forest certification. 
National regulations do so in two ways. First, since forest certification principles 
require compliance with all national laws and regulations, national certification 
requirements have to be adapted to national legislation. The national standard, 
therefore, does not challenge certain environmentally unsound practices prescribed by 
law. There are different reasons for this. In some cases, challenging certain prescribed 
practices may lead to serious contradictions between national regulations and 
certification standards and increase certification costs. In turn, this may decrease the 
willingness of forest operations to pursue certification. Second, forest operations are 
the primary objects of forest certification as a nonstate regulatory instrument. At the 
same time, private forest operations are not the only organizations that may be 
responsible for forest management. Some forest management practices may be 
conducted by other organizations, including national or local forest service, and may 
turn out to contradict the certification standard. Yet, this is not a common reason for 
certification organizations to withdraw a certificate. 
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The second limitation deals with the compliance assessment system in forest 
certification programs. It is commonly based on the competition between 
organizations that offer certification services to forest operations in the market for 
certification services. Certified companies bear direct certification costs (e.g. the costs 
of assessment, an assessment team’s accommodation and transportation costs and 
certification organizations’ charge fees). Since there is more than one certifier on the 
market, they compete with each other over companies seeking certification. This may 
lead to lower certification costs but at the same time may negatively affect the quality 
of compliance assessment. In order to generate an advantage on the market for forest 
certification services, certification organizations may try to reduce costs by reducing 
personnel or working time required for a compliance assessment. This may, however, 
negatively affect the quality of compliance assessment, since due to the lack of time 
or personnel noncompliance may be overlooked or tolerated. 
The Restrictive Effect of Domestic Forest Regulations 
Domestic regulations restrict the application of FSC standards of good forest 
management in two ways. First, Russian environmental and forest legislation is 
extensive and very prescriptive. Environmental and forest regulations are not 
harmonized with each other, and this creates apparent contradictions. Environmental 
regulations are relatively restrictive, whereas forest regulations are driven mainly by 
commercial use concerns and oriented towards “full utilization” (McDermott, Cashore 
and Kanowski 2010). In contrast, forest certification standards encourage an approach 
that minimizes the negative impact of forest management and particularly of logging 
and require the protection of key biotopes and valuable forests that contradicts “full 
utilization” approach. These contradictions represent a challenge for certification, 
since FSC’s Principle 1 requires compliance with national regulations, so that forest 
enterprises have to comply with both national regulations and FSC requirements. 
There exist several alternatives to the “full utilization” approach. One is the 
transition from large-size clear cuts (removal of all trees on a logging site) to narrow 
strip cuts and selective cuts (“softer” logging techniques that are believed to reduce a 
negative impact of logging on the forest). Another one is the exclusion of key 
biotopes, rare and endangered species and ecosystems, and valuable forests (e.g., old-
growth forests) from large-size clear-cutting. As far as the first alternative is 
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concerned, the national standard for Russia actually requires forest companies to 
develop a plan for a gradual transition from clear cuts to softer logging techniques. 
However, the standard does not specify what such plans should include and how they 
should be evaluated. The standard only requires that the program exists and that the 
share of harvesting with “softer” techniques (compared to clear cuts) is documented. 
The evaluation of such plans is left to certifiers: Certification organizations are 
entitled to judge whether companies had made enough progress towards “softer” 
harvesting (FSC 2008d). In sum, the formulation in the standard is relatively vague 
and does require substantial change from certified companies. 
Another alternative requires excluding of environmentally valuable parts of 
logging sites (e.g., key biotopes) from logging. Since the standard provides no 
universal solution, forest enterprises took different measures in order to fulfill FSC 
requirements and avoid penalties of the forest service. In Arkhangelskaya oblast a 
large industrial logging group Titan negotiated general exemptions from logging rules 
with the local forest service (interview 20). The forest service officially permitted the 
Titan’s logging units to exclude certain trees or key biotopes while logging without 
penalties. In the Republic of Karelia, the Segezha Pulp and Paper Mill hired a group 
of young foresters and trained them in identifying key biotopes and other types of 
trees that required special protection according to FSC standards (interview 3). These 
group joined forest service officers when they inspected logging sites before issuing 
logging permits. They negotiated individual exemptions that had to be documented in 
a logging permit and helped forest officers to identify trees that had to be left on a 
particular site (interview 3). They helped inspectors to formulate exemptions in a way 
that did not contradict legal requirements. 
To sum up, whereas there is no universal solution to the problem of 
contradictions between national regulations and FSC standards that would be included 
into the standard, individual companies were successful in finding a compromise 
solution.  
As far as the second way domestic regulations restrict the impact of forest 
certification is concerned, according to the Russian forest law, the federal government 
owns all forestland in Russia. Private companies lease forests for ten to forty-nine 
years but parts of forest operations, e.g., planning, planting, issuing logging permits 
and thinning, remain in the hands of the federal and local forest services. It constitutes 
a challenge for forest certification, since it is common to certify private forest 
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leaseholders who cannot be hold responsible for potentially unsound practices of 
federal or local forest officers. This makes Russia an interesting case for investigating 
how such challenges are dealt with by forest operations and certification organizations. 
Do they tolerate it? Do they require companies to settle this with the forest service? Is 
it possible that forest enterprises and certification organizations with their assessment 
procedures are likely to even out any potential changes in practice that forest 
certification could have supported?  
Environmentalists and company managers suggested that some of the 
requirements of the FSC contradicted domestic legal requirements. Moreover, 
companies were unable to implement changes required by FSC forest certification, 
since companies were not legally responsible for the management of the forest 
resources they leased from the federal government represented by the federal forest 
service. Before January 2007 when the new forest code was enacted, Russian forests 
were publicly owned and managed by the federal forest service and its regional local 
departments. Companies leased forests from the state for a long or short period of 
time but limited to forty-nine years or purchased the standing trees for logging. Forest 
management practices, including inventorying, planning, assigning logging sites, 
designating protected areas, regulating and monitoring company operations, 
replanting and taking care of forests, were the tasks of the forest service at various 
levels. Centralized and hierarchically organized departments and units of the forest 
service were the actual managers of the forests, while companies that leased forests 
were only users of forest resources and had to coordinate their activity and their 
logging plans with forest authorities.  
After the introduction of the new forest code forest forests remained public 
property but the responsibilities concerning the management and use of forests were 
redistributed between the federal and regional forest service and the private sector. As 
a result of the reform, forest planning and management functions were largely 
transferred to the local and regional level. The federal authorities retained 
administrative and regulative functions and remained responsible for making rules 
that would regulate the activity of the regional and local forest service and private 
sector. The regional and local authorities were granted more autonomy in actual 
planning and management of publicly owned forests that were not leased to private 
companies. As far as leased forests are concerned, the responsibilities of forest service 
and private companies were also redistributed. The private companies that lease 
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forests for a long term, i.e., forty-nine years, became responsible for planning and 
managing their own forests, while the regional and local authorities retained only 
monitoring and control functions. Companies are no longer obligated to obtain 
logging permits for logging sites assigned by the forest service but can plan their own 
operations themselves. They have to inform the forest service about their plans, 
coordinate them with the regional forest plan developed by the regional forest service 
and declare their logging sites and volumes of extracted timber. Yet, they receive 
significantly more autonomy in forest management than before. Companies become 
fully responsible for managing their forests, including logging, planning and taking 
care of forests.  
What are the implications of the reforms in the Russian forest sector and the 
introduction of the new forest code have for forest certification? One the one hand, 
according to the previous forest code, the planning and management of forest 
resources was separated from their use by private sector. Companies that leased 
forests from the federal forest service were de jure unable to manage their forests 
resources independently from the state. Forest service assigned logging sites, even in 
the forests that have been leased by private companies, and issued logging permits. It 
performed forest inventorying and planning. It provided long-term plans for forest 
management that companies had to follow. It determined annual allowable cut, i.e., 
the amount of timber that could be extracted from forests for Russia, regions and local 
forest service units. It also regulated the logging through the slogging rules, replanting 
quotas and thinning rules that many environmental organizations and companies 
found outdated and environmentally inappropriate. However, companies had to follow 
these rules to avoid high fines and to keep their lease agreements. According to the 
laws, the forest service could cancel leasing contracts if companies did not perform in 
accordance with the extensive rules or failed to meet numerous commitments. When 
describing this situation, company managers complained that they did not feel they 
were real proprietors and managers of the leased forests (interview 26).  
It implies that before the introduction of the new forest code it was 
problematic for certifiers to adequately assess the performance of companies 
according to the FSC’s standards, since they require, on the one hand, the compliance 
with all existing national regulations and, on the other hand, prescribe more 
environmentally appropriate forestry practices that contradicted domestic rules. 
Moreover, forest inventory and developing of long-term management plans were the 
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prerogative of state forest authorities. Companies had a little say in planning and 
managing their forests. Forest service was also responsible for thinnings in younger 
forests on the land leased by companies. For this purpose, they either contracted 
leasing companies to do it or hired external contractors to perform this task. Leasing 
companies did not have any priority over external contractors. As a result, external 
contractors could be contracted to thin in the forests leased by other companies. 
Environmental organizations, companies and even state authorities themselves 
believed that this structure of relationships between the state and private sector bred 
corruption and bolstered illegal activities in the forests (interview 13, 15 and 25). 
Environmentalists and company managers described thinnings administered 
by local forest service officers as one of the most widespread illegal activities in 
Russia. Thinning is a removal of certain trees from young regenerating forests that is 
required to improve the future condition of the forest and shape the future stand (i.e., 
what trees would constitute the forest in the future). Before the enactment of the new 
forest code forest service was responsible for this procedure. Since forest service by 
law did not possess necessary human and material resources, forest officers were 
required to contract individuals or private organizations to perform thinning. However, 
it often happened in reality that private contractors agreed with forest officers to 
remove not the trees that had to be removed according to the rules – and this was 
usually low-quality trees that can often be used for firewood only – but the best trees 
that can later be sold for a higher price for the production of expensive sawn wood. 
One of the certified companies that had to face such illegal thinnings on its 
leased territories was Segezha pulp and paper mill. Segezha believed that though 
uncontrolled thinnings organized by local forest service it was losing the resources 
that it could use for its own production. Being unable to solve the problem informally 
with the regional forest service, it appealed to the federal forest service and organized 
a field experiment to demonstrate that Segezha was able to thin and use extracted 
timber more effectively and environmentally appropriately than local forest officers 
and external contractors. This was also confirmed by environmental organizations, 
including Greenpeace, whose representatives attended the experiment. Although this 
experiment was not directly relevant to forest certification, it illustrated that Russian 
companies did not fully control their forests (interview 5).  
More importantly, Russian companies were often unable to revise their current 
forest management plans or complete new plans to bring them in full compliance with 
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forest certification requirements because they had to be fully compatible with very 
prescriptive domestic laws, rules and regulations that were not always internally 
consistent, economically viable and environmentally appropriate, from the point of 
view of environmental organizations. Moreover, they did not have reliable 
information on the condition of forests, since the forest service was unable to 
inventory and evaluate country’s forest resources during the last two decades and 
could not, therefore, provide companies with accurate information. For the same 
reason, the state bodies responsible for forest policy-making, planning and 
management also operated with outdated information. It can be expected that under 
these conditions forest certification would turn out to be a problematic enterprise 
because the certifiers would have not be able to evaluate companies’ forest 
management plans based on inaccurate information and consistent with imperfect 
laws and regulations, both internally contradictory and partly incompatible with the 
requirements of the FSC. 
Environmentalists and companies hoped that with the introduction of the new 
forest code, the situation would slowly improve. According to the new forest code, 
planning and management responsibilities had been transferred to the companies 
leasing forests on the long-term basis (up to forty-nine years). Companies were able to 
determine their own long-term forest management strategies and plans and could use 
and take care of their forests in a way that best fitted their short- and long-term 
economic goals. They were able to independently select logging and planting 
techniques and assign logging sites and volumes of timber to be extracted. 
Environmental organizations hoped that at least parts of the problems caused by the 
imperfect legislation would be solved when companies would be able to manage their 
own operations in their own forests. Company strategic plans had to be coordinated 
with the regional plans of forest use developed by the regional forest service and 
regional authorities retained inspection and monitoring functions but forestry 
techniques and operational plans can be independently developed by companies.  
Yet, after the introduction of the forest code it was unclear how the new forest 
code would be implemented in practice in the upcoming years. Environmentalists and 
company managers feared that the transition period would take at least another two 
years before the new forest code could operate. The introduction of the new forest 
code that was not perfectly consistent and lacked a considerable amount of supporting 
regulations and statutory acts resulted into legal uncertainty when two forest codes 
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were operating simultaneously. Since the reform was underfinanced and regional 
authorities often lacked competent staff capable to implement all changes prescribed 
by the reform, they were unable to quickly and effectively design regional forest plans 
and other required regulations and norms to make the new forest code fully 
operational. The federal government itself was long behind the schedule with 
transferring the functions and developing supporting regulations at the federal level. 
The question is then how companies, environmentalists and auditors dealt with this 
legal uncertainty when certifying companies or inspecting their compliance after 
certification. 
The Restrictive Effect of the FSC Compliance Assessment System and 
its Market Nature 
Currently, seven certification organizations, or certifiers, are active on the 
Russian market for certification services (see Table 9), with three companies 
occupying a large share of the market (NEPCon (SmartWood), GFA Consulting and 
OOO Forest Certification). Only organizations accredited by FSC can offer 
certification services and issue certifications. FSC grants accreditation after FSC’ 
affiliate, the Accreditation Services International (ASI), assesses compliance of 
certification organizations with FSC standard for certifiers. Certification organizations 
are entitled to decide to what extent forest operations comply with forest management 
standards and issue FSC certificates without an FSC authorization. Because of that 
and since certification organizations and their assessment teams enjoy discretion in 
interpreting standards and on-the-ground practices, certifiers are often suspected of 
abusing discretion and issuing certificates for companies that do not perform in 
compliance with FSC standards. A report by Councell and Loraas (2002) provides 
some evidence of this. 
FSC has developed a set of internal procedures aimed at preventing certifiers’ 
errors and misuse of their power, including annual assessments of certifers’ 
performance, peer reviews of assessment reports and spontaneous so-called short-
notice assessments on the spot. Ultimately, FSC can temporarily withdraw or 
terminate accreditation. In 2008, FSC actually terminated the accreditation one of the 
Russian certification bodies – EuroPartner – for failing to fulfill its obligations before 
its clients and the FSC. Yet, the question is whether these procedures effectively 
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ensure a proper quality of compliance assessment and how the competition between 
certifiers affects it. 
Table 9: Certification Bodies Operating in Russia 
1. SGS Qualifor (forest certification division of the Switzerland-based SGS) 
2. EuroPartner (Russia, accreditation terminated in August 2008) 
3. NEPCon (representing the Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood forest certification program, 
U.S.A., in Europe) 
4. GFA Terra Systems (Germany) 
5. Soil Association (UK) 
6. Control Union (the Netherlands) 
7. OOO Forest Certification (Russia) 
 
This system, however, can only work if the FSC and ASI have enough capacity to 
monitor and control certification bodies’ performance. However, representatives of 
many environmental organizations almost unanimously complained that with the 
rapid expansion of certified areas and quickly growing number of certified companies, 
it became extremely difficult for them to monitor the performance of individual 
companies, auditors and certifiers and meaningfully participate in the process of forest 
certification as stakeholders representing environmental and social interests 
(interviews 12, 13, 15, 30 and 34). Unlike companies and certification bodies, the 
majority of environmental organizations does not financially benefit from forest 
certification and have to put their own, often very limited resources in monitoring 
certification. In this aspect, the problem of the quality, therefore, focuses not on the 
quality of the actual performance of the certifiers or producers but on the limited 
capacity of the FSC and environmental organizations to monitor and control 
certification and, therefore, make credible claims about the reliability of the program. 
Environmentalists and forestry experts reported that they continuously 
observed the decreasing quality of forest certification after its start in Russia around 
2003. They claim that certifiers and auditors did not always properly assessed 
companies’ systems and practices of forest management; that their own capacities to 
control and monitor certification bodies and forest operations decreased compared to 
the growth rate of certified areas; and that the FSC’s requirements indeed set a very 
high forest standard and yet remain formal and overly open to interpretation. They 
almost unanimously admit that the decreasing quality of forest certification caused 
serious concern among environmental stakeholders. The Russian office of the FSC 
also acknowledges the problem (interview 14). At the meeting with certification 
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bodies in April 2007, the FSC Russia reported that only eight of forty certified 
companies improved their forest management or already had a very high level of 
forest management. Four companies did not show any improvement. The rest were 
classified as companies that insufficiently improved their forest management (or had 
been certified for less than two years and couldn’t have been properly evaluated).25  
Experts involved in forest certification admit that certification bodies lacked 
experienced professional auditors and well-trained experts in forest ecology, social 
issues and worker rights that would be able to properly assess producers’ compliance 
with the standards (interview 34). They are concerned that international auditors that 
certification bodies hire to audit Russian companies with national legislation, 
economic and social context and habitual practices and are, therefore, cannot properly 
assess companies in Russia. In contrast, Russian experts that have local knowledge do 
not have international experience and lack extensive training, knowledge and skills 
that auditors should possess to successfully audit companies (interviews 25 and 35). 
Unlike certification bodies that have to be accredited to perform certification 
assessments, auditors and experts are not accredited by the FSC. The FSC, therefore, 
does not have any direct mechanism to control auditors working for certification 
bodies. While the FSC planned to create a common training system and a register of 
trained auditors, this plan was realized (interview 14). 
Moreover, environmentalists and forestry experts were disturbed by the rapid 
expansion of certified forests and growing competitive pressures that drove the quality 
of forest certification down. Certification bodies calculated the cost of certification on 
the basis of the area to be certified, auditors’ honoraria, the number of auditors in an 
assessment team and the number of days that the assessment takes. To minimize costs 
and attract more clients, certifiers had to decrease the amount of auditors and experts 
in assessment teams and the amount of days for each assessment. Experts observed 
that initially up to ten auditors and experts attended each assessment and that this 
number gradually decreased to two or three people, while the amount of work that 
auditors had to do continuously increased. Each auditor had increasingly more clients. 
Many clients had considerable areas to assess and monitor, up to two million 
                                                 
25
 “Main Outcomes of the FSC National Office in Russia in 2006”, presentation by the director of the 
FSC National Office in Russia at the annual meeting of certification bodies operating in Russia in 
Moscow, April 2007. Document on file with the author. 
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hectares. 26  Furthermore, over time the FSC’s standards and procedures were 
continuously revised and became increasingly more complex and formalized. 
Following and observing them was a challenge for many auditors (interviews 12, 13, 
14 and 19). These factors influenced the performance of auditors and made it hard for 
many auditors to cope with their responsibilities. One Greenpeace activist describes 
the situation in the following way: 
The auditor comes to the forest management unit. And he already has ten of those. And 
he has to monitor each of them, he has to follow corrective action requests, deal with the 
correspondence, follow the implementation of the requirements and so on. … And he has 
another ten applications. So he starts to hurry-scurry. He has ten thousand hectares to 
assess in two days. He quickly collects materials, does not have time for personal 
interviews and then he leaves. And then here is the certificate. This is the decreasing 
quality (interview 13). 
The leading auditor and the director of the one of the certification bodies in Russia 
explained it in the following way:  
The problem is that we now have more certification bodies in Russia. … On the one hand, 
competition is good. But on the other hand, it is bad, since the price goes down. The 
price depends on the amount of people [in an assessment team]. This is why the quality is 
going down. … We are trying [to maintain the quality] but we have lost several tenders 
lately because of that. …Here is a company in Siberia, 1.5 million hectares. We offered 
to assess it with three people in five days. And I think it’s not enough. We calculated the 
budget using our profit rate, which is close to zero, but we lost. This means that someone 
offered even a lower price. The quality is decreasing. That’s for sure, I can tell you 
(interview 19).  
Indeed, Greenpeace and WWF activists working with forest certification, as well as 
the head of the FSC office in Russia suggested that certifiers active in Russia have 
performed very differently. While some certifiers developed more stringent and 
prescriptive standards and practiced a more strict approach, others used lax standards 
and were more lenient towards poorly performing companies (interviews 12 and 14). 
Some auditors were suspected of systematic deliberate violations of the FSC’s 
standards and auditing rules. These differences were, however, masked by a common 
accreditation status that did not allow recognizing better performing certifiers.  
                                                 
26
 Two million hectares are equal to twenty thousand square kilometers. For example, the area of 
Belgium is 30528 square kilometers.   
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At the meeting of the forest certification experts and certification bodies’ 
representatives in April 2007, the representatives of the FSC Russia and the ASI 
identified a number of issues that the FSC office for Russia, national initiative and 
environmental and social stakeholders found problematic. These issues ranged from 
improper assessment of compliance with the FSC standards, low qualification of 
auditors and inadequate interpretation of standards to unfair competition. Inadequate 
assessment of forestry aspects related to high conservation value forests, biodiversity 
maintenance, environmentally justified logging techniques and sustainability of 
forestry were recognized as the most typical auditors’ mistakes. The ASI’s 
representative drew attention to the systematic inadequate assessment of compliance 
with principles four (worker and community rights and wellbeing), six (reduction of 
environmental impact on forests), seven (forest management planning), eight 
(monitoring and assessment of forest management impact) and nine (high 
conservation value forests).27 
In 2006, the conflict between one of the most experienced auditors and an 
environmental organizations in Komi, the Silver Taiga Foundation, broke out. The 
Silver Taiga Foundation accused the auditor of systematic and deliberate 
misinterpretation of the FSC standards and of non-compliance with the FSC rules for 
accredited certifiers. In response, the auditor accused the Silver Taiga Foundation in 
lobbying of the interests of another certifier that they used to work with the Silver 
Taiga Foundation. The conflict soon turned into a public scandal and threatened to 
damage the reputation of the FSC’s program in Russia. Environmental organizations 
and the FSC office in Russia supported the Silver Taiga Foundation in the conflict. 
The ASI arranged a special inspection of the certifier’s performance and confirmed 
serious violations of the FSC auditing procedures by the auditor and non-compliance 
of companies he certified (interview 30). As a result, at least two companies certified 
after the assessment of this auditor ran into serious difficulties with environmental 
organizations and the FSC. The certificate of one of those two was temporarily 
suspended. Although this conflict was described as an exception, environmental and 
                                                 
27
 “ASI Auditing and Russia”, presentation by an ASI representative at the annual meeting of 
certification bodies operating in Russia in Moscow, April 2007. Document on file with the author 
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social stakeholders warned that many auditors inadequately assessed and certified 
companies. 
Beside the poor performance of auditors that environmentalists, the FSC and 
ASI observed that the capacities of environmental and social stakeholders to monitor 
and control forest certification decreased. First, monitoring and control of forest 
certification is not a primary task of environmental organizations. For instance, WWF 
that had been the most active supporter and advocate of forest certification worldwide 
concentrates on the protection and conservation of biodiversity in two hundred most 
critical regions that WWF identified as such. Sixteen of these regions are located in 
Russia, including the Arkhangelsk federal region, the Far East and East Siberia. 
Although WWF Russia was expected to work primarily in these regions, it also 
assisted environmental organizations and companies in other regions. WWF 
International did not always approve such assistance. WWF had to focus on its target 
areas giving less attention to others (interview 12). Second, the resources and 
capacities of environmental organizations were quite limited. They were unable to 
monitor all certifications. The director of the WWF Russia’s forest program said: 
We took care of the first certified companies as if they were our children. We very closely 
watched them. At that time there were four organizations that did it: WWF, Greenpeace, 
the Social-Ecological Union and the Biodiversity Conservation Center. And as the 
certification expanded in Russia, these organizations, including us, lost the physical 
capacity to keep the track of each certification (interview 12). 
Environmental activists from other organizations also expressed similar concerns and 
claimed that with the considerable expansion of forest certification they became 
unable to monitor auditors, certification bodies and producers.  
I mean before we only had three certified companies and we could control them. We 
could come and see what was happening here and there. And now don’t even hope we 
could do this. We don’t have our own money. We only have grants. … And you know the 
result is that forest certification flows and control is weak. Only the most odious cases 
are detected (interview 13).  
The activist from the Silver Taiga Foundation claims that the role of external 
observers also changed. Initially, observers were able to take part in all assessments. 
Over time, fewer observers were able to monitor assessments. In the end, independent 
observers were required to obtain a permission from both certification bodies and 
companies to be assessed:  
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We notice that observers were always present at the first assessments in Russia, while 
today the very presence of observers and potential candidates has to be approved by both 
certifiers and certified companies. If it is approved they like to say: good, now you find 
your own transportation and accommodation. We have just been in Visinga but we you 
go just fifty kilometers further – where are observers going to stay? There is nowhere to 
stay and observers don’t come. … So the formally open system becomes closed (interview 
34).28 
He also claimed that the attitude of auditors to the comments of the reviewers and 
observers changed. After assessments auditors had to write reports that were reviewed 
by independent experts not involved in the assessment a specific company (to avoid 
the conflict of interests). He reported that “earlier if a reviewer wrote something it had 
to be implemented by an auditor. Today auditors may write anything that is not even 
convincing and ignore comments. Reviewers’ comments had been taken more 
seriously” (interview 34). 
To sum up, although environmental and social stakeholders generally 
supported the idea of forest certification as a mechanism that helped reward producers 
managing their forests well, they also emphasized that the performance of 
certification bodies and auditors was not always satisfactory and that the quality of 
forest certification has been going down. They explained this tendency as a result of 
competitive pressures on certifiers, rapidly growing certified areas, inadequate 
qualification of auditors and the lack of proper monitoring and control of certifiers by 
the FSC and stakeholders. It was in a way ironic that the competition among certifiers 
in a relatively competitive market for certification services weakened the 
effectiveness forest certification as a market-based instrument to identify and reward 
companies that manage their forests and supply chain responsibly. To remain in the 
market, certifiers were forced to reduce the cost of certification by decreasing the 
number of days allocated for an assessment or amount of people in assessment teams, 
which affected assessment quality thus undermining forest certification impact. 
Challenged by the ever growing amount of work they had to do for their clients, 
auditors were unable to maintain or improve their performance. Coupled with the lack 
of well-trained experienced auditors and insufficient monitoring and control by the 
                                                 
28
 Visinga is a village in the Republic of Komi located eighty-eight kilometers south of the Republic’s 
capital city Syktyvkar.  
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FSC, ASI and stakeholders, these factors have led to the decreasing quality of forest 
certification and auditor performance.  
In addition, a number of environmentalists claimed that the FSC’s standards 
and procedures and the FSC’s global policies contributed to the decreasing or limited 
effectiveness of forest certification. Forestry experts suggested that because the 
standards were generic and universal, i.e., applicable for all countries and all types of 
forests, its requirements provided guidance but did not guarantee that forest 
management would be sustainable if they are applied (interviews 35 and 15). The 
head of the Pskov Model Forests describes how this applied to the economic aspects 
of forest management in the following way:  
… What is important for us is that forest management plan has to be economically 
justified and balanced. It has to be comprehensible, predictable and more of an 
economic instrument. Actually, the FSC does not require it. The FSC standard says that 
companies should have a plan but having a plan is not enough to make forest 
management sustainable. On the one hand, I can understand it. It [the standard] has to 
be implemented in all cases in all countries and the FSC can’t formulate stricter 
requirements. But from my perspective, it is a great weakness of the FSC system 
(interview 35). 
A number of environmental experts also emphasized that in general the FSC’s 
standards, procedures and requirements could be very broadly interpreted and 
companies and certifiers often opted to implement only minimal changes that would 
yet allow them to remain within the FSC’s rules. Environmentalists, however, thought 
that although legitimate, this limited the ability of forest certification to significantly 
improve forest management in Russia. Greenpeace leading forestry expert and activist 
claimed the following:  
Nonetheless, the very fact of the FSC certification (of a company) does not mean that the 
forests are managed properly, in a strict compliance with international principles and 
criteria because they can be understood differently. They are vague. But also because 
auditors do not always strictly assess compliance (…) I mean any unspecific 
formulation … provides a diapason of potential measures and producers do not what is 
somewhere in the middle of the diapason but the minimum that creates the least problems 
for producers. … So are the FSC’s standards: You can’t definitely say that their 
implementation in practice results into that forest management becomes what you want it 
to be, i.e., proper, sustainable and so on. If you follow the spirit of the principles and 
criteria, then yes. But if you follow their letter and at the very minimal level, then no. Our 
people follow the letter of the principles and criteria at the most minimal level. I mean 
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whatever does not have to be done or whatever is inconvenient to do won’t be done. Most 
often so (interview 15).  
In general, forestry and environmental experts agreed that forest certification could be 
used as tool to encourage and reward producers to improve their practices. Yet, they 
also emphasized that structural features of the FSC’s standards and procedures, such 
as indeterminacy of standards and auditing procedures, limited the ability of the FSC 
and its supporters to significantly improve forest management practices in certified 
companies. Growing competitive market pressures on certifiers, rapidly growing 
certifier areas and low qualification of auditors had also contributed to the lowering 
quality of forest certification and limited its potential impact, at least from the 
perspective of the influential environmental stakeholders, including WWF Russia and 
Greenpeace Russia.  
In response to the growing concerns of environmental and social stakeholders 
with the decreasing control over certifiers’ and producers’ performance, the FSC and 
its accreditation unit ASI designated resources and developed a set of measures aimed 
at strengthening monitoring and control in the certification program. In 2007-2008, 
the ASI started practicing spontaneous field audits, also called short notice audits. 
Short notice audits complemented annual surveillance field audits of certification 
bodies’ performance and were intended to evaluate certifiers and producers on a short 
notice without much time for preparations. For example, in 2007 the ASI conducted 
fourteen short notice assessments in China where the situation with forest certification 
became challenging from the perspective of environmental organizations. The ASI 
also included Russia into so called high visibility regions and planed to organize 
additional short notice audits to address the problem of certifiers’ and producers’ 
performance (ASI Annual Activity Report 2007, document on file with the author)  
The FSC and ASI also organized a number of meetings in Bonn where the 
FSC international center is located and in major forest regions of the world to discuss 
the most challenging issues in the development of the FSC forest certification 
program around the world, including a meeting between certification bodies and 
major environmental organizations. These meetings resulted in a set of agreements 
and recommendations addressing the problem of credibility that environmental 
organizations raised. The ASI in cooperation with national initiatives also organized a 
number of training courses aimed at improving qualification of auditors and fostering 
the development of national indicators for the FSC’s generic principle and criteria. 
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The FSC also improved its dispute resolution mechanism and currently reforms its 
financial and administrative system to increase financial resource inflow and improve 
its standard-setting and accreditation services. The FSC also intensified its efforts in 
developing and providing guidance to certifiers, companies and stakeholders how to 
interpret and implement the FSC’s standards and criteria.  
In Russia, the FSC national office together with the national working group, 
the ASI and environmental organizations organized a series of meetings and training 
courses for auditors and stakeholders. In August 2007, the FSC Russia organized a 
two-day training seminar for certifiers and auditors addressing the most problematic 
aspects of forest certification: high conservation value forests, new forest legislation, 
social aspects of forest certification and environmentally appropriate forest planning 
and management. These seminars aimed at improving the qualification of auditors and 
providing guidance to certification bodies and their auditors on the interpretation of 
standards and, therefore, the harmonization of certifiers’ diverging approaches to 
certification. Although these measures indicate that the FSC took seriously the 
credibility issues and other challenges raised by stakeholders, it is yet too early to 
claim what actual effects these measures have had on certifiers’ and certified 
producers’ performance and effectiveness of the FSC’s forest certification program.  
To sum up, the description of the development of forest certification in Russia 
presented in this section shows that while forest certification successfully took off in 
Russia in the beginning of the 2000s and quickly gained support of the largest forest 
companies, its local effects were mixed. Environmental organizations and all parties 
involved in forest certification went through a significant learning curve and 
accumulated new knowledge and experience. Companies were able to secure their 
position in the international markets, improve their reputation and access skills and 
knowledge of forestry scholars and environmental organizations. Companies 
improved compliance with national regulations and started to protect better 
biodiversity and rare species during and after logging and to conserve important forest 
ecosystems. They improved workers’ safety and established cooperation with local 
communities and indigenous people. 
Yet, environmental activists reported that the majority of companies remained 
at the lowest margin of change and that certification bodies performed at best 
moderately. The improvement of the actual company performance was only limited. 
The contradictions between national regulations and FSC requirements complicated 
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the assessment of compliance. The competition between certification bodies drove the 
quality of forest certification down. Due to the program’s quick expansion, 
environmental organizations were no longer able to monitor and control the 
performance of certified companies and certification bodies. The FSC had to respond 
by introducing additional control measures, on the one hand, and by organizing 
capacity-building trainings for auditors and companies, on the other hand. The FSC 
indicated to auditors and certification bodies that the issues of high conservation value 
forests, the impact of operations on the condition of forests, forest management 
planning and worker safety should receive more attention and be better controlled. In 
other words, the translation of standards into practices in a domestic context proved to 
be selective and lagging behind the adoption of standards. 
In the final section of this chapter I review how this was possible in the 
certification systems, in which companies were expected to become certified only 
after they met all standard’s requirements. I show that actors who translated the 
standards were able to use the discretion given to them in the system to match the 
difficult domestic context with abstract standards during the development of national 
standards and actual auditing of companies.  
7.5 Bringing Together Standards and Practices 
The translation, of the FSC’s generic standards occurred through two intersecting 
processes. One is the translation of global principles into the national standard for 
Russia that specified broad principles and criteria into specific local indicators. The 
second one is the actual interpretation of standards in the course of assessments of 
forest management and the implementation of standards. Through the overlapping 
networks and well organized communication channels, standard-makers and auditors 
were able to share experience and provide feedback to each other and thereby create 
common understandings what complying with the FSC’s principles, criteria and 
indicators meant in practice. 
As a result, the national standards became more concrete, on the one hand, and 
more realistic and pragmatic, on the other hand. They contained a list of concrete, 
specific indicators that defined the expectations of both auditors and companies. At 
the same time, through extensive consultations with auditors, companies and 
stakeholders and through practical experience with the certification of companies, 
7 The Effects of Forest Certification 
 
223 
standard-makers were able to formulate principles, criteria and indicators that 
matched the actual skills and available resources that companies seeking certification 
possessed, as well as pre-existing social rules and mechanisms that regulated forestry 
practices before forest certification became operational in Russia. It significantly 
facilitated the expansion of the FSC’s forest certification in Russia. 
Initially, the standard consisted of broad principles of sustainable forest 
management in Russia. Very specific, concrete requirements – indicators – of what a 
company actually had to do to comply with the standard were missing. One of the 
reasons for this was that the first standards were designed before actual assessments 
took place in Russia. Designers lacked experience in certification and were unable to 
design functional standards that would be specific enough to provide companies and 
auditors with guidance what to do and what to look for. As companies and 
environmental organizations started experimenting with certifications in the early 
2000s, the standard-makers were able to accumulate experience and test their 
standards. They participated as auditors, experts or observers and helped make the 
later versions of the standards more concrete:  
They [the standards] became more concrete in a sense that at first we could write that 
rare species should be protected. … But the question that companies immediately asked 
was: What am I supposed to do? Should the rare flower that I found in the forest be 
protected? Am I supposed to leave it there? What happens if I break it? … And we had to 
specify what concrete steps a company should take. We had to define what species are 
rare, what populations should be protected and how they should be protected (interview 
25). 
Yet, the indeterminacy of standards could not be eliminated entirely. Even the most 
comprehensive standards could not cover all unique situations that might emerge in 
the real life. It could not include a complete list of rare species because it has to be 
region- or ecosystem-specific. Forests ecosystems are fragile. Forests are extremely 
diverse. Human knowledge about forests in general and about specific forest types 
and areas is limited. Standards, therefore, could only provide guidance but they could 
not precisely prescribe, for instance, how many trees exactly should be left on a 
logging site after harvesting. With these considerations in mind, standard-makers 
created a framework standard for Russia that 
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“… does not prescribe how many trees should be left at the site after clearcutting 
because it depends not only on the region but also on the type of forest. And this would 
be impudent of someone to say he knows it. This is why we developed a framework 
standard” (interview 25). 
 
It was the auditors who decide whether in a specific context, in which a specific 
company operates, its forest management practices were in compliance with relatively 
vague requirements of the standards. 
Auditors also often perceive standards as guidance rather than as a strict 
prescription of what companies should do or should have done to qualify for a 
certificate: “Certification is a process of moving in the right direction” (interview 6). 
They frame certification not as an outcome but as the beginning of the forest 
management reform. Together with assessing company’s compliance with the 
standards, auditors often evaluate companies’ performance against their intentions, 
attitudes towards certification and progress that companies demonstrates over time to 
comply with the standards. Auditors also evaluate the progress and in general 
companies’ practices against the unfavorable and uncertain context, in which they 
operate. They may take into account the inability of a company to comply with a 
certain requirement under the circumstances that it cannot control, including 
contradictions of the FSC standards with the Russian legislation. They may encourage 
companies to convince local forest service to consider making an exception for 
certified companies but essentially they do not perceive this kind of non-compliance 
as an obstacle to certification. 
It happens sometimes that after we did not find a first-aid kit in one place it is already at 
the next site. A manager comes to this next site before us and puts it there. Auditors see it. 
It is obvious. It is not there to help someone in case of an accident but to show it to 
auditors. … But it also happens that we see that people actually work [to achieve 
certification]. We do not expect them to do everything perfectly. But we see that they are 
trying to act as international standards prescribe. … When we see these positive 
developments, we realize that the system works (interview 6). 
The citation suggests that what counts is the effort and intentions of forest companies 
to achieve compliance. This does not mean that auditors can certify any company 
regardless of its performance. This company should prove that it operates legally, that 
its forest operations do not devastate the forests and that it genuinely committed itself 
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to responsible forest management. Yet, it does not have to be a perfect compliance to 
achieve certification. 
Auditors report that they rely on their reason and commons sense to make 
judgments on the compliance of forest companies. If they realize that companies are 
unable to change certain practices because they were obliged to it by law, for example 
to remove key biotopes during logging, they are likely to make exceptions for these 
companies. 
We have decent environmental protection legislation but it does not work on the ground, 
in the forest. We have environmental protection laws and official registers of endangered 
species. But who enforces them? Who is responsible for it in the country? No one. … So 
we require it from forest companies. But they know nothing about it. Objectively. And it 
is not their task. But they have to do it. … This is why this situation exists and forest 
companies are not the ones to solve it. We can’t require the impossible from them. So we 
use our common sense to make a decision (interview 25). 
Auditors in this situation become responsible for controlling the improvement of 
companies over time: 
He [an auditor] sees that a company should have a certain document, for example a 
forest management plan. But it cannot develop it before certain governmental 
regulations are in place. … The auditor has to issue a corrective action request but if a 
company does everything right without this plan the auditor cannot suspend the 
certificate. If there are no governmental regulations, the auditor has to control for it 
(interview 14). 
The question is, however, what is the basis of the auditor’s control in the situation 
described in the citation? It can only be auditor’s subjective judgment, how ever well 
informed, because he also lacks any documents or guidelines for the same reason: 
there is no forest management plan and there are no federal or local regulations in 
place. 
In some cases the FSC’s requirements may turn out to contradict each other. 
Here, auditors again are in the position to judge which requirements would be more 
important in a specific context. The FSC’s requires that intact forests should be 
preserved and carefully protected. In Russia, a number of large tracts of forests have 
remained intact but the livelihoods of the local population in the nearby forest 
settlements depend on logging operations in these forests. Although the makers of the 
Russian standards carefully specified what companies should do with these forests, it 
is ultimately the auditors who decide whether what a company does is in compliance 
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with the FSC standards and which standards – environmental or social – are more 
important in this case.  
Certainly, this discretion that the system gives to auditors when they audit 
forest management of companies is not unlimited. It is restricted by the FSC’s rules 
and control mechanisms, including annual assessments of certification body 
performance, required peer reviews and dispute resolution mechanisms. Nonetheless, 
while remaining within the FSC’s rules, auditors are able to maneuver and avoid 
obstacles that could have otherwise slowed down the process of certification. Auditors 
do not expect companies to radically reform their forest practices over a short period 
of time before a certificate can be issued. Rather, certification bodies grant certificates 
provided that companies demonstrate a reasonable progress towards better forest 
management over time measured against the difficult context, in which companies 
operate. 
The FSC systems of CARs to a certain degree institutionalized such a stepwise 
approach to forest certification. Companies do not have to fulfill all requirements that 
the FSC’s standards prescribes. When auditors detect non-compliance with the 
standards they issue major and minor CARs. If companies have major CARs 
outstanding they cannot receive certificates. Companies are required to develop a 
corrective action plan and specify measures they intend to implement to meet the 
requirements. If auditors find the plan satisfactory they issue a certificate and control 
the implementation of the plan – and the correction of minor corrective action 
requests – during annual audits. The system of corrective action requests that the FSC 
has developed enables companies to be certified before they can actually meet all 
requirements of the FSC forest certification system.  
Informally, however, many of those involved in forest certification in Russia 
admit that auditors that assess corporate forest management systems and practices 
often manipulate minor and major corrective action requests and too easily redefine 
major corrective action requests into minor to make sure companies will receive 
certificates. Some even claim that not even a single company in Russia should have 
been ever granted a certificate (interview 47). Auditors that assess companies tolerate 
non-compliance and often certify basically “good intentions” instead of actual 
compliance. Although formally certificate can only be issued for actual performance 
and, therefore, compliance, the accreditation unit of the FSC and Russian national 
initiative accept that the early certification is crucial to motivate companies to 
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gradually improve their forestry practices over time provided that auditors actually 
monitor the improvement:  
Companies that wanted a certificate and got it in advance – and the FSC actually 
permits certifying good intentions – have to confirm that they improve within next few 
years but if they cannot they lose their certificates. … I expect that some companies will 
lose their certificates. And this is inevitable (interview 25). 
Whether this is actually going to happen is an open question. Between 2000 and 2008, 
only few certificates were suspended. 
The ambiguity of standards and auditing procedures and the stepwise approach 
favored by the FSC and its supporters helped auditors to certify companies before 
they could actually perform according to the highest aspirations of the FSC forest 
certification system. FSC supporters, auditors and companies were able create the 
requirements that would be, on the one hand, specific enough to be implemented by 
companies and checked by auditors and, on the other hand, compatible with the 
capacities for the implementation of the FSC’s standards the companies actually 
possessed.  
7.6 Discussion 
The discussion of the impact and effectiveness of the FSC in Russia should begin with 
a question how effective a private voluntary instrument without strong sanctioning 
mechanisms can be in general. Does it make sense to discuss its effectiveness and the 
factors facilitating or impeding it at the local level? The recent studies of the 
effectiveness of forest certification have shown that its macro-effectiveness has not 
been particularly significant. Marx and Cuypers (2010) show that forest certification 
so far has not contributed to halting deforestation rates. Gullison (2003) and 
Rametstein and Simula (2003) argue that while generating some positive impact on 
individual forest operations practices, forest certification does not improve 
biodiversity protection at the macro-level and forest management at the landscape 
level. Indeed, it is hard to expect that forest certification is likely to stop deforestation 
worldwide if so far approximately 20% of the world’s managed forests, or 7% of the 
world’s total forests, have been certified – not only by the FSC but all existing 
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certification programs (FAO 2007: 94). 29  Moreover, the majority of the certified 
forests – and approximately 81% of the FSC certified forests – are located in North 
America and Europe, Canada and Russia being the leaders of the FSC certification 
(FSC 2011: 2). From this perspective, the selective adoption of forest certification, 
mainly by companies in countries where deforestation is not a major problem, 
undermines the effectiveness of forest certification at the macro-level and is 
undoubtedly more important that any implementation-related problems I discuss in 
the last sections of this chapter. 
Yet, it is not certain how these impacts should be evaluated. The effects of 
forest certification on deforestation, biodiversity conservation and landscape-level 
management may be slow-moving but could potentially turn out to be long-term – this 
makes their evaluation as ineffective less certain (Bartley 2010a: 15). The existing 
data does allow predicting with certainty the long-term impact of forest certification at 
the macro-level. Ultimately, forest certification continues to grow rapidly, whereas the 
FSC develops projects aimed at integrating tropical forestry and in particular small-
scale and community forest enterprises (Macqueen 2008).  
Moreover, such an approach does not capture the positive (and negative) 
effects that forest certification induces at the local level. At the same time, the study 
by Newsom and Hewitt (2005) suggests that almost every company regardless of its 
location in the world has to improve one or more aspects of its forest management 
system and practice in order to become certified. In addition, this approach does not 
capture unintended consequences of forest certification, such as the mitigation of local 
conflicts, the diffusion of a multi-dimensional conception of forest management, 
ratcheting up of certification standards and the establishment of forest certification as 
a multi-stakeholder organizational model for similar programs in other environmental 
issue-domains, including palm oil, responsible soy certification, fisheries certification 
programs (Auld, Gulbrandsen and McDermott 2008; Gulbrandsen 2005a; Overdevest 
2010; Pattberg 2006; Rametsteiner and Simula 2003). 
Following this perspective, I identify in this chapter the impact of forest 
certification on forest management at the local level. I show that forest certification 
                                                 
29
 The share of the FSC is around 45% (own calculations based on the information of the FSC (source: 
www.fsc.org) and the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes, the FSC major 
rival (source: www.pefc.org). Websites were accessed on April 28, 2011. 
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had a positive impact on on-the-ground practices in environmental and social areas. 
Positive effects include better biodiversity protection measures on logging sites, better 
protection for high conservation value forests and specifically old-growth forests and 
improvements in occupational health and safety. It has also improved the relationship 
of companies with local and indigenous peoples’ communities. Moreover, the data 
presented in this chapter suggests that forest certification empowers groups that were 
previously ignored by influential forest companies and whose rights have not been 
recognized before. For example, forest certification serves as leverage for the Pomors 
who are not recognized as an indigenous people by the federal government and use 
forest certification to protect their right to practice traditional forest use. Taking the 
data presented in the previous chapter, it can be also argued that forest certification 
helps create new local knowledge on responsible forest management based on global 
principles, criteria and concepts and spread it among different stakeholder groups, 
ranging from company managers to local communities (Bartley 2010a: 18).  
This chapter also shows that implementation does not follow one single 
pattern. Not all practices have to be reformed. Not all concepts are entirely new for 
local actors. Therefore, different patterns of implementation can be identified. If 
principles and criteria are clear and overlap with domestic regulations and existing 
practices, they can be directly implemented if necessary, even though the 
implementation may require redefining existing practices using the language of the 
standard (reframing). As local actors adapt and implement broad global principles, 
they can also creatively reinterpret and recombine global ideas and existing practices 
and – in the cases when no local elements are available – invent new practices. This 
chapter therefore emphasizes reflexive and creative character of implementation in 
contrast to approaches that tend to see it in mere technocratic terms. It also 
demonstrates that local actors can the context into which they are embedded as a 
resource for implementing alien ideas formulated in distant transnational forums.  
At the same time, the pictures shouldn’t get too harmonious. The context can 
also have a restrictive effect on the effectiveness of forest certification. I show the 
forest sector depends on the existing national forest regulatory system for reliable 
information on forest resources that has not been provided to companies because of 
underfunding of the federal and local forest service and forest inventory agencies. 
Moreover, certain domestic regulations took certain forest functions from companies 
and allocated them to forest service agencies. As a result, the requirements of forest 
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certification dealing with these functions cannot be fulfilled by companies. However, 
the discretion given by the FSC forest certification system to certification bodies and 
auditors, as well as an informal stepwise approach approved and tolerated by the 
majority of local actors, enables FSC auditors to close the implementation gaps. In 
addition, the competition among the certification bodies, the lack of skilled well-
trained auditors and the rapidly growing number of companies willing to certify their 
forest management also undermines the quality of the assessment audits conducted by 
certification bodies. 
To sum up this chapter, the central argument of the chapter is that forest 
certification has had a positive impact on forest management practices as well as a 
number of unintended indirect consequences but its impact was restricted by the 
domestic regulation and imperfect institutional context and by the limitations of the 
FSC’s market-based compliance assessment system.  
 
   
8  Conclusion 
This research intends to provide new insights into the operation and impact of new 
nonstate market-driven forms of governance, mainly social and environmental 
certification and labeling. It seeks to open up the black box of the implementation of 
transnational certification standards in local contexts, or in other words, the translation 
of transnational standards into specific on-the-ground practices, and to explicate the 
social processes that shape the outcomes of translation. It addresses the gap in the 
environmental and certification literature that has so far been paying little attention to 
what is happening with the transnational standards when they hit the ground. I have 
conceptualized the emergence, diffusion and implementation of certification and 
labeling programs as a process of active institution-building that occurs at two levels 
in transnational governance systems. At the transnational level, transnational 
standards are set and the organizational structures, procedural rules and enforcement 
mechanisms are constructed. The enactment and implementation of transnational 
standards occurs at the domestic level. In this thesis, I have analyzed the processes at 
both transnational and domestic level and evaluated the local impact and effectiveness 
of certification and labeling on the bases of an extended case-study of the emergence 
and operation of forest certification in Russia. In the concluding chapter, I would like 
to review the main results of my research and describe how it enriches the existing 
literature on transnational standards and certification and labeling.  
8.1 Summary of the Thesis Findings 
I begin my empirical analysis by examining the emergence of the FSC and 
forest certification. Following Bartley’s approach (2007b), I show that this process is 
driven by problem-solving and conflict-settlement efforts of transnational actors and 
is shaped by the context, into which actors are embedded, i.e., the neoliberal rules 
favoring free trade and non-discrimination in the market (Bartley 2003) and the 
political discourse of sustainable use and management of natural resources favoring 
multi-stakeholder participatory approaches and multiple functions and applications of 
natural resources (economic, environmental, social and cultural). The emergence of 
certification and labeling has also been strongly influenced by early naming and 
shaming campaigns across North America and Europe. Activists called on companies 
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and consumers to buy “good” wood and avoid “bad” wood. As a result, they also had 
to provide a system that would enable distinguish “good and “bad” wood, i.e., 
certification and labeling. 
I argue, however, that these attempts to harness markets through changing 
retailer and consumer behavior not only provided the first impetus to the emergence 
of forest certification but also shaped its organizational form and its standards. 
Therefore, I add to the literature on certification and labeling by identifying how the 
market nature of forest certification also affects the strategic choices of actors 
involved in the making of a new organization seeking to regulate environmental and 
social behavior of firms in the global forest sector. I show that the FSC supporters are 
exposed to the pressure caused by the growing demand of conventional market 
players, i.e., mainly large national and multinational forest companies in advanced 
industrial countries, for increasingly more certified wood from accessible sources 
providing enough timber for a mass production. The forest certification system was 
thus created in a way that it includes these sources - i.e., not only tropical, but also 
boreal and temperate forests in all regions of the world – as well as some controversial 
sources – e.g., plantations – that also provide significant amounts of wood for the 
global market. 
However, the main contribution of the thesis to the existing literature is the 
analysis of the translation of transnational forest certification standards into local on-
the-ground practices based on a detailed case-study of the Russian experience with 
forest certification. I assume that the local enactment of the certification program and 
the implementation of transnational certification standards is the second phase of the 
transnational institution-building, since institutions are effective when they are locally 
enacted and the rules that have been agreed upon in transnational forums are accepted, 
appropriated and blended into everyday practices by local implementing actors that 
are also embedded in their domestic context – institutional, social, political, legal, 
economic and cultural. It has to be noted here that although rule formulation and rule 
implementation are analytically different (Streeck and Thelen 2005), these two phases 
do not necessarily follow each other in a linear way. They may overlap, and feedback 
loop may emerge.  
It has to be noted here that a functionalistic view that equates the existence of 
an institution with the function it fulfills should be avoided. How effective an 
institution is in reaching its direct goal, e.g., solving or alleviating the problem that 
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has driven the emergence of an institution, is only one dimension of institutional 
effectiveness. It misses important side effects that may emerge even if an institution is 
not effective, including settling conflicts, creating  and redefining authority structures, 
redefining identities and learning (Pattberg 2006; Young 1999). Moreover, as the 
some analyses show, institutions (defined as regimes, i.e., set of legitimate rules and 
enforcement mechanisms (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 12-13)) may persist even if it is 
not effective (Böhling 2011). In the case of forest certification, effective local 
implementation of its certification standards was of a vital importance. Since this is a 
membership organization that depends critically on its stakeholders for its credibility 
and legitimacy, it had to make sure that it sets a high bar for forest companies that its 
stakeholders approve. The stakeholder and media critique of the FSC appearing from 
time to time shows that its performance is constantly monitored and the results are 
made public (Counsell and Terje Loraas 2002; Der Spiegel 2006; Wright and Carlton 
2007). In sum, institutional effectiveness is not the only factor that contributes to 
institutional persistence, but in the case of forest certification, effective 
implementation of global rules at the local level has been important.  
In addition, for local implementing actors, forest certification emerged as a 
tool for gaining access to and executing influence over companies’ management of 
their forests. It also enabled them to access external funding and draw attention to the 
environmental issues that were previously ignored by companies and local and 
national governments (i.e., old-growth forests and biodiversity protection). In order to 
make use of this tool, they had to make sure that it is applied properly. In turn, this 
does not mean that its effectiveness was perfect. As I show in Chapter 7.4, the 
effectiveness of forest certification at the local level has been limited by two factors: 
domestic forestry regulations and the market nature of the FSC’s compliance 
assessment system (see below).  
What is interesting and theoretically relevant in the study of translation of 
transnational standards into on-the-ground practices? Why is it worth looking at? The 
literature on the public policy implementation suggests that the process of 
implementation of rules in a domestic context and implementing actors play a crucial 
role in shaping the outcomes of implementation. Implementation is not a mere top-
down execution of rules – e.g., orders, laws, directives or standards – whereas 
implementing actors are not passive recipients of orders (Treib 2006). The vast 
literature on public policy implementation (Pülzl and Treib 2007) and the 
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organizational literature on diffusion (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996; Sahlin-
Andersson 1996) suggests that when ideas, e.g., rules, organizational elements or 
practices, travel across settings, borders or levels in multi-level governance systems, 
they are edited and adapted to the local conditions by local actors (Campbell 2004: 
79-80; Schneiberg and Bartley 2008: 49-50). The interactions between actors and 
between actors, their context and transnational ideas shaped the outcomes of 
translation that cannot be taken for granted or seen as automatically following the 
initial rules. However, the literature on certification and labeling has so far paid little 
attention to the implementation and its specific dynamics and patterns and has focused 
mainly to on the emergence of certification and labeling and certification standard-
setting. 
Transnational voluntary standards are particularly interesting from this 
perspective, since they present a significant challenge for those who implement them 
and for those who enforce them. Like any standards, they are a specific type of rules. 
Rules represent collectively enforced expectations that prescribe or provide guidance 
for action and thereby make behavior predictable. Similar to formal authoritative rules 
(e.g., laws and directives) and in contrast to informal rules (e.g., social norms), 
standards explicitly describe desirable behavior or desirable characteristics of an 
object (e.g., a forest or a production site) or a process (e.g., a production process) 
(Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000).30 In contrast, practices are defined as specific ways in 
which production and work are done (Perez-Aleman 2011: 174). 
Transnational standards per se are based on broad and relatively vague 
principles commonly applicable to all types of enterprises in all regions of the world 
and do not specify explicitly and exactly what practices are in compliance with the 
standards. Moreover, as the recent studies in the anthropology of international law 
suggest (Levitt and Merry 2009; Merry 2006a; Merry 2006b), transnational standards 
may contain concepts and requirements unfamiliar to local implementing actors and 
making no sense to them. They may find it difficult to establish exactly how they 
should reform their practice in order to comply with alien requirements that have been 
                                                 
30
 At the same time, standards are different from formal rules, since while describing desirable behavior 
they do not explicitly rule out undesirable behavior. Moreover, those who make standards do not rely 
on formal authority to make individuals or organizations observe rules but provide incentives for 
voluntary compliance, such as recognition, membership or distinction from those who do not follow 
standards (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000: 12-13). 
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formulated in distant transnational forums. Considerable gaps between global 
requirements and local practice – that follows legal norms and informal patterns – 
make such translation challenging. Therefore, when habitual practices are challenged 
and new standards are provided, implementing actors need to specify broad principles 
and adapt them to a particular domestic legal and social context and then establish 
how they should modify their practices and what new practices they should introduce.  
The second challenge is of a political nature. The socio-legal literature on 
transnational law (Halliday and Carruthers 2007; 2009) shows that the introduction of 
transnational standards, as well as rules in general, may challenge the preexisting 
structures of control and empower actors that try to question habitual practices and 
rules and introduce new ones. This may cause conflicts over the new standards and 
the ways they are expected to be implemented by implementing actors and enforced 
by enforcing actors. Transnational standards are voluntary and cannot therefore be 
imposed on firms directly. The advocates of new standards have to convince firms to 
adopt new rules, in this case certification standards. Moreover, even when advocates 
have enough influence to impose certain rules, implementing actors can undermine 
successful implementation (e.g., through delay). This requires active interest 
negotiation, settling conflicts and searching for a compromise. The ways local actors 
cope with the gaps and contradictions between global standards and local regulations 
and practices and “join in” with how standards are applied, as well as how they cope 
with emerging conflicts – in a difficult context of a non-advanced industrial country – 
is at the core of the part of the thesis that includes Chapters 5 to 7. 
I divide the process of implementation at the domestic level into two phases, 
which do not follow each other linearly and overlap in time but they can be 
analytically distinguished from each other and both contribute to the emergence of a 
working local forest certification system. First, several years before companies got 
interested in certifying their forest management, individual environmental activists 
and NGOs started promoting forest certification in Russia. They spread the 
information about the FSC and forest certification, persuaded companies to certify, 
they organized campaigns and published reports about the problems of the Russian 
forests and forest sector and framed forest certification as one of the solutions to it. 
They also developed the national standard and compliance guidelines for Russia, 
educated professional auditors and consultants for forest certification, mobilized 
broad support of forest certification among the environmental and social NGOs in 
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Russia and included forest certification into their projects. In other words, they were 
creating the organizational and institutional infrastructure that was required for a 
successful start of forest certification in Russia and its rapid expansion in 2003-2009. 
These activities occurred mainly in formal intentionally devised settings, such as 
official meetings, conferences and projects, and were better organized and structured.  
The development of the national standard and NGOs’ project work related to 
forest certification played a particularly important role. The National Initiative 
responsible for the development of the national standard served as a forum for settling 
conflicts between and within stakeholder groups and as a forum for discussing the 
contents of the FSC global principles and criteria and the ways they had to be applied 
in Russia. The NGOs’ projects, including model forests, also contributed to 
understanding how exactly the global standards should be applied in Russia. They 
created compliance guidance for companies, offered consulting serviced to companies 
and educated managers and auditors. They also monitored and controlled certification 
assessments and certified companies, pointed out the problems with compliance and 
joined in in cases of conflicts between companies and stakeholders. They thus 
engaged in local conflict settlement and compromise building, on the one hand, and 
local adaptation of standards that involved sense-making, standard (re-)interpretation 
and new knowledge and skill building.  
The second phase is the implementation of the FSC transnational standards of 
good forest management, or in other words, the translation of standards into on-the-
ground practices in implementation settings, i.e., companies. Companies’ operations 
managers had to implement transnational standards that often appeared alien to them 
on an everyday basis and often proceeded by trial and error experimenting with both 
the transnational standard and their common practices. The standards provided 
managers and external consultants with the targets, often vague and unspecific, but 
they did not specify how exactly compliance is achieved. It did not prescribe precisely 
what managers had to do exactly in order to comply with the FSC standard, 
particularly in the early 2000s when many compliance guidelines that are now widely 
used by managers and consultants had not been at place. Moreover, the contradictions 
between national regulations and transnational requirements presented a particular 
challenge for managers. They had to search for solutions to these contradictions that 
would enable to follow the standards without being subjected to sanctions by forestry 
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officials. In contrast to earlier more formal phase, on-the-ground translation was less 
structured and formal and more spontaneous and occurring on the spot.  
I also show that the translation of standards into practices follows different 
patterns ranging from direct implementation to the invention of new practices, 
depending on the difference between habitual forest management practices and the 
availability of locally available building blocks for practices in compliance with 
transnational standards.  
I complete my empirical analysis by analyzing the outcomes of 
implementation at the local level. I show in Chapter 7 that forest certification has 
indeed generated environmental and social effects, including better biodiversity 
protection on logging sites, better protection of high conservation value forests and 
particularly old-growth forests, improved cooperation between certified logging 
companies and local communities, as well as indigenous peoples communities, and 
improvements in worker safety. Yet, its effectiveness has been limited by two major 
factors: (1) the domestic regulations and unfavorable institutional context and (2) by 
the market nature of the FSC system and particularly of its compliance assessment 
system that had a restrictive effect on the FSC impact at the local level. In addition, 
inadequate qualifications of forest management auditors also decrease the quality of 
forest management assessment and also have a restrictive effect on the environmental 
and social change that forest certification could potentially induce.  
In the final section of Chapter 7, I address the question how local actors – 
particularly activists and auditors – close the gaps between the strict standards, 
difficult local situations and implementation and how they deal with the limited 
effectiveness of forest certification. I argue that through the process of translation of 
generic global principles of good forest management into specific domestic standards, 
including operational indicators adapted to a local natural and social context, and 
consequently into corporate environmental and social practices, local actors – NGOs 
and auditors – evaluate not only the forest management of companies seeking forest 
certification but also the natural and social context, in which they operate and 
informally adjust the requirements of forest management standards to the context. 
Two mechanisms enabled the creative translation of global norms into specific 
practices of certified companies. One was the inherent ambiguity of the FSC’s 
standards and a certain extent of discretion defined as a freedom of interpretation that 
auditors, certification bodies and stakeholders are given by the system. The second 
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mechanism was the informally institutionalized stepwise approach to forest 
certification. This means that auditors, companies, consultants and stakeholders might 
use the freedom of interpretation to match the conditions, in which companies operate, 
their resources and capacities for change and the standards of the FSC. Through the 
stepwise approach that the FSC formally did not recognize, auditors and stakeholders 
enabled certified companies to become certified, even when they did not entirely 
comply with all requirements of the standard. Ambiguous standards and stepwise 
approach to certification, therefore, also contribute to the rapid growth of certified 
areas but limit the extent of change that can be expected when all standard 
requirements are implemented. 
These processes were also reinforced by the voluntary and market-driven 
character of the certification system that I described in the paragraphs above. Since 
voluntary programs lack serious sanctioning mechanisms. The certificates may be 
withdrawn but forest certification auditors cannot stop companies from employing 
unsound forest management practices. Moreover, because of the strong competition, 
certification bodies are interested in certifying as many companies as possible. 
Coupled with limited resources that the FSC, ASI and domestic NGOs have for 
monitoring certifiers’ performance, this produces a negative effect on the quality of 
certification.  
This should not be interpreted as if the FSC had absolutely no control over the 
performance of auditors, stakeholders and companies. The FSC annually inspected the 
performance of certification bodies and reserved the right to inspect the performance 
of certified companies on short notice. It also has a complex accreditation system that 
helps it monitor and control the activity of certification bodies. It also provided 
guidance to certification bodies and stakeholders how to interpret standards and 
trained them in compliance assessment skills. Yet, since real-life situations were 
diverse and could not be fully reflected in standards and rules, local actors always 
retained some degree of discretion. The FSC’s monitoring and control capacities are 
also limited, since as a nongovernmental organization it lacks sustainable sources of 
funding. This means that it is unable to trace each case of certification and itself 
evaluate whether the decisions taken by auditors and certifiers were good enough 
grant assessed companies the certificates of the FSC. 
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8.2 Theoretical Implications of the Study of Translation 
What is the theoretical relevance of this research? There are several 
analytically important themes running through the thesis. First, my research explicates 
a relationship between human action, actors and their context, into which they are 
embedded. Second, whereas previous research has focused mainly on the structural 
factors shaping the uptake and effectiveness of transnational standards, my research 
emphasizes the importance of a specific kind of actors for the translation of rules into 
practices – translators – and their social skills and organizational capacities. Third, my 
study also seeks to deconstruct the process of implementation and identify the social 
processes it involves. Building on the theoretical insights from the sociology and 
anthropology of law and organizational studies of diffusion and translation, I show 
that translation involves both political conflict settlement and compromise building, 
on the one hand, and collective knowledge building and learning, on the other hand. 
In addition, I also show that implementation follows several different patterns. In this 
section, I will describe how my address to these themes enriches the literature on 
certification and labeling and more broadly on transnational standards and other 
private market-driven forms of governance. 
Action, its context and institutional entrepreneurship  
The relationship between action and its surroundings, or more broadly agency 
and structure, has been one of the most debated subjects in the social sciences (Sewell 
1992). The broad literature on the organizational neo-institutionalism emphasizes the 
dependence of action on formal rules, informal conventions and cultural scripts (i.e., 
institutions in a broad sense) and the importance of repeated and sticky action for the 
reproduction of social institutions. This view is in sharp opposition to some 
approaches within the rational choice school of thought that emphasize the 
significance of the independent strategic action within given constraints. In contrast, 
my study is consistent with the sociological approaches that emphasize the multi-
dimensional nature of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) and allow for both 
repeated and creative and strategic action embedded into its social, cultural, political 
and cognitive surrounding (Beckert 2003: 769) and simultaneously constrained and 
enabled by it. I follow Beckert (1999: 777) who argues that intentional agency and 
institutional structures are interdependent.  
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How does this interdependence play out in the process of institution-building? 
The concept of institutional entrepreneurship introduced by DiMaggio (1988; 1991) 
enables bringing together strategic action, interests and institutional context. 
DiMaggio (1988: 14) writes, “[i]nstitutions arise… when organized actors with 
sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value 
highly.”  How does their surrounding enable and constrain institutional 
entrepreneurship? My findings show that the larger institutional and discursive 
context embedding institutional entrepreneurs constraints their institution-building 
efforts by restricting the alternatives that are available to them. In my study, I have 
shown following Bartley (2003) that at the transnational level, the neoliberal 
institutional context has restricted the options that were available to the actors 
constructing the first forest certification and labeling system. At the local level, I have 
shown that the local institutional and legal regulations had a restrictive effect on the 
operation of forest certification in Russia. 
At the same time, the context has also had an enabling effect on the building 
of a new institution of certification and labeling by providing institutional 
entrepreneurs with previously institutionalized and legitimate building-blocks – e.g., 
concepts, policies, and organizational models – for the new institution. At the 
transnational level, the concept of sustainability and multiple functions and uses of 
forests and multiple groups have stakes in forest – i.e., stakeholders – provided forest 
certification advocates with the building blocks for their forest certification system (a 
three-chamber organizational structure, deliberative decision-making, and the social, 
environmental and economic dimensions of forest use reflected in the FSC’s global 
principles and criteria). At the local level, local actors (e.g., NGOs, companies, 
consultants and auditors) used global ideas, concepts and experience (e.g., high 
conservation value forests) and local legal norms and common practices (e.g., 
especially protected forest area) as a resource to adapt alien transnational standards to 
their domestic legal and social environment and thus enabled the effective translation 
of transnational standards into on-the-ground practices. 
To sum up, my findings are consistent with the idea that the social, legal, 
political and cultural context in which actors are situated has an enabling and 
constraining effect on their action aimed at institution-building. It restricts the 
repertoires of action available to intentional and strategic actors; at the same time, it 
provides them with the building blocks for new organizations and rules. 
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Social movement organizations as institutional entrepreneurs and 
translators 
Not every actor involved in an institution-building process is an institutional 
entrepreneur. Following DiMaggio’s definition, institutional entrepreneurs are well 
organized actors with sufficient resources with specific interests that they value highly 
and seek to realize. The literature dealing with the emergence and diffusion of 
certification and labeling emphasizes the role of the well organized transnational 
environmental movement seeking to improve environmental conditions and seeing it 
as an imperative for their activity across borders. I seek to contribute to this literature 
by focusing on the role of locally embedded social movement organizations with 
sufficient organizational capacities defined as “social and material resources” (Espach 
2009: 131). Both branches of large international NGOs and “indigenous” grassroots 
NGOs functioned as institutional entrepreneurs at the local level and induced through 
their activities the emergence and enactment of a national forest certification systems.  
I show that the domestic organizational networks of NGOs, their close 
connections to the transnational environmental movement, their social skills and 
expertise play a particularly important role in the process of local enactment of 
systems of private market-driven governance and the translation of transnational 
standards into local practices. Social skills are defined as abilities of actors to induce 
cooperation and attract support for their projects (Fligstein 2001b: 105). Locally and 
transnationally connected NGOs possess knowledge of both global concepts and local 
practice and navigate between global forums and local settings in a multi-level and 
multi-sited system of international governance. They can thus provide local 
implementing actors, i.e., company managers, with the knowledge and skills 
necessary for implementing transnational standards in their specific context. They can 
also provide local enforcing actors, i.e., auditors, with knowledge and skills necessary 
for assessing compliance with the transnational standards. In other words, they play 
the role translators of transnational standards for local implementing and enforcing 
actors. 
Here my findings are consistent with the emerging literature on transnational 
governance that emphasized the role of actors that possess expertise and social skills 
and are embedded into both local and transnational self-regulating communities of 
practice (Djelic and Quack 2008; Djelic and Quack 2010; Merry 2006b; Quack 2007). 
8 Conclusion 
 
242 
The results of my research are also consistent with the findings of Espach (2006; 2009) 
who demonstrates that the social and material resources of local environmental groups 
explain the uptake of certification and labeling in a given country. 
Table 10 Types of Institutional Work Aimed at Creating Institutions: The Case of Certification 
Forms of 
institutional 
work 
Definition Examples from a Study of 
Certification and Labeling 
Advocacy The mobilization of political and 
regulatory support through direct and 
deliberate techniques of social suasion 
NGOs persuading companies 
to certify 
Constructing 
identities 
Defining the relationship between an 
actor and the field in which that actor 
operates 
Creating new identities 
- for companies as 
responsible producers of 
wood 
- for auditors as independent 
assessors of compliance 
with FSC standards 
- for other NGOs, individual 
activists, workers, and local 
and indigenous 
communities as 
stakeholders in the FSC 
certification system 
Constructing 
normative 
networks 
Construction of interorganizational 
connections though which practices 
become normatively sanctioned and 
which form the relevant peer group with 
respect to compliance, monitoring and 
evaluation 
NGOs mobilizing the 
preexisting networks for 
promoting forest certification, 
monitoring and evaluating 
companies and auditors, 
acting as stakeholders and 
developing the national 
standard 
Educating The educating of actors in skills and 
knowledge necessary to support new 
institution  
NGOs training companies, 
auditors and stakeholders 
Creating 
organizational 
infrastructure 
The mobilization of existing 
organizations and the creation of new 
organizations that support a new 
institution or fulfill certain functions 
within a new institution 
NGOs creating certification 
centers and consulting 
companies 
Creating new 
knowledge and 
skills 
The creating and spreading of new 
knowledge and skills necessary for the 
operation of a new institution 
NGOs offering training 
programs for auditors, 
managers and stakeholders 
Source: Own design based on Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 221) 
 
The role of environmental NGOs as institutional entrepreneurs is best captured by the 
concept of institutional work aimed at creating institutions discussed in Section 2.7. In 
Table 10, I provide the types of work formulated by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
with several examples from my study of forest certification in Russia. I also add to the 
8 Conclusion 
 
243 
classification of Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) two types of institutional work aimed 
at the institutionalization of a new certification program: creating an organizational 
infrastructure and developing new knowledge and skills. NGOs mobilized their 
domestic networks and attracted funding from international donors in order to create 
several organizations, including regional certification centers and consulting 
companies, which persuaded companies to join certification, offered assessment and 
consulting services, took part in designing the national standard and monitored 
companies and certifiers. NGOs also developed new knowledge concerning forest 
management and compliance with FSC standards, as well as the developed skills and 
trained auditors, managers and stakeholders. New knowledge and skills developed by 
NGOs are reflected in compliance guidelines and manuals that were published in the 
2000s.  
Deconstructing the translation of transnational standards into on-the-
ground practices 
How do local actors enact and translate transnational standards? In this 
subsection, I abstract from the concrete details of my case-study and specific activities 
of local actors (e.g., developing of national standards, project work and consulting) 
and attempt to identify larger theoretically important social processes that constitute 
the process of translation beyond its technical implementation dimensions and to 
show that translation is not a straight-forward but a situated, textured and multi-
faceted process. 
Following the literature on diffusion/translation (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996) 
and organizational learning (Perez-Aleman 2011) and the recent literature on 
transnational law (Halliday and Carruthers 2009; Merry 2006a; Quack 2007), I argue 
that through engaging in two social processes – negotiation of conflicting stakeholder 
interests and collective learning – local actors translate broad global principles and 
criteria of good forest management into nationally applicable standards, develop 
knowledge about their implementation and actually translate global principles into on-
the-ground practices. Through these two processes, local actors are able to over two 
challenges that I have identified in the beginning of this chapter: political conflicts 
and interpretative problems caused by the introduction of new rules that challenge 
preexisting structures of control over forest management practices and contain 
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unfamiliar concepts and ideas. These processes involve the reflexive adaptation of 
transnational standards to domestic regulations and practice, collective sense-making, 
conflict-settlement and problem-solving through the creative recombination of 
existing and new concepts and practices of forest management (Quack 2007). Thus, 
interest negotiation and collective learning represent two mechanisms of change that 
have been previously neglected in the literature on transnational standard-setting (see 
Figure 2). The former process is concerned with interests; the latter with cognition. 
These two processes are analytically distinct but occur simultaneously and influence 
each other. Conflicts may trigger learning. Learning about implementation may, in 
turn, help settle conflicts between stakeholders, since it may influence actors’ 
perceptions of their own and each others’ interests. 
Figure 2: Translation in a Multi-Level Standards and Certification System 
 
Source: Own design (see also Malets 2011) 
8 Conclusion 
 
245 
 
Specifically, interest negotiation occurs at two levels. At the national level, actors 
representing different interests (e.g. economic, social and environmental) negotiate 
national indicators for global principles and criteria in formal settings, such as 
conferences, meetings and seminars. They also develop practical recommendations 
and compliance guidelines for companies seeking to become certified. At the local 
level, companies, auditors and stakeholders negotiate specific on-the-ground practices 
that have to conform to the FSC’s global and national standards. Thus, similarly to 
conflict settlement at the transnational level (Bartley 2007b), at the domestic level, 
forest certification provides an arena for settling conflicts between and within 
different stakeholder groups – i.e., environmentalists and industries as well as state 
authorities – related to the responsible use and management of forests. 
The role of collective learning defined as new knowledge and skill building 
(Perez-Aleman 2011: 174) deserves special attention. This concept of learning enables 
closing a theoretical gap between transnational standard-setting literature, which 
assumes that a change in practices will occur after the introduction of a standard 
(provided there is a gap between standard and practice), and a widespread 
understanding of practices as sticky and hard to change. The concept of collective 
learning helps identify ways to change practices. The literature on translation as a 
main mechanism for the diffusion of ideas, such as practices or organizational forms 
(Czarniawska and Sevon 1996), specifies one of the ways learning contributes to 
change: While being imitated, ideas are edited and may, therefore, take a different 
shape across settings depending on local circumstances (Sahlin-Andersson 1996). I 
suggest that translation may occur in several different modes, ranging from direct 
implementation to the invention of new practices, but in general I argue that the 
“editing” of global ideas occurs through a recombination of externally given and 
locally available concepts and practices that serve as building blocks for new 
knowledge.  
Locally embedded actors – both “indigenous” grass-roots organizations and 
branches of international organizations – use global and local knowledge reflected in 
concepts, categories, common practices, national regulations and voluntary standards 
as building blocks for constructing knowledge related to certification. They combine 
external, “global” elements (high conservation value forests or old-growth forests) 
and locally available elements (especially protected forest areas) in different ways in 
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order to define a way to achieve compliance with certification standards that might 
differ from national legal requirements. When certification requirements cannot be 
directly implemented, local practices can be reframed to meet FSC requirements. 
Local elements may also be combined with new elements that can be either borrowed 
or invented specifically for a certain country. From this perspective, new forest 
management practices are not always derived directly from “global ideas” and 
imposed on forest companies, but are constructed from both external and locally 
available elements. Negotiation, learning and experimentation play a crucial creative 
role in turning transnational voluntary standards into local practices. 
What the translation approach lacks is an explicit account of the feedback 
loops that may occur when ideas travel between settings. Drawing on the recursivity 
framework (Halliday and Carruthers 2007), I argue that implementation and standard-
making, at least at the national level, influence each other. The cyclical, multi-stage 
nature of standard formation, diffusion and implementation is also increasingly 
emphasized in the standardization literature (Botzem and Dobusch 2010). Standard-
making and implementation are connected through a network of advocates – mainly 
NGO activists – who play different roles in the certification system: They develop 
national standards, advise companies, train managers, auditors and stakeholders, 
conduct research in certified forests, monitor certified companies, attend audits and 
develop compliance guidelines and recommendations for certified companies. They 
accumulate and generalize practical experience and insert it into the national standard, 
other official documents and compliance guidelines. In turn, new requirements are 
reflected in the changes in companies’ forest management systems and on-the-ground 
practices. Standard-making and implementation are recursive: Through the national 
standard, forest certification advocates shape implementation whereas implementation 
feeds back into standard-making (cf. Halliday and Carruthers 2007, also see below). 
Avenues for new research 
The study I present in my thesis opens up new comparative questions. Studies 
comparing certification standard-setting and implementation across countries, 
industries and issue-fields (e.g., labor conditions, business security, fisheries, palm oil 
and soy) would help to test the conclusions presented above and identify other factors 
that may be important for explaining the implementation of transnational certification 
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and labeling programs and their degree of their effectiveness. Moreover, my study 
speaks to another two kinds of literature and may thus open new avenues for further 
research into the dynamics of transnational economic regulation.  
The first literature is the sociological studies of accounting and auditing 
initiated by Power (1996; 1997). The key element of the FSC’s program of forest 
certification is the third-party system of verification of compliance with the FSC’s 
standards of forest management. The assessment of forest management systems and 
practices is carried out by professional assessment teams that can produce 
authoritative judgments on producers’ compliance with the FSC’s standards. FSC 
designers created this procedure to imitate financial auditing: “[I]ndependent auditing 
of companies’ forest management practices, similar to the way accountants audit a 
company’s financial transactions, is essential to make claims of sustainability 
credible” (Jenkins and Smith 1999: 63). It is not surprising that in everyday language 
forest management assessments, the formal term adopted by the FSC, are called 
audits. This is consistent with Power’s observation that “auditing has become a 
legitimate part of good management practice in a wide variety of domains” (Power 
2003a: 387) and thus contributes to his “auditing explosion” thesis (Power 2003b). 
Power shows that auditing is more than verification of compliance, detection 
of fraud or assessment of organizational effectiveness. Auditing conveys legitimacy to 
an audited organization and under certain circumstances facilitates the improvement 
of organizational performance. Auditors are not merely verifiers; they are “agents of 
change.” However, whether this change is substantive or formal is an open question. 
The expansion of auditing entails the transformation organizational routines into 
auditable practices (Power 1996). Practices are formalized to be easily checked or 
assessed by independent auditors. Essentially, external audiences also expect auditing 
to induce substantive improvements in organizational practices beyond formalization. 
They expect that auditing can motivate organizations become more efficient or 
environmentally responsible or improve the quality of their services. Auditing per se 
is, however, no guarantee that organizational performance will improve. 
My case study demonstrates several parallels to financial auditing studied by 
Power. My findings are consistent with the notion that auditing has become a 
legitimate part of good management practices and serves a legitimacy-production 
function. I have emphasized in the chapter dealing with the effects of forest 
certification in Russia that companies seeking certification did not have to 
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significantly improve or substantively reform their practices. The focus was rather on 
the formalization and documentation of their compliance with the FSC standards. 
Company managers that certified their forest management systems and practices 
reported that market benefits, including price premium and increased market access, 
were not significant. Rather, they were motivated not by immediate benefits but by 
potential losses of market share. Company mangers justified their adoption of forest 
certification by reputation gains, which they expected to receive with the certification. 
They hoped that forest certification would mitigate or prevent conflicts with 
environmental activists and facilitate the endorsement of company practices by 
environmentalists. Only few company managers suggested that it was necessary to 
improve or reform their forestry practices. As a result, environmentalists suggested 
that forest certification becomes an increasingly formalized procedure that has lost its 
initial transformative aspirations. Yet, more research is necessary to investigate the 
role of auditors and auditing on the performance of certified companies.  
Second, the studies of certification standard-setting and implementation at the 
transnational and local level may contribute to the studies of recursivity of law. 
Halliday and Carruthers (2007) develop a theoretical framework for understanding 
legal change in a global context – the recursivity of law – and apply it to explain the 
formation and change of domestic corporate insolvency regimes. They connect global 
norm making and domestic lawmaking and implementation into a cyclical model of 
recursive law (2007: 1147). In this model, transnational and domestic actors creatively 
translate global norms into law on the books at the national level and then law on the 
books into law in practice (national lawmaking). The gap between law on the books 
and real situations stimulates new rounds of legal reforms and revisions and may 
resonate at the global level (global norm making). Applying this framework to the 
study of forest certification may help explain how the local events, conflicts and 
learning on one setting may affect standard-setting at the transnational level that will 
in turn affect domestic implementation in other settings across the world. Actors at the 
transnational level react to conflicts and problems emerging locally during 
transnational standards implementation by revising existing standards, and providing 
new rules and compliance guidelines, which in turn become obligatory for other 
companies within a certification a certification system.  
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8.3 The Effectiveness of Certification as Private Market-Driven 
Regulation 
The analysis presented in my thesis suggests that the capacity of market-driven forms 
of governance to produce change is quite limited. Its market nature facilitates their 
very existence (they cannot be prohibited as barriers to free trade) but restricts its 
transformative potential. Initially, the designers of the FSC hoped that forest 
certification would create a fair trade in tropical timber, i.e., would provide a market 
and price advantages to small-scale and community operations in tropical countries to 
encourage them not to clear but conserve and manage their forest. When the demand 
for certified products emerged, it turned out that it was mainly large industries and 
retailers in Europe and North America that became interested in forest certification. 
They source wood in considerable quantities and not from small-scale and community 
forest operations in tropical countries. Small-scaled producers could not ever satisfy 
it. Moreover, forest legislation, policy and practices were poor in tropical countries 
and the costs of certification turned out to be too high for small operations. The 
forests were, therefore, mainly certified in relatively safe countries of North America 
and Europe. In tropical counties the majority of certified forests are plantations. Their 
environmental value and impact is disputed. The FSC promised to take action to 
broaden its activity in tropical and other developing counties and started a pilot 
project aimed at created a dual FSC-Fair Trade certification program (Macqueen 
2008), but it is yet to early to evaluate its impact and effectiveness.  
Moreover, it can be argued that the impact of voluntary forms of governance 
remains precarious and uncertain, since it is most accessible and less costly for 
companies that already practice good forest management consistent with international 
principles and criteria. Those who remain beyond the demand of the market and 
cannot benefit from certification and for those whose compliance costs are higher than 
potential – real or perceived – gains escape certification and labeling. Such a selective 
acceptance of forest certification can be explained by its focus on more conventional 
market producers, as discussed above, and seriously questions its potential 
effectiveness. The recent studies that attempt to evaluate the macro-effectiveness of 
forest certifications have shown that forest certification could not halt deforestation 
and biodiversity loss and cannot effectively protect forests at a large-scale landscape 
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level (Gullison 2003; Marx and Cuypers 2010): Deforestation rates and landscape-
level management are beyond the scope of forest certification. 
Yet, it is possible to evaluate the impact of forest certification at least at the 
level of forest enterprises that certified their forest management. Does forest 
certification produce the expected environmental and social change in certified 
companies? The analysis of the FSC’s impact on Russian forest companies is one of 
the goals of the thesis. I argue that forest certification as private voluntary standard-
based program has produced positive change, but it has been limited by a number of 
factors I address below. 
My research shows that in counties where forest certification seems to work 
well, it yielded several positive effects on on-the-ground practices and the 
relationships between environmental groups and forest industries. Yet, 
environmentalists became concerned with the decreasing capacity of the FSC to 
monitor and control the performance of certifiers and certified producers. The media 
drew attention to a number of controversial certifications approved by the FSC. In 
many cases, environmentalists and observers were disturbed that market forces 
overruled the initial intentions of the FSC: The demand for certified timber drove the 
expansion of certified forests and supply chains that the FSC with its limited 
resources was no longer able to control. 
The findings presented in the thesis suggest that effectiveness of voluntary 
programs crucially depends on the involvement of local social movements with 
considerable social skills defined by Fligstein (2001b) as an ability to induce 
cooperation in others. Highly motivated well-organized social movement activists are 
able to achieve significant results even with limited resources. With their local 
knowledge and skills, they are able to mobilize constituencies, reframe and spread 
“global” knowledge and build organizational infrastructure for emerging programs, 
even under unfavorable local conditions (see the two subsections above). This is 
consistent with the studies that point to the need to intensify capacity-building efforts, 
which international organizations and nongovernmental organizations increasingly 
favor over strict enforcement (Tallberg 2002).  
The effectiveness of transnational private regulation also depends crucially on 
the structure of international markets for wood products. The analysis shows that 
companies that could lose access to markets or were reputation-conscious were most 
susceptible to pressures by environmental organizations and buyers. If countries or 
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groups of producers are excluded from the market, they remain unaffected by the 
programs based on market incentives. Although direct market benefits play only a 
minor role in companies’ decisions to become certified, the even potential danger of 
losing access to the market is crucial. Firms seeking to protect their reputation against 
environmental campaigns are also likely to pursue certification. Although the link 
between reputation and profits is not systematic (Vogel 2005, ch. 2), even the 
potential existence of this link may motivate firms to participate in the programs. It is, 
therefore, politically important to build and support the markets that would provide 
incentives to improve reputation or to secure market access though the participation in 
voluntary programs.  
The actual demand for certified products and consumer willingness to pay a 
green premium for certified timber is also likely to improve the effectiveness of 
voluntary programs. As a study of the U.S. consumer market indicates, while between 
1995 and 2000 the consumer awareness of forest certification grew, self-reported 
purchases of certified products and the average willingness to pay a premium declined 
(Ozanne and Vlosky 2003). The authors argue that consumers are confused by a great 
variety of available labels and programs and increasingly question their efficacy and 
credibility. Increasing awareness of consumers and further promotion of certified 
products in the market might, therefore, become a crucially important factor 
facilitating the effectiveness of various voluntary programs. 
The credibility and efficacy of programs is also determined crucially by the 
control that organizations running voluntary programs exercise over the performance 
of certifiers and certified firms. Global rules of social and environmental 
responsibility are only successful when they are effectively and convincingly 
translated into local practices. Fast growth of programs may undermine the capacity 
of private organizations similar to the FSC to control certification bodies and certified 
companies. Moreover, as the findings presented in Chapter 7 suggest, the competitive 
struggles that emerge between certification bodies for new clients creates a race to the 
bottom in the implementation of standards and lead to the decline of certification 
quality. The FSC has to improve its capacity to control the quality of auditors’ 
performance as the system expands, since the competition between certifiers may 
undermine the very idea of independent and objective verification of compliance.  
The implication of these findings is that it may not be enough to “let the 
markets regulate themselves” to achieve the best outcomes in the implementation of 
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private standards. If markets are left to regulate themselves on their own, they may 
weaken the transformative capacity of private regulatory programs by triggering race 
to the bottom among its participants or by focusing on the firms that already perform 
well and exclude those beyond its reach. At the same time, markets may be potentially 
more effective than traditional command-and-control means because they are more 
flexible and responsive and are able to conduct signals like increased demand for 
certain types of products. This suggests that markets have to built, supported and 
effectively regulated.  
Another factor that facilitates the effectiveness of voluntary regulatory 
programs is the availability of extensive domestic regulatory framework. For one 
thing, it is easier to promote forest management planning among firms that know what 
it is, even though the way they do it may be seen as ineffective or inappropriate. It is 
easier to verify that company logs forests on the land it owns or leases from the state 
if the borders of forest plots are mapped and there are no conflicts over tenure rights. 
If these basic criteria are fulfilled, critical issues like biodiversity protection and 
worker rights move into the focus of voluntary programs. Moreover, even if the 
supporters of regulatory programs perceive existing laws and regulations as outdated, 
disintegrated and ineffective, they are able to employ existing conceptual apparatus in 
the process of translation of global rules into local practices. Through the process of 
negotiation and interpretation of both abstract global rules and familiar local rules and 
practices, they are able to reframe local practices to fit global rules. They are also able 
also adapt and reformulate generic global rules to make them fit local frames of 
reference, i.e., to make them familiar to local firms and stakeholders. In this case, the 
improvement of existing practices can be partly redefined as improving compliance 
with domestic regulations that are consistent with global standards. The last point 
suggests that nonstate organizations actually become private enforcers of domestic 
regulations. 
Yet, the development of forest certification in Russia also suggests that the 
lack of proper legislation and institutional preconditions for the long-term 
management of natural resources is a problem that cannot be solved by private means 
only. Even if environmental organizations succeed in certifying and improving the 
practices of the largest and the most visible companies, the rest will continue 
managing their forests irresponsibly. Moreover, as long as the requirements of 
voluntary programs clash with domestic regulations, companies will be inclined to 
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follow rules imposed by the state. As my findings suggest, certifiers will be likely to 
tolerate non-compliance because it is “beyond the scope of control” of certified 
companies. Ultimately, if the state provides environmentally, socially and 
economically balanced and well-enforced governance, private regulation becomes 
obsolete. This may suggest that building capacity of national governments, enhancing 
their enforcement capacity and reforming legislation are better ways to improve 
environmental condition. The question is then whether the task of achieving “good” 
public governance is feasible. As Chapter 4 suggests, while this is desirable, it may in 
fact be no less problematic than creating effective private regulation. 
8.4 A Final Remark 
To conclude the thesis on the impact of private regulation, it has been extensively 
argued that private regulation can be more effective and desirable than public 
regulation, since it relies on markets that can efficiently relocate resources and 
encourage companies to change their practices without state coercion. Moreover, 
neoliberal rules that structure transnational governance limit the policy repertoire of 
states and interstate organizations: They are no longer able to practice tariffs or bans 
to protect their market from irresponsibly produced goods. Since rules and standards 
proposed by private actors are voluntary and market-driven, they do not contradict 
WTO rules and are a preferred mode of governance of environmental and social 
conditions. In addition, they are democratic, transparent and consensus-based, which 
makes them legitimate alternatives to public regulation. They spread the knowledge, 
produces discursive and normative changes that are believed to facilitate the growth 
of environmental and social responsibility of producers and consumers. These are the 
arguments often invoked in favor of private regulation. 
In contrast, the skeptics have argued that voluntary market-based modes of 
governance have only a limited outreach and do not tackle the actual causes of 
environmental degradation and low social, labor and human rights standards. Some 
critics have argued that such programs as certification can help companies greenwash 
their unsustainable practices. In the debate on forest certification, it has been argued 
that forest certification is viable only in developed industrial countries with well-
enforced elaborated legislation and institutionalized norms of sustainable behavior of 
producers and consumers. Developing countries with important tropical forests 
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remain beyond the reach of the FSC. Small-scale producers and community 
operations also cannot participate and benefit from forest certification, since the 
majority cannot access international markets dominated by large industrial forest 
companies with considerable demand. Their supply cannot match it. Finally, the main 
causes of deforestation and forest degradation in tropical and other developing 
countries is the poverty of forest populations that clear forests for agriculture and the 
activity of transnational corporations that clear forests for industrial plantations. In 
passing, the FSC certifies plantations under certain conditions, which has been under 
sever critique for years. Several environmental organizations consider endorsing 
plantations through the FSC certificates unacceptable.  
Public regulation has also proved to be ineffective in tackling a large number 
of global forest-related problems. States and international organizations were unable 
to find effective legally-binding solutions to growing deforestation, forest 
degradation, indigenous population displacement and increasing poverty. This 
suggests that the truth about the private means of global governance of environmental 
and social conditions is as always somewhere in the middle. Private forms of 
regulation are neither alternatives nor functional equivalents to public regulation and 
the substitution of public regulation with private regulation may be a dangerous 
journey. One solution could be that public and private regulatory projects have to be 
cooperative, responsive and mutually reinforcing. The participation of private 
organizations in public decision-making, whether national or transnational, will 
increase legitimacy and credibility of political outcomes and foster fruitful exchange 
and social learning between parties. This requires strong political will, which, as the 
history of the global forest convention shows, is yet not there. Whether such 
cooperative relationships are attainable and viable in the long run remains to be seen. 
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Appendix 1 List of Interviews 
 Organization Position Date and Place  
1 Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Technische 
Zusammenarbeit  
Head of the Forest 
Certification unit in the 
Programme Office for Social 
and Environmental Standards 
September 05, 2006 
Eschborn, Germany 
2 Segezha Pulp and 
Paper Mill 
Director of the Forest 
Department 
October 10, 2006 
Segezha, Russia 
3 Segezha Pulp and 
Paper Mill 
Deputy Director of the Forest 
Department  
October 10, 2006 
Segezha, Russia 
4 Segezha Pulp and 
Paper Mill 
Deputy Director of the 
Marketing Department 
October 11, 2006 
Segezha, Russia 
5 Segezha Pulp and 
Paper Mill 
Deputy Director of the Forest 
Department 
October 16, 2006 
Segezha, Russia 
6 SGS Vostok Ltd Leading auditor, Head of 
forest certification unit of 
SGS Qualifor South Africa 
for Russia 
October 23, 2006 
St. Petersburg, Russia 
7 Ilim Group Senior Officer for 
Technology and Organization 
of Timber Supply 
October 26, 2006 
St. Petersburg, Russia 
8 FSC International 
Office 
Head of the Policy and 
Standards Unit 
December 13, 2006 
Bonn Germany 
9 The Rainforest 
Foundation UK 
Director, FSC founding 
member 
December 15, 2006 
London, UK (telephone) 
10 FSC International 
Office 
Chain-of-Custody Program 
Manager in the Policy and 
Standards Unit 
December 20, 2006 
Bonn Germany 
11 FSC International 
Office 
Regional Offices Liaisons 
Manager and member of FSC 
national initiative for 
Germany 
January 5, 2007 
Bonn Germany 
12 WWF Russia  Head of the Forest Program January 11, 2007 
Moscow, Russia 
13 Greenpeace Russia Head of Nuclear Campaign, 
member of FSC national 
initiative coordination council 
and former FSC contact 
person for Russia 
January 11, 2007 
Moscow, Russia 
14 FSC Russian 
national office 
Director January 12, 2007 
Moscow, Russia 
15 Greenpeace Russia Head of Forest Campaign, 
forestry expert 
January 12, 2007 
Moscow, Russia 
16 Northern Research 
Institute for 
Director and leading auditor 
by GFA 
January 17, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
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Forestry (the 
Federal Office for 
Forestry of the 
Russian Federation 
Ministry for Natural 
Resources) and 
GFA 
17 JSC Onega 
Sawmills (Onezhski 
LDK) 
Deputy Director General for 
Ecology 
January 18, 2007 
Onega, Russia 
18 WWF Russia, 
Program Office in 
Arkhangelsk 
Head of Office January 19, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
 
19 OOO NEPCon Director and leading auditor January 19, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
 
20 Management 
Company OOO 
Titan-Lesprom 
Officer for Certification January 19, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
21 OOO Titan  Director for Economic 
Affairs and Finance 
January 19, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
22 Department for 
Industrial Forestry 
Sector of 
Arkhangelsk 
Government 
Head of Certification 
Department 
January 22, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
23 Arkhangelski State 
Technical 
University, 
Department of 
Forestry  
Head of Forestation 
Evaluation Chair, auditor by 
GFA, consultant in forest 
certification, head of FSC 
regional working group for 
Arkhangelsk  
January 22, 2007 
Arkhangelsk, Russia 
24 Formerly Segezha 
Pulp and Paper 
Mill, Moscow 
Office 
Now informal advisor, 
formerly (up to 1993) deputy 
minister for forestry 
January 23, 2007, 
Moscow, Russia 
25 Center for 
Biodiversity 
Conservation and 
FSC national 
initiative for Russia 
Director and head of national 
initiative 
January 24, 2007 
Moscow, Russia 
26 Ilim Group Director for Cooperation with 
Public and Local Authorities 
January 30, 2007 
St. Petersburg, Russia  
27 Stora Enso Oyj, 
Wood Supply 
Russia 
Environmental Manager February 2, 2007 
St. Petersburg, Russia 
28 OOO Lestest, 
representative of 
Control Union 
Director February 2, 2007  
Novgorod, Russia 
29 Center for voluntary Director February 5, 2007 
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forest certification, 
research and 
development 
company NIOKR 
Syktyvkar, Russia 
30 Regional nonprofit 
fund Silver Taiga 
Coordinator for Forest and 
Economic Projects 
February 5 (and 7) 2007 
Syktyvkar, Russia 
31 Forest Committee 
of Federal Agency 
of Forestry in the 
Republic of Komi  
Deputy Head February 6, 2007 
Syktyvkar, Russia 
32 Mondi Pulp and 
Paper Mill 
Officer for Environmental 
Management and Forest 
Certification 
February 6, 2007 
Syktyvkar, Russia 
33 Sysolsky Forest 
Management Office 
of the Federal 
Agency of Forestry 
in the Republic of 
Komi 
Director February 7, 2007 
Visinga, Russia 
34 Regional nonprofit 
fund Silver Taiga 
Coordinator for Forest and 
Economic Projects 
February 7, 2007  
Syktyvkar, Russia 
35 Research Institute 
of Forestry, 
Pskov Model Forest 
Scientific Director February 12, 2007 
St. Petersburg, Russia 
36 OOO EuroPartner, 
certification body 
Forest Certification Program 
Director 
February 12, 2007  
St. Petersburg, Russia 
37 FSC International 
Office 
Social Strategy Program 
Manager  
March 28, 2007 
Bonn, Germany 
38 FSC International 
Office  
Executive Director April 16, 2007 
Bonn, Germany 
39 FSC National 
Initiative Germany 
(FSC Arbeitsgruppe 
Deutschland) 
Executive Director April 30, 2007 
Freiburg, Germany 
40 WWF Germany  Forest Policy June 15, 2007 
Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany 
41 WWF Germany Forest Policy / Business 
Cooperation 
June 15, 2007 
Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany 
42 Eigenbetrieb 
Kreisforsten 
Herzogtum 
Lauenburg 
Executive Director June 20, 2007 
Farchau bei Ratzerburg, 
Frankfurt am Main 
43 Stadtwald Lübeck Executive Director  July 16, 2007 
Lübeck, Germany 
44 Hornbach Baumarkt 
AG 
Head of Quality Assurance 
and Environmental Issues  
September 03, 2007 
Bornheim bei Landau, 
Germany 
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45 Amur Branch of 
WWF Russia 
Certification Coordinator October 15, 2007 
Vladivostok, Russia 
46 BROC Bureau of 
Regional Outreach 
Campaigns  
Director October 29, 2007 
Vladivostok, Russia 
47 Accreditation 
Services 
International 
Accreditation Program 
Manager 
December 12, 2007 
Bonn, Germany 
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Appendix 2 Map of the Russian Federation 
Source: Oldfield (2005) 
Note: Oblast, republic, krai and autonomous okrug are federal units, or administrative 
divisions, of the Russian Federation  
 

References  261 
References 
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance." International Organization 54:421-456. 
—. 2001. "International 'Standards' and International Governance." Journal of 
European Public Policy 8:345-370. 
Aksenov, Dmitry, Dmitry  Dobrynin, Maxim Dubinin, Alexey  Egorov, Alexander  
Isaev, Mikhail  Karpachevskiy, Lars  Laestadius, Petr  Potapov, Andrey  
Purekhovskiy, Svetlana  Turubanova, and Alexey  Yaroshenko. 2002. Atlas of 
Russia's Intact Forest Landscapes. Moscow: Global Forest Watch Russia. 
Arts, Bas. 1998. The Political Influence of Global NGOs. Case Studies on the Climate 
and Biodiversity Conventions. Utrecht: International Books. 
Aspers, Patrik. 2006. "Ethics in Global Garment Market Chains." Pp. 287-307 in The 
Moralization of Markets, edited by Nico Stehr, Christoph Henning, and Bernd 
Weiler. London: Transaction Press. 
—. 2008. "Order in Garment Markets." Acta Sociologica 51:187-202. 
Auld, Graeme, Lars H. Gulbrandsen, and Constance L. McDermott. 2008. 
"Certification Schemes and the Impacts on Forests and Forestry." Annual 
Review of Environment and Resources 33:187-211. 
Bardini, Thierry. 1994. "A Translation Analysis of the Green Revolution in Bali." 
Science, Technology and Human Values 19:152-168. 
Bartley, Tim. 2003. "Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and 
the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Product Field." 
Politics & Society 31:433-464. 
—. 2007a. "How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of an 
Organizational Field and the Rise of Forest Certification." Social Problems 54: 
229-255. 
—. 2007b. "Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of 
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions." 
American Journal of Sociology 113:297-351. 
—. 2010a. Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation. Working Paper No. 8. 
Jerusalem: Jerusalem Forum on Regulation and Governance, The Herbew 
University. 
—. 2010b. "Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The Limits of Forest and 
Labor Standards Certification in Indonesia." Business and Politics 12: Issue 3, 
Article 7. 
Battilana, Julie, Bernard Leca, and Eva Boxenbaum. 2009. "How Actors Change 
Institutions: Towards a Theory of Institutional Entrepreneurship." The 
Academy of Management Annals 3:65-107. 
Beckert, Jens. 1999. "Agency, Entrepreneurship, and Institutional Change. The Role 
of Strategic Choice and Institutionalized Practices in Organizations." 
Organization Studies 20:777-799. 
—. 2003. "Economic Sociology and Embeddedness: How Shall We Conceptualize 
Economic Action." Journal of Economic Issues 37:769-787. 
—. 2007. The Social Order of Markets. MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/15. Cologne: 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
Bernstein, Steven. 2000. "Ideas, Social Structure and the Compromise of Liberal 
Environmentalism." European Journal of International Relations 6:464-512. 
References 
 
262 
—. 2001. The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. 2004. "Non-State Global Governance: Is 
Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?" 
Pp. 33-66 in Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, 
Environment and Social Governance, edited by John J. Kirton and Michael J. 
Trebilcock. Aldershot: Ashgate Press. 
Bobrov, Rem. 2001. Dom u Zolotogo Pruda (in Russian: The House by the Golden 
Pond). St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Research Institute for Forestry. 
Böhling, Kathrin. 2011. Emergence of Stakeholder Governance in the United Nations: 
An Outcome of Institutional Work. Paper prepared for the 6th Organization 
Studies Summer Workshop "Bringing Public Organization and Organizing 
Back in". 
Botzem, Sebastian, and Leonhard Dobusch. 2010. Standardization Cycles: A Process 
Perspective on the Formation and Diffusion of Transnational Standards. 
Unpublished Manuscript: Social Science Research Center Berlin and Freie 
Universität Berlin. 
Brukhanov, Alexander, Andrei Ptichnikov, Anatoly Kotlobay, and Alexander 
Voropayev. 2003. The Russian-Danish Trade in Wood Products and Illegal 
Logging in Russia. Moscow: WWF Russia. 
Brunsson, Nils, and Bengt Jacobsson. 2000. A World of Standards. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bryant, Dirk, Daniel Nielsen, and Laura Tangley. 1997. The Last Frontier Forests: 
Ecosystems and Economies on the Edge? Washington, D.C.: World Resources 
Institute. 
Callon, Michel. 1986. "Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication 
of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay." Pp. 196-233 in Power, 
Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?, edited by John Law. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Campbell, John L. 2004. Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. 2004. Governing Through 
Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Cashore, Benjamin, Elizabeth Egan, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. 2007. 
"Revising Theories of Nonstate Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance: Lessons 
from the Finnish Forest Certification Experience." Global Environmental 
Politics 7:1-44. 
Cashore, Benjamin, Fred Gale, Errol Meidinger, and Deanna Newsom. 2006a. "Forest 
Certification in Developing and Transitioning Countries: Part of a Sustainable 
Future?" Environment 48:6-25. 
Cashore, Benjamin, Fred Gale, Errol Meidinger, and Deanna Newson (Eds.). 2006b. 
Confronting Sustainability: Forest Certification in Developing and 
Transitioning Societies. New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies. 
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Chorev, Nitsan. 2005. "The Institutional Project of Neo-Liberal Globalism: The Case 
of the WTO." Theory and Society 34:317-355. 
References 
 
263 
Clapp, Jennifer. 2005. "The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 
14000 and the Developing World." Pp. 223-248 in The Business of Global 
Environmental Governance, edited by David L. Levy and Peter J. Newell. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Counsell, Simon, and Kim Terje Loraas. 2002. "Trading in Credibility: The Myth and 
Reality of Forest Stewardship Council. Report with Case Studies." London: 
The Rainforest Foundation UK. 
Crossley, Rachel. 1996. "The World Bank and Forestry." Pp. 232-237 in Certification 
of Forest Products: Issues and Perspectives, edited by Virgilio M. Viana, 
Jamison Ervin, Richard Z. Donovan, Chris Elliot, and Henry Gholz. 
Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (Eds.). 1999. Private Authority 
and International Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Czarniawska, Barbara, and Bernward Joerges. 1996. "Travel of Ideas." in Translating 
Organizational Change, edited by Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevon. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Czarniawska, Barbara, and Guje Sevon (Eds.). 1996. Translating Organizational 
Change. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Dalton, Russel J. 2005. "The Greening of the Globe? Cross-national Levels of 
Environmental Group Membership." Environmental Politics 14:441-459. 
Dauvergne, Peter. 2005. "The Environmental Challenge to Loggers in the Asia-
Pacific: Corporate Practices in Informal Regimes of Governance." Pp. 169-
196 in The Business of Global Environmental Governance, edited by David L. 
Levy and Peter J. Newell. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Der Spiegel. 2006. "Zweifel am Ökoholz." Pp. 167. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. 1988. "Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory." Pp. 3-22 in 
Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment, edited by 
Lynne G. Zucker. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
—. 1991. "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art 
Museums, 1920-1940." Pp. 267-292 in The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Djelic, Marie-Laure. 1998. Exporting the American Model: The Postwar 
Transformation of European Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Djelic, Marie-Laure, and Sigrid Quack (Eds.). 2003a. Globalization and Institutions: 
Redefining the Rules of Economic Game. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
—. 2003b. "Theoretical Building Blocks for a Research Agenda Linking 
Globalization and Institutions." Pp. 15-34 in Globalization and Institutions: 
Redefining the Rules of Economic Game, edited by Marie-Laure Djelic and 
Sigrid Quack. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
—. 2008. "Institutions and Transnationalization." Pp. 299-323 in The SAGE 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, edited by Royston Greenwood, 
Christine Oliver, Roy Suddaby, and Kerstin Sahlin. Los Angeles: Sage. 
— (Eds.). 2010. Transnational Communities: Shaping Global Economic Governance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Djelic, Marie-Laure, and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson. 2006a. "Introduction: A World of 
Governance - The Rise of Transnational Regulation." Pp. 1-28 in 
Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation, edited by 
Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
References 
 
264 
— (Eds.). 2006b. Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dmitriev, Vladimir. 2006. "Printsipialno Vazhnye Statyi, Predlozhennye 
Nepravitelstvennymi Ekologicheskimi Organizatsiyami, Kotorye ne Naschli 
Mesta v Proekte Novogo Lesnogo Kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii (in Russian 
Crucially Important Articles Suggested by the Nongovernmental 
Environmental Organizations that Were Not Included into the Draft of the 
New Forest Code of the Russian Federation)." Ustoichivoe Lesopolosovanie 
(in Russian Sustainable Forest Use) 4 (12):8-12. 
—. 2007. "Kommentariy k Novomu Lesnomu Kodeksu (In Russian Comments to the 
New Forest Code)." Ustoichivoe Lesopolosovanie (in Russian Sustainable 
Forest Use) 1 (13):2-13. 
Dudley, Nigel. 1992. Forests in Trouble: A Review of the Status of the Temperate 
Forests Worldwide. Gland: WWF International. 
Dudley, Nigel, Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud, and Francis Sullivan. 1995. Bad Harvest? The 
Timber Trade and the Degradation of the World's Forests. London: Earthscan. 
Duina, Francesco G., and Frank Blithe. 1999. "Nation-States and Common Markets: 
The Institutional Conditions for Acceptance." Review of International 
Political Economy 6:494-530. 
Elliott, Chris. 2005. "From the Tropical Timber Boycott to Forest Certification." Pp. 
79-90 in Forest Certification: An Innovative Instrument in the Service of 
Sustainable Development?, edited by Dieter Burger, Jürgen Hess, and Barbara 
Lang. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. 
Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Ann Mische. 1998. "What is Agency?" American Journal of 
Sociology 103:962-1023. 
Espach, Ralph. 2006. "When is Sustainable Forestry Sustainable? The Forest 
Stewardship Council in Argentina and Brazil." Global Environmental Politics 
6:55-84. 
Espach, Ralph H. 2009. Private Environmental Regimes in Developing Countries: 
Globally Sown, Locally Grown. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Falkner, Gerda, Miriam Hartlapp, and Oliver Treib. 2007. "Worlds of Compliance: 
Why Leading Approaches to EU Implementation Are Only "Sometimes-True 
Theories"." European Journal of Political Research 46:395-416. 
Falkner, Gerda, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp, and Simone Leiber. 2005. Complying 
with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in Member States. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
FAO. 2005. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005: The Progress towards 
Sustainable Forest Management. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations. 
—. 2007. State of the World's Forests 2007. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
Federal Customs Service of Russia. 2008. Russia's Imports of the Major Types of 
Goods. Moscow: The Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation. 
Federal Forest Service Agency of Russia. 2007. "Dannye o Lensnyh Uchastkah, 
Peredannyh v Arendu po Sostoyaniyu na 01 Dekabrya 2007 Goda (In Russian: 
Data on the Leased Forest Slots as of December 1, 2007)." Moscow: Federal 
Forest Service Agency. 
Finnish Forest Industries Federation. 2008. Basics on Forest Industry. Statistics. 
http://www.forestindustries.fi/tilastopalvelu/TilastokuviotVanhat/Basics/Form
s/AllItems.aspx (accessed on January 29, 2009). 
References 
 
265 
Fischer, Carolyn, Francisco Aguilar, Puja Jawahar, and Roger Sedjo. 2005. "Forest 
Certification: Toward Common Standards? Discussion Paper 05-10 for the 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank Group." Washington, 
D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
Fligstein, Neil. 1996. "Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market 
Institutions." American Sociological Review 61:656-673. 
—. 2001a. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First 
Century Capitalist Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
—. 2001b. "Social Skill and the Theory of Fields." Sociological Theory 19:105-125. 
—. 2005. "The Political Economy and Economic Sociology of International 
Economic Arrangements." Pp. 183-204 in The Handbook of Economic 
Sociology, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Fligstein, Neil, and Alec Stone Sweet. 2002. "Constructing Markets and Politics: An 
Institutionalist Account of European Integration." American Journal of 
Sociology 107:476-511. 
FSC-Russia. 2008. Forest Management Certificates (as of October 2008). Moscow: 
The Forest Stewardship Council Russia. 
FSC. 1996. FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship. Bonn: Forest 
Stewardship Council. 
—. 2005. "FSC News: Estimated Size of FSC Global Market Revised to US$5 Billion. 
April 25, 2005." Bonn: The Forest Stewardship Council (see also FSC Canada. 
2005. Annual Report 2004-2005. Toronto: The Forest Stewardship Council 
Canada, p. 5). 
—. 2008a. "FSC Certificates: Facts and Figures." Bonn: Forest Stewardship Council. 
—. 2008b. FSC News Plus Notes (May). Bonn: Forest Stewardship Council. 
—. 2008c. FSC News Plus Notes (September). Bonn: Forest Stewardship Council. 
—. 2008d. "Russian National Forest Stewardship Council Standard. FSC Code: FSC-
STD-RUS-01." Moscow: Russian FSC National Initiative. 
—. 2011. Global FSC Certificates: Type and Distribution (April 2011). Bonn: The 
Forest Stewardship Council. 
Gale, Fred. 1998. The Tropical Timber Trade Regime. New York: St. Martin. 
Garcia-Johnson, Ronie. 2000. Exporting Environmentalism: U.S. Multinational 
Chemical Corporations in Brazil and Mexico. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Greenpeace. 2007. Consuming Canada's Boreal Forest: The Chain of Destruction 
from Logging Companies to Consumers. Toronto: Greenpeace Canada. 
Gronow, Antti. 2008. "The Over- or the Undersocialized Conception of Man? Practice 
Theory and the Problem of Intersubjectivity." Sociology 42:243-259. 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H. 2005a. "The Effectiveness of Non-State Governance Schemes: 
A Comparative Study of Forest Certification in Norway and Sweden." 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 5:125-
149. 
—. 2005b. "Sustainable Forestry in Sweden: The Effect of Competition among 
Private Certification Schemes." The Journal of Environment and Development 
14:338-355. 
Gullison, Raymond E., Peter C. Frumhoff, Josep G. Canadell, Christopher B. Field, 
Daniel C. Nepstad, Katharine Hayhoe, Roni Avissar, Lisa M. Curran, Pierre 
Friedlingstein, Chris D. Jones, and Carlos Nobre. 2007. "Tropical Forests and 
Climate Policy." Science 316:985-986. 
References 
 
266 
Gullison, Raymund E. 2003. "Does forest certification conserve biodiversity?" Onyx 
37:153-165. 
Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy (Eds.). 1993. Institutions for 
the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Thomas J. Bierstecker (Eds.). 2002. The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Halliday, Terence C., and Bruce G. Carruthers. 2007. "The Recursivity of Law: 
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of 
Corporate Insolvency Regimes." American Journal of Sociology 112:1135-
1202. 
—. 2009. Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Haufler, Virginia. 2003. "Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation." Pp. 226-252 in 
Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, edited by 
Miles Kahler and David A. Lake. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Henry, Laura A. 2010. Red to Green: Environmental Activism in Post-Soviet Era. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Henry, Laura A., and Vladimir Douhovnikoff. 2008. "Environmental Issues in 
Russia." Annual Review of Environment and Resources 33:437-460. 
Hirst, Paul. 2000. "The Global Economy: Myths or Reality?" Pp. 107-124 in The Ends 
of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In, edited by Don Kalb. Lanham: 
Rowan and Littlefeld. 
Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. 1999. Globalization in Question: The 
International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Hobson, Keith A., Erin L. Bayne, and Steve L. van Wilgenburg. 2002. "Large-Scale 
Conversion of Forest to Agriculture in the Boreal Plains of Saskatchewan " 
Conservation Biology 16:1530-1541. 
Houghton, Richard A. 2005. "Tropical Deforestation as Source of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions." Pp. 13-21 in Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change, edited 
by Paolo Moutinho and Stephan Schwartzman. Belem and Washington, D.C.: 
Amazon Institute for Environmental Research and Environmental Defense. 
Humphreys, David. 1996. Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation. 
London: Earthscan. 
—. 2006. The Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance. London: 
Earthscan. 
Ilim Pulp Group. n.d. "Ilim Pulp Business Profile." 
IMFN. 2006. Model Forests Profiles 2005. Ottawa: International Model Forest 
Network. 
Jacobson, Harold K., and Edith Brown Weiss. 1995. "Strengthening Compliance with 
International Environmental Accords." Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateral and International Organizations 1:119-148. 
Jenkins, Michael B., and Emily T. Smith. 1999. The Business of Sustainable Forestry: 
Strategies for an Industry in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Jennings, Steve, Ruth Nussbaum, Neil Judd, and Tom Evans. 2003. High 
Conservation Value Forests Toolkit. Oxford: ProForest. 
References 
 
267 
Kahler, Miles, and David A. Lake. 2003a. "Globalization and Governance." Pp. 1-30 
in Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, edited 
by Miles Kahler and David A. Lake. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
— (Eds.). 2003b. Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Transnational 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
King, Andrew A., and Michael J. Lenox. 2000. "Industry Self-Regulation Without 
Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program." Academy of 
Management Journal 43:698-716. 
Knill, Christoph, and Andrea Lenschow. 2000a. "Do New Brooms Really Sweep 
Cleaner? Implementation of New Instruments in EU Environmental Policy." in 
Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems, 
edited by Christoph Knill and Andrea Lenschow. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
—. 2000b. "On Deficient Implementation and Deficient Theories: The Need for an 
Institutional Perspective in Implementation Research." Pp. 9-35 in 
Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems, 
edited by Christoph Knill and Andrea Lenschow. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Knize, Anatoliy, and Boris Romanyuk. 2005. O Dvukh Tochkakh Zreniya na 
Rossiskiy Les i Lesnoe Khozyaistvo (in Russian: On Two Points of View on 
Russian Forest and Forestry). Pskov: WWF Russia and Pskov Model Forest 
Project. 
Komarova, Tatyana. 2007. "Rannyaya Peredacha (In Russian: Early Transfer)." in 
Kommersant. 
Kotlobay, Anatoly, Olga Lopina, Yuriy Kharchenkov, Alexander Brukhanov, Andrei 
Shchegolev, and Denis Smirnov. 2006. Otsenka Obyemov Drevesiny 
Somnitelnogo Proiskhozhdeniya i Analiz Praktiki Vnedreniya Sistem 
Otslezhivaniya Proiskhozhdeniya Drevesiny v Ryade Mnogolesnyh Regionov 
Severo-Zapada, Sibiri i Dalnego Vostoka Rossii (in Russian The Estimation of 
the Volumes of Timber of Uncertain Origin and the Analysis of the Operation 
of Systems of Timber Tracing in Several Regions of the Russian North-West, 
Siberia and the Far East). Moscow: WWF Russia. 
Kotlobay, Anatoly, and Andrei Ptichnikov. 2002. Illegal Logging in the Southern Part 
of the Russian Far East: Problem Analysis and Proposed Solutions. Moscow: 
WWF Russia. 
Kotlobay, Anatoly, Andrei Ptichnikov, Alexander Voropayev, Ulf Sonntag, and 
Johannes Zahnen. 2004. Illegal Logging in Northwestern Russia and Export of 
Timber Products to Germany. Moscow: WWF Russia. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, 
and Frey Timotheos. 2008. "Globalization and Its Impact on National Spaces 
of Competition." Pp. 3-22 in West European Politics in the Age of 
Globalization, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, 
Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Frey Timotheos. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univesity Press. 
Lanly, J. P., and J. Clément. 1979. "Present and Future Forest and Plantation Areas in 
the Tropics." Unasylva 31:12-20. 
References 
 
268 
Latour, Bruno. 1986. "The Power of Association." Pp. 264-280 in Power, Action and 
Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?, edited by John Law. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Lawrence, Thomas B., and Roy Suddaby. 2006. "Institutions and Institutional Work." 
Pp. 215-254 in The Sage Handbook of Organizational Studies, edited by 
Stewart R. Clegg, Synthia Hardy, Thomas B. Lawrence, and Walter R. Nord. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Levitt, Peggy, and Sally Merry. 2009. "Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses 
of Global Women's Rights in Peru, India, China and the United States." 
Global Networks 9:441-461. 
Levy, Marc A., Robert O. Keohane, and Peter M. Haas. 1993. "Improving the 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions." Pp. 397-426 in 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental 
Protection, edited by Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Linton, April, Cindy Chiayuan Liou, and Kelly Ann Shaw. 2004. "A Taste of Trade 
Justice: Marketing Global Social Responsibility via Fair Trade Coffee." 
Globalizations 1:223-246. 
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 2001. "Why Is There No International Forestry Law? An 
Examination of International Forestry Regulation, Both Public and Private." 
UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 19:155-182. 
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. with James K. Rowe. 2005. Globalization, Governmentality and 
Global Politics: Regulation for the Rest of Us? London: Routledge. 
Luyssaert, Sebastiaan, E.-Detlef Schulze, Annett Börner, Alexander Knohl, Dominik 
Hessenmöller, Beverly E. Law, and Philippe Ciais. 2008. "Old-Growth Forests 
as Global Carbon Sinks." Nature 455:213-215. 
Macqueen, Duncan (Ed.). 2008. Distinguishing Community Forest Products in the 
Market: Industrial Demand for a Mechanism that Brings Together Forest 
Certification and Fair Trade. Edinburgh: International Institute for 
Environment and Development. 
Malets, Olga. 2011. From Transnational Voluntary Standards to Local Practices: A 
Case Study of Forest Certification in Russia. MPIfG Discussion Paper 
(forthcoming). Köln: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
Mäntyranta, Hannes. 2002. Forest Certification: An Idea That Became an Absolute. 
Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy: KustannusosakeyhtiöMetsälehti. 
Marin, Bernd, and Renate Mayntz (Eds.). 1991. Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence 
and Theoretical Considerations. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 
Marx, Axel, and Dieter Cuypers. 2010. "Forest Certification as a Global 
Environmental Governance Tool: What is the Macro-Effectiveness of the 
Forest Stewardship Council?" Regulation and Governance 4:408-434. 
Mastenbroek, Ellen, and Michael Kaeding. 2006. "Beyond the Goodness of Fit: A 
Prefernce-Based Account of Europenization." Pp. 19-42 in European 
Research Reloaded: Cooperation and Integration among Europeanized States, 
edited by Ronald Holzhacker and Markus Haverland. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Mattli, Walter. 2003. "Public and Private Governance in Setting International 
Standards." Pp. 199-225 in Governance in a Global Economy: Political 
Authority in Transition, edited by Miles Kahler and David A. Lake. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Mattli, Walter, and Tim Büthe. 2003. "Setting International Standards: Technical 
Rationality or Primacy of Power?" World Politics 56:1-42. 
References 
 
269 
Mayntz, Renate. 2010. Legitimacy and Compliance in Transnational Governance. 
MPIfG Working Paper 10/5. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Studies of 
Societies. 
McDermott, Constance, Benjamin Cashore, and Peter Kanowski. 2008. "Linking 
Nature across Cultures: a Global Comparison of Forest Policies from the 
Macro to Micro Level." in Paper Presented at the International Symposium 
for Society and Resource Management. University of Vermont. 
McDermott, Constance L., Benjamin Cashore, and Peter Kanowski. 2010. Global 
Environmental Forest Policies: An International Comparison. London: 
Earthscan. 
McNichol, Jason. 2006. "Transnational NGO Certification Programs as New 
Regulatory Forms: Lessons from Forestry Sector." Pp. 349-374 in 
Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation, edited by 
Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Meidinger, Errol E., Chris Elliott, and Gerhard Oesten. 2003. "The Fundamentals of 
Forest Certification." Pp. 3-25 in Social and Political Dimensions of Forest 
Certification, edited by Errol E. Meidinger, Chris Elliott, and Gerhard Oesten. 
Remagen-Oberwinter: Forstbuch. 
Mendelsohn, Robert, and Michael Balick. 1995. "The Value of Undiscovered 
Pharmaceuticals in Tropical Forests." Economic Botany 49. 
Merry, Sally Engle. 2006a. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating 
International Law into Local Justice. Chicago: the University of Chicago 
Press. 
—. 2006b. "Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle." 
American Anthropologist 108:38-51. 
Meyer, John W., John Boli, and George M. Thomas. 1987. "Ontology and 
Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account." in Institutional Structure: 
Constituting State, Society, and the Individual, edited by George M. Thomas, 
John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli. Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications. 
Meyer, John W., David John  Frank, Ann Hironaka, Evan Schofer, and Nancy 
Brandon Tuma. 1997. "The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 
1870-1990." International Organization 51:623-651. 
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony." American Journal of Sociology 83:340-363. 
Miles, Edward L., Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen Wettestad, Jon Birger 
Skjaerseth, and Elaine M. Carlin. 2002. Environmental Regime Effectiveness: 
Confronting Theory with Evidence. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Mirovitskaya, Natalya. 1998. "The Environmental Movement in the Former Soviet 
Union." Pp. 30-66 in Environment and Society in Eastern Europe, edited by 
Andrew Tickle and Ian Welsh. Harlow: Longman. 
Murphy, Craig N. 1994. International Organizations and Industrial Change: Global 
Governance since 1850. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Myers, Norman. 1980. Conservation of the Tropical Moist Forests. Washington, D. 
C.: National Academy of Sciences. 
—. 1984. The Primary Source: Tropical Forests and Our Future. New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co. 
—. 1996. "The World's Forests: Problems and Potentials." Environmental 
Conservation 23:156-168. 
References 
 
270 
Newsom, Deanna, Volker Bahn, and Benjamin Cashore. 2006. "Does Forest 
Certification Matter? An Analysis of Operational-Level Changes Required 
During the SmartWood Certification Process in the United States." Forest 
Policy and Economics 9:197-208. 
Newsom, Deanna, and Daphne Hewitt. 2005. The Global Impacts of SmartWood 
Certification: TREES Program, Rainforest Alliance. 
North, Douglass 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Oldfield, Jonathan D. 2005. Russian Nature: Exploring the Environmental 
Consequences of Societal Change. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Ovchinnikov, Aleksey. 2009. "Forest Certification and the Pomors (in Russian: 
Lesnaya Sertifikatsiya i Pomory)." Pp. 123-130 in Recommondations on 
Social Aspects of the Forest Certification Program of the Forest Stewardship 
Council (in Russian: Rekommendatsii po Sozialnym Aspektam Sertifikatsii po 
Skheme Lesnogo Popechitelskogo Soveta), edited by Maria Tysiachniouk. 
Vologda: Poligrafist. 
Ovchinnikov, Veniamin. 1980. Rovesniki Pyatiletok (In Russian Coevals of Five-Year 
Plans). Arkhangelsk: Severo-Zapadnoe Knizhnoe Izdatelstvo. 
Overdevest, Christine. 2010. "Comparing Forest Certification Schemes: the Case of 
Ratcheting Standards in the Forest Sector." Socio-Economic Review 8:47-76. 
Ozanne, Lucie K., and Richard P. Vlosky. 2003. "Certification from the U.S. 
Consumer Perspective: A Comparison from 1995 to 2000." Forest Product 
Journal 53 (3):13-20. 
Ozinga, Saskia. 2004. Footprints in the Forests: Current Practice and Future 
Challenges in Forest Certification. Utrecht: FERN. 
Parson, Edward A. 1993. "Protecting the Ozone Layer." Pp. 27-73 in Institutions for 
the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, edited 
by Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge: The 
MIT Press. 
Pattberg, Philipp. 2005a. "The Forest Stewardship Council: Risk and Potential of 
Private Forest Governance." The Journal of Environment and Development 
14:356-374. 
—. 2005b. "The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and 
Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules." Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 18:589-610. 
—. 2006. "The Influence of Global Business Regulation: Beyond Good Corporate 
Conduct." Business and Society Review 111:241-268. 
Pautov, Yuriy, Andrei Ptichnikov, Rudolf Sungurov, and Vladimir Chuprov. 2000. 
Kak Vyiti na Rynok FSC? Prakticheskoye Posobie po Dobrovolnoy Lesnoy 
Sertifikatsii (in Russian How to Access FSC Marekts? A Guide to Voluntary 
Forest Certification. Moscow: WWF Russia. 
Perez-Aleman, Paola. 2011. "Collective Learning in Global Diffusion: Spreading 
Quality Standards in a Developing Country Cluster." Organization Science 
22:173-189. 
Pisarenko, Anatoliy, and Vladimir Strakhov. 2004. Lesnoe Khozyaistvo Rossi: Ot 
Polzovaniya k Upravleniyu (in Russian Forestry in Russia: From Forest Use 
to Forest Management). Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya. 
Potoski, Matthew, and Aseem Prakash. 2005. "Green Clubs and Voluntary 
Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance." American 
Journal of Political Science 49:235-248. 
References 
 
271 
Power, Michael. 1996. "Making Things Auditable." Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 21:289-315. 
—. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2003a. "Auditing and the Production of Legitimacy." Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 28:379-394. 
—. 2003b. "Evaluating the Audit Explosion." Law & Policy 25:185-202. 
Prakash, Aseem, and Matthew Potoski. 2006. "Racing to the Bottom? Trade, 
Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001." American Journal of Political 
Science 50:350-364. 
Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation: How Great 
Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; or Why It's Amazing that 
Federal Programs Work at All. This Being a Saga of the Economic 
Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek 
to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes. Berkley: University of 
California Press. 
Ptichnikov, Andrei V. 2000. Lesa Rossii: Nezavisimaya Lesnaya Sertifikatsiya i 
Ustoichivoye Upravlenie (In Russian The Forests of Russia: Independent 
Certification and Sustainable Management). Moscow: WWF Russia. 
Pülzl, Helga, and Oliver Treib. 2007. "Implementing Public Policy." Pp. 89-107 in 
Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, edited by 
Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
Quack, Sigrid. 2007. "Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of 
Disturbed Agency." Organization 14:643-666. 
Rametsteiner, Ewald, and Markku Simula. 2003. "Forest Certification - an Instrument 
to Promote Sustainable Forest Management?" Journal of Environmental 
Management 67:87-98. 
Rao, Hayagreeva. 1998. "Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Consumer 
Watchdog Organizations." American Journal of Sociology 103:912-961. 
Roshchupkin, Valeriy. 2008. Lesnye Resursy Rossii: Vystuplenie na 
Mazhvedomsvennoy Komissii po Protivodeystviyu Nelegalnomu Oborotu 
Drevesiny (In Russian The Forest Resources of Russia: A Report For the 
Interdepartmental Commission on "The Counteraction to the Illegal Timber 
Trade". Moscow: Federal Forest Service Agency. 
Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin. 1996. "Imitating by Editing Success: The Construction of 
Organizational Fields." Pp. 69-92 in Translating Organizational Change, 
edited by Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevon. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1996. "Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy 
of European Welfare States." Pp. 15-39 in Governance in the European Union, 
edited by Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang 
Streeck. London: Sage Publications. 
—. 1999. Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Schatzki, Theodore R. 1997. "Practices and Actions: A Wittgensteinian Critique of 
Bourdieu and Giddens." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27:283-308. 
Schneiberg, Marc, and Tim Bartley. 2008. "Organization, Regulation and Economic 
Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the 19th to 21st Century." 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4:31-61. 
Scott, W. Richard. 2001. Institutions and Organizations, Second Edition. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
References 
 
272 
Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and 
Transformation." American Journal of Sociology 98:1-29. 
Sharipova, Alina. 2008. "Razdelenie Zakonom (In Russian Divided by Law)." in 
Kommersant. 
Shvarts, Evgeniy. 2004. ""Detskaya Bolesn Levisny" pri Stroitelstve Kapitalisma: 
Hoteli kak Luchshe, No... Slishkom Bystro i Sekretno (In Russian "An 
Infantile Disorder of Leftism" in Building Capitalism: They Wanted to Do 
Good but... too Fast and too Secretly" " Ustoichivoe Lesopolosovanie (in 
Russian Sustainable Forest Use) 2 (4):8-13. 
—. 2006. "Lesnoy Kodeks: Nevypolnennye Obeschaniya i Upushchennye 
Vozmozhnosti (In Russian The Forest Code: Unfulfilled Promises and Missed 
Opportunities)." Ustoichivoe Lesopolosovanie (in Russian Sustainable Forest 
Use) 4 (12):2-7. 
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr. , Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 
1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation." American Sociological Review 51:464-481. 
Sommer, A. 1976. "At Attempt at an Assessment of the World's Tropical Forests." 
Unasylva 28:5-25. 
Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. 2005. "Introduction: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies." Pp. 1-39 in Beyond Continuity: Institutional 
Change in Advanced Political Economies, edited by Wolfgang Streeck and 
Kathleen Thelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Suchman, Mark C. 1995. "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches." Academy of Management Review 20:571-610. 
Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." American 
Sociological Review 51:273-286. 
Synnott, Timothy. 2005. Some Notes on the Early Years of FSC. Bonn: Forest 
Stewardship Council. 
Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. "Path to Compliance: Enformcent, Management, and the 
European Union." International Organization 53:609-643. 
Taylor, Peter Leigh. 2005a. "A Fair Trade Approach to Community Forest 
Certification? A Framework for Discussion." Journal of Rural Studies 21:433-
447. 
—. 2005b. "In the Market But Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest Stewardship 
Council Certification as Market-Based Social Change." World Development 
33:129-147. 
The World Bank. 1997. Russia: Forest Policy During Transition. Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank. 
Tollefson, Chris, Fred Gale, and David Haley. 2008. Setting the Standard: 
Certification, Governance, and the Forest Stewardship Council. Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press. 
Treib, Oliver. 2006. "Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs." 
Living Reviews in European Governance 1. 
Tysiachniouk, Maria. 2006. "Forest Certification in Russia." Pp. 261-295 in 
Confronting Sustainability: Forest Certification in Developing and 
Transitioning Societies, edited by Benjamin Cashore, Fred Gale, Errol 
Meidinger, and Deanna Newson. New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies. 
References 
 
273 
Tysiachniouk, Maria, Oleg Konyushatov, Antonina Kulyasova, Ivan Kulyasov, and 
Ilya Teslya. 2009. Recommendations on Social Aspects of the Forest 
Certification Program of the Forest Stewardship Council (in Russian: 
Rekommendatsii po Sozialnym Aspektam Sertifikatsii po Skheme Lesnogo 
Popechitelskogo Soveta). Vologda: Poligrafist. 
Tysiachniouk, Maria, and Jonathan Reisman. 2004. "Co-Managing the Taiga: Russian 
Forests and the Challenge of International Environmentalism." Pp. 157-175 in 
Politics of Forests: Northern Forest-Industrial Regimes in the Age of 
Globalization, edited by Ari Aukusti Lehtinen, Jakob Donner-Amnell, and 
Bjornar Saether. London: Ashgate. 
UNICE, and FAO. 2006. Forest Product Annual Market Review 2005-2006. Geneva 
Timber and Forest Study Paper 21. Geneva: United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe and Food and Agricultures Organization of the United 
Nations. 
Upton, Christopher, and Stephen Bass. 1995. The Forest Certification Handbook. 
London: Earthscan. 
Vogel, David. 2005. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. New York: Brookings Institution Press. 
—. 2008. "Private Global Business Regulation." Annual Review of Political Science 
11:261-282. 
Weiner, Douglas R. 1999. A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection 
from Stalin to Gorbachev. Berkley: University of California Press. 
Werle, Raymund, and Eric J. Inversen. 2006. "Promoting Legitimacy in Technical 
Standardization." Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 2:19-39. 
Wright, Tom, and Jim Carlton. 2007. "FSC's 'Green' Label for Wood Products Gets 
Growing Pains." Pp. B1 in The Wall Street Journal. 
Wrong, Dennis H. 1961. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern 
Sociology." American Sociological Review 26:183-193. 
WWF. 2006. Russian-Chinese Timber Trade and Illegal Logging in Siberia and the 
Far East (in Russian). Moscow: WWF Russia. 
Yanow, Dvora. 1996. How Does a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and 
Organizational Actions. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Yaroshenko, Alexey. 2008. Novoye Lesnoe Zakonodatelstvo: Chem Ono Grozit 
Lesam i Lesnomu Hozyaistvu (in Russian New Forest Legislation: How It 
Threatens Forests and Forestry). Public Lecture by the Forest Projects 
Director in Greenpeace Russia on February 4, 2008. Moscow: Greenpeace 
Russia. 
Young, Oran R. 1994. International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a 
Stateless Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
— (Ed.). 1999. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal 
Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Zeitlin, Jonathan. 2011. "Pragmatic Transnationalism: Governance Across Borders in 
the Global Economy (Presidential Address at the SASE Annual Meeting 2010, 
Philadelphia, USA)." Socio-Economic Review 9:187-206. 
 
 
Lebenslauf 
 
Olga Malets, geboren am 16. Oktober 1979 in Gatchina, Russland 
 
Abschlüsse 
 
2004 Master in Sociology and Social Anthropology, 
 Central European University, Budapest 
2003 Diplom-Volkswirtin, Staatliche Universität St. Petersburg 
 
Studium 
2006-2009 Promotionsstudium, Universität zu Köln 
2003-2004 Masterstudium, Central European University, Budapest 
2001-2002 Auslandsaufenthalt, Universität Bielefeld 
1998-2003 Diplomstudium Wirtschaftssoziologie, 
 Staatliche Universität St. Petersburg 
 
Schulausbildung 
1990-1998 Lyzeum No. 3 (allg. Hochschulreife), Gatchina 
1995-1996 Auslandsaufenthalt in den USA, Besuch der Westminster 
Senior High School, Maryland 
 
Berufserfahrung 
2005-2009 Stipendiatin am Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln 
2001-2005 Forschungsassistentin am Center for Institutional and 
Comparative Research, St. Petersburg 
 
Köln, den 31. Januar 2009 
Erklärung nach §6 der Promotionsordnung der 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Universität zu Köln 09.02.2005 
 
Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorgelegte Arbeit ohne Hilfe Dritter und ohne 
Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus anderen 
Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Aussagen, Daten und Konzepte sind 
unter Angabe der Quelle gekennzeichnet. Bei der Auswahl und Auswertung 
folgenden Materials haben mir die nachstehend aufgeführten Personen in der jeweils 
beschriebenen Weise entgeltlich/unentgeltlich geholfen: ---.  
Weitere Personen waren an der inhaltlich-materiellen Erstellung der 
vorliegenden Arbeit nicht beteiligt. Insbesondere habe ich hierfür nicht die 
entgeltliche Hilfe von Vermittlungs- bzw. Beratungsdiensten in Anspruch genommen. 
Niemand hat von mir unmittelbar oder mittelbar geldwerte Leistungen für Arbeiten 
erhalten, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Inhalt der vorgelegten Dissertation stehen. 
Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im In- noch im Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher 
Form einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt. Ich versichere, dass ich nach bestem 
Wissen die reine Wahrheit gesagt und nichts verschwiegen habe. 
 
Köln, den 31. Januar 2009 
 
